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A REGIONAL HANDBOOK
ON
NORTHWEST CHINA

Volume I

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PREFACE

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/introductory p. ii/

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

A REGIONAL HANDBOOK
ON
NORTHWEST CHINA

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compiled by

The Far Eastern and Russian Institute

University of Washington, Seattle

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1956

[Title Page]

PREFACE

121 The present handbook is one in a series of regional handbooks which the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington compiled under a contract with the Human Relations Area Files. It is designed as a supplement to the General Handbook on China, compiled by the Institute under the same contract; it describes and analyzes regional peculiarities and developments in China's great Northwest. Reference is therefore made to this General Handbook for all topics discussed in the present volume; the coverage of the General Handbook is not duplicated here, and the presentation of problems and events of the Northwest presumes familiarity with the overall setting, discussed in the General Handbook. Reference is also made to the preface of the General Handbook, in which the circumstances of this compilation and the working methods of the team of contributors are set forth. The outline of the regional handbooks follows the prescribed format. Sections, however, have been treated more briefly or left out altogether, when little or no regional deviation from the general pattern was discernible.

Research conducted at the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington has for some years been guided by the concept of regionalism. A regional approach to the problems of Chinese economy, social structure, and political power has permitted the use of a much wider range of material and has added a new dimension to its analysis. The work on the Human Relations Area Files Handbooks provided the opportunity to expand this research experience into an attempt to cover the regions of China as rounded and to a degree self-contained units. It has to be stressed, though, that this attempt should be regarded as an experiment rather than a solution, since much more work and thought is needed to establish the essence and the functions of any one region of China. To begin with, the question of what constitutes a region is far from being satisfactorily answered. The Human Relations Area Files handbooks took, mainly for fortuitous reasons, the administrative areas established in early Communist times as regional units. As far as the regions go that were dealt with at Seattle, that is to say the Northeast, the Northwest, and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, this choice turned out to be at least a workable assumption.

In the case of China's Northwest, the delimitation of the region and the circumference of its characteristic features can almost be called traditional. Ever since the "Movement to Develop the Northwest" (k'ai-fa Hsi-pei) was launched in

121 the early thirties (see particularly: Tai Chi-t'ao, Hsi-pei. Nanking 1931), this part of China attracted growing attention as one of the greatest hopes for her future. To be sure, the provinces covered by the concept have not always been the same in the series of surveys engendered by this movement; particularly, the province of Suiyuan, now part of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, has been frequently included. (For a discussion of the question of geographical extent see: Wang Chin-fu, Hsi-pei chih ti-wen yü jen-wen. Shanghai 1935, and Ch'en Cheng-hsiang, Hsi-pei ch'ü-yü ti-li, Chungking 1945) A more sober approach has however already then identified the Northwest geographically in the manner of the present handbook: it was meant to include what were then the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang. (see Hsü Hsü, Hsi-pei chien-she lun. Shanghai 1944)

This more or less generally accepted definition of the geographical area has set a challenging but highly difficult task for the compilers of the present handbook. The degree of diversity within the region, which includes the cradle of Chinese civilization as well as the most remote outpost of the Chinese colonial empire, called for a breadth of coverage which at times tended to strain the unity of presentation to the bursting point. The fact, on the other hand, that the region has been considered a unit by observers as well as inhabitants, necessitated analyzing interrelationships of the different segments of Northwestern society. Every possible type of relation in every field of human life presented itself here as if in a test-tube. What could be done within the framework of this handbook is again only a beginning. If pursued, this analysis could lead to a typology of group relations.

128 The present compilation owes much to the spirit of teamwork which prevailed in our handbook project. This team included the contributors to the other handbooks. All the names mentioned on the title-pages and in the prefaces of the General Handbook and the other Regional Handbooks deserved to be repeated here. Editorial work on most of the sociological and political sections was done by Beatrice Miller, and on all the economic sections by Dorothy Schroeter. Charts and tables were designed by Florence Cochran.

October 1956 Hellmut Wilhelm

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GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

000 **I. General Introduction**

II. Main Patterns of Social Life

III. Stability of the Societies in the Northwest

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V. Individualistic and Collectivistic Bents and Traditions

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Sinkiang AI1

GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SOCIETY

S N
1. General Introduction

131 The Northwest of China, consisting of the four provinces:
635 Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and Sinkiang, part of which is now
161 called the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, comprises an
S N area of 1.3 million square miles, (almost a third of all China),
144 in which thirty-six million people live. There are at least
563 four different racial types (Turanides, Sinides, Mongoloides
and Tangutides) and more than a dozen different ethnic groups:
Eastern Turks or New Uighur (Chin. Wei-wu-erh), Chinese
(chin. Han), Chinese Muslims (chin. Han-hui or Tung-kan-hui, Engl. Dungans), Kazakhs (chin. Ha-sa-k'o), Kirghiz
(chin. Chi-erh-chi-ssu) Uzbeks (chin. Wu-tzu-pieh-k'o), Tatars
(chin. T'a-t'a-erh), Tajiks (chin. T'a-chi-k'o), Western
Mongols or Oirats (chin. Ölöt or simply Meng-ku), Sarigh-Uighurs (chin. Tung-hsiang-hui-hui), Shera Yögur (chin.
Tu-jen), Monguors (chin. also Tu-jen), Salars (chin. Sa-la),
N Tibetans (chin. Hsi-fan), Manchu (chin. Man), Sibo (chin.
563 Hsi-po) and Solons (chin. So-lun). The last three ethnic
groups, the Manchus, Sibos, and Solons are persistently
listed in Communist censuses, although it has been proved
that they are non-existent as linguistic units, or as separate
ethnic groups. Numerically, the Chinese constitute the over-
S N whelming majority in the Northwest (about thirty million).

563 While the Turks of the Northwest (i.e. New Uighurs,
771 Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Tatars and Salars) are rather
firm believers in Islam (Mohammedanism), the Western
Mongols, Sarigh-Uighurs (the latter are Turks), Shera
Yögur, and Tibetans are faithful Buddhists of the northern
form, also called Lama Buddhism, and the Chinese believe in
a variety of religious or philosophical systems: Confucianism,
S N Taoism, Buddhism, and even Demonism and Animism.

563 The economic pattern of the Northwest as well displays
an enormous variety; we find nomadic pastoralism among the
233 Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Western Mongols, and Tibetans, intensive
241 horticulture among the New Uighur of the oasis-belt of Sinkiang,
agriculture by means of irrigation (kariz system. See chapter
about agriculture) among Chinese (only fifteen percent of
the Northwest agriculture is without any irrigation), sedentary
S Turks and Mongols, and a mixture of primitive agriculture
N and pastoralism among some Tibetan and Mongolian Tribes of
563 Chinghai and Kansu. The Turkic and the Chinese Muslims
43 are the bearers of the trade along the old "silk roads" of
N 369 Sinkiang, Chinghai and Kansu. The urban centers of the Northwest
are also centers of petty industry and handicraft. The newest
000

S
N
The newest
311 development, found in the Northwest, especially in Sinkiang,
is the partial industrialization of those areas which are the
sources of coal, oil, gold, iron, alum, quartz, gypsum, nitrates,
S salt, and as recently reported, uranium.
N The non-Chinese peoples of the Northwest are not only
563 outnumbered but also outweighed in economic and political
respects. For more than two thousand years, the Chinese have
been ruling those areas (with short interruptions as far as
Sinkiang and Chinghai are concerned), even though they
never had more than a few garrisons stationed in frontier
areas. Those garrisons made it possible for a thin stratum
of Chinese officials to rule the areas on the top level. On the
lower level, the indigenous peoples and tribes governed them-
selves - under the supervision of the Chinese viceroys or
S governors and their bureaucracy.
N
175 The general policy of the Chinese government in Peking
was to make use of the existing form of governmental institu-
642 tions of frontier areas like Sinkiang, Chinghai, and Inner-
177 Mongolia. In Sinkiang (prior to 1884 it was called "Hui-chiarg,"
631 i.e., Muslimic Dominion), two types of local government had
S existed: the Muslimic type and the Mongolian type. The
[171] Northern and Northeastern part of Sinkiang, where the Mongols
were the dominant inhabitants, had the same governmental
institutions as Outer and Inner-Mongolia, namely, banners
S ruled by dzasaks, who were appointees of the Emperor in
N Peking. The Republic of China tacitly recognized their ranks
[668] and interfered very little with their functions. Only Communist
[565] China deprived the nomad aristocracy of their titles and rights.
The Muslimic communities were fuled by Bäks with various
175 ranks: the Ak'im Bäk, "local governor"; the Ishkhan Bäk,
631 "assistant governor"; the Shang Bäk, "collector of revenue";
795 the Qazi, "judge"; the Kukbashi or Mirabu Bäk, "superintend-
647 ant of agriculture"; Yüzbashi, "hundred-men-leader"; Onbashi,
657 "ten-men-leader"; etc. All the local Bäks were appointed by
the emperor or later on by the president of the Republic upon
the recommendation of the Imperial or Republican governor,
although it must be stated that some governors of Sinkiang,
Chin Shu-jen and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, ruled and governed the
S province without asking Peking for the consent of appointments.
N
175 Besides the Chinese civil service there existed Chinese
631 military staffs and detachments, centered in Ili, Urumchi,
Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashghar, Sining, Su-chou, Lan-chou, etc.
647 Relay stations provided communication between the government
[202] in Peking and the frontier areas. Maintaining the effectiveness
of the means of communications was an important duty of
000 Chinese officials. Only since 1930 have some automobile high-
ways been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation

S
N
489 Only since 1930 have some automobile highways
496 been built, and the Communist regime, in cooperation
648 with Soviet Russia, are building the first Inner Asiatic railway,
668 linking Alma-Ata with Lan-chou. This railway will, without
175 doubt, speed up the Sinification of the frontier areas, and
[491] above all add industrialization to agriculture and pastoral
nomadism.

S
N
As far as Chinhai was concerned, the Western Mongols
631 (the Oirats) were also locally ruled by dzasaks, the leaders
563 of banners. Unlike the banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia
657 and Sinkiang, however, they did not combine banners to form
175 leagues or to elect one of their tribal leaders as the captain-general of the league. The Chinese governor - with his seat in Sining - functioned as captain-general. In regard to the nomadic Tibetans, the Chinese government appointed chieftains as dzasak-lamas and gave them the rights and the privileges which this office involves. The sedentary Tibetans were ruled by t'u-ssus, also appointees of the Peking government. By and large, this governmental pattern existed until the Communists came into power.

S
N
The form of governing non-Chinese peoples changed in the
563 course of time in various ways, but one thing never changed:
657 the aim of the Peking government to rule, to suppress, to
175 exploit, and to sinify them.

S
Unlike the eighteen provinces in China proper, the province
631 of Sinkiang (after 1884) and the Eastern Three Provinces, (after
635 1907) the areas comprising Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese Turkestan,
175 although occupying more space than China proper, were
administrated by a quite different type of governmental system.

S
Political subdivisions of the Chinese Empire such as Mongolia,
631 Chinese Turkestan and Tibet were usually referred to as dependencies.
657 This is however an inaccurate translation of
175 the Chinese term "fan," which really means "the barbarian
647 west." Since the cultural, ethnic and historical background in these areas was very different from the rest of the Empire, these regions required, and in practice had, a very particular type of governmental control. All these frontier territories were administered by the "Department of Dependencies" in Peking. This department was subdivided into the following bureaus:

a. Inner Mongolian bureau, that administered frontier boundaries, titles of nobility, appointment of officials, military affairs, league conferences, and finally organisation of banner units of Inner Mongolia.

b. "Reception bureau" for Inner Mongolia nobility, that was responsible for the payments and allowances to the Inner Mongolian aristocracy.

c. Eastern Turkestan bureau, that was in charge of Moslem affairs in Eastern Turkestan.

S
631 d. Justice bureau which took care of the civil and criminal
657 cases of the frontier area.

175 e. Territorial development bureau which took care of the
647 preservation of forests, wild animals and which was in charge
of the improvement of live-stock, fur curing and of the Mongolian
S N inhabitants in general.

175 The Yüan and Manchu dynasties, which themselves repre-
657 sented minorities, employed a quite different, one might say a
563 positive attitude towards non-Chinese. Generally speaking,
the Manchus functioned and acted as the mediators between the
S N minorities and the Chinese. But even the Manchus, after they
175 had become completely sinified, used colonial methods that
657 led to revolts and uprisings in Sinkiang, in Kansu and in Chinghai.
563 The Chinese Muslims in Kansu, e.g., revolted in 1648, 1781-1784,
669 1820-28, 1862-78, 1895-97, 1918-21, 1928-1929, at which times
they tried, with little success, to get rid of the Chinese mastery and to establish their own Muslimic realm. Whenever such uprisings occurred, the Muslimic Turks of Sinkiang sympathized with them or revolted at the same time. In Sinkiang, Yakub Bäk even succeeded in establishing a short-lived Muslimic empire between 1864-1877. The Western Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinhai, who revolted and established the Dzungarian Empire between 1673 and 1697, were defeated by a Chinese army in 1697 and again in 1757. In Chinghai, the Tanguts (Tibetans) revolted successfully many times, but like all other minorities who tried and failed, they were eventually brought under Chinese control again. Needless to say, all these unsuccessful petty revolutions, revolts and uprisings of non-Chinese or Chinese Muslims, always upset the economy of the area greatly, increasing thereby the hatred towards the Chinese in general, and the Chinese officials in particular.

S N II. Main Patterns of Social Life, Social Organisation and Mode
175 of Economy of the Minorities.

631 Even though the Northwest is occupied by a fantastic con-
619 glomeration of heterogeneous societies, it still can be, and
always has been, considered by politicians as one area, a
S N political, military, and economic unit, and also as the "land
175 of promise," which it in fact became. When the Communists
again set up the unit as an administrative area in 1949, it
631 was only the continuation of an old concept, held by the
668 Chinese rulers because of the geographical location of the North-
178 west and its commercial traditions (silk road, Mongolia-
619 Tibet road, Chinghai-Tibet road, Sinkiang-India road,
648 Sinkiang-Russia road), which culminated in Sheng Shih-ts'ai's
cooperation with Russia, or earlier with Yakub Bäk's policy

S N
175 towards Russia, Turkey, and England. The cultural cohesion
631 created by Islam that connects Chinese Turkestan with Russian
668 Turkestan and other neighboring Muslim countries, and that
178 created by Buddhism that connects Mongolia with Tibet
619 through Chinghai and small areas of Sinkiang, marked the
648 four provinces of Sinkiang, Chinhai, Kansu, and to a small
degree, Shensi, as one single area which represents one
administrative unit.

S
The Eastern Turks:
563 The main pattern of social life of the Eastern Turks is
241 based primarily on "Oasis Agriculture" with its irrigational
complex. All agriculture in this area is made possible through
S
563 the organized use of water. The family organization among the
Eastern Turks is therefore an extended one, since a certain
596 level of productivity can only be reached through collective
labor (upkeep of irrigational systems and dikes). One reason
S
[312] the Eastern Turks developed the extended family pattern
is that the family recieves water in proportion to the amount
[241] of labor its members put into the upkeep of irrigational
systems and canals; the greater the family, the more water
is therefore provided for their land.

The Internal structure of the family system is not based
S
upon clan rules. Eastern Turkic communities are governed
[622] by a body of leaders, selected from the community itself
[634] whereas the larger governmental districts are headed by
Chinese officials or, at present, by Chinese Communists.
S
563 A secondary aspect of Eartern Turkic social life is formed
S
[441] by trade and handicrafts. Merchants and craftsmen form
"guilds" which in turn influence the social life of the community.

S K
Kirghiz and Kazakhs:
563 Kirghiz and Kazakh society is clan-based. (The definition
614 of the notion of "clan" is explained in the chapter about the
S K
Social Structure.) All family relationships are deeply rooted
563 in the clan system. The main pattern of social life among
233 these two tribes is created by their nomadic way of life, whose
361 most essential economic activity is cattle breeding. The transition
[177] to a semi-sedentary life is now under way. The Communists
[668] insist that the Kirghiz and Kazakhs occupy a permanent
winter camp site, since this facilitates better political
S K
control over the tribes. The choice of the summer camp site
still remains more or less in the hands of the tribes. Kirghiz
[622] and Kazakhs are ruled by "bäks," or "manaps" (elders)
responsible to the Chinese officials.

S N
563 The Mongols: general remarks.
[233] Mongol social life is based on nomadic pastoralism. The
[594] basic unit is the nuclear family. A group of patrilineally

S
N A group of patrilineally
563 related families forms the basic economic (i.e., migrational)
621 unit in Mongol society. Pastures are distributed among such
S units. The structure of the society itself dictates a certain
N collectivistic working concept. Mongol social groupings are
[622] led by tribal chieftains, who are directly responsible to the
563 district Chinese official. Mongol society, unlike other North-
177 western societies, has not undergone great changes under
668 Communist influences. Their basic pattern of life has remained
S the same as it was under the Manchu and Republican regimes.
563 The Oirats (or Western Mongols:
233 The Oirats of the Northwest are primarily pastoral nomads.
[434] Their chief source of income is cattle, horses, sheep and
goats. Because they live in a desert-steppe area they move
[131] around in larger or smaller groups depending upon the avail-
S able resources.
563 The designation for these small economic and migrational
621 units or camps is "xotn" which includes a group of nuclear
[594] families patrilineally related - tracing descent from a common
[613] ancestor in the third, fourth, or fifth generation.

Membership in this group can be gained by adoption, by
[597] attachment of a daughter's husband in the case of a man with no sons and of poor unrelated families or poor related families on the paternal side. Although some poorer families remained apart from these "xotn" it usually is more worthwhile to add their few cattle, etc., to that of the larger group and render services in return for the benefits gained
S thereby.
[613] Among the Oirats the closer an individual's relationship
[554] to the ancestor, the greater prestige and status he enjoys in
this group.
S
563 The headman or elder ("axalaci") dwells in a tent situated in
361 the front of the encampment facing south. The remainder of
[622] the group is arranged according to the age of the male members
S in a circle behind the dwelling of the elder. The dependent
[613] families are situated in the rear of the circle but still according
[554] to the closeness of their relation to the ancestor.

Wives of members of these extended families are also
563 affected by the social set-up; their position and status varies
621 directly with that of their husbands, although a wife's position
593 as far as respect patterns go was never equal to her husband's.
562 A wife observes strict respect for her husband's kinsmen who possess, by reason of age and relationship, a higher position than that of her husband. Very often she will not even pronounce the names of any of these elder gentlemen out of respect for them. The status of the wife grows with that of her husband during his lifetime. When he dies, she can either remain living with his kinsmen, in which case she holds the same position socially that he had during his lifetime, or she can

563 /Oirats/

621 return to her father's family, in which case she forfeits all
593 rights which were hers as a member of her husband's family.
562 The oldest male of the oldest family holds the position of
563 "axalaci" which carries with it the right of final authority
622 in the group. Upon the death of the "axalaci" authority over
the "xotn" is invested in his wife who in turn passes the
care of the herds on to her oldest son or a younger brother
of her husband.

[422] Herds are the common property of the "xotn" but are
managed by the "axalaci." However, the cattle belonging to
[233] dependent related or non-related families are managed by
the owners and is not the common property of the "xotn."

563 If any of the sons of the "axalaci" desires to move away
from the family and establish himself independently, he can
622 rightfully claim a percentage of the common herd. If the
591 particular times happen to be especially prosperous so that
233 cattle are in such abundance that pasturage in one area is
lacking to supply them all, the son might be encouraged to
leave, the pressure for his departure increasing if there
were ample manpower to get along without him.

563 When the "axalaci" dies the herds are distributed evenly
622 among his children, with the exception of the eldest son,
who receives a larger percentage than his younger brothers.
233 A certain percentage also passes into the ownership of
428 the clergy.

563 The "xotn" or encampment is a political as well as an
economic unit. It is termed a "fifteen" (does this mean
621 that each "xotn" was broken into units of fifteen yurts,
or is it simply a convenient term synonomous with "xotn"?
The reference is vague on this point.)

563 If a crime is committed by a member of a particular
"fifteen" against an individual or group outside of his own
628 "fifteen" the entire unit will be penalized for this infraction
[626] of the law. Thus, a strong element of social control was
made operative.

563 The "xotn" is also a very convenient unit for purposes
of taxation, and as a resource of cattle and other animals
621 it was the income for the nobility and the lamaseries. In
[651] addition the encampment is an exogamic unit.

[582] The use of pasturage among the various "xotan" is based
563 primarily on tradition. Each has several hundred acres of
628 land from which they choose a part each summer and each
233 winter. If by chance one group needs the pasturage of another,
the former will ask permission, and this will normally be
423 granted. Special arrangements have always to be made, however;
no group can simply move in on another's pasturage.

563 The axalaci of several "fifteens" in addition to chosen
622
628

S
563 leaders from every five-tent group meet on problems of
622 importance such as taxes, Oirat-Chinese relations,
628 internal administration, new regulations and laws, etc.
S This assembly of a tribe is called in Oirat: xurug.
792 Lamaseries function as marketing centers and these are
443 the only places where non-patrilineally-related people meet
each other in order to trade their products and where they
go for religious festivals.
S There are slight differences in herd ownership and
563 management between the various tribes of the Western
619 Mongols.(They call themselves the "Dörwön Oirat"(or
233 "four Oirat") or Ulan-Zalatan ("those who wear red
422 tassels on their hats).) The main tribes of Western
Mongols are the Torguts, the Dörböts and the Ölöts plus the
Oirat proper.
S Some tribes merge the herds of related and non-related
[602] individuals while others do not. The basis for different
[609] types of economic activities is the "non-kinship-relationship."
S Some Western Mongolian tribes came in contact with
563 other peoples more than other tribes did, in the course of
177 history, with the result that customs, usage, and tradition
S underwent slight changes. Nevertheless, the pattern of
[184] authority, of inheritance, and the fact that the extended
family represents a basic functional unit for purposes of
taxation, exogamy, election, etc., are by and large the
same in all tribes.
N The Salars:
563 In the Chinese province of Kansu are found three classes
794 of Moslems. There are those who have descended from the
merchants on the old trade route from China through Persia
to Arabia; another group has evolved from the Uighur branch
of the Hun family; and finally there are the Salars. The Salars
are of pure Turkish origin and are among the latest arrivals
in China.
N To their new home the Salars brought with them the
[197] original Turkish language and to this day that is their spoken
N language. The men have learned just a few words of Chinese
[191] and the women hardly any. This is one of the indications of a
N
563 lack of assimilation which is characteristic of the Moslems
794 in the west of China. Thus there is a general similarity among
177 the Moslems of Kansu and a dissimilarity between them and
184 Moslems further east. With the progression eastward assimilation of Islam to the Chinese way of life increases to the
extent that finally the only difference is the abstinence from
eating pork.

This difference in the degree of assimilation can be attributed
to four factors: the Moslems in the east have been exposed to

563 Chinese life for a longer period of time; geographical isola-
794 tion of those in the west; arrival in the west of the "New Sect,"
177 among whom are the Salars, dedicated to reform the older
184 residents; and the fact that many in the east are mere converts.

The Moslems in Kansu are further set apart by the physical
[144] characteristics of their Tatar ancestry. Also contributing
[262] to the general physical condition of the Moslems is their
[272] tendency to eat more meat, drink more milk, and indulge
[273] less in wine and opium than the Chinese.

The Salars are Moslems of the Shiah division and of the
563 "New Sect." (See chapter about Religion.) The majority of the
794 Moslems in China are of the "Old Sect" and much better
795 assimilated than the "New Sect." The "New Sect" is prevalent mainly in the west of China, and as indicated earlier, their lack of assimilation is due to an obsession to reform the older residents, and is accompanied by extreme fanaticism and intolerance. Amont this "New Sect" the Salars are the most fanatic of all and it may be that they excel in this tendency because of their isolation. Salar stubbornness is further revealed in the practice of the women, who persist in wearing the ancient dress of Samarkand.

563 Because the Moslems in China have throughout history
794 persecuted and been persecuted, they display a certain
caution in the practice of their religion in areas where they
[798] are not abundant. For example the mosques may often be
[346] architecturally designed to assume a Chinese style, and if
they are in a decided minority the mosques will be constructed without a minaret. In such cases the muezzin will refrain from giving his calls. The isolated Salars, however, are more strict than most Moslems in certain observances. The women,
[562] for instance, are still required to wear the veil while absent
from their immediate home heighborhood.

Although there have been attempts in the past by the Moslems
563 to set up their own state in North-West China, their internal
794 division over religious questions makes their unification a
795 difficult task because the Chinese leaders take advantage of
this weakness and play one faction against another. It also seems to be the opinion that more than a religious basis is necessary in order to establish any sort of political entity. The Moslems are further handicapped in the field of practical political action in the modern world by the fact that it is nearly an impossibility to attain both a Koranic education and a modern education, an inherent requirement for coping with modern conditions in directing the establishment of a bona fide Moslem state. Even if some type of autonomous Moslem government were set up, the isolation, small population, and eccentricity of the Salars probably would

N
563 preclude their enjoying any great influence.
794 The Salars' pattern of social life follows the Islamic form.
[795] Patriarchy rules the extended family, whose members'
[596] main occupation is agricultural work. However, agriculture
[241] goes hand in hand with trade, which plays also a noticeable
[438] role. As a group, the Salars are economically unimportant
S since they form only a small Turkic tribe.

563 The Sarigh Uighurs:

The Sarigh Uighurs, the so-called Yellow Uighurs, are a
S small tribe of Turkic origin which is becoming extinct.
[241] Although immediate neighbors of the Chinese, they never
[233] learned agriculture, and remained herdsmen. Nowadays
[464] the Sarigh Uighurs are mostly hired shepherds of Chinese cattle
S owners. Frequently one also finds them as laborers on Chinese
[422] farms. An occasional Sarigh Uighur family owns a few cows,
S sheep, and horses. The smallest and the only social unit, is
[592] the patriarchal family.

S The Shera Yögur:

[233] The people belonging to this small Mongolian tribe, rapidly
S becoming extinct, are semi-nomadic herdsmen. The old
[614] Mongolian clan-system is still preserved. Clan exogamy
S exists and the migrational units are the single clans. The
[792] economic centers, however, are their Buddhist monasteries,
[422] for it is the monasteries who own the herds and not the individual
tribesmen.

N The Monguors:

563 Ethnically consisting of Mongols, Turks, Tibetans, and
M 233 Chinese, speaking an old Mongolian and Tibetanised dialect,
241 the Monguors are the only Mongolian tribe of the Northwest
178 that shifted successfully from nomadic pastoralism to farming.
[177] They learned farming and the use of their agricultural tools
for raising barley, wheat, peas, potatoes, etc., from the
N Chinese. However, livestock still plays an important role as
563 the second inportant economic resource. While sheep, cows,
M 231 mules, and pigs are economically important, horses are bred
[554] only because to own horses is a mark of prestige.

N 563 The basic social and economic unit of the Monguors is the
M extended family which is patrilineally and patrilocally
596 oriented. The grandfather and great-grandfather enjoy
[603] authority over all members of the family. Property is collect-
[421] ively owned.

N The families belong to a clan which is headed by a chieftain
563 whose Chinese title is T'u-ssu, who is at the same time a
M 614 Chinese official. Originally the clan chieftain was simply the
622 head of a number of extended families, whose migrations he
177 directed and whose highest duty was the military protection of
178 the clan through organisation and training of the men. Later

N 563 on, when the Monguors gave up the nomadic way of life and
M 614 became sedentary, the connection with the Chinese became
622 closer and closer and closer until the Monguors finally came
178 under Chinese rule. As the best means of maintaining control
177 over the "frontier barbarians" the Chinese permitted them
a certain amount of local self-government; at this time the
clan chieftain became a Chinese official, a so-called T'u-ssu
or "local chief."

The Monguors were no exception to the rule that all
minorities, militarily powerless in comparison with the ruling
Chinese, succumbed to the new culture, which, in the minds
of the minorities, had always been superior and therefore
worthy of imitation. As soon as the minorities were militarily
defeated or went into submission voluntarily and deliberately,
M their chieftains proudly received the insignia and title of a
[177] Chinese office. This is true of the Khans of the Mongols, the
Bëks of the Turks, the rgyal-pos of the Tibetans.

While the Turkic chieftains received the title of Shang-lao
(Bëk), the Mongolian tribal leaders became Wangs, and the
Monguor clan chieftains received the title of T'u-ssu. This
institution was installed by the Chinese to administer minority
tribes at the western frontier of the Chinese Empire. The
N T'ang annals already report that the Chinese Emperor made
563 hereditary chieftains of frontier territories heads of the Chi-mi-
175 chou, (the predecessor of the T'u-ssu institution). The Yüan
M 175 dynasty already called this office by its present name - T'u-
177 ssu. The Ming dynasty continued to confer this title on Mongol
614 clan chieftains whose clans were by this time mixed with
622 Tibetans, Turks, and Chinese. The Manchu dynasty, (who favored
minorities for obvious reasons: (1) the Manchus themselves
constituted a minority and (2) maintenance of political equilibrium
and balance of power in regard to minorities and indigenous
Chinese) extended this system in a way that the various
clans gained a limited measure of self-determination and
autonomy. However, the ties to the Imperial court and its
administrative institutions were, and remained close. Finally,
the office of the T'u-ssu remained under the same name during
the Republican period of China. In other frontier areas, e.g.
in Sinkiang, the names of these offices were different, but
they differed only slightly functionally. Father Schram describes
the institution as follows: "...the T'u-ssu system may be
described as a method of allowing marginal non-Chinese
peoples attached to, but not yet absorbed into, the body of
Chinese society, to continue to live according to their own
customs, but under a form of administration adapted to, and
forming an extension of, that ofChina as a whole. Hence the
dual function of the T'u-ssu as "native Chief" and as Chinese
official."

S N

II. Stability of the Societies in the Northwest

563 182 It is safe to say that the minorities of Sinkiang, Chinghai and Kansu represent rather unstable societies. This instability has several causes. The first is certainly the fact that the Turks, the Mongols and the Tibetans consider themselves utterly different from the Chinese in regard to race, religion, language, and ethnic grouping; therefore they desire independence and do not want to be ruled by "aliens," which they S N [167] consider the Chinese to be. The second reason for instability is the progressive settling and colonization by Chinese peasants who cut down the pasture areas of the nomadic Mongols, Turks, and Tibetans, and consequently provoke hatred against them- S N [651] selves. The third reason for the unstable character of the societies of the Northwest was the reckless taxation of the minorities by many Chinese officials who considered their offices in areas like Sinkiang and Chinghai as an opportunity to gain wealth while holding those offices for a limited number of years. In periods of wars, the minorities were subject to merciless requisition of their cattle and agricultural products. S N 563 669 182 In addition to the friction and animosity between the minorities and the Chinese, the disunion among the minorities themselves was at times considerable. As an illustration one might remember that during the uprisings of the Dungans between 1931 and 1936, the Chinese Muslims fought against Turkic Muslims (which supposedly represent a single religious unit), Mongols, Chinese, and White Russians fought against the Chinese Muslims (Dungans) and the Kirghiz and Kazakhs even formed a special unit and fought against both groups or joined one of the two according to the military situation, opportunistically. This period was without doubt the culmination of disunion and confusion among minorities of the Northwest during the last decades.

S 563 635 182 On the other hand, when a governor who was more interested in the welfare of the country as such than in his own enrichment, like Sheng Si-ts'ai of Sinkiang, with a cleaner officialdom, ruled the province, the society gave a more stable impression and the frictions between the various nationalities decreased.

S N 563 798 182 A further reason for the disunion of the society in the Northwest is the incompatibility of various religions, especially the "martial" Islam on the one hand and the more peaceful Buddhism on the other. The Muslims feel superior to any other religious community; the Buddhists (Mongols, Tibetans, Shera Yögurs, Monguors) consider the Muslims as having a barbarian religion; the Chinese, generous and tolerant in regard to religions consider at least Islam to be somewhat inferior to their own multi-religious conceptions and beliefs.

S N 563 182 The Chinese, fully aware of their old culture and history, continued up to our times to consider Mongols, Turks and Tibetans if not as barbarians, at least as inferior peoples. This attitude of the Chinese caused, perhaps as an understandably psychological reaction, the superiority-complex behaviour of some minorities. In addition, the higher efficiency and diligence of the average Chinese peasant in comparison with the average non-Chinese did not help mutual understanding and esteem.

S N 563 668 [641] Constitutionally, for the first time in centuries, the minorities are not only considered by the present Communistic regime as absolutely equal to any other racial or ethnic group but they are also treated with consideration. The Communists do everything in order to avoid hurting the nationalistic feeling of the minorities. S N [177] The price the minorities have to pay for a certain degree of local self-determination, independence and self-government is the thorough acceptance of the party line with all its consequences, above all, collectivization, which certainly means an incredible change of the traditional economic pattern, because eight ninths of the total population are peasants and only the remaining one ninth are pastoral nomads, whose livestock - collectivization is yet to come.

S N 563 829 Since the overwhelming majority of the population of the Northwest consists of Chinese, the attitude toward the state in general is positive. Natural recognition of the government lies in the traditional line of Chinese behavior. The deep-rooted respect for "magistracy" and officialdom implies this basic recognition.

S N 563 668 578 669 The relationship between Chinese Communist rulers and ruled Chinese (whether Communist or not) might be described as less frictional than that between the non-Chinese minorities and the Chinese Communist rulers, that is, a certain tension and uneasiness between the Uighur Autonomous Region and the government has occurred several times during the last five years, and also between the Tibetans of Chinghai and the Communist authorities, and the recent uprisings of Tibetans (July 1956) seem to be of major significance.

S N 829 Generally speaking, the average Chinese in the Northwest has neither a sense of common destiny or any sense of mission. S N 829 571 The average Chinese peasant's life is concerned with one main and urgent problem: livelihood. Quite different is the situation among the intelligentsia, who are culture conscious to such a degree that it often results in a feeling of superiority over other peoples. Among those intellectuals there is a strong feeling and conviction that China has a grand mission in Asia - cultural and political leadership.

S N
668 Based on our experience with Soviet Russia, there can be
186 little doubt that the Chinese Communist propaganda has been,
or will be, successful in building up a tremendous feeling
for nation and nationality, an artificial and overemphasized
S N pride for everything which is China or Chinese. The Chinese society
[182] in the Northwest might be described as stable and united because
of its common history, common language, common beliefs,
common pattern of living (agriculture by means of irrigation
accounting for ninety-five percent) and common fate. We do not
refer to the artificial stability and unity enforced by secret
police and military garrisons which might turn into a genuine
stability like that in Russia after a long period of propaganda.
Training of the younger generation and making propagandistic
use of political mistakes committed by other powers, like
Hitler's lost war against Russia, which was the last step in
S N developing a final and real unity among Russians.
563 Turning back to the minorities, we can say that the Turks
and the Chinese Muslims do have a sense of mission in
795 regard to their religion. For centuries the Muslim has been
797 taught to fight and to convert the "non-believers" to the "only
668 true faith on earth": Islam (Mohammedanism). How strong
their feeling is in regard to their religion may be seen from
the fact that the Communist regime avoids carefully interference
in religious matters and even permits every religious activity
to continue, including the pilgrimage to Mecca. Of course,
the average Muslim is hardly aware of the fact that the top
S level Muslim leadership is under complete control of the Com-
munist regime. As a religious group the Turks (Eastern
563 Turks, Salars, Kirghiz, Kazakhs and some small islamized
795 Tibetan clans) and the Dungans (Chinese Muslims) are united
to a certain degree and they do have a sense of common
destiny, repeatedly brought forward, when political events
showed that they considered themselves one single group,
imbued with common fate, which culminated in their idea
and highest aim: the attempt to erect their own Islamic
Empire and realm, an attempt which cost hecatombs of blood
but never came true. Their perception and conviction that
the support of their highest spiritual leaders, first the Caliph
of Baghdad, then the Sultan of Constantinople and finally the
Great Mufti of Jerusalem (in spite of Stalin's and Ata Turk's
discouraging denoucement of any Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkic
movement) developed their group feeling and group conscious-
S N ness.
563 As far as the Mongols of the Northwest are concerned, it
can be stated that because of their geographical separation
S N (see map of ethnic groups) political disunion was inevitable.
[795] However, as an ethnic and religious group (the Mongols are

SN 563 [795] all Buddhists) they have a strong feeling of belonging together. Nevertheless the Mongols are fully aware that their former power is declining more and more every decade and that their pastures are constantly diminishing because of the encroachment of agriculture and Chinese migration pressure. The establishment of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (to which the Edzin Gol and Alashan areas have recently been added) and the organization of several autonomous chou for the Mongols of Sinkiang, Kansu and Chinghai, might restore to a small degree the hope for recovery of their lost strength and political power, a hope which has been stimulated during the Sino-Japanese war. In addition, the organization of those autonomies will certainly raise their feeling of security, and might east the widespread desperation of Mongolian leaders who have anticipated the final decline of the Mongols as an ethnic group and a linguistic unit because of rapid sinification SN 563 668 177 and loss of pasture land, and therefore loss of cattle, the only life resource of the average Mongol. It is difficult to say what effect the Communist regime will have on the ethnic group of the Mongols. So far, the Mongolian indigenous culture has been fostered by the Communist regime, but there is little doubt that, when it comes, the complete transition of the Mongolian society into a Communistic society will not be carried out without resistance and ensuing hatred. It is unthinkable that the average Mongol, who for centuries has adhered to the simple pattern of nomadic life (owning cattle individually and only pastures collectively) will agree with the policy of bolshevization. It can be easily conceived that deprivation of their cattle will mean the end of the nomadic Mongolian society as such. What has been said about the Mongols may very well be true also for the Kazakhs and Kirghiz.

SN 181 IV. Dominant Social Motives.

The dominant social motive of the average citizen of the Northwest depends largely on his ethnic group affiliation. Starting with the majority, the Chinese, it should be repeated that they are diligent and industrious farmers whose whole energies must be used in order to maintain their families, who cooperatively toil in the fields and earn just enough to live on. SN 181 771 [769] In such a setup little room is left for cultural and religious ambitions; although ancestor worship is sincerely practiced it is difficult to say whether this kind of worship is a true religious phenomenon or only a reflection of the traditional respect toward elders and parents. The religious behavior

S N
181 of the average Chinese seems to be fatalistic, considering
771 Providence or Heaven to determine his fortune in life. In
general, the average Chinese is rather indifferent in religious
matters, although he might be sensitive if someone looked
askance on his belief in local spirits, demons, and gods,
S N but this is merely a matter of tradition rather than religion.
181 The Chinese is strongly individualistic and usually dislikes
to be ordered around and governed; he ardently defends his
own opinions. His inclination for social groupings is obvious.
Wherever Chinese live, they soon form integrated communities
and at times of distress or in critical situations they are ready
to help each other collectively, a characteristic tendency
found especially within the extended family, which as a rule
feels itself responsible as a whole for debts, misdeeds, etc.,
of any member. The Chinese are reported to be basically
anti-militaristic, although this may be more a traditional
attitude of the literati than a sound fact, considering only the
last fifty years of Chinese history. However, a Chinese
proverb says, "From good iron do not make nails; from
good men do not make soldiers." To toil his fields in peace,
to make a living this way, and to raise his children, whom
he deeply loves, and not to be interfered with by state and
S N government, can be described as the average conception of
342 the "good life." The average Chinese of the Northwest lives
in simple mud or stone houses (in the Yellow River area,
35 caves of the adjacent loess hills), stove, k'ang, and ancestor
S N altar being almost the only furniture.
517 Culture, art, and literature were primarily fostered by
571 the richer merchants, land and water owners, and, or course,
565 the officials and scholars. These groups represented, up to
423 1949, an economically powerful class who owned a considerable
part of the land and the water rights. Chinese officials of the
S N frontier provinces had a reputation for being extremely money-
565 minded. The Chinese gentry, consisting of former officials
571 and degree holders, who were in many cases at the same time
423 holders of land or watter rights, have been abolished as a
178 class, while large parts of the academic strata, the intelligentsia,
668 became more or less the Communist avantgarde of China,
showing the same phenomenon which appeared in Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, etc., before and during the
Second World War, where the intelligentsia showed a deep
S N inclination towards Communism.
563 In regard to the nomadic minorities of the Northwest (Kirghis,
233 Kazakhs, Mongols and Tibetans) the dominant social motives
are two fold, and can be subdivided into an economic and a
religious one, equally strong. The whole economic life of the
nomads is centered around their livestock. The nomad's life

S N
563 depends on his herds: they are his only resource, his only
233 wealth, and his only pride. When two nomads meet, whether
[521] they are Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Mongols, or Tibetans, the first
subject that comes up is their cattle. Among nomads, social
[554] status is established by the possession of horses, camels,
[422] and livestock in general, and only secondarily determined
by titles or descent. This is especially true for the Kirghiz,
Kazakhs and Tibetans, and to a lesser degree for the
Mongols, among whom aristocratic birth (real or imagined)
plays an important role.

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The average nomad's life can be described as follows: he
[342] lives in a roomy felt tent, furnished with house altar, in the
[352] case of Buddhists, or with an artistically made book-stand
[353] for the Quran in the case of Muslims, and some chests and
carpets. The whole family takes care of the livestock, and
periodically the migration unit moves during the summer time
S N from pasture to pasture, preserving the richest and most
[621] protected grazing land for the winter time. The weather
plays a fatal role in the welfare of the nomad's livestock, and
every so often a migration unit (the ail, the aul, the ayir,
S N the omoq, otoq, xotn, or uruq, the ulus or even the aimaq)
[614] loses its livestock. In this case, those clans which still own
[426] enough livestock divide their herds and lend part of them to
[476] those who suffered the loss. Collective cooperation is exercised in this respect by Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Mongols,
while the nomadic Tibetans, in a similar situation, have quite
S N a reputation for robbing neighboring tribes of their livestock.

563 The nomadic way of life, the close contact with nature and
dependence on nature promotes animism, shamanism, and spir-
771 itualism, which goes hand in hand with the prevailing religions
of Islam (in the case of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Salars, and
some Tibetan clans) and Buddhism (in the case of the Mongols,
Tibetans, and Sarigh-Uighurs). As a general rule, the nomadic
Kirghiz and Kazakh are not very fanatic or ardent Muslims, and
neither are the Mongols very pious Buddhists, but still, both
S N feel strongly about their religious although they are rather lax
in their observance. No matter how poor a Buddhistic nomad
[792] is, he voluntarily supports and feeds wandering lamas,
[794] invites several on major occasions (birth, death, and marriage
if the bride's father can afford it), pays them, and finally is
accustomed to the old tradition ot giving a small percentage of
his livestock every year to Buddhistic monasteries. All
nomads are very superstitious, and the relationship between
cause and effect is often misinterpreted, e.g., in the case
of disease or weather. It is safe to say that the dominant
motives of the nomads are economic in the first place and
religious in the second place.

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V. Individualistic and Collectivistic Bents and Traditions

563 233 [423] [476]

The nomadic society of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Mongols shows collectivistic trends insofar as the pastures are always owned collectively and the livestock can be taken care of and protected only cooperatively. In periods of war and uprisings, the livestock had to be protected militarily, which was one reason why the military organization of the nomads, introduced by Chingis Khan, survived up to the twentieth century. Here we can say that the nomadic Kirghiz and Kazakh still shows a tremendous martial spirit, especially the Kazakhs who fought the Communists in 1949 and 1950 in a heroic way in spite of the fact that they were outnumbered from the very beginning.

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As a matter of fact, the Mongols show much less martial spirit than neighboring Kirghiz, Kazakh and especially Tibetans, who constantly rise up here and there, becoming a major nuisance for Peking, although they are hopelessly outnumbered by Chinese Communist Troops. Many explorers agree independently that the Mongols, once intrepid, dauntless, unafraid, frightful and terrifying warriors, make now the impression of being inefficient soldiers, timid, downhearted, and discouraged (so Rockhill, Howorth, Tafel, Vladimirtsov, Hedin, Futterer, and Filchner). Russian scholars, above all B. Vladimirtsov in his **Le Regime Social Des Mongols, Le feodalisme Nomade, Paris 1948**, blame Buddhism for the disappearance of the martial spirit and courage of the Mongols. This opinion is, however, contradicted by the fact that Tibetans, who have been influenced by Buddhism some centuries longer than the Mongols, are well-known as tough and cunning fighters and apparently fearless and daring insurgents.

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N 563 792

Almost every Tibetan family has at least one son in a monastery. They faithfully pay their tributes to these monasteries where their sons live as novices or monks. The monasteries are the only cultural centers of the nomads. Kumbum might be named as a magnificent example in regard to external architectural beauty as well as internal wealth in respect to its library, printing house, and the spiritual value of its schools and its Lamaistic academies.

S N 563 668 233 [361]

There are many reasons to believe that the Communist regime is determined to abolish nomadism and to make the nomads sedentary or at least semi-sedentary. The first step was the erection of permanent winter sites. The attitude of the nomads toward the regime seems to be ambivalent. The erection of veterinary stations for the livestock and the extension of additional irrigated pastures certainly are measures approved by the nomads but on the other hand the threatening

S N 563 668 233 deprivation of livestock and the progressing industrialization are certain to be the source of increasing discontent among the nomads.

S N 563 181 In summing up, the nomads are extremely freedom-conscious. Freedom of the individual is expressed by the everlasting dream of every nomad which finds its expression in the conception of the free rider who recognizes nothing but "the eternal power of the eternal heaven" (Mongolian saying), and who possesses nothing but his felt tent, his highly esteemed and valued horses and his herds. But, no doubt, the Communists will succeed as they did in Soviet Russia in destroying the picture of the independent rider of the steppes of Central Asia, the cradle of so many different peoples and magnificent cultures.

S N [668] Within their own social structure and social units, the Nomads combine harmoniously individualistic and collectivistic trends of their pattern of life. Communistic collectivization can be imposed upon them by force, of course, but they will hardly accept it in their minds.

S N

VI. Approach to Individual and National Problems

563 181 153 The nomads of the Northwest work hard for their existence. It is easily understood that they need their whole energy for maintaining such a life, which is a constant struggle against the hardships of land, weather and against the centuries-old uncertain political environment. S N 563 153 577 Under such circumstances the nomads developed very realistic minds. A realistic mind is implicitly logical in regard to political or daily matters of life, although the realization of the unpredictable inclemencies or favors of surrounding Nature gave rise to an illogical or, in terms of Jung's depth philosophy, a translogical conception of the relationship between man and Nature, whose favorable or unfavorable phenomena were brought into connection with their "good andbad" deeds, whereby "good and bad" do not have the same connotation as they do in our society; polygamy in the case of the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Eastern Turks, polyandry in the case of the Tibetans, or murder of a personal dependent in the case of Kazakhs, for example, are never considered as "bad" deeds, but killing a louse, in the case of a Mongol, or killing of a yak calf (even if it is sick or hurt) in the case of Tibetans, are considered "bad" deeds.

S N 563 153 779 155 The nomadic Muslims (Kirghiz, Kazakhs, Salars and some Islamized Tibetan clans) as well as the sedentary Muslims (New-Uighurs, Uzbeks, Tatars, Tajiks, Chinese Muslims or Dungans) have on account of their religion a rather doctrinal

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563 outlook on life, which results in a remarkable internal
153 social stability of family and community at the expense of
779 personal ease. The greatest Islamist of our time, Carl
155 Brockelmann, once called the Quran "die Heeredienstvorschrift für die Mohammedaner" ("the army regulation book for the Muslims"), and indeed the Quran is not only the condensation of Muslimic religion and philosophy but also the code of laws and the "code of practical regulations" concerning the practical daily life of the average Muslim. From childhood on those "regulations" are drilled and hammered in to the people. The Quran becomes the basis from which everything is judged. The conclusion, that the Muslims do show a strong inclination for doctrinal behavior, is rather justified.

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563 If we describe the nomad as a logical and realistic individ-
153 ual to whom neurosis and psychosis are in general alien, one
185 certainly should not forget that there has been still room for romance in his life: first and foremost, the Muslimic nomads
[158] as well as the Buddhistic nomads (the Mongols) dreamed and still dream of the creation of their own empire in which thev are the masters and not the Chinese. The Mongols still mourn for their once powerful and grand empire "where the hoof of the brave horse was the only sound and the roaring and bellowing of camels and cows the only noise" and where the Khan of the Khans, the Khakhan, the Great King, resides in Qaraqorum, the scene of the Great qurultai (constitutional and legislative assembly), ruling the Mongolian tribes and leading the Mongolian armies, in the name and as the representative and vicar of the "Eternal Blue Heaven," the ruler over the universe.

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563 While in the folklore and literature of the Muslimic nomads
538 the Golden Horde and the Chagatai Empire (Chagatai Ulus), Batur Khan and Timur Lenk (Tamerlane) are oft-repeated subjects, the Mongolian folklore abounds in painting the deeds of Chingis Khan and is excessive in describing the adventurous greatness of the former Mongolian Empire.

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563 The Buddhistic conception of palingenesis and reincarnation
775 add another romantic feature to the life of the average Mongol
771 and Tibetan and the belief of the Muslim (after having become
[827] a hajji, a pilgrim, or even better, a hazze, one who fought as a soldier against the "non-believers") that he would enter the paradise of heaven (or better one of the seven heavens, the seventh, only when he sacrificed his life to Allah in combat), is a deep-rotted romantic conception.

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563 As we said, the life of the Buddhistic nomad is centered
771 around his tent and his herds, so to speak, the outer sphere of his life, but the inside sphere is absorbed deeply by religion,

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N
563 in the case of Tibetans more than in the case of the Mongols
771 and Turks.
N
While the attitude of the average Northwest Chinese is
181 rather indifferent to national problems, at least as long as
[829] his economic position is not unfavorably affected, his approach
to individual problems is characterized by a distinct
realism and opportunism.

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[635] The provinces of Kansu and Shensi, almost exclusively
populated by Chinese, are, in comparison with the provinces
[162] of China proper, less progressive in regard to education and
general living standard; therefore the frontier Chinese is
more conservative but also more suspicious and distrustful
when faced with innovations and reforms. He relies more
upon himself, seeking and expecting less help from the
N bureaucracy.

181 Generally speaking, the frontier Chinese can be divided
into the following groups: the descendants of those who were
166 exiled and ostracized for political reasons during the Manchu
167 period, further on, the descendants of criminals who were
sent to the frontier areas as workmen, and last but not least,
the colonist (the overwhelming majority), partly adventurers
and desperados and partly surplus population of China proper
and finally descendants of former garrison troops and
merchants from China proper who were condemned to frontier
service, desperately looking for new cultivable land.

N
181 Among the Chinese of the Northwest, those living in Shensi
and Kansu belong to the oldest settlers. Detached and severed
from his old homeland, the frontier Chinese is more versatile
N and more open-minded towards unusual and unaccustomed
[812] situations. The old Confucian ethics in regard to family life
and relationship with neighbors is still very strong.

The frontier Chinese is possessed by a romantic feeling for his old country. His position at an outpost in a remote area makes him see the old homeland in an euphemistic light.

The frontier Chinese has to prove true and to stand the test more than the Chinese of China proper, which creates a healthy measure of self criticism without falling into the neurotic error of self-laceration. The frontier Chinese is difficult to influence since he is more unrestrained and less
N bound to his environment than the Chinese of China proper.

[668] The obvious propagandistic success of the Communists in
the Northwest does not contradict the above-mentioned phenomena,
because the Communistic propaganda proceeds in an atmosphere
of terror and the Chinese, as a born realist and opportunist,
inclines to rationalize his pretended acceptance of propaganda.

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000 IV. The Rise of the Communists

Chronological Chart
Additional Readings

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

NORTHWESTERN CHINA
HISTORICAL SETTING

I. IL-KHANS
II. CHAGATAI ULUS
III. QYPCHAQ KHANATE
A. GOLDEN HORDE
B. JUCHI-BĂTU-ULUS
IV. ÜGEDEI ULUS
V. MONGOLIA PROPER
TULUI ULUS
VI. REALM OF YAQUB BĂG
BOUNDARY OF CHINGIZ KHAN'S EMPIRE
EASTERN BOUNDARY OF TIMURS EMPIRE
TIMURS ATTEMPT TO CONQUER CHINA
GALDANS DZUNGARIC EMPIRE
1717 GALDANS SUCCESSOR CONQUERED LHASA
U.S.S.R.
LAKE BAIKAL
III A.
KIRGHIZ STEPPE III.
III B.
II.
CASPIAN SEA
ARAL SEA
KOBDO
ALTAI MTS
KARAKORUM
OUTER MONGOLIA
GOBI DESERT
IV.
V.
TIEN SHAN
TURFAN
VI.
TARIM BASIN
YELLOW R.
C H I N A
I.
I R A N
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
T I B E T
HIMALAYA
LHASA
NEPAL
ARABIAN SEA
I N D I A
MILES

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HISTORICAL SETTING

N 631 I. General History of Relations with China

Northwest China, once a major administrative region of Communist China, is an arbitrary political union of widely dissimilar
N geographical areas inhabited by a conglomeration of diverse ethnic
635 groups. At the eastern end of this vast wedge-shaped region is
[162] Shensi, which has been an integral part of China Proper throughout history and is inhabited almost exclusively by Chinese. Although it is only one-seventeenth of the total area, this single
N province holds almost half of the population of the Northwest.
[633] Sian, the provincial seat of Shensi, has been in centuries past and
[177] still is today China's political and military base for the control of the Northwest and has been the center for the diffusion of Chinese
[668] culture to the Northwest in the past and of Communist ideology in the present.

S At the western end of the Northwest region of China is the
635 province of Sinkiang or Chinese Turkestan. Its territory occupies
[131] half the area of the Northwest but its population is only a seventh
[161] of the total. Three-quarters of the inhabitants are Uighurs, a
[563] people Turkic in speech and Moslem in religion. The rest is divided among thirteen nationalities.

N In the north is the now abolished province of Ninghsia, in-
635 habited largely by Mongols. In the south is Chinghai (also known as Kokonor) with a heterogeneous population of Mongols, Chinese and Tibetans. The Gobi Desert, which pushes south to Ninghsia, and the highlands of Chinghai constricts the habitable area into an hourglass shape, forming a corridor connecting Shensi in the east and Sinkiang in the west. This is the province of Kansu.

N +175 A. The Role of the Kansu Panhandle

487 All traffic between China Proper and Turkestan has been funnelled through the narrow confines of this corridor. The ancient
S 175 Silk Road started from its terminus at Sian (known in the past as
487 Ch'ang-an) and wound its way, via the Kansu Corridor, into Chinese Turkestan where it branched into the northern and southern routes to bypass the towering Tienshan Mountains. The conquering armies of Han, T'ang and Ch'ing had marched out through this narrow passageway to assert the political rule of China over the desert wastes and oasis towns of Turkestan. Hordes of nomads, lured by the lush plains and opulent cities of China, have poured through this funnel to raid and pillage and, when successful, to found militaristic kingdoms. This was the route worn deep by the trudging feet of camel caravans bearing the tea and silk and porcelain of China to bazaars in the Near East and even to the markets of Byzantium and Rome. In the train of these caravans travellers have come into China, from the Buddhist missionary, Kumarajiva,

N *175 487 to the Venetian merchant, Marco Polo.

S 175 487 During the centuries when China faced the land frontier of the Northwest and the Silk Road was the main channel of China's intercourse with the outside world, the target of China's imperialistic expansion, when strong, was the domination of the petty states of Central Asia. The principal strategic pass that must be held to prevent invading armies from pouring in and ravaging China, in periods of weakness and division, was Yü-men, the Jade Gate, in northwestern China.

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B. Recurring Cycles of Nomadic Eruptions

As the advance and recession of Chinese power in Turkestan reflected the vigor and the decline of Chinese dynasties,(a feature of Chinese history discussed in the historical section of the General Handbook), so were the outbursts and withdrawals of the nomads the manifestations of their activity and passivity. The juxtaposition and interaction of the Chinese scheme of advance and withdrawal with the nomadic scheme shaped the dynamics and course of history of Northwest China. S (131) Together with Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang forms a broad semicircular belt, which marks the marginal zone between China and the steppes and is the amphitheater for the vast age-long struggle between the sedentary and nomadic peoples.

1. Earliest invasions

N *175 648 S 175 648 The alternate thrust of the nomads into this marginal zone, at times even penetrating into the heartland of China, and their retraction into the steppes, have been a recurring phenomenon in the history of Central Asia. With tidal regularity, the nomads have surged forth when China was weak and divided, only to ebb when China was strong and united. As far back as the eighth century B.C., when China was beginning to disintegrate into warring states, there were invasions of China by the north and northwestern peoples called Ti and Jung. In Central Asia there was the expansion of the Scythians. From the third to the first century B.C., the confederacy of nomads led by the Hsiung-nu or Huns were active in China's Northwest. During this same period Central Asia was overrun first by the Greeks of Alexander's army, then by the Yüeh-chih and, further east, by the Sakas and Wu-sun. The defense measures of the Ch'in dynasty and the military advance of the Chinese during the Han dynasty in the first century B.C. and the first century A.D., held the Huns in check and finally succeeded in splitting up the Hun confederation.

2. Turkic Incursions

From the fourth to the seventh centuries, with China weak and divided, the border peoples from China's northern and northwestern frontiers breached China's defenses. First in dribbles and then in raging torrents they occupied the northwest and poured

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*175 into China to establish militaristic states in North China. The
648 aggregation of invaders included the Huns, the Hsien-pi, the Juan-
S juan, the Toba, and the Tibetans. But the dominant group to
175 emerge was the Turks, who eventually ruled an extensive terri-
648 tory stretching from Mongolia to the Urals. Once more China, reunited under the Sui dynasty, was able to hold off the nomads. Under the T'ang dynasty the Chinese were able to advance into the domain of the nomads and to destroy the Turkish federation.

By the ninth century, as China declined in power, the nomadic peoples on the northern rim of the Chinese empire came into their own again. The situation appeared to be a repetition of what had happened at least twice before. The decline of the Chou had been followed by the disintegration of China into warring states (cycle one); the collapse of Han had ushered in the Three Kingdoms and the North and South Dynasties (cycle two). Now, with the fall of T'ang, there came the chaotic Five Dynasties and the division of China again into the north and south (cycle three). In each successive stage, the extent of nomadic power was greater than in the previous one. In the first period of division, both northern and southern states were primarily Chinese; in the second stage of division, the northern states were non-Chinese while the southern states were Chinese; but in the third stage, at first the northern states were alien and the southern state (Sung) Chinese, but later the northern invaders (Mongols) succeeded in conquering all of China.

3. Mongol expansion

In the period following the fall of Tang, peoples from Manchuria, Khitans and Juchens, as well as peoples from Turkestan, such as the Sha-t'o (or Chöl) Turks, poured into China. In the Northwest, the Western Turks and their offshoots, the Qarluqs the the Uighurs, were active. Later, some of the Khitans, ousted from North China, also established themselves in Turkestan. Here too, the Arabs, who had penetrated Central Asia in the 7th and 8th centuries, were influential. But the most powerful were the Mongols who, having united the tribes of Mongolia into a vast confederation of nomadic people in a series of sanguinary wars, in the 13th century embarked on a career of conquest that was to include all of Asia and part of Europe.

The Chinese, in their resurgence under the Ming dynasty, did not recover Turkestan. Central Asia remained in the grip of the later Mongols, from the Timurid dynasty in Persia, through the descendants of the Chagatai princes in Turkestan, to the Oirats in Northwestern China, the last of whom by the mid fifteenth century, were bold enough to make forays into China. The 17th century saw the rise to power of the Oirats who dominated vast areas of Mongolia and Turkestan. Not until the middle of the eighteenth century was the power of the Oirat confederacy broken and China,

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*175 under the Ch'ing emperors, reasserted its sway in Turkestan.

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4. Pattern of nomadic expansion and contraction

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648 Wave after wave of nomadic peoples have made their appearances and then faded away, leaving the imprint of their stay on the palimpsest of Turkestan. The pattern of their entry, their ascendency, and their exit have been similar. Each outburst and withdrawal of the nomads showed but variations on the major theme. The Huns, the Turks, and the Mongols, to mention a few of the more powerful of the plethora of nomadic peoples, all had their geneses in the same region, an area of Mongolia south of Lake Baikal. The process of their rise to power followed parallel lines. First, there was a bitter internecine struggle from which one group emerged triumphant. Second, the nomadic tribes were unified into a strong coalition under the leadership of the dominant group. Third, they expanded outward from the steppes into neighboring regions, especially into the marginal zone of modern Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. Then they consolidated these areas into bases of operation for the fourth stage, the invasion and, when successful, the conquest of the opulent agrarian lands. At the peak of their strength, these nomadic invaders would establish a strong, militant empire, under an absolutist government, to control the motley subject peoples under their domination.

But once they reached the peak of their power, the downgrade began. The paucity of their numerical strength made it difficult for them to hold large territories. The tradition of intertribal contest instilled the spirit of independence in the minds of the satraps appointed to rule portions of the far-flung empires. The failure to resolve the incompatibility between pastoral and agrarian economy, and the resentment and rebellious tendency of the subject peoples whom the conquerers were only able to overawe by military strength, were all factors which brought about the disintegration and decline of the empires of the nomads.

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5. Theories concerning nomadic eruptions

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648 What accounted for the sudden irresistible ferocity of nomad eruptions and what accounted for the docility of their withdrawal? A number of very ingenious theorires have been advanced, as answers to this intriguing question, but so far these are still in the realm of assumptions.

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182 Many scholars have regarded the influence of climate as a possible cause of the high tide and ebb of nomadic activities. Superimposed on the progressive dessication of Central Asia resulting from the withdrawal of glaciers, were the minor cyclic fluctuations of alternating dry and moist spells. A climatologist (C.E.P. Brooks) spoke of the "classical rainfall period of 640 years," and a geographer (Raymond Wheeler) believed in a major alternation of dry and cold every 510 years. Ellsworth Huntington,

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175 a proponent of the theory of climatic alternations, called the
121 phenomenon "the pulse of Asia."

648 The most important of the multiple influences is believed to
132 be that of the economic effects of climatic changes. When the
114 climate is warm and moist, the land of the nomads is fertile
182 enough to support the nomads and their herds, but when the climate becomes drier and colder, the rivers and lakes shrink and the pasturage is reduced. This cuts down the food supply and forces the nomads to rampage into the land of their neighbors. Speaking of the thirteenth century, Arnold Toynbee declared that the "paroxyrm of aridity coincided in date with the demoniac eruption of the Mongols, and it will be seen that the physiographical recoil towards humidity likewise corresponds in date with the rapid ebb of the Mongols." (A Study of History, vol. III, p. 439).

Although the outbursts and recessions of the nomads were periodic, the rigid periodization was too mechanical and many scholars have discredited climate as the sole factor. Huntington suggests that four factors may have impelled the huge migration of the nomadic peoples, namely: climate, the inherent quality of the people especially as manifested by the leaders, the pull exerted by the wealth and the opportunities of the agricultural lands, and the push exerted by over-population. (Mainsprings of Civilisation, p. 568).

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A period of peace and prosperity would allow the population of the nomads to increase. However, in the desolate steppes, food
233 was dependent upon flocks of sheep and herds of cattle and horses,
262 and the people, unlike their sedentary neighbors, did not have the tradition nor the facilities for food storage. Any sudden change in climate which caused a reduction of pasturage and water supply would create a "time of troubles" and compel the nomadic people to migrate in search of food and pasturage.

When the nomads were experiencing a "time of troubles," the lush riches and the military weakness of the settled peoples would tempt border tribes to encroach upon the agrarian regions. Distress and discontent at home and the lure of wealth abroad furnish the push and the pull of Toynbee's theories. When the leavening of bold leadership and ideas were added, the nomads often were induced to burst out from the steppes of Asia and to set the world in commotion.

Other scholars entirely discount the influence of climate and seek the explanation for the advance and withdrawal of the nomads in social and political conditions. Owen Lattimore, who has given much thought to this question, (cf. Inner Asian Frontiers, passim), lists a number of reasons other than climate, for the eruption of
NS the nomads. There were, for example, technological factors like
175 the invention of the powerful compound bow and the technique of
121 mounted archery which gave the nomads an edge over their enemies.
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The Chinese had to adopt the nomad bow and the technique of mounted archery before they could meet the nomads on equal terms.

Another factor, according to Lattimore, was the pastoral economy of the nomads which led to migration. Horses and cattle cannot graze on fields that have been cropped by sheep and goats. Therefore, the nomads whose livelihood depended upon their herds and flocks, must continually seek new pastures. The claims to pasturelands and the right of movement led to wars. The continuous wars stimulated the rise of leaders, hard-headed men who survived the hurly-burly of warfare and politics of the steppes and deserts. Finally, a supreme leader emerged who would then weld the various groups into a grand confederation strong enough to encroach upon the neighboring regions for land, for the profits of trade, and for revenue and tribute from the conquered peoples.

According to Lattimore, the nomads who invaded the marginal zone between the steppes and the settled lands, were not pure nomads but were semi-settled. Their wars of conquest were not only for pastures for their herds and flocks but for land, for the riches of the cities, and for the proceeds of commerce. Moreover, the cycles of their invasion and retreat began only a few centuries before the Christian era when they split from the settled peoples on China's northwestern frontier and when they acquired the technology of nomadic warfare. The true nomads on the steppes evolved from the mixed nomads, not vice versa.

The migrations which led to conquest over a wide area, such as those carried out by the Huns, the Turks and the Mongols, normally did not begin with the true nomads but with the mixed nomads, and were caused by (1) a group breaking away from the mixed nomads in order to become true nomads; or (2) a group breaking away from the true nomads in order to revert back to mixed nomadism. The Huns, Turks, and Mongols had fixed bases of operation and their conquests were for land.

Under these circumstances, according to Lattimore, the cycles of nomadic expansion and withdrawal each went through the following process:

1. The maintenance of large armies of mounted warriors to conquer land for the profit of trade and revenue from subject peoples;
2. A dichotomy of nomad society. The nomadic warriors who went forth to conquer and who were left to garrison conquered territories had control of the sources of wealth but declined militarily. The warriors who stayed in the steppes as the military reserve continued to be warlike but gradually became impoverished;
3. A split within the nomad state between those in the conquered areas and those in the steppes, leading to decline and withdrawal.

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6. Summary

In summary, the workings of the historical process represented

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105 in these tides of nomadic eruptions can hardly be explained by one
175 set of factors, useful as it may be as a contribution to our under-
648 standing of this process. Moreover, each set in turn led into a
182 rather involved pattern. Geography and the highly specialized economies of the nomads, particularly when they had reached the stage of pure nomadism, induced them to seek a more stable base for their evolving power urge than could be found in the steppe lands of Mongolia, from which most of the nomadic conquests emerged. It induced them to push first into the oasis situation of Turkestan with its mixed, richer, more stable but, geographically speaking, more fragmented economy. This aspect helped form the pattern of relationships of the group, which was on its way to conquest of other nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples in Central Asia. However, only from the foundation of this economic basis could an effort at conquest of neighboring civilizations be sustained.

The social pattern of development leading a warrior leader to integrate his clan, his tribe, his people, and finally, a confederation of peoples, into a conquest force is interlinked with the previous one. This expansion led to a relative shrinkage of the group that had been carrier of the power urge and more and more force had to be substituted for the self-consciousness of the participants and their community of purpose. In the course of the social development towards conquest and empire building, the initial group gained a feeling of mission but lost its surroundings geographically, economically, and socially. As a rule this change also led to a change in the pattern of emerging leadership: the warrior leader chosen by his own people had to make room for the heir of a diversified empire.

This development again was linked with the development of a relationship to neighboring agricultural societies, particularly China, a relationship that has been understood under the concept of marginality by Krader (The Cultural and Historical Position of the Mongols, Asia Major 3, 1952, 169-183). Economically speaking, this relationship is always one of interdependence. From the Chinese side the natural and necessary exchange of produce was conceived under an evolving series of patterns. In periods of Chinese power ascendancy the nomadic raid pattern was transformed into trade, then into tribute, and then, if necessary, into conquest. However, in periods when a nomadic empire building situation coincided with a decline of Chinese power, the nomads would shake off conquest, resort to raids and to conquest in their turn.

Whatever may have been the causes of the periodic eruption of the nomads, whether they were due to climatic changes or due to concentration and the disintegration of nomadic society, the pattern remained. With clockwork regularity different groups of

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nomads have descended on the marginal zones, such as Turkestan and Inner Mongolia, conquering and absorbing some peoples and pushing others, in a sort of chain reaction, until the reverberations were felt from China Proper in the east to Russia in the west. The history of China's great Northwest cannot be clearly delineated without tracing in broad sweep the see-saw of power between China and the nomadic peoples.

C. Early History to 1644

1. Chou Dynasty

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In antiquity the Northwest region of China was known as the province of Yung, one of the nine provinces of ancient China. For a long time, it was a region inhabited by peoples whom the Chinese called "barbarians," the Ti in the north and the Jung in the west. The founder of the Chou Dynasty, King Wen (circa 12th century B.C.) was himself a "western barbarian." His fief in the Wei River Valley in Shensi, an area which in the early years of Chinese civilization was fertile and fruitful, provided his son, King Wu, with the men and resources for the campaign to gain control over China. Later, as the barbarians of the Northwest became strong, they forced the Chou court to transfer its capital from the Wei River Valley to Honan.

2. Ch'in Dynasty

The region of Shensi, centering around the Wei River Valley, became the fief of the Marquis (later Duke) of Ch'in. The bountiful resources of the region, enhanced further by the development of irrigation, the militant nature of the people who were part Hun, and the administrative and social reforms initiated by Legalist ministers enabled Ch'in to rise to power, to triumph over the other feudal states in 221 B.C., to conquer the empire and establish the first centralized government over China. Ch'ang-an (now Sian), the erstwhile capital of the Chou kings, became the national capital of a mighty empire from this time on, down through the Han, Sui and T'ang Dynasties.

Under the Ch'in state and later the Ch'in empire, the Chinese began to extend their power up the Kansu Corridor and into the regions of the modern provinces of Ninghsia and Chinghai. In the north, they completed the Great Wall to fend off the northern barbarians and to protect their flanks as they advanced westward. The advances made during the Ch'in Dynasty, which fell in 209 B.C., prepared the way for the great expansion of the Chinese into Turkestan during the Han period.

3. Han Dynasty

With the consolidation of Chinese unity a new power arose among the barbarians of the Northwest. This was the confederation of nomadic tribes formed under the leadership of the Hsiung-nu or Huns. During the civil war which overthrew the Ch'in

*175 dynasty, they invaded China. At one time they even surrounded a Chinese army and besieged the first Han emperor. The Han court was constrained to buy them off by paying tribute and by sending Chinese princesses to become the wives of Hunnish chieftains. The constant menace and the sporadic inroads of the Huns finally induced the Han Emperor Wu to attempt, by diplomacy combined with the force of arms, to strike a determined blow at his enemy.

*175 101 During the Ch'in period, there was a people known as the Yüeh-chih who lived in the present-day province of Kansu until they were driven west by the more powerful Huns. These people had moved to Bactria, where they were known to the Greeks as Asoi and Tochari. Later when they established themselves in northern India they were called Kushans. In the hope of enlisting the support of the Yüeh-chih, Emperor Wu sent an officer, Chang Ch'ien, with a small party to locate the Yüeh-chih and to form an alliance with them against their common foe, the Huns.

*175 Chang Ch'ien left China in 138 B.C. and the account of his travels and exploits in Central Asia has since been ranked as one of the great stories of courage and adventure of all times. First he was taken prisoner by the Huns and spent ten years in captivity; Escaping with one companion, he reached the Ili Valley to find that the Yüeh-chih had been driven farther west by another warlike people, the Wusun. Chang went on to Ferghana, in the present region of Khokand, and learned that the Yüeh-chih were in a land southwest of Ta-hsia (Bactria), between the Amu Darya (the Oxus) and the Syr Daria (Jaxartes). When he finally found them, the Yüeh-chih refused to enter into an alliance. Chang made his way back to China. He finally reached it in 126 B.C. after another short captivity by the Huns. He set out again in 115 B.C. and again failed to win over the Yüeh-chih. Although he failed in securing an alliance for a two-front attack on the Huns, Chang was able to return to China with a lore of geographic knowledge of Central Asia that broadened the international outlook of the Chinese people and fired their imagination with ideas of the conquest of the west. The victory of Han troops over the Huns in 121 B.C. opened the Kansu Corridor to Chinese colonization. Other Han armies under Li Kuang-li conquered the Tarim Basin in 104 and 102 B.C. and garrisoned the distant outposts of the Han empire. Both the northern and southern routes around Tienshan came under Chinese domination and the presence of Chinese troops safeguarded the flow of trade between China and the West.

After a temporary eclipse of Chinese power in Turkestan during the inter-regnum of Wang Mang in the first decade of the Christian era, the Chinese reestablished themselves in the Western Regions (Hsi-yü), a name given at this time to the

*175 territories west of the Kansu Corridor. In A.D. 44, the Chinese inflicted a crushing defeat on the Huns, splitting their confederacy into two hordes, one of which migrated westward to reappear a couple of centuries later as "the scourge of Europe." Set in motion by a strong push, the migration of a nomadic people from the border of the Han Empire to the frontier of the Roman Empire, was but one of the more conspicuous examples of how events in the Orient had their repercussions in Europe. The effects of famine or plenty, peace and chaos in China, transmitted through the conduit of Turkestan, were felt eventually in faraway Europe.

A revolt of the desert tribes that almost lost Turkestan to China led to another Chinese expedition in A.D. 78. The pacification was largely the work of one man, Pan Ch'ao, who, by diplomacy and high-handed methods, won the Tarim Basin back to Chinese political control. A Chinese protectorate-general was established over the oasis states of Khotan, Kharashahr, Kucha, and Kashgar, and later Pan Ch'ao was appointed the protector-general. His military activities raised the prestige of Han China so that "more than fifty nations sent hostages." States as distant as Parthia sent tribute. In A.D. 97, he led his army of native levies under Chinese officers to the shores of the Caspian Sea, the farthest western penetration of a Chinese-led army. In this campaign, one of his officers travelled further west and would have established contact with the Roman Empire had he not turned back, balked by stories of the hardship of sea voyages told to him by his native guides.

In the Han period the Chinese employed two methods for the domination of the Western Regions. In areas close to China, the native administration was transformed and merged into the provincial governments of the Chinese. In states farther away, the natives were permitted to retain their own political system and to govern themselves under their own chieftains, with the Chinese in charge of the army and of diplomatic affairs. By this method, the native states served as buffers to protect China from external encroachment. The chieftains of the native states were chosen from the ones who were favorable and loyal to China. They were given honors and titles, and girls of the imperial house to be their consorts. The display of armed might discouraged ideas of independence and quelled attempts at secession. To provide food for the army of occupation and to lessen the drain on the home government, Chinese troops were settled on the land as farmers and their efforts influenced the techniques of agriculture and irrigation in the far west.

However, because of the long line of communication with the home base, Chinese control over Turkestan was always precarious. Traffic through the Kansu Corridor was threatened by the Chiang (a proto-Tibetan people) who inhabited the region of present-

*175 day Chinghai. The constant raids of the Chiang on one border and the revival of nomad power in the Tarim Basin following the retirement and death of Pan Ch'ao combined to force the Chinese to abandon Turkestan and to withdraw back into the Kansu Corridor.

China's withdrawal from the northwestern regions was not entirely the result of strong pressure from the non-Chinese peoples. It was also the consequence of the decline of Chinese political power and the division of China into a number of belligerent states. With the growing weakness of China, the balance of power shifted to the side of the nomads.

4. The period of North and South

During the latter part of the Han dynasty too, large numbers of native troops were recruited into the Chinese army and stationed in China along the northern frontier. With the weakening of Chinese rule they threw off their allegiance. Joined by hordes of other nomads who poured through the undefended ramparts of the Kansu Corridor and other strategic points of China's northern and northwestern frontier, they set up strong militaristic states in North China. This took place in the first decades of the fourth century. In 316, the Chin dynasty, which had emerged from the civil wars that marked the fall of the Han, was driven to South China by the invading barbarians. For more than two and a half centuries, a succession of non-Chinese kingdoms ruled North China. Some of the more aggressive ones extended their influence to the Northwest.

5. Sui dynasty

The T'u-chüeh or Turks, descendants of the Huns, rose to prominence during this period as the dominant people on China's northwestern frontier and China's most dangerous external foe. They appeared in the middle of the sixth century when they defeated the Juan-juan, a Mongolian people. Forming an alliance with the Sassanid monarchs of Persia, they drove the Hephthalites or White Huns into India and established themselves in the region of Bokhara and Samarkand. Then, forming an alliance with Byzantium, they defeated their former allies, the Sassanids. The region they occupied straddled the trade routes between the Orient and the Near East and their levies on the commercial caravans gave them the economic resources that spurred their rise as a military power.

In 589, China was once more reunited by the Sui dynasty and the national capital once again was established at Ch'angan (Sian). It was a strong and aggressive dynasty and the Turks were at first inclined to make friendly overtures through embassies sent to the Sui court. But the first Sui emperor was shrewd enough to realize that there could not be any enduring amity between China and the Turkish confederation and that sooner or later the Turks would attempt to invade China. The policy of the first Sui

*175 emperor in regard to the Turks was one of diplomacy backed by military power. Since the Turks were divided into the eastern and western branches, he conferred honors and titles on the kagans of both branches, encouraging them to bid for his favors. By concluding an agreement with the Sui court the Western Turks put the Eastern Turks in the shade. Not to be outdone, the Eastern Turks submitted and became vassals of Sui.

This policy of divide-and-rule served to forestall a major war between China and the Turks. However, it did not prevent sporadic border clashes nor revolts when the attention of the Sui court was diverted to internal unrest and troubles from foreign enemies from other quarters.

6.. T'ang Dynasty

The Turks supported the House of Li, which spearheaded the revolt against Sui and founded the T'ang dynasty in 618. However, in 624, a severe cold wave coupled with dwindling food supplies compelled the Eastern Turks to make a large-scale incursion into China. They advanced to the gates of the T'ang capital, Ch'angan (Sian) and, in the fury and momentum of their eruption, they could have overrun North China. Having arranged with the Western Turks to harass the rear of the Eastern Turks, young Li Shih-min, later Emperor T'ai-tsung, by a daring feat of diplomacy, persuaded the Eastern Turks to sign a treaty of friendship with China and to withdraw.

When he became emperor, three years later, Li Shih-min set out to diminish the power of the Turks. His agents sowed dissension in Turkish ranks and incited the people to rise against their rulers. T'ang troops lent assistance to the rebels and in 630 succeeded in destroying the Eastern Turks. Turkish troops were incorporated into the Chinese army. For the next half century, the expansion of the Chinese into the Northwest was accomplished largely with the aid of these Turkish auxiliaries.

Having eliminated the Eastern Turks, the T'ang emperor employed the same methods of creating dissension, followed by the intervention of Chinese troops, to overcome the Western Turks who were settled in the Ili Valley. It was a long campaign, but, as the war progressed, the Chinese found many allies among the native tribes of Central ASia. The Uighurs were the most useful. With their aid, the T'ang forces finally crushed the Western Turks (657-59) and took possession of their lands. Thus the frontier of the T'ang empire extended westward to the valley of the Oxus, northward to Lake Balkash and southward to the Pamirs. The amount of territory encompassed was greater than that under the Han dynasty.

Earlier, between 630 and 639, a T'ang army had subdued the Tibetan kingdom of Turfan in the region of Chinghai and a Chinese princess was given in marriage to the king of Tibet. Through her

*175 influence and the Chinese artisans in her entourage, some fundamental changes were instituted in Tibet. From Tibet, a Chinese-led army invaded northern India in a punitive expedition to avenge an insult to a Chinese envoy.

The advance of the Chinese armies and the political stability that followed their occupation gave impetus to the development of Buddhism. Many of the tribes, such as the Uighurs, were converted. It was at this time that a Chinese pilgrim, Hsuan-tsang, writing of her peregrinations to India, gave a vivid description of conditions in Central Asia.

In the administration of the lands west of the Kansu Corridor, the T'ang officials went a step further than their predecessors of the Han period. As the troops of the native states in Turkestan were incorporated into the Chinese army, so were their governments absorbed into the Chinese provincial system and the native rulers who were retained were treated as Chinese officials. Following the policy of the Han court, the T'ang emperors established a protectorate-general over the Western Regions. Troops, who at their top strength numbered nearly half a million men, were garrisoned in Kucha, Kharashahr, Kashgar and Khotan. To reduce the drain on the government, they were settled on the land.

But, as in the Han period, the T'ang government could not succeed in completely subjugating the native people. Its domination of Turkestan was maintained in the face of constant and powerful opposition. In 670, the Tibetans attacked. They captured the four garrison towns and thus severed the trade route between China and Central Asia. Though driven back by the Chinese, the Tibetans, nine years later, formed an alliance with the Western Turks. Their combined power almost succeeded in wresting Turkestan from the control of the Chinese. It was only in 692, that the Chinese destroyed the Turkish-Tibetan alliance, recaptured the four garrison towns, and reopened the trade routes.

Having triumphed over the Western Turks and the Tibetans, the Chinese soon found themselves confronting a new and more formidable foe. Early in the eighth century, led by their general Qutaiba, the black-flag armies of the Arabs marched into Sogdiana. They were at the height of their power and stories of their prowess in battle had preceded them. The fearful princes of Transoxiana and the Tarim region pleaded for aid and succor from China, but the T'ang court, now less vigorous than before, was disinclined to heed their pleas for help. When pressed, it gave only token aid to some of the nearby vassals.

The reluctance of the T'ang court gave the Tibetans their long sought-for chance to strike a blow against China and to reestablish their prestige as a great military power. To do this they needed the assistance of the Arabs. Since the Chinese-garrisoned cities in the Tarim Basin blocked the easiest and most direct route, the

*175 Tibetans had to take a circuitous way over the Hindu Kush and across the headwaters of the Indus River in order to reach the open end of the Oxus Valley. In 741, despite three Chinese expeditions to prevent them, the Tibetans succeeded in joining hands with the Arabs. The junction of the Tibetans and the Arabs presented such a strong military combination that many of the small states in Central Asia threw off their allegiance to China and joined the allies. Chinese political influence in the Tarim Basin was undermined.

The T'ang court thereupon decided to split the alliance and to regain its influence in Turkestan. The officer chosen for this task was a Korean named Kao Hsien-chih. Kao, who was second in command of the four garrison towns, set out in 747 with an army of 10,000, horse and foot. From Kashgar, and Aksu, his army marched through Tash Qurghan, then across the high and inhospitable plateau of the Pamirs. Defeating the Tibetans who were entrenched in a fortified position near Sarbad, he brought his army through the ice-covered Darkot and Boroghil passes to the valleys of the Yasin and the Gilgit, tributaries of the Indus. His expedition across the Hindu Kush cut the Tibetan-Arab line of communications. Sir Aurel Stein, who has followed the route of Kao Hsien-chih's march, calls it a feat which matched those of the great Alpine commanders. Three years later, he defeated a determined attempt by the Tibetans to recover the Yasin-Gilgit area, Chitral and Tokharistan. By reestablishing Chinese ascendancy in the moutainous region where today the frontiers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan meet, he was able to bring the princes in the Vale of Kashmir and the Indus valley back to the political fold of China.

The reassertion of Chinese power in Central Asia was brief. Kao's high-handed treatment of the people in Tashkent, a thousand miles north of the scene of his victorious expedition, stirred up a wholesale rebellion of the people in the region beyond the Syr Daria (Jaxartes). They were given aid and support by the Arabs. Kao Hsien-chih marched north to suppress the rebellion and, in one of the decisive battles of history, the Chinese army under Kao clashed with the Arabs and their native allies at Athlach on the banks of the Talas River in July, 751. Caught between the Arab legions and the forces of Tashkent, Kao and his 30,000 men were decimated. The battle determined the fate of Central Asia. Supremacy in that region passed from the Chinese to the Arabs. Some of the Chinese prisoners of war were taken as far as Bagdad and other cities of the Abbassid Caliphate. There they introduced Chinese technology such as the art of making paper and spinning silk, and lacquerware. A few of them were able to find their way back to China by way of the Indian Ocean and brought back first-hand information of the Near East.

*175 The Chinese defeat in Central Asia had repercussions in China. The military disaster laid bare the weakness of the T'ang government. Foreign auxiliaries revolted and in 755 drove the emperor from his capital Ch'ang-an (Sian). Not until 757 did the T'ang troops, aided by Central Asian mercenaries, including an Arab contingent sent by the Caliph Abu Jafar al Mansur, finally put down the rebellion. Many of the Arab soldiers settled down in China and the Islamic conversion of the Kansu Corridor and Sinkiang dates from this period. Islam flourished. It escaped the persecutions directed at the other religions at the end of the T'ang dynasty, probably because of the services that the Arab troops had rendered to the T'ang court.

There were still trouble from the Tibetans who in 763 invaded and sacked the T'ang capital Ch'ang-an (Sian). In repeated incursions which lasted until 801 they spread ruin and panic through the western marches of China. In 798, the T'ang emperor Tetsung concluded an alliance with the Caliph Harun al Rashid and, in a long drawn out campaign the Tibetans were finally brought to their knees in 821. Shortly afterwards, internal dissensions sapped the power of the Tibetans and they ceased to be an important factor in the affairs of Central Asia.

Following the reverses suffered by the T'ang armies in the far West and the progressive withdrawal of T'ang authority, the Turkic peoples began to reassert themselves and to set up independent kingdoms. The Uighurs, who defeated the Eastern Turks in 744, established an empire centered around their base on the Orkhon River in Western Mongolia. They were overwhelmed by the Kirghiz in 840. Some of the Uighurs migrated to the region of the Irtish River, but the bulk of them moved to the area around Urumchi and the Tarim Basin. The Qarluqs entrenched themselves in the territory of the Ili River while the Sha-t'o (of Chöl) had control of the area of present-day Kansu. As they steadily grew in power and as the T'ang empire disintegrated in a welter of insurrections and civil wars, these border peoples, such as the Sha-t'o, began to edge their way through the Kansu Corridor and other passes and to set up militaristic states in North and Northwest China.

7. Sung Dynasty

Conditions were stabilized in the tenth century with the reduction of the score and more of petty states into three major states: the Chinese dynasty of Sun occupying most of what is China Proper today, the Khitan state of Liao in North China claiming suzerainty over Mongolia westward to the Altai Mountains, and the Tangut state of Hsi-hsia which occupied the strategic Kansu Panhandle and parts of present-day Ninghsia. The Tibetans held Chinghai. These states waged long and fruitless wars against each other until the emergence of a new power, the Juchens from Manchuria, *175 led to another change in the geographic and political picture. The Juchens, whose state was named Chin, destroyed the Liao empire and supplanted the Khitans in North China. A branch of the royal family of Liao fled westward to found the kingdom of Kara Khitai in the Tarim Basin. Defeated by the Juchens, the Sung court fled southward to establish themselves below the Yangtze River.

The invasions of nomadic peoples in north and northwest China and the border wars that had been raging for over two centuries were dwarfed in magnitude and ferocity by the appearance of a new people. Far up north, in the heart of the Gobi Desert, the Mongols under the leadership of Chingis Khan had fought their way to supremacy over the other nomadic tribes. Erupting from their desert fastness, they conquered the Tangut state of Hsi-hsia in 1209 and made forays into the Chin kingdom in North China. Pushing westward, the Mongols entered the Tarim Basin in 1217 and subdued the state of Kara Khitai. Then they launched an offensive against the Khwarezmian empire located in the region between the Syr Daria (Oxus) and the Amu Daria (Jaxartes). Mongol horsemen plundered the riches of the Punjab while other spearheads driving westward penetrated Southern Russia as far as the Dnieper.

Returning from their invasion of Russia in 1225, the Mongol forces destroyed the Tangut state of Hsi-hsia in 1227 for its failure to cooperate with the Mongol overlords. Although Chingis Khan died that year, his sons continued the war against Chin, which they wiped out in 1234. The extinction of Chin brought the Mongols face to face with Sung China. In a desultory war lasting forty years, interrupted by another Mongol excursion into Europe, the Sung dynasty was destroyed and all China came under the domination of the Mongol Yüan dynasty.

8. Yüan Dynasty

Although under the rule of the Mongols there was peace in the region of Kansu and Turkestan so that there was a resumption of caravan traffic via the Silk Roads, yet the peace was ephemeral. During the reign of Qubilai, who conquered and unified China, there were costly internecine wars between him and his cousin, Khaidu, who had his base in the region later known as Dzungaria in northern Turkestan. After Qubilai's death, Turkestan, though nominally a part of the Yüan empire, was more or less the independent domain of the princes of the Chagatai branch of the Mongol ruling house.

9. Ming dynasty

In China, the Mongol dynasty was overthrown in 1367. The Chinese, who established the Ming dynasty, paid little attention to the Northwest regions. Neither the first Ming emperor, who was concerned with the consolidation and reconstruction of China, nor the third emperor, who built a powerful navy for expansion

*175 to the southeast, were interested in the recovery of Turkestan. They had a purely defensive policy for the northwest land frontier. They fortified the passes in the Kansu Corridor and conciliated the Uighur inhabitants of Turkestan by granting them honors and privileges and not interfering with their governments.

The Ming court was more concerned with the Mongols in the north. The strongest of these were the Oirats who at first submitted and then rebelled. The Yung-lo emperor personally led a series of expeditions into Mongolia and succeeded in holding them in check. But as the military strength of Ming China ebbed after his death, their power increased. In 1449, one of their chiefs, Esen, inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Ming forces and took the Ming emperor as prisoner. At the height of their power, the Oirats controlled an area as far west as the northern portion of Tienshan, as far south as Kansu and as far east as Chahar.

Throughout the Ming period, there were incessant encroachments by the Oirat, but the most serious were those led by Altan Khan in the 16th century. In his three major invasions of China, his horsemen despoiled the provinces of Shansi, Ninghsia and Kansu and extended the orbit of his power from Uriangghai in the north to Chinghai and Tibet in the south. He built a vast, though evanescent Mongol empire. Finally, in his old age he accepted a title from the Ming court and halted his raids on China.

Thus, for about eight hundred years from the latter part of
the T'ang to the beginning of the Ch'ing, the extent of the Chinese
empire did not go beyond the Kansu Corridor and the vast region
of the Northwest was free of Chinese rule. During this long
period, the Chinese were not only unable to recover Turkestan
[167] but they were also uninterested in its recovery. The advance of
the border peoples into China's North and Northwest pushed the
Chinese to the South and Southeast. Gradually, with the rise of
the southeastern coastlands as the cultural and economic centers
of China and with the development of maritime travel, there was
greater intercourse between China and the outside world by sea.
The nation turned towards the Southeast to face the sea and the
importance of the Kansu Corridor declined to that of the backdoor
of China.

*175 Another reason for the reorientation was economic. Climatic
13 changes resulting in increased aridity led to the shrinkage of the
487 chain of oases that formed the caravan routes. This made travel
difficult, and the desiccation of the soil reduced the fertility of
the Wei River valley, once the home of Chinese civilization and
*175 the base for China's imperialist expansion. Natural calamities,
73 such as floods, droughts, pestilence, and famine, and the devas-
166 tation of wars added to the impoverishment of the area and quick-
ened the shift of population centers from the Northwest to the
*175 Southeast. Sian (Ch'ang-an) the capital of China for two thousand
633

+175 years, ceased to be the leading metropolis, dropping in rank to
[633] a city of secondary importance. This decline of the Northwest
[178] had been in process since the end of the Han dynasty and had
accelerated during the T'ang. The decreasing productivity of the
land made it harder and harder to maintain large bodies of troops
+175 to defend the Northwest frontier. Supplies for the defense forces,
724 not to say for campaigns to the Far West had to be brought up by
canals from the Southeast, a tenuous system which, once obstruc-
487 ted, would constrain the withdrawal of Chinese troops from far-
flung outposts in the Northwest and render abortive any attempt
at their recovery.

000 II. The Succession of Steppe Empires

A. The Scythians

Historically, the first empire to break out of the steppes was founded by the Scythians. They are supposed to have been a North-Iranian people, who nomadized in what is today's Turkestan and Western Siberia. The Greek historian, Herodotus, has left a rather intimate description of their manners and folkways. They are mentioned also in Assyrian, Persian and Indian sources (under the name Saka). Of the three groups of Scythians who inhabited respectively the Ferghana-Kashgar area, the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, and western Siberia north and northeast of the Caspian Sea, it was the last that set events in motion. In the second half of the eighth century B.C. this group fell upon the Cymmerians, a Thraco-Phrygean people settled north of the Black Sea. This conquest catalysed a migration of nations, the echo of which was heard even by the prophets of Israel. It was the first known inroad of the steppe nomads into the southern cultural world.

The Scythian Empire continued until the third century B.C. Its southward drive under the leadership of Ishpakai was stopped by the Assyrians in 678 B.C. Ishpakai's successors, Bartatua and Madyes, expanded their empire towards the south and the west. In ca. 628 B.C., however, they were repulsed by the Medes under Kyaxares. The Persians under Cyrus battled against the Scythians in the region east of Khiva in ca. 529 B.C. and 15 years later under Darius in the southern Ukraine. The Scythians finally were decimated by the Sarmathians, another North-Iranian nomadic tribe, who pushed the Scythians into the Crimea towards the end of the third century B.C.

There is abundant archeological evidence of the Scythian Empire. Their particular art style, the so-called animal style, set the pattern for subsequent craftsmen of the steppe. Its influence was felt all over Central Asia well into the confines of early Chinese dynasties.

*175 B. The Huns

For centuries Turco-Mongolian tribes had raided the Chinese frontier. A confederation of these tribes was brought about by their ruler Touman (Chinese: Shan-yü ; Mongolian: Tengri). Known to the Chinese as the Hsiung-nu, and to the west, some time later, as the Huns, this confederation occupied the mountainous area of the upper Orkhon River, not far from the later Mongol capital, Kharakhorum. Under the pressure of the Huns, China changed from fighting in chariots to cavalry tactics. Even though expelled from the present-day Ordos and Alashan regions by the Ch'in commander, Meng T'ien, the Huns became a formidable power and adopted Chinese administrative experience for the creation of their empire. Under Maotun (209-174 B.C.), they successfully invaded China and forced the Han emperor, Kao-tsu, to negotiate. Maotun's son, Laoshan (174-161 B.C.) forced the Yueh-chih (Tochari) to migrate westward from western Kansu. A group of Yüeh-chih turned toward Tibet. Most passed through the Northern Gobi and attempted to settle in the Ili Valley and the Issyk Kul Basin, but were driven off by the Wu-sun (presumably a people belonging to the Sarmathian Alans). Thereupon they moved to the Jaxartes on the Graeco-Bactrian border. Pushed by the Yüeh-chih (140-130 B.C.), the Saka (eastern Scyths) moved south and seized Graeco-Bactria from the King, Heliokles. Crossing the Oxus River, the Yüeh-chih next conquered Bactria and the Saka escaped to Drangiana (Scistan) and Kandahar in present-day Afghanistan (130-70 B.C.).

The Kushans, one of the five Yüeh-chih clans to depart from Bactria in 128 B.C. conquered a part of Northern India in the period 30-244 A.D. Thus, the first impact of the Huns had an important influence upon the fate of Asia, particularly Central Asia. Their forward drive contributed to Hellenism's loss of Afghanistan, the destruction of the Iranian-Parthian Empire, and the creation of the Indo-Scythian Empire. The expulsion and dispersal of the Yüeh-chih increased the importance of the Huns. Thereafter they ruled on both sides of the eastern Gobi, Inner Mongolia and northwestern China. Through the campaigns of Emperor Wu, between 124 and 102 B.C., the Huns were driven back into Central Asia, Inner strife weakened the Hsiung-nu Empire after 60 B.C. and eventually it split into an eastern and a western part, the former occupying present-day Mongolia and Sinkiang and the latter the region between Lake Balkash and the Aral Sea. However, the new West Hunnic Empire was unable to consolidate itself and was further weakened by a Chinese military expedition (36-35 B.C.). Only ca. 370-375 A.D., under Balamir and Attila, did the Western Huns again enter upon the stage of history. The fate of the Eastern Empire has been described above.

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C. Other Turko-Mongol Empires

The destruction of the Eastern Huns was brought about not by the Chinese but by the Hsien-pi. They are believed to have been Proato-Mongols from the Hsingan area in Manchuria, and replaced Hunnish rule on the Orkhon in the middle of the second century B. C.

Not until the fourth century A. D. did a new forward migration of the Huns begin. Liu YÜan, ruler of a Hunnish tribe of Inner Mongolia, planned the conquest of China. His son Liu Tsung (310-318 A. D.) became the "Atilla of China". He conquered and laid waste Lo-yang (311 A. D.) and Ch'ang-an (312 A. D.). He captured and killed two China emperors. The pressure of the Hsiung-nu forced the Chin to transfer the capital to Chin-ling (Nanking) and the Huns founded their first dynasty on Chinese soil, the Chao Dynasty, 304-352 A. D. It was succeeded by the (Hunnish?) Ch'in Dynasty, which extended from Shensi far into Central Asia (351-392) and then by the Hsia (407-431), which ruled over part of the same territory. During this period the Hsien-pi eventually succeeded in establishing one dynasty in Kansu (Southern Liang, 397-404) and a succession of different ones in North China (Yen, 349-410). Other Mongol and Turkish tribes established themselves in Shensi and Kansu.

Another confederation which resorted to empire-building on Chinese soil was the Toba, an offshoot of the Hsien-pi. This confederation appears to have consisted of a Turkic core with proto-Mongolian and possibly even Tungusic components. The Toba asserted themselves against all of the nomadic states on Chinese soil. Their dynasty, the Wei, founded in 386, eventually encompassed the entire area of North China, and parts of Inner Asia up to Tun-huang. It finally split apart in 535. Thus the Toba succeeded in establishing the most enduring conquest dynasty of this period. This was due to a series of factors: the original breadth of their confederation; the initial vigor of their leadership; the readiness to conform to Chinese social and administrative patterns for the governing of their Chinese empire; and, most important, the wisdom they gained from the shortcomings of earlier conquest dynasties. Once settled on Chinese soil most of these had tended to lose their identity. More significantly, they had cut their ties to the nomadic home base, which, after all, was the only source of strength to sustain their power in the new environment. The Toba, however, had consciously divided their society into two sectors, one of which was to rule Chinese (agricultural) territories with the help of Chinese administrative experience, whereas the other was to maintain the nomadic and warrior traditions of the steppe. Only after this balance had been disturbed in favor of the Chinese sector did the Toba Empire disintegrate due to martial pressures emanating, not from the Chinese population they ruled, but from their neglected nomad-warriors.

*175 Goodrich (A Short History of the Chinese People, p. 85) conveniently tabulates the different conquest dynasties of this period in the following way:

Ruling Group	Race	Domain	Date of Rule
CHAO			
Early Chao, or northern Han	Hsiung-nu	Shansi	304-329
Later Chao	Hsiung-nu	Hopei	319-352
LIANG			
Early Liang	Chinese	Kansu; central Asia as far as Turfan	313-376
Later Liang	Turkic or Mongol	Kansu	386-403
Southern Liang	Hsien-pi or Turkic	Kansu	397-404, 408-414
Northern Liang	Hsiung-nu	Western Kansu; central Asia as far as Kao-ch'ang	397-439
Western Liang	Chinese?	Western Kansu	401/5-421
YEN			
Early Yen	Hsien-pi or Mongol	Hopei and Honan	349-370
Later Yen	Hsien-pi	Hopei	384-408
Western Yen	Hsien-pi	Shansi	384-396
Southern Yen	Hsien-pi	Shantung	398-410
Northern Yen	Chinese	Northern Hopei and Southern Manchuria	409-436
CH'IN			
Early Ch'in	Mongol	Shensi; and into central Asia at one time	351-394
Later Ch'in	Mongol or Tibetan	Shensi	384-417
Western Ch'in	Turkic or Mongol	Kansu	385-390, 409-431
HSIA	Hsiung-nu	Shensi	407-431
WEI			
Northern Wei	Turkic	All of North China and part of Central Asia	386-535

*175 In 402 A.D. the leader of the Juan-juan, believed to be a proto-Mongolian people, ruled the Gobi and Tsaidam area. With him and his successors the titles Khan and Khagan, for the first time replaced the Hsiung-nu title of Shan-yü (tengri).

In approximately 440 A.D. the Hephtalitic or White Huns, a horde probably of Mongolian origin, migrated from the Altai region via Turkestan into Transoxania. Their leader, Aqsunvar, defeated and killed Peroz, the king of the Sassanids (484 A.D.). The latter's successor, Kavadh (498 or 499 A.D.), was almost a vassal but the Sassanid state remained too powerful to provide a promising target. Therefore, the Hephtalites turned against India.

Thus by about 500 A.D. the steppe was divided into three vast Turko-Mongolian empires. The Juan-Juan ruled the area from the Manchurian border to Turfan and the eastern extremity of Lake Balkash, and from the Orkhon River to the Great Wall. They seemed to have exercised a type of suzerainty over the Hephtalites, who ruled the area from Turkestan to Eastern Iran, and from the Aral Sea to the Punjab. The Western Huns, who had already split into several groups by this time, controlled the steppes of South Russia.

D. The T'u-chüeh (Turks)

In the middle of the sixth century a new empire arose in the steppes. It was known to the Chinese by the name, T'u-chüeh, an attempted transliteration of an original Türküt, plural form of the word Türk meaning "strong." The T'u-chüeh had resided in the Altai region as part of the Juan-Juan confederation. Around 520 A.D. an internecine war had broken out among the Juan-Juan and had led to their weakening. A revolt of the proto-Uighuric Tölös against the Juan-Juan was suppressed ca. 546 A.D. with the aid of the T'u-chüeh whose tribes united under Bumin. Under his leadership and in cooperation with the Toba, the T'u-chüeh destroyed the Juan-Juan empire in 551. The last Juan-Juan Khaqan ended his life by suicide, 552 A.D. Then Bumin took the title of Khaqan and ruled over the Orkhon region, which remained the pivot of steppe empires from the days of the Hsiung-nu to the era of Chingis Khan.

Bumin's son, Mu-han, (553-572 A.D.) founded an Eastern branch that ruled the approximate area of present-day Outer and Inner Mongolia. Bumin's younger brother, Istemi, (552-575 A.D.) founded a Western line in Eastern Turkestan. The latter destroyed the Hephtalite Empire with the aid of the Sassanids (565 A.D.). Some of the Hephtalites on the Aral Sea apparently became the nucleus of the Avars who pressed forward into Europe. Istemi, now a neighbor of the Sassanid Empire, allied himself with Byzantium (567 A.D.). However, his son, Tardu (572-603 A.D.), attacked Byzantium in the Crimea. The conquest of heretofore Persian Tokharistan was completed.

#175 As long as the semblance of cooperation between the two Turkic empires was maintained, it constituted a formidable threat to newly-reunited China. However, the Western ruler, Yabghu (possibly an Indo-Scythian title adopted by the Western Turks) Tardu refused to recognize the Khaqan title of the Eastern Empire. The Chinese at first supported Tardu in order to stave off the more immediate threat of the Eastern Turks. Later, however, when Tardu advanced against Ch'ang-an (601 A.D.), they allied themselves with the Eastern Empire and incited the Tölös in Dzungaria against him. Tardu was forced to flee to Lake Kokonor and disappeared (603 A.D.). With the rise of the T'ang, conquest replaced diplomacy in Chinese dealings with the Turks. The Eastern Turkic El-Khagan (Chinese: Hsi-lieh) was defeated in 630 A.D., again with the support of the Tölös.

Disintegration of the Eastern Turkic Empire, brought about by a rebellion of the Turkic Qarluqs, accelerated. Even the Indo-Scythian states of the Tarim Basin were forced into submission. The Eastern Turkic Empire became subject to China for fifty years. (630-682 A.D.).

The Eastern Turkic Empire was revived under the Khagan Qutlugh (died 691 A.D.) with the aid of the able Chinese-educated statesman, Tonyukuk. Khagan Mo-cho (691-716 A.D.) successfully interfered in internal Chinese quarrels. With the aid of the Chinese he defeated the Khitan (see below) (696-697 A.D.). However, he died as a result of a conspiracy. He was succeeded by his brother, Bilge Khagan (716-734 A.D.), who, upon the advice of Tonyukuk, negotiated a peace treaty with China (721-722 A.D.) and erected a stele engraved with the so-called Orkhon inscriptions, the oldest example of literary Turkish. His death by poison led to a serious crisis and finally to the destruction of the Eastern Turkic Empire (744 A.D.) by the Uighurs who were allied with China.

E. The Uighur Empire

The Uighur, who, in alliance with other Central Asiatic tribes, succeeded in smashing the powerful Eastern Turkic Empire, had originally been part of the Tölös confederation. They had nomadized along the banks of the Selenga in northern Mongolia, even though part of the Turkic Empire had maintained a rather independent existence. In their wars against the Eastern Turks the Uighurs had sided with the Chinese; by the middle of the eighth century we find an Uighur confederation, consisting of nine Uighur tribes, the Qarlug, and the Basmil, in possession of a territory ranging from present-day Manchuria to the Altai and the Tienshan. Their capital was again situated on the Orkhon at what is today's Qara-Balgasun. During Kao Hsien-chih's campaigns in Central Asia they had kept a friendly neutrality. This traditional friendship led the T'ang rulers to enlist their help in suppressing the An Lu-shan rebellion (see China General, Historical Setting). Without their support, the

*195 rebellion might have meant the death-knell of the T'ang Empire. Twice they freed Lo-yang from the rebels, and they again assisted the Chinese in repulsing the Tibetans. The Uighur Empire became the principal power of Central Asia. Several of their Khagans received Chinese princesses in marriage, and a thriving exchange of tribute continued to bind the two empires together. As evidenced by the famous trilingual Qara-Balasagun inscription, Manicheism was introduced to the Uighurs from China and became their dominant religion.

Since the third decade of the ninth century inner strife had plagued the Uighur court. Thus the Kirghiz, approaching from the upper Yenissei, were able to destroy the Uighur Empire in 840 A.D. Its last Khagan fell in battle, and until 920 A.D. the Kirghiz controlled the key position on the Orkhon River.

The remaining Uighur tribes sought refuge among the Tibetans and the Chinese. Those who had fled to the Chinese found no welcome and were extinguished by 848. Those who had fled toward the west, however, were able to maintain two centers of continued Uighur existence, one in western Kansu and one in the area of Kucha and Bisbalig. In the tenth century they were strongly entrenched in the Kan-chou and the Turfan area, still retaining tribute relationship with late T'ang and the so-called Five Dynasties.

F. The Sha-t'o (Chöl Turks)

The Sha-t'o or Chöl Turks, who played such a decisive part in Chinese history during the tenth century, had originally belonged to the western T'u-chüeh Empire. In the seventh century, east of Lake Barkul, they split away from this Empire. One section of their tribes was still found between the tenth and the twelfth centuries north of the Aral Sea. However, the main group was dislocated by the Tibetans in 712 and immigrated west into the area of Ku-ch'eng. A century later, driven out again by the Tibetans, they requested protection from China and were assigned grazing territory in the Ordos and Alashan region. From there, under their young commander, Li K'o-yung, they interfered in favor of the tottering T'ang house. Two of the short-lived Five Dynasties, the Posterior T'ang (923-936) and the Posterior Chin (936-946 A.D.) were Sha-t'o foundations.

G. The Khitan and the Juchen

The Khitan are now commonly considered to be descendants of the Hsien-pi. At the time of the founding of their empire, however, they constituted a highly complex tribal society in which Tungusic and Uighur components were particularly strong. They are mentioned in Chinese records in the early fifth century as nomadizing in present-day Jehol. Raids across the Chinese border are frequently mentioned.

#175 Chinese attempts to subdue them appear to have been generally unsuccessful. Toward the end of the seventh century a major drive toward empire-building was blocked by the Eastern Turks. Thus only in the early tenth century did they emerge as a major power under the energetic leadership of their Khan, Ye-lü A-pao-chi (died 926). In 924, A-pao-chi drove the Kirghiz out of the Orkhon region. At the same time he destroyed the Tungusic North Korean Kingdom of Po-hai. His son and successor (927-47) assumed the Chinese dynastic title of Liao (937).

The empire that was erected covered most of present-day Manchuria, part of North China including present-day Peking and Tatung, and Mongolia up to the Altai. They took Kan-chou and Su-chou from the Uighurs, but an attempted drive toward Kashgar was cut short.

The patterns of conquest and rule of the Liao Emperors are based on the same principle which earlier conquerors had used: a dichotomy of administrative and social institutions into two sectors, a "Chinese" and a "tribal" one. In this way Khitan power remained impregnable even after the rise of the new indigenous Chinese dynasty, the Sung (960). The Sung had to recognize the Liao Empire and even to pay heavy tribute to guarantee a peace negotiated in 1004. This peace lasted for about a century.

When, in 1125, the Juchen finally smashed the Liao Empire, the "tribal sector" of the Khitan migrated west under the leadership of Ye-lü Ta-shih, who founded the empire of Kara-Khitai in Turkestan up to the Aral Sea.

The Juchen (Jürched) who rose under A-ku-ta (1113-1123) took over the Liao Empire and added to it the greater part of North China, after having captured the Sung capital, Kaifeng, and abducting into captivity two Chinese Emperors (1126). The Sung again had to pay heavy tribute to maintain a precarious peace. The Juchen were a Tungusic people who already had stopped the earlier drive of the Khitan toward the sea and toward Korea. They called their dynasty Chin (Gold). Their patterns of rule followed closely those of the Liao.

H. The Mongols

By the end of the twelfth century the actual steppe empires in Central Asia were limited to the region north of the Gobi and to the Altai, Khangai and the Kentei ranges. The Maiman, a mongolized Turkic people living on the upper Trtych, adopted cultural characteristics from the Uighurs. The Turkic Kirghiz, who had been expelled from the Orkhon region by the Khitan, lived further north. Another Turkic people, the Kereits, were Nestorians; their Khan Marguz (Marcus), was handed over by the Tatars to the Chin and executed. His grandson, Toghrut, in alliance with the Chin, defeated the Tatars and by 1199 A.D. had become the most powerful ruler of Mongolia. The Chin court at Peking

#175 bestowed the title of King (Wang Khan) upon him. North of the Kereits and south of Lake Baikal lived the Turkic or Mongolian Merkits. West of Lake Baikal lived the Mongolian Oirats, in northern Manchuria the Tungusic Solons, between the Kerulen and the Hsingan range the Mongolian Tatars, and between the Onon and the Kerulen the actual Mongols. The last may not have been originally a steppe, but a forest people. They were divided into numerous independent and mutually hostile tribes.

1. Chingis Khan

Chingis Khan, or Temujin, as he was called until 1196, was born in 1167 (1155?). While he was a boy, his father, Yesügei, the leader of the Mongolian Kiyat clan, was killed by the Tatars, and his clan disintegrated. Shortly afterwards, Temujin became the vassal of Wang Khan under whom he defeated all the other major steppe peoples. In 1203 Chingis Khan quarrelled with Wang Khan, forced him to flee and brought the Kereits into submission. In 1204 Chingis Khan defeated the Naimans and killed their chieftain. A tribal assembly (Qurultai) was convoked and Chingis Khan was proclaimed Khaqan (1206). Thereafter, all the peoples subjugated by Chingis Khan became part of the "Mongol Ulus". Chingis Khan attacked Hsi-hsia, in Kansu and the Ordos region and forced the ruler to pay tribute (1206-1211). Then he turned against the Chin empire and devastated it methodically. In 1215 Yen-ching (now Peking) fell to the Mongols. The captured Khitan prince, Ye-lü Ch'u-tsai, became an important adviser to Chingis Khan.

In 1218 the Mongols conquered Kara-Khitai. Since at that period Moslems were persecuted in Kara-Khitai, the Mongols were regarded as liberators. With the conquest of Kara Khitai, the Mongols bordered on the newly-created empire of Khwarezm, which they proceeded to attack. Bukhara was captured in February, 1220, Samarkand in March of the same year, and the former Khwarezm capital, Khurghan, in April, 1221. The occupied territories were laid waste completely.

Chingis Khan's generals next conquered the Koman Empire in Southern Russia (1221-23) and then returned to the steppe north of the Syr-darya. Then the conquest of Hsi-hsia was completed. Chingis Khan died before the end of this campaign (August 18, 1227).

Prior to his death, Chingis Khan had divided his empire into several uluses and apportioned them among his sons, his wife and his closest followers. The second son, Chagatai, (died 1242), received primarily the former principality of Kara Khitai.

2. Turkestan under the house of Chagatai (13-14 century)

The successors of Chagatai were able to retain the characteristics of a steppe empire. They continued the tradition of the Kara-Khitai Empire which also had had a Mongolian dynasty

#195 ruling over a Turkic population. By the early 14th century they had become turkified to such an extent that their name has been used to designate the Eastern Turkic language; Chagatai equals Turkic.

Until around 1260, the Chagatai Ulus displayed few signs of being independent of the all Mongol capital Kharakhorum. However, under Alghu (1261-1266), who supported Qubilai in the latter's quarrel with Erik Böke, the Chagatai Ulus received a more independent status. Soon thereafter the Chagataids embraced Islam (1266). From 1267-1301 the Chagatai Khanate was vassal to Khaidu, a descendant of Ugedei and a rival of Qubilai. Following the death of Khaidu (1301), the power of the Chagatai Empire reached its zenith under the successive reigns of Duvá (died 1306), Esen Bugha (died 1320) and Kebek (died 1326). During the latter's reign a campaign against India was undertaken. After a temporary split of Chagatai into Transoxania and the actual "Mogolistan" (the region along the Issyk Kul), the Chagatai ulus was reunited by Tughluk Timur (1347-1363). Tughluk Timur appointed Tamerlane as advisor to his son to whom he had granted Transoxania. Tamerlane (1336 1405), after overthrowing the Chagataids, carved out a huge Central Asian Empire which included Northern India, Eastern and Western Turkestan, Northern Persia and Southern Russia. After Tamerlane's death the Chagatai Khanate in Eastern Turkestan (Issyk Kul and Sinkiang area) flourished once again under its rulers and became again the most powerful state in Central Asia. However, when Mahmud (1490-1509) was defeated by Mohammed Sheiban the Chagatai Khanate once again was restricted to the region east of the Tienshan range. In the 17th century all traces of the house of Chagatai were lost. In the Kashgar region it was replaced by Khodjas who regarded themselves as direct descendants of Mohammed.

3. Ügedei

The third son of Chingis, Ügedei, received the former Naiman region, and the youngest son, Tolui (died 1232), the Mongolian home region. The latter convoked a qurultai in 1229 which elected Ugedei as Khaqan. In 1235 Ügedei built his capital at Kharakhorum. During the next four years Ügedei, with the aid of the Sung emperor of the South, completed the conquest of the Chin Empire. The Mongolian general, Churmaghan, completed the conquest of Persia (1230-1241). Between 1235 and 1241 the Mongolian armies invaded the empire of the Kama Bolghars, Southern Russia, Poland, Croatia and Hungary, but the Mongolian prince, Batu, retreated upon the death of Ügedei. In opposition to Batu, Ugedei's widow forced the qurultai to proclaim her son, Göyük, as Khaqan. A quarrel broke out between Batu and Göyük but the latter died in 1248 after a reign of two years. After a brief interregnum he was

*175 succeeded by Möngke (1251-1259). A qurultai of 1253 announced renewal of the campaigns against Persia and China.

Persia was finally conquered in 1256. Thereafter it was ruled by Möngke's brother, Hulagu, and by his successors, later called the Il-khans.

4. Qubilai and the Yüan dynasty

The conquest of China was not completed until 1279. It was directed by Möngke's brother, Qubilai, who succeeded Möngke as Khaqan in 1260, after a brief quarrel with his rival, Erik Böke, over the succession. As early as 1270 Qubilai proclaimed the Yüan as a new Mongolian dynasty for China. This dynasty lasted until 1368 when it was overthrown by resurgent Chinese forces who established a native dynasty, the Ming.

5. Dissension between Eastern and Western Mongols

After the expulsion of the last Yüan emperor, Toghan Temür, (died 1370) the Ming rulers advanced into Mongolia. For more than twenty years, the Hung-wu Emperor (1368-1398), the first emperor of the Ming dynasty, conducted campaigns against the Mongols. In 1402 the Mongol Chief, Gun Temur Khan, was assassinated. From that time on intertribal warfare ensued between the nomads east of the Alashan, the Eastern Mongols, and those west of it, who were known as Wala or Oirat (see below).

In the west several Oirat chiefs achieved varying degrees of success in their efforts to exercise power and authority over their fellow tribesmen. Batula, son of an Oirat prince, was proclaimed chief of his people by Elbe, Khan of Mongolia, in 1393. Earlier, in 1388, Toghan Temür's nephew, Tokuz Temür, had been defeated in the Buir Nor region by a Chinese army. Khan Elbe himself was defeated and killed by the prince of the Kergüts in 1399. Only under Olghai Temur, (1403) did the Qubilaids (descendants of Qubilai) again become renowned. However, they were defeated by the Yung-lo emperor on the Onon River in 1410 and shortly thereafter by the Oirat leader, Ma-ha-mu. The Oirat domination of Mongolia was fostered by the Chinese government and reached the peak of its success under Toghan (1434-39).

After a series of localized struggles for power the Oirats became formidable and even subdued the Eastern Mongols and other neighboring tribes. Fired with the ambition to revive Mongol greatness, the next Oirat chieftain, Esen Taiji, made preparations to renew incursions into China. In 1449 he collected his forces and descended upon the frontier of Shansi. At a place called T'u-mu (in Chahar) the Chinese imperial armies were surrounded by the enemy. The emperor, Ying-tsung, who had taken the field in person against the Oirats, was captured alive and carried away to the desert, and Esen Taiji proclaimed himself khan of all Mongolia. Only the stubborn resistance of the militia

*175 saved the Chinese capital, Peking. Hoping to ally himself with the Ming empire, Esen returned the captive emperor to Peking. However, internal dissensions soon disintegrated the Oirats. Esen Taiji was assassinated by his own men in 1453, and the Western Mongols' period of political dominance came to an end.

The decline of the Oirats did not bring an end to Mongol activity. Now the Eastern Mongols dominated the desert country and continued the practice of raiding the Chinese frontier.

With the accession of Dayan Khan (1470-1543), Mongolia was again united under one Eastern Mongol khan. The Oirats were compelled to acknowledge his supreme authority. As a consequence of the new political alignment the continuous struggle between the Oirats and the Eastern Mongols ceased for a time. Kharakhorum was taken from the Oirats in 1552.

Events of this and the following period were related to the reconversion of the Mongols to Tibetan Buddhism in the sixteenth century under the Tumet prince, Altan Khan. The church proved to be a unifying agency, a cohesive force which held together the elements of Mongolian culture and enabled it to resist assimilation by Chinese civilization. This conversion also produced a more closely integrated society which was amenable to control by a central authority. Thus, even before the period of Western Mongol ascendancy control of the church was identified with control of the Mongols. As a result of the conquest of Tibet by the Khoshuts (who are western Mongols), the Buddhist church and its officials became subservient to the Western Mongols and acquired new political importance. Mongol aspirants to power installed their own relatives in high ecclesiastical offices and then attempted to consolidate control over their newly-expanded empire by using the church as a symbol of Mongol unity. The Dalai Lama came to be associated with the cause of the Western Mongols. The Jebtsundamba incarnation (see section Religion) was established among the Khalkhas (who are eastern Mongols), and in similar manner became the symbol of the Eastern Mongols' claim to hegemony.

6. The rise of the Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty

The former rulers of China, the Juchens, now called Manchu, took advantage of the waning power of the Ming dynasty. Their able leader, Nurhachi (1599-1626), reorganized their six leagues between the Sungari River and the Japanese Sea and laid the foundations of the Manchu Empire. His son, Abahai (1626-1643), defeated the Khan of the Chahars, Ligdan Khan (1604-1634). Inner Mongolia entered into a relationship with the Manchus that lasted until 1912. The Manchus' final conquest of China occurred in 1644, when Abahai's son, the Shun-chih Emperor was elevated to the throne of Ch'ing.

The Qubilaid Burni, Khan of the Chahars, attempted to attack

*175 his successor the Kang-hsi Emperor but was defeated and captured. However, the real danger for China came from the Western Mongols.

7. The Western Mongols or Oirats

a. earlier history

Chinese and Mongol annals of the thirteenth century testify to the existence of a tribe of Western Mongols in the early part of that century who had probably lived in what is now the northwestern Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. These Mongols were called Wei-la or Wa-la. The Ta-shi Wei-la are said to have made a league with other tribes against Chingis Khan in 1204. The submission of the Wa-la to Chingis is reported a few years later. The Persian historian, Rashid-ed-Din, writing in the fourteenth century, reports the league and submission of the Oirats during the same years. They apparently are to be identified with the Ta-shih Wei-la and Wa-la. The Horiads of Marco Polo and the Boyrats of John of Plano-Carpini are evidently the same Oirats.

The Western Mongols or Oirats, whom the Chinese writers of the Ming period term Wa-la, were noticed by the Turkish writers of the same period under the name of Kalmaks. Even today these people are known in Europe by the same name, which is more generally written Kalmuck. The origin of this name is obscure and has not been satisfactorily explained, although it is thought to have been applied to the Western Mongols by Turkish neighbors.

Chinese authors of the Manchu dynasty generally wrote the name of the Oirats Wei-la-t'e or O-lu-te, from which are derived the spellings, Elute, Eleuth, Olot, Olöt and others, by which these people are variously designated. Howorth believes that the name Oirat, or one of its variants originally was the name of only one branch of the Western Mongols, the dominant tribe among them, and that later it was applied to the whole group.

b. composition

Since ancient times the Oirat have been considered to be a union composed of four tribes, the names of which have varied according to the sources and the period of their history. However, the initial divisions in the Ming period seem to have comprised the following tribes:

1. The Choros in the Ili District
2. The Khoshut in Urumchi
3. The Durbet on the Irtish
4. The Torgut in Tarbagatai

After the Torgut migration to Russia in the early part of the 17th century, the Khoit, who formerly were part of the Durbet, are listed as one of the four Oirat. During this same period the Khoshut resettled in Kokonor and their former lands in Urumchi became common pasture for all the Dzungarian princes. The Ch'ien Lung Emperor, noting this apparently unorganized use

*175 of the common pastures, ordered the restoration of the four Oirats as a means of promoting systematic land utilization. He proposed to establish the Durbet, the Khoshut, the Khoit, and the Choros as the four groups. Later, with the final pacification of the Northwest in the late 18th century, the return of the Torgut from Russia, the formation of the aimaks and the allotment of the pastures, the Oirat numbered six: the Elueth (Olöt), Khoshut, Khoit, Choros, Durbet, and Torgut.

Regardless of what names have been applied to the sub-groups at various periods, these Western Mongols constitute a unit distinct from the rest of the Mongols. Before the Yüan dynasty historians recognized them as a separate division of the "Mongol nation". Finally, with the breakup of the Yüan dynasty and the reappearance of the ancient division between Eastern and Western Mongols, the Wa-la or Oirat again appear as a separate group. They sometimes fought, sometimes joined, their northern or western neighbors in the struggles for supremacy over all of Mongolia. These struggles continued until the Mongols were finally pacficied in the Manchu period, and their history is in a great measure the history of the Western Mongols.

After the death of Dayan Khan renewal of conflicts in Khalkha ended the period of peaceful relations. The new wars were fought between the Oirats and the Khalkha Tushetu and Jasaktu Khans. About 1577 the Tushetu Khan, Abatai, won a brilliant victory over the Oirats. He subjected them to his authority and installed his son, Subagatai, as their khan. However, after the death of Abatai in 1586, the Oirats rebelled, killed Subagatai and declared themselves independent. This revolt set off a new series of wars with the Khalkhas that continued into the last half of the 17th century.

During this period of Oirat activity a Dzungar prince, Batur Khun, arose. His goal was the creation of a single powerful Oirat state. His ambitions forced other princes to secede from the proposed union. It was during the first quarter of the 17th century that the Torgut prince, Khu Urluk, led his people's migration to the banks of the Volga. Later in the same century some of the Durbets and Khoshuts of Dzungaria followed the Torguts to Russian territory.

A Khoshut prince, Gushi Khan, became a successor to the aspirations of Batur Khan. A resolute and energetic individual, he had made a name for himself by his military activities and his devotion to the Lamaist faith, which he defended with his forces wherever it needed support. In 1637 he launched a campaign against the Khalkha prince, Tsoktu-noin, who, forced out of his own country by other princes, had withdrawn to Kokonor, where he espoused shamanism and began to persecute Buddhism, especially the Yellow Sect. Gushi Khan defeated the Khalkha prince, conducted victorious campaigns in Kham and Tibet, and then retired with his people to Kokonor.

*175 The defection of Oirat princes from the union to escape Batur Khun's influence had been coupled with the rising peril in the east from the Manchus, who had grown into a strong military power. Both factors impelled the Oirat and the Northern Mongol princes to forget their ancient enmities and to unite to protect their mutual interests. The defeat of Ligdan Khan of Chahar and the submission of many southern Mongolian princes to the Manchus alarmed the princes of northern Mongolia. It forced them to consent to the Oirat proposal to participate in a pan-Mongolian congress. In the fall of 1640 the seven independent Khalkha princes and the chiefs of the four tribes that comprised the Oirat union met near the Tarbagatai mountains and approved a body of laws that aimed to create a union of northern and western Mongols. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the princes were delineated, and laws to provide uniform criminal and civil procedure were devised. The objective of the congress was to establish a basis for elimination or mediation of internecine conflicts. These consistently had frustrated earlier attempts to unify the Mongols politically, and now threatened to destroy them. The Oirat and Khalkha princes agreed to refrain from attacking each other or from provoking any kind of discord among themselves.

Despite the acknowledged political necessity of creating a united front to halt internal disintegration and to oppose Manchu encroachment, neither Oirat nor Khalkha princes supported the resolutions of the Congress. Conflicts between the princes, at least among the Oirats, were resumed and continued until all the Mongols were subdued by the Manchus.

b. Galdan and his successors

Soon after the accession of the Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644) the Inner (eastern and southern) and Outer Mongols submitted to the jurisdiction of the Chinese empire. The Oirats, however, not only remained defiant but became strong enough to challenge the supremacy of the Ch'ing dynasty. The Dzungars, left-wing of the Oirat federation, already had dominated the neighboring minor tribes of the Ili district, forcing the Torguts to migrate. The Khoshuts had conquered Kokonor and Tibet. The Dzungars subdued the other Oirats and intervened in a religious war which had broken out among the Islamic priests, thereby extending their influence to eastern Turkestan, which they controlled for the next seventy-eight years. Having established sovereignty over a vast area, embracing the districts of Kobdo, Kokonor, and Turkestan both north and south of the Tienshan, Galdan, the Dzungar chieftain, now turned his attention to the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia.

The Ch'ing government, experiencing difficulties with the Russians at this time, adopted a conciliatory attitude toward the Dzungars. Galdan, however, continued his campaign against the Khalkhas and forced large numbers of them to seek the protection

*175 of the Ch'ing emperor. Galdan then prepared to invade the districts south of the desert. The K'ang-hsi Emperor saw clearly that the ambitions of the khan included eventual conquest of the Chinese empire. In 1690, when Galdan descended upon the Inner Mongols and defeated the imperial forces, the emperor marched against him with troops from various tribes and won a decisive but costly victory. Galdan was allowed to return with his followers to his homeland.

During Galdan's ascendancy, and as a direct result of his aggressive campaigns, the Khoshuts of Alashan settled in the region which they inhabit today. These people, led by descendants of Gushi Khan, the Kokonor chief, first settled in the western Ordos where they were victims of Galdan's aggrandizement. After the Dzungar prince had laid waste their territory and killed some of their leaders in 1686 the Khoshuts applied to the Manchu emperor for new pastures, which were allotted to them in the region west of the Alashan mountains.

Galdan's retirement after his defeat by the Chinese armies was only a temporary one. He soon sought the aid of the Russians and the Dalai Lama, while his warriors renewed their attacks upon the Khalkhas. Finally, after the Dzungar chief had murdered the Emperor's envoy who had been sent to establish peace in a family feud between Galdan and his newphew, Tsewang Raptan, the Emperor sent two Chinese armies against him. The Dzungars were thoroughly beaten. Galdan escaped westward only to find his homeland occupied by Tsewang Raptan, and orders posted everywhere for his arrest. At length, after refusing the Emperor's offer to accept his peaceful surrender, Galdan took his own life in 1696.

Tsewang Raptan declared himself vassal of the Emperor and surrendered the entire district of Dzungaria west of the Altai mountains. Following him the Khoshuts in Kokonor also submitted.

It seemed that the pacfication of the Western Mongols had been completed. After a short interval of peace, however, new conflicts erupted among the Oirat tribes, and the next fifty years were marked by sporadic rebellions that repeatedly required the intervention of imperial troops. In the last years of the K'ang-hsi Emperor's reign, the chief of the Mongols in Tibet, Latsan Khan, who was subservient to the Emperor, drove out the Dalai Lama's civil functionary who was a protege of the Dzungar princes. Meanwhile, Tsewang Raptan was undertaking a policy of aggrandizement. He extended his authority to parts of Central Asia, Siberia, Mongolia and eastern Turkestan as far as Qomul (Hami), which was held by the Chinese. As he became strong, he threw off his allegiance to the Ch'ing court. In 1715, although he was beaten back in his attempt to seize Qomul, his troops led by Cheren Dondub bypassed the Chinese defenses and invaded Chinghai. Brushing aside Chinese defenders, the Dzungars knifed their way into Tibet to capture Lhasa, which they held until 1720. Latsan Khan was put to death, the Dalai Lama taken prisoner, *175 and the country subjected to the ravages of the invading Dzungars. The Emperor sent his armies against Tsewang Raptan to restore order, and he was finally defeated by the Chinese under Nien Keng-yao and forced to evacuate Tibet. However, the Emperor's armies were unsuccessful in Turkestan, and the greater part of the country remained in the hands of Tsewang Raptan.

Meanwhile, Tsewang Raptan, moving north, came into conflict with the Russians. Two Russian expeditions, sent against him in 1715 and 1720 by Tsar Peter I, were beaten by the redoubtable Cheren Dondub. Among the prisoners taken was a Swedish officer who helped the Dzungars make firearms.

Such were the circumstances when the K'ang-hsi Emperor died in 1722. His successor was Yung-cheng, whose accession was marked by a new Oirat rebellion among the Khoshuts of Kokonor. The Khoshut prince, Lobdzang Dandzin, a grandson of Gushi Khan, declared himself independent. A Chinese army marched into Kokonor, quickly quelled the uprising, and forced Lobdzang Dandzin to flee to Dzungaria where he was given asylum by Tsewang Raptan.

When Tsewang Raptan died, the court at Peking thought that the opportunity had come to chastize the Dzungars and to bring them to submission. In 1731 a large army, composed of Solons, Khorchins and other Mongol auxiliaries and buttressed by Manchu bannermen, was sent under Furdan. But, not far from Kobdo, it was met and routed by the Dzungars under Cheren Dondub, who then led his men to capture the towns of Qomul (Hami), Urumchi (Tihua) and Kitai. The defeat set back China's advance in the Northwest for twenty years. Although the war continued until 1738 when peace was finally concluded, the people of Dzungaria prospered under the rule of the son of Tsewang Raptan, Galdan Chereng. He renewed the attack on the Khalkhas. Once more the Emperor resorted to military intervention.

Having failed in every attempt to penetrate Dzungaria or to subdue its inhabitants, the Emperor decided to adopt conciliatory measures. He established a frontier between the Oirats and Khalkhas along the Altai Mountains and arranged an agreement between the two peoples to refrain from trespassing upon the pastures of the other.

The death of Galdan Chereng in 1747, however, precipitated a new series of violent conflicts among aspirants to the succession. In the Ili Valley, the grandson of Cheren Dondub, Davatsi, killed Tsewang Raptan's grandson who was then ruler of the Dzungars, and made himself ruler.

Davatsi's success was in part due to the assistance of Amursana, chief of the Khoits. After he had secured his position Davatsi turned against Amursana who fled with his followers to China and submitted to the Emperor, later to assist the Ch'ing troops in their advance on Ili. Other Oirat chieftains whose ambitions had been frustrated by

*175 Davatsi also took refuge in China. The tales of their grievances reached the ears of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor who sent his armies into Dzungaria and subjugated the country. Davatsi was captured and sent to Peking. Imperial garrisons were installed in the country and the four Oirat divisions were re-established. The Tannu-Urianghai, who had been vassals of the Dzungars, now also became subjects of the empire.

Amursana had expected to succeed Davatsi as chief of all four tribes, but the imperial government, distrusting his motives, permitted him to assume only a minor office. Disappointed that the Chinese Emperor did not confer on him the title of "Khan of the Four Birat Tribes," Amursana rebelled in 1755 and massacred the Chinese troops at Kuldja. The first Chinese punitive expedition against him was unsuccessful.

Amursana's avowed aim was to restore an independent Dzungarian khanship. The insurrection was successful for a time and the spirit of revolution even spread into Outer Mongolia. However, in 1756 the Chinese government soon penetrated to the troubled area with two fresh armies. The Ili region was recaptured by troops under Chao-hui. Amursana fled to the land of the Eastern Kazakhs from whom he obtained troops for an invasion in 1757. Defeated again, he fled to Siberia where he died shortly afterwards.

c. the end of Oirat power

With the flight and death of Amursana, the power of the Oirat was broken. Thousands were killed, other thousands died of an epidemic of smallpox. Some found refuge in Russian territory, but many more were exiled to northern Manchuria. Some of the Khoshuts also migrated to Chahar.

The slaughter of an estimated 600,000 nomads in 1758 by the imperial armies in the final pacification of the Western Mongols, and the resettlement of some Mongol groups in other parts of the empire had resulted in the virtual depopulation of portions of northern Chinese Turkestan. Under these circumstances the Volga Torguts or Kalmucks returned from Russia to their old homeland in the Ili district. These Mongols had migrated to the Volga under pressure of Dzungar aggression in the early seventeenth century, but had maintained sentimental ties with their native country and religious connections with the Dalai Lama of Tibet.

In 1771 some 160,000 of them undertook a long hazardous march across Central Asia and returned to Ili. On their way they were constantly harassed by hostile tribes, and they arrived greatly reduced in numbers and in a very forlorn condition. Emissaries of the Imperial government welcomed the Torguts, supplied them with food, clothing, livestock and money, and conducted their leaders to the Emperor. He received them personally, entertained them and expressed his pleasure at their return to his kingdom. Four districts were assigned to the returned Torguts for

*175 settlement: an area north of Karashar, one east of the Tarbagatai, a third between the Ili and Urumchi rivers, and a fourth east of Kulja.

After the redistribution of the Mongols of the northwest they were found in five general areas which roughly corresponded to administrative districts under the Manchu dynasty. These were the Altai or Kobdo district with 14 banners of Durbets, two of Khoits, two of Torguts and one of Khoshuts; the Kokonor district with 21 banners of Khoshuts, two banners of Choros, one banner of Khoits, and four banners of Torguts; the Alashan district with one banner of Khoshuts; the Edsin Gol district with one banner of Torguts; and the Ili district with ten banners of Torguts and three banners of Khoshuts.

Having thus disposed of the Western Mongols, the Manchu government proceeded to repopulate Dzungaria by encouraging immigration from northwestern China. It also moved some of the Chahar from their home ranges north of Kalgan to the Borotala valley of Dzungaria. Groups of Solons and Sibos, Tungusic people from northern Manchuria, were also transplanted to the newly-conquered region. There they served as military colonists after participating in the wars on the western frontier.

III. China's Control of the Northwest

A. Moslem Rebellions

With the pacification of the Oirats, the court of Peking attempted to gain control of the regions inhabited by peoples of Moslem faith-those who were ethnically Chinese as well as those who were ethnically Turkic. The Ming court, unable to exercise control over them, had sought to win them by granting favors and privileges. When the Ch'ing court took over, it conferred honors on religious leaders of other minority peoples but slighted the Moslem priests. The first to revolt were the Chinese Moslems in Kansu who proclaimed a Ming pretender as their leader. They established liaison with other rebel forces including the military commander at Tatung and the turncoat general, Wu San-kuei, in South China. While the Manchu forces were preöccupied with quelling rebellions in other parts of China, the Moslem rebels succeeded in gaining possession of the whole of Kansu. But their victory was short-lived. As soon as the K'ang-hsi Emperor could spare troops from other fronts, he sent them to Kansu where they soon crushed the Moslem revolt.

South of the Tienshan range, the Turkic Moslems, or Uighurs, had been under the domination of the Dzungars following Galdan's conquest of the Tarim Basin. After the defeat of Galdan, they acknowledged the suzerainty of the Ch'ing Emperor but as soon as the Dzungars, under Amursana, were up in arms, they joined in the revolt.

175 As soon as he had subjugated the Dzungars in 1756, the Ch'ing commander, Chao-hui, sent a part of his army into the Tarim Basin. There they freed the scions of a princely family, the Little Khoja of Yarkand and his brother Burkhan al-Din, the Big Khoja of Kashgar, who had been imprisoned by the Dzungars. However, the Uighurs did not take readily to the exchange of overlords. Rallying the Moslem population south of the Tienshan, they revolted and set up the Khojas as their rulers. The Moslems were unable to present a united front, split as they were by factional disputes and by quarrels between the Old and the New Sects (see section Religion). They were easily subdued by a Chinese army under Chao-hui in 1759. The cities in the Tarim Basin fell one by one to the forces of Chao-hui who pursued the fleeing Khojas to Badakshan and the Pamirs. Among the prisoners was the beautiful wife of one of the chiefs. Taken back to Peking she became the "fragrant concubine" of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor and the source of many romantic stories.

The wars against the Oirats and the Moslems were commemorated in engravings done by French artists in Paris in 1774. Although they glorified the military deeds of the K'ang-hsi and Ch'ien-lung Emperors, the seventy years of warfare left Turkestan in a state of devastation and had been a heavy drain on the resources of China.

The killing of the Khojas, regarded as descendants of the Prophet, aroused the people of Turkestan and there was general talk of revenge. The people refused to cooperate with the Ch'ing officials and carried out both passive and active resistance against them. Among the members of the households of the Khojas who had fled to Khokhand was Jehangir, the grandson of Burkhan al-Din, the Big Khoja. Raising a force of several hundred Burut (Khirghiz) tribesmen, he crossed the frontier in 1820 with the avowed aim of retaking Kashgar, Yingisshar, Yarkand and Khotan. The Ch'ing government sent Ch'ang-ling with forces from Ak su to quell the rebellion. After defeating the Khokand army, Ch'ang-ling recaptured Kashgar in 1827. Jehangir, who was lured into a trap, was captured and taken as prisoner to Peking where a big victory celebration was held.

But the Moslems still resisted. Jehangir's brother, Yussuf, collected another army from Khokand and attacked Kashgar and Yarkand. By this time, the Ch'ing government was too weak to take positive action and, in a treaty signed in 1830, it tried to buy off the rebels by granting them special commercial privileges. The raids carried on by the Moslem rebels with the assistance of Khokand did not cease. As the Ch'ing government declined in power, the rule of its frontier officials became more oppressive and the opposition of the native people became more widespread and more determined. In 1848, a fresh force from Khokand invaded the Tarim Basin. It was led by Wali ~~Khan,~~ the nephew of Jehangir, and by six others. Known collectively as the Seven Khojas, they plunged Turkestan into

175 another sanguinary and desolating war.

The suppression of the "Rebellion of the Seven Khojas" was achieved only after the massacre of thousands of the resident population, Chinese, Chinese Moslems, and Uighurs. Thereafter, nothing was done to ameliorate the situation. The officials sent by Peking treated the local residents as a conquered people and levied heavy taxes as a means of self-enrichment. The local functionaries whom they appointed to assist them in the administration emulated them in tyranny and rapacity. Consequently, as soon as China was prostrated by domestic insurrections, the Taiping Rebellion in South China and the Nien Rebellion in North China, the Moslem peoples in the entire region of the Northwest, from Shensi province all the way to Kashgaria, rose in revolt.

The first to rebel were the Chinese Moslems in Shensi in 1862. A raid on the province by a small Taiping force precipitated the uprising. In the confusion that ensued, the Chinese Moslems, led by Pai Yen-hu, seized a number of Shensi towns, spread fire and rapine throughout the Wei River Valley, and at one time even reached the gates of Sian. When the rebellion in Shensi was finally put down in 1863, it spread to Kansu where it was led by Ma Hua-lung. To-ming, a Chinese Moslem from the Shensi-Kansu region, marched west to occupy the area around Turfan, Qomul (Hami) and Urumchi (Tihua). The steppe-land of Ili was occupied by another rebel band. The strongest of the insurgent groups was led by Yakub Beg, who had control of the territory around Kashgar.

When the Moslems of Eastern Turkestan joined in the general insurrection against Ch'ing rule, they had sought the assistance of Khokand, which was then having trouble with the Russians' steady advance into Central Asia. Unable to provide direct assistance, it sent Buzurg, the son of Jehangir, and Yakub, an adventurer with a checkered career including that of a dancing-boy and a bandit. There were stories that they were supplied with arms by the Russians in a sub rosa attempt to use them as vanguards of Russians advance, but these stories may have been apocryphal. They arrived at Kashgar in 1865, and thousands of rebels flocked to enlist in their forces.

After Buzurg was made king of Kashgaria, Yakub Beg, as commander-in-chief, set out to eliminate the other rebel leaders and to expand and consolidate the territory under his control. Some of the rebel leaders lost their lives in the bloody struggle for power. Others, such as To-ming, who held the Qumul-Urumchi region, were murdered by their own people, leaving Yakub Beg master of the whole of Eastern Turkestan. Later, in a coup d'etat, Yakub deposed Buzurg and made himself king. Pai Yen-hu, expelled from Kansu by Chinese forces, threw in his lot with Yakub so that the latter controlled an empire extending from the Pamirs to Lop Nor. The British in India afforded him diplomatic recogni-

175 tion by sending two missions to negotiate a trade treaty with him. The Sultan of Turkey made him the Amir of Kashgaria and bestowed upon him the title of Commander of the Faithful, supplying him with arms and sending officers to train his army. His relations with the Russians, who had annexed Khokand, were strained. He feared their designs on his empire and they refused to give him military assistance.

Meanwhile, the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion (in 1864) and of the Nien Rebellion (in 1868) enabled the Ch'ing court to take more energetic action in the Northwest than before. Tso Tsung-t'ang, a Chinese officer who had distinguished himself in the wars against the Taiping and the Nien rebels, was given the responsibility of rooting out the Moslem rebels in Kansu. By 1869, having cleared Shensi of all insurgent forces, he besieged Ma Hua-lung, the leader of the New Sect, in Chin-chi-pao, the rebel stronghold in Kansu. With the capture of Chin-chi-pao and the execution of Ma Hua-lung in 1871, the resistance of the Chinese Moslems in Kansu collapsed.

The next step, to press on westward beyond the Kansu Corridor and to recover Turkestan, was harder. The Peking court complained that it had no funds for an extended campaign. Many of the high officials believed that peace could be obtained by a renunciation of China's claims on the Far West and the recognition of Yakub Beg as an independent monarch. The British minister at Peking suggested that Yakub's domains be made into a buffer state. All this opposition and the suggestions were brushed aside and Tso Tsung-t'ang's views finally prevailed. Funds were obtained from many parts of China as well as in loans from foreign banks. Veterans of the wars against the Taiping and Nien rebels were sent to bolster Tso's command. Having reconquered the northern areas of the Tienshan in 1876, a column of his troops led by his lieutenant, Liu Chin-t'ang, pushed into the Tarim Basin. In 1877, Chinese troops recaptured Turfan and the kingdom of Kashgaria came to an end. Yakub Beg committed suicide and Pai Yen-hu, who had joined forces with him, fled to Russia.

Tso Tsung-t'ang's pacification of Turkestan brought Chinese forces face to face with Russian troops. By the Treaty of Peking in 1860, China ceded to Russia all the land east of Lake Balkash and west of the Tienshan, a region that Russian troops had occupied after their conquest of Central Asia. In 1871, when Yakub Beg was at the height of his power, the Russian government sent troops to occupy the city of Kulja and the territory of Ili on the pretext of safeguarding the region and preserving peace and order. They promised to withdraw when the Chinese had recovered the area. However, the Russian move also was designed to counter the extension of British influence in Chinese Turkestan and the steady advance of Chinese forces under Tso Tsung-t'ang.

In 1877, when the Chinese finally reconquered Turkestan, the

175 Russians were reluctant to withdraw. The Treaty of Livadia, signed in 1878 after negotiations held in St. Petersburg, was unfavorable to China. China was constrained to pay for the expenses of Russian occupation. Moreover, China also had to agree to Russian retention of the region of the Tekes River and the strategic passes between Ili and Kashgaria and to the establishment of Russian consulates as far interior as Kansu. All China received was the city of Kulja. The Ch'ing court refused to ratify the treaty. The Chinese envoy, who had exceeded his instructions by agreeing to the terms of the settlement, was condemned to death. At Qomul (Hami), where Tso Tsung-t'ang had his headquarters, Chinese troops made threatening moves, and Russia sent reinforcements into Ili. For a time a full-scale war between China and Russia seemed imminent. Finally, cooler heads prevailed, both sides yielded ground and in 1881 at St. Petersburg a treaty was successfully concluded in which China regained the Tekes Valley and the mountain passes between Ili and Kashgaria. Instead of the five million rubles for the cost of occupation, China agreed to pay nine million rubles. In addition, China permitted the opening of Russian consulates not only at Kulja (Ining), Tarbagatai, Kashgar, Urga, but also at Su-chou and Turfan.

B. Sinkiang as a Chinese province

In view of Russia's covetousness and Britain's hints of alienation of the region, Tso Tsung-t'ang proposed that Turkestan be made into an administrative province of China. His suggestion encountered strong opposition at court. Many high officials favored the construction and consolidation of the southeastern coastal provinces for defense against the Western powers, rather than the diversion of China's attention to the northwestern territories. But the recommendation of Tso Tsung-t'ang was finally adopted. The entire region north and south of the Tienshan range was made into a province in 1884 and renamed Sinkiang, the New Dominion, with Liu Chin-t'ang as the first governor. The provincial seat was located at Urumchi (Tihwa) and the headquarters of the military governor established at Kulja. The Chinese system of administration was organized in all the cities and counties of the New Dominion.

This was the first time that the region of Chinese Turkestan formally became a Chinese province, although the way was prepared in the Han and Tang Periods. However, in the past, Chinese troops only held the main cities. The administration of the region was largely relegated to the native princes, and the civil government was quite different from an actually Chinese-administered province. Again, during the Mongol period, an ambulatory government was set up in Turkestan, but it was only a nominal government. The real power was in the hands of the Chagatai princes. The occupation of Turkestan during the reign of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor was largely military, and the civil administration consisted of Ch'ing officials working through the native chieftains, and it was their excesses and exactions that provoked large-scale uprisings.

175 Under the energetic administration of the first governor of Sinkiang, Liu Chin-t'ang, and, to a lesser extent, under the administration of the second governor, Yüan Ta-hua, there was a genuine attempt to reform the government and to work for the welfare of the native peoples. Some of the abuses were eliminated, the tax burden was equalized, more schools were established, and wastelands were opened for agriculture. However, the good intentions of the governors were not enough. Repayment of the three million taels borrowed from abroad for the military campaign and of the nine million rubles for Russia's occupation of Ili drained the province. With a large percentage of its revenue siphoned off little funds were left for internal development.

In the train of the Chinese army there came hordes of Chinese migrants, many of whom were merchants and craftsmen from Hunan, Tso Tsung-t'ang's native province. Gradually, they entered into the business life of the cities and operated farms in the countryside. Soon their encroachments led to clashes with the native peoples.

There is little evidence that the Mongols were influenced by the Moslem rebellions of the early 19th century. These disturbances were confined almost entirely to the oases south of the Tienshan range. In the sixties of that century, however, the revolt spread to Dzungaria and the Ili valley and to some degree involved all the nationalities of the province. Many Mongol groups abandoned their ranges, particularly in the Tienshan mountains and the Ili region, and fled to more remote and possibly less desirable areas. Some may have returned to their former pastures after hostilities ceased, but it is probable that these [illegible]rs effected a redistribution of Mongol tribes.

The Chinese rebellions of the early 20th century - the Boxer uprising in 1900 and the revolution of 1911-1913 - caused no mass disturbance in Sinkiang. However, apparently these years saw the growth of a spirit of independence throughout Mongolia, especially in the western regions most remote from Chinese authority. In this developing spirit the provincial government saw a threat to the ruling Chinese minority. It was feared that the Mongol tribes of Sinkiang might join with the clans of Outer Mongolia in a bid for autonomy.

C. Sinkiang during the Republic

Toward the end of the Ch'ing dynasty, there had been a slackening of the administration in Sinkiang. The officials sent out from Peking were not men of high caliber. Their failure to understand local conditions and their maltreatment of the natives had aroused much resentment and hostility. Yüan Ta-hua, the governor, was virtually an independent ruler of Sinkiang while the rest of China was engulfed in the civil war that resulted in the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty and in the formation of the republic. In 1911, when

175 the revolution reached Sinkiang and the revolutionists occupied Urumchi, it was Yüan who defeated them. The revolutionists, led by a man from Hunan, one of the many who had migrated to Sinkiang, withdrew to northern Sinkiang where they proclaimed the independence of Ili. One of Yüan's officers, Yang Tseng-hsin, recruited a Moslem corps, marched north and succeeded in suppressing the revolt. With the military power in his hands and with the backing of Yüan Ta-hua, Yang assumed the governorship of Sinkiang. The Republican government formally confirmed the office in 1912.

175 1. Governor Yang Tseng-hsin

159 635 669 The first phase of Yang's administration was military. Oppression of the local officials and crushing taxes drove the Chinese Moslems in Qomul (Hami) to revolt, but Yang soon quashed the insurrection. In Ili, Chinese and Manchurian revolutionists continued their resistance. Yang dulled the edge of their power by negotiations. He recognized their republic as a part of Sinkiang and their officials as legitimate officials. Later, when the Ili revolutionists agreed to accept a loan from Russia without the knowledge of the provincial or central authorities, Yang wired Peking and received orders to seize and execute the leaders. Yang acted promptly in taking over control of that region.

159 175 635 575 668 Another source of trouble for Yang Tseng-hsin was the activities of a secret society known as Ko-lao Hui, introduced into Sinkiang by the troops of Tso Tsung-t'ang and Liu Chin-t'ang. In later years it gained many adherents among the Chinese Moslems. A member who later rose to prominence was Ma Hung-pin, who under the Communists became a vice chairman of Kansu province. During the disorders following the fall of the dynasty, the headquarters of the secret society moved to Kashgar and its influence spread to Kharashar, Kucha, Aksu, Yarkand and Khotan. It took Yang Tseng-hsin two years to suppress the organization.

159 635 175 648 On the northern borders of Sinkiang, Yang's troops fought a number of skirmishes with the Outer Mongolian forces who invaded Sinkiang in 1912 and seized control of Kobdo. Hostilities finally ended with the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Yang and the government at Urga.

159 635 175 185 631 Internally, Yang undertook administrative and financial reforms. By severe punishment of corrupt officials he sought to check graft, and by the issuance of a new currency he tried to halt inflation. Under him, a million mou (about 135,000 acres) of new land was opened to cultivation. To win the support of the natives, he gave power at the lower administrative level to the begs - Uighur headmen. Since their tenure of office was thirty years to life, they had an advantage over Chinese-appointed magistrates who were periodically changed. In official proclamations, he permitted the use of the native languages. This policy was effective until the collapse of the Imperial Russian government.

000 Imperial Russian government.

159 The revolution in Russia presented fresh problems to Yang's
635 administration. In 1917, hordes of Kazakhs who were residents of
175 Russian Turkestan, fled from conscription and poured into Sinkiang.
648 At one time, it was estimated that there were 200,000 Kazakh
167 refugees in the province, of whom about 100,000 were in the vicinity of Ili and 70,000 in Tarbagatai. Yang used his good offices to persuade the Soviet Government to pardon them and to permit these Kazakhs to return home. Following the Kazakhs, large numbers of White Russian emigres entered Sinkiang between the years 1918 and 1921. Yang drove out the more truculent ones, disarmed the others and gave them asylum in Sinkiang. Many of them enlisted in his forces.

159 The Soviet domination of Outer Mongolia resulted in the complete
635 repudiation of Chinese authority by all the Mongols except those in
175 the inner regions of the border provinces who were more accessible
648 to Chinese influence.

These new developments impelled Yang Tseng-hsin to adopt a campaign to promote dissension among his nomadic subjects. To accomplish this first he withdrew from the Mongols their rights to all the nomad lands granted them under the Manchu dynasty. Under these rights the Kazakhs had been required to pay grazing fees to the Mongols for use of the land. Then he withheld arms from the Mongols and supplied them to the Kazakhs, thus insuring the continuation of hostilities between the two peoples. These measures, coupled perhaps with the enmity which often exists between peoples of different faith and tradition, were sufficient to prevent the Sinkiang Mongols from joining with their kinsmen beyond the Altai. Under the pressure of Kazakh raids that penetrated even to the north of the Altai range, the Mongols of Sinkiang retreated farther into the province. Communication between them and Outer Mongolia came to an end.

175 The revival of a spirit of independence among the Mongols was
648 characterized generally by a lack of native leaders or of outstanding personalities of any sort. Nevertheless, there was one individual whose ambitions were associated with this spirit and who enjoyed a brief success as a Mongol leader. This was Dambijantsin or Ja Lama. Ja Lama, a Russian Kalmuck by birth, appeared in Western Mongolia in the early twentieth century. With his propaganda for the revival of the Mongol federation, he succeeded in attracting a following. As early as the late nineteenth century, travelers in Outer Mongolia had heard reports of Ja Lama. He claimed to be the grandson of Amursana, the last great Oirat chieftain, and he foretold the liberation of the Mongols from the Chinese by the action of forces that would gather in Siberia. Some such legend seems to have been current among the Oirats at that time. The Russian traveler, Roborovski, heard rumors that Amursana himself would return to unite the Western Mongols. Whether he created the legend or merely

175 648 took advantage of it, Ja Lama assumed the role of liberator. He was influential in swinging Western Mongol support from the Sinkiang government to Outer Mongolia. His apparent objectives were the conquest of Sinkiang and part of Tibet, and a union of all the Western Mongols to form a new Western Mongolian state. In 1912 he led a successful attack on the town of Kobdo. He assumed religious and princely titles and served briefly as military governor of the region. In 1914 he was arrested and deported by the Russians, whose negotiations for a Chinese-Mongolian treaty were being disturbed by his aggressive activities. Eventually he returned to eastern Sinkiang. There he again rallied a group of Mongol adherents and built a fortification. He was hunted down and killed by assassins from the Urga(Outer Mongolian) government, which apparently feared the consequences of a new Western Mongolian union.

The destruction of Ja Lama and his "organization", and the policy of the Sinkiang government in dealing with the Mongols, both contributed to the permanent detachment of the Kobdo district from Western Mongolia. The actual separation dates from the latter half of the eighteenth century and the Manchu conquest of the Northwest. In 1754 the Imperial government set up the Kobdo region as an administrative district under the administration of Outer Mongolia. When Ja Lama attacked and captured the city of Kobdo and established himself as governor of the district, it was Russian power that expelled him and forced the return of Kobdo to Outer Mongolia. Finally when Ja Lama established himself in eastern Sinkiang and attracted a new following of Western Mongols, he again threatened the detachment of Kobdo. It was the Urga government that sent men to kill him and thereby insure Outer Mongolia's retention of Kobdo. The Mongols of the Kobdo district were, and probably still are, descendants of Oirats whose attachment to Outer Mongolia was merely a military and political convenience for the Manchu administration. Ja Lama's temporary success and the actions taken against him by the Russian and Outer Mongolian governments probably reflected a real feeling of "Oiratism" among the Mongols of Kobdo.

175 Before the Chinese Revolution in 1911, Western Mongol tribal territories were administered by princes who enjoyed virtual autonomy under the provincial government. This arrangement was continued with some modification under the Republic. The government extended its control over the princes and consequently over the Mongols themselves. The league and banner system probably remained in effect until the establishment of regional autonomy in Sinkiang, although the administrative units did not correspond strictly to tribal divisions and, in some cases, even included groups of unrelated peoples. There were three leagues and two special groups which were constituted as follows:

The Unen Susuktu League consisted of ten banners of Torguts, 175 widely distributed and separated from each other by non-Mongol peoples. These Torguts were located in the Tienshan Range above the oasis of Karashahr, on the northern slopes of the Tienshan, and on the southern slopes of the Altai.

The Bato Setkhiltu League was composed of three banners of Khoshuts who lived on the Yulduz plateau in the heart of the central Tien Shan.

The Ching Setkhiltu League, which included three banners of Khoshuts and seven of Urianghai, was located in the Chuguchak-Altai area in northern Sinkiang.

The Chahars in the Borotala Valley, and the Oirat in the valleys of the Tekes and Kash rivers in the Ili region were not included in the leagues.

However, the Chahars and Urianghai are not true Western Mongols. The former were transplanted from Chahar by the Manchus after the conquest of Dzungaria in the eighteenth century; the latter are descendants of tribes who originally lived in what is now Tannu Tuva.

175 Through Yang Tseng-hsin's efforts, Sinkiang remained neutral
159 in the civil war that raged in China in 1926-27. His troops kept out
635 the forces of the "Christian General" Feng Yü-hsiang. On his own
648 initiative, he negotiated a new treaty with the Soviet government permitting Soviet consulates to operate in Sinkiang even after the National Government broke off relations with Soviet Russia in 1927. With the establishment of the National Government at Nanking, Yang wired his acknowledgement of, and allegiance to, the new government, which confirmed his position as governor.

2. Governor Chin Shu-jen

175 Yang Tseng-hsin came from the southwestern province of Yunnan
159 and during his rule many men from Yunnan had followed him to Sin-
635 kiang. In 1928, a fellow Yunnan official, allegedly with the conniv-
[682] ance of the Chinese Communists and the Russians, murdered Yang at
[661] a banquet in his honor. The military commander Chin Shu-jen, who was believed to be implicated in the assassination plot, immediately suppressed the revolt and put the ringleaders to death. He then maneuvered himself into the position of governor.

Under Chin, the government of Sinkiang virtually disintegrated. Corruption was rife. Chin himself set the example for rapacity. He ruled in open defiance of the National Government at Nanking to the extent of concluding, on his own initiative and without the cog-
[648] nizance of Nanking, a new agreement with Soviet Russia in 1931. The agreement permitted Soviet authorities to establish eight commercial agencies in Sinkiang and to have complete control over telegraph and radio communications, thus increasing Soviet influence in the province.
175 The deterioration of economic conditions, heightened by spiralling
159 inflation and the exploitation by Chin's minions, oppression, and
635 inequities, led to widespread discontent. The situation was ripe for
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175 159 635 669 659 578 rebellion.

The rebellion began at Qomul (Hami), where at the death of the old prince, the Chinese had taken over the region and divided it into three administrative districts under the rule of Chinese magistrates. Then, with the influx of refugees from Kansu, Chin ousted the Uighurs from one of the three districts to provide land for the refugees. To make things worse, the Uighurs had to pay taxes while the Chinese refugees were exempted for three years. Finally, when a tax-collector forced a pretty Uighur girl to marry him against her will, the Uighurs rose in anger and killed the tax collectors and the refugees.

When Chin sent troops to put down the rebellion, the Uighur rebels sought the aid of Ma Chung-ying, a young Chinese Moslem (Dungan) officer from Kansu. Entering Sinkiang in 1932 with 400 men, his [648] force was soon swelled by local recruits. The Japanese, seeking an opportunity to intervene in Sinkiang, were believed to have given him guidance and moral support, if not actually funds and military equipment. Barkol (Chen-hsi) and Qomul (Hami), as well as large areas of eastern Sinkiang, fell to the arms of the young conqueror. However, his attack on Urumchi was beaten back by a young Manchurian officer, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, whom Chin Shu-jen had brought to Sinkiang to take command of the army.

[648] Sheng's defenders were later reinforced by Manchurian troops, who had been interned in Soviet Siberia and who were repatriated and sent to Sinkiang. They were called the Northeast Anti-Japanese Army.

With the arming and augmenting of both the provincial government army and the rebel forces, the civil war increased in ferocity and intensity. There was a heavy slaughter of the Han Chinese, the Chinese Moslems, and the Uighurs. Meanwhile, the Russian mercenaries stationed at Urumchi, whose pay had been in arrears, also revolted. In the pandemonium, Chin fled the city and found refuge in Russia. Sheng Shih-ts'ai came to the fore to take control over the army and the civil government.

3. Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai

175 159 635 669 Although frustrated in his assaults on Urumchi in 1932 and again in 1934, Ma Chung-ying was able to expand his power from Qomul (Hami) westward to Kashgar, hemming in Urumchi from all sides. In his marches back and forth across Sinkiang he left wide swaths of pillage and rapine, death and desolation in his wake. His far-ranging depredations were the signal for other bands of insurgents to rise. The Chinese military commander of Ili raised the banner of independence. In the Tarim Basin, the local Han Chinese and Chinese Moslem residents had banded together into an Eastern Turkestan Army to defend themselves against the ravages of Ma Chung-ying. In November, 1933, a group of Burut chiefs, assisted by returned-students from Turkey, seized control of the Eastern Turkestan Army and established an Eastern Turkestan Republic at Kashgar. In their newly-drafted constitution, they stated that the structure of their government would be based on the Koran, and all decrees and laws

175 also would be based on the Koran. Emissaries were sent to seek
159 aid and support from Moslems in Afghanistan and India where the
635 Pan-Islamic Movement was then in full swing. Telegrams were
669 sent to the Nationalist Government of China and to the League of
Nations requesting recognition of their state. Not only did they
fail to obtain support and recognition from abroad, but they were
also repudiated by their own people. Once in power, they embarked
on a terroristic program of persecuting the Han Chinese and the Chi-
nese Moslems who were the mainstays of the Eastern Turkestan
Army. Then, too, they were weakened by internal dissensions and
by the struggles of the leaders for power, until one by one they were
killed. The Eastern Turkestan Republic was finally dissolved when
Ma Chung-ying attacked Kashgar in June, 1934.

[648] Meantime, Sheng Shih-ts'ai reached an agreement with the
Soviet authorities whereby he received planes, trucks, armored
cars, machine-guns and ammunition. While Soviet troops operated
in the region of the Altai Mountains, Sheng's forces marched north
and succeeded in routing the insurgents at Ili. Again he led his army
south against Ma Chung-ying. His possession of superior armaments
turned the scales in the battle of Urumchi. Ma Chung-ying fled,
[506] harried by Sheng's warplanes, which bombed and strafed the rebel
columns at Turfan and Korla. He went to Kashgar in April, 1934.
Four months later, again forced to evacuate Kashgar, he crossed
the border into Russian Turkestan and was never heard of again.

The civil war in Sinkiang had lasted for four years of wholesale destruction and bloodshed. Weary of strife and disorder, the people were ready to accept Sheng Shih-ts'ai's proclamation of a new and stable government and his promises for a new era in Sinkiang. When he first came to power in 1933, he announced an eight-point policy that had gained him considerable support. The eight points were: 1. racial equality, 2. religious freedom, 3. immediate and equitable distribution of farm relief, 4. financial reform, 5. administrative reform to clean the government, 6. extension of education, 7. promotion of self-government, and 8. judicial reform.

Under the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Uighurs and Kazakhs were appointed to high posts in their own district governments. The non-Chinese nationalities were encouraged to use their own languages and to organize their own schools. The number of students in schools increased from 3,000 in 1933 to 150,000 in 1936, and many non-Chinese students were sent abroad to study in Soviet Russia. The Sinkiang Daily was published in seven languages, and cultural associations were established for the Uighurs, Kazakhs, Dungans (Chinese Moslems), Tartars, Russians, and Chinese.

When he finally had suppressed the rebellions and firmly established the authority of his government, Sheng Shih-ts'ai announced his Six Great Policies for New Sinkiang: 1. anti-imperialism, 2. kinship with Soviet Russia, 3. racial equality, 4. honest government, S 175 159 635 669 5. peace, and 6. reconstruction. After the years of tyranny and misrule, the government which Sheng created in Sinkiang in comparison was enlightened and progressive, although, because of the characteristics and background of the region, it was autocratic.

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IV. The Rise of the Communists

While Sheng Shih-ts'ai was consolidating his power in Sinkiang, events were taking a dramatic turn at the other end of the vast territory which comprises China's Northwest. The nucleus of the first Communist guerilla bands appeared at Paoan in northern Shensi in 1931. By the following year, when they came under the overall direction of the Political Department of the Chinese Communist Party headquarters at Yulin, they controlled eleven counties. The poverty of the region made the people receptive to Communist propaganda. In 1935, the Red Army, which had been driven out of Kiangsi, reached northern Shensi after a long and circuitous trek through southwestern China. Here they were under attack by government troops until December, 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek, who was visiting Sian, was detained by Manchurian troops stationed in the area. Under the terms that the Nationalist Government accepted to secure the release of Chiang, the policy shifted from fighting the Communists to outright opposition to Japan. With the pressure on them removed, the Chinese Communists immediately began to expand in all directions. In the months that followed they occupied 24 counties (18 in northern Shensi, 5 in Kansu and one in Ninghsia). They controlled a population of two million in what was known as the Shen-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region.

Their headquarters at Yenan, in northern Shensi became the Mecca of the Chinese Communists and fellow-travellers. From here tentacles of Communist strength stretched out to North China, Inner Mongolia, and to Sinkiang where some of the Communist agents found service in the administration of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. During World War II, the Communists were unable to penetrate southern Shensi, where the government had stationed an army. The Communists also made little headway in Ninghsia, in the regions held by the Chinese Moslem general, Ma Hung-k'uei, and in Chinghai, held by another Chinese Moslem general, Ma Pu-fang. In both these provinces, the Moslem population repudiated Communism and resisted Communist forces.

S 175 159 648 [635] The Nationalist Government's preoccupation with the war against Japan permitted Sheng Shih-ts'ai to govern Sinkiang as a virtually independent ruler. For seven years, until 1940, he maintained his policy of kinship and orientation to the Soviet Union rather than to China and his nominal superior, the Nationalist Government.

After 1941, when German armies overran and occupied eastern Russia, and the Soviet government, engaged in a violent struggle for survival, could not continue to send him supplies, he broke his ties

175 with Russia and sought to return to the fold of China. The National
159 Government had been waiting for this opportunity. Immediately it
648 dispatched officials to Sinkiang to take over the administration from
[167] Sheng's underlings; Nationalist troops under Chu Shao-liang and Ma Pu-fang were sent to overawe Sheng's army; and another tide of Chinese colonists invaded Sinkiang and were settled in the vicinity of Urumchi.

Under these circumstances, Sheng Shih-ts'ai tried to shift back to Soviet Russia. Moreover, by this time, Russian forces had rolled the German invaders back from Leningrad and Stalingrad and were steadily advancing. In 1944, Sheng ordered the arrest of Chinese Nationalist officials and also of students and teachers from China Proper. His coup failed and the National Government removed Sheng from the governorship of Sinkiang and transferred him to Chungking to the sinecure position of Minister of Agriculture. This was the end of the colorful career of Sheng Shih-ts'ai. A trusted Nationalist official, Wu Chung-hsin, was appointed as governor of Sinkiang.

One of the many problems that Wu Chung-hsin inherited from
175 Sheng Shih-ts'ai was that of the Kazakhs in Ili. In 1940 Sheng had
159 arrested 70 Kazakh delegates from the Altai region who had come to
669 protest his high-handed treatment of their people. When news of the
[563] arrest reached the Kazakhs, they revolted en masse, led by one of their chieftains, Osman Batur. After sporadic fighting between the rebels and provincial troops, Sheng agreed to negotiate and to release the prisoners. However, before they were released, a number of them were executed. Incensed by this act of treachery, the Kazakhs in the Altai region revolted again. They put up a strong resistance but were finally overwhelmed by Sheng's forces. Osman Batur fled.

When Sheng turned against the Russians and attempted a rapprochement with China, Osman Batur organized the Altai-Kazakh Restoration Society. With arms from Outer Mongolia and the tacit support of Soviet Russia, he attacked and captured Ching-ho, Ta-cheng (Chuguchak) and A-shan (Altai). He was besieging Wu-su in 1944 when the new governor, Wu Chung-hsin, decided to negotiate. In the settlement of this uprising, which has been called the "Ining (Kulja) Incident", the Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops from Kulja and to grant the Kazakhs semi-autonomy in the territory they held which included Kuldja, Ta-cheng and A-shan. The new Eastern Turkestan Republic was established at Kulja. It had a government headed by a council of three, a Kazakh, a Uighur, and a White Russian. One of the leaders, Akhmejan Kasimi, was placed in charge of administration and finance; another of the leaders, Osman Batur, headed the army, which at one time was reported to number 40,000 men.

175 By November, 1945, the Ili rebellion had spread to the Tarim
669 Basin and insurgent forces surrounded Yarkand, Khargalik, and Kho-
(648) tan. At that time it was denied that Soviet Russia gave any military

175 assistance to the Ili rebels. Later, however, when the Chinese
669 Communists came to power, there were profuse statements thank-
648 ing the Soviet Government for its unstinted aid and support. Soviet support to the Ili rebels was more apparent on the diplomatic plane. The Soviet consul-general at Urumchi was openly friendly to the rebels. He gave them every encouragement, while he played his game as intermediary between Kazakh insurgents and the Chinese authorities.

175 The negotiations between the Ili regime and the Chinese govern-
669 ment delegates headed by Chang Chih-chung lasted from October, 1945, to June, 1946. The insurgents were willing to abandon their independence if the Chinese government would grant them autonomy. The Chinese negotiators were willing to permit the Ili regime to retain its armed forces as a peace preservation corps if the Chinese could have top military command and full authority in Sinkiang's diplomatic affairs.

Finally a settlement was reached in the summer of 1946. An agreement was signed providing for a reconciliation between the Chinese authorities and the rebel leaders. Attached to the agreement were two codicils concerning the reform of the provincial government and reorganization of the armed forces. The terms of the settlement also contained provisions for the election of district officials by adult suffrage and for the formation of a provincial government composed of men, some of whom were appointed by the Chinese government and some nominated by the provincial delegates. The use of the Uighur and Kazakh languages was permitted in schools and in the army. To implement the agreement, Chang Chih-chung succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as governor. Burkhan Shahidi, a Uighur, and Akhmejan Kasimi, a Kazakh, were appointed vice-chairmen of the provincial administration. A determined effort was made to improve the government and to give the local people a greater voice in political affairs.

175 However, realization of these agreements, which would have
668 given the non-Chinese residents of Sinkiang a large measure of self-government, was delayed and hamstrung by distrust and hostility on
669 both sides. The military commanders and the diehard Kuomintang
578 party members were unwilling to relinquish their prerogatives to
563 the native leaders; the extremist native leaders were impatient and uncompromising. In February, 1947, the more contentious elements, led by Akhmejan Kasimi, issued a statement, known as the Kulja Declaration. It denounced the supremacy of one nationality (the Chinese) over the other nationalities of Sinkiang, and called for the unification of all the races of Sinkiang under a native government. Adopting a moderate attitude, Chang Chih-chung issued a statement declaring that, while Sinkiang should have an autonomous and democratic government, the pattern of the government should be based on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen rather than on Soviet ideas.

175 563 578 [635] The pressure on Chang Chih-chung from both sides became so intense that in May, 1947, he resigned and was succeeded by a Uighur, Maksud(Masud) Sabri. Maksud's appointment accentuated the clash of interest between rival factions in Sinkiang. The Uighur people generally supported him since he was one of them although he had spent many years of his life abroad. However, some of the more articulate popular groups denounced him vociferously and a majority of the members in the provincial assembly adopted a resolution opposing his nomination. In July, shortly after confirmation of his appointment, the Kulja delegation, headed by vice-chairman Akmejan Kasimi, withdrew. However, in a statement from Kulja (released in November) they denied that they had any intention of seceding from China and declared that they would return if their demands, including the removal of Maksud, were met. Since to dismiss Maksud so soon after his appointment in order to please the Kazakhs, would alienate the Uighurs, the National Government procrastinated and a deadlock resulted.

175 578 648 Meanwhile the Kulja faction itself was split by dissensions. Osman Batur defected. He and his men were incorporated into the Nationalist Army and stationed at Pei-ta-shan (Baitik Bogdo) close to the border of Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia, claiming this region as its own, invaded in 1948 and penetrated a hundred miles into Chinese territory until they were checked by Osman Batur who was acclaimed as a hero throughout China. The dispute finally reached the United Nations without a satisfactory settlement.

175 578 669 668 [635] By December, 1948, matters in Sinkiang had reached such an impasse that Maksud Sabri was removed and the governorship of Sinkiang was given to Burkhan Shahidi, another Uighur, who was vice-chairman of the provincial government and a middle-of-the-roader. During the first part of 1949 the Communist advance in China itself turned the attention of the National Government away from Sinkiang. In September, Saifuddin Azizi, a leader of the Kulja coalition, went to the Communist capital as a delegate to the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and he brought word of the submission of the Ili faction to the Chinese Communists. Chang Chih-chung, whom the National Government sent to Peiping to negotiate with the Communists, also surrended and exerted his influence to persuade the officials in Sinkiang to join the Communist bandwagon. By the end of September, when Communist troops under Wang Chen pushed through the Kansu Corridor, the governor of Sinkiang, Burkhan, and the military commander, T'ao Chih-yueh, in separate telegrams, offered their allegiance to the Chinese Communist Government. A few days later, Communist troops reached and occupied Urumchi.

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Sinkiang AI1
Iran MA1
China AF1

	WESTERN ASIA Present-day Iran, Afghanistan, Soviet Central Asia	NORTHWEST CHINA Sinkiang (Ili Region, Tarim Basin), Chinghai and northern Kansu	CHINA PROPER including Shensi and southern Kansu
1200 -			
1100 -			CHOU (Capital: Sian) 11'th
1000 -			
900 -			
800 -	Medes 708-550	Jung, Ti, and Chiang	Invasion of Jung
700 -	Zoroaster-zoroastrianism		
600 -	Rise of Persia 580		
500 -	(Achaemenids)		Warring States
400 -	Conquests of Alexander 321-331	Huns (Hsiung-nu). Chinese settle in Kansu, Chinghai. Huns drive Yüeh-chih westward 165 B.C. Chang Ch'ien's Travels 138-126 Chinese advance into Turkestan 121-119 Take Tarim Basin, 104, 4 garrison cities; three campaigns against Loq-lun, 99-90; defeat of Wu-sun 72 B.C.	DIVISION
300 -	Greek states in Bactria Parthia (Assakids)		CH'IN (Capital: Sian) Great Wall linked
200-	Scythians (Sakas) 165		HAN (capital: Sian) 206 B.C. - 220 A.D.
100 -			
B.C. A.D.		Chinese split Hun Confederacy - 44 A.D. Revolt of Nomads, Kushan (Yüeh-chih) invade Turkestan 87	Wang Mang 9-23

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100 -		
Pan ch'ao reaches Caspian Sea 92	Pan Ch'ao regains Turkestan 74-94; returns to China 102	
	Huns retake Turkestan 107-31.	
	Invasion of Kushan 127	
200 -		
Sassanid Dynasty in Persia 226-651		THREE KINGDOMS (221-265) CHIN 265-419
300 - Mani; Manichaeism		Barbarian Invasions Foreign States in North China
	Hephthalites (White Huns), Juan-juan, Kao-chü (Tolös)	
400 - Wars with Rome	Appearance of Turks; Expansion	Minor Chinese state in South China
	Turks destroy Juan-juan and the Hephthalites 552; Division of Turks into East and West 582	DIVISION
500-		
554 -subjugate the Hephtalites in region of Oxus		
600 - Arabs invade Persia	Travels of Hsuan-tsang	SUI (capital:Sian) 589-618
Expansion to Mediterranean; Last Sassanid King flees to China, 674	Chinese defeat E. Turks 636; Tibetans 639; W. Turks 659; Chinese control of Turkestan	T'ANG (capital:Sian) 618-906 invasion of E. Turks 629
	Arabs and Tibetans effect junction 741	Rebellion of An-lu-shan 755
700- ARABS -	Expedition of Kao Hsien-chih over the Pamirs 747	Uighurs sack Loyang 762
Qutaiba conquers Central Asia 707-713	Battle of Athlach 751, Chinese defeat.	Tibetans sack Ch'ang-an 763
	Uighur Empire on the Orkhon 744-821	
800-	Defeat of East Turks, 745	Barbarian Invasions
	Tibetan Wars 763-821	
	Kirghiz destroy Uighur Empire 840	FIVE DYNASTIES (North) and
900-	Uighurs migrate to (1)Irtish (2)Urumchi-Turfan	TEN STATES (South)
	Qarluks, Uighurs, Sha-t'o (Chöl) Turks	DIVISION

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Sinkiang AI1
Iran MA1
China AF1

1000 -	Hsia	Liao(Khitan) Sung(Chinese) 960-1279
1100 -	Kara-Khitai	CHIN (Juchen)
1200 - Mongols destroy Khwarezmian	Mongols destroy Hsia & Kara-Khitai	Mongols destroy Chin 1233 Mongols destroy Sung 1279
1300-Mongol Il-Khans in Persia; Tamerlane 1369-1405	Chagatai and Usedei princes (Mongols)	YUAN dynasty 1260-1367 (Capital:Peking) MING dynasty 1368-1644 (capital:1. Nanking 2. Peking)0
1400 - Timurid Dynasty 1387-1449	Oirats (Mongols) -Esen, ca. 1450	Expulsion of Mongols Invasion at Oirats 1449
1500 - Safavid Dynasty in 1560-1736	Oirats (W. Mongols) Atan Khan ca. 1550	
1600- Abbas I ("the Great") 1587-1629	Oirat confederacy; Galdan invades Mongolia 1697; Tsewang Raptan 1697-1727	CH'ING dynasty 1644-1911
1700-	Conquest of Tibet 1717 Amursana 1755 Chinese dominate Turkestan, 1759 Return of the Turgots, 1770	
1800 - Kajar Dynasty in 1794-1925	Moslem Revolts, 1820-1878 Jehangir 1820-27; the 7 Khojas, 1848; Yakub Beg, 1865-78. Tso Tsung-t'ang reconquers the Northwest 1869-78. Sinkiang Province created 1884	Taiping Rebellion, 1851-64 Moslem Revolts in Shensi & Kansu, 1862-71; Ma Hua-lung, 1862-71; Pai Yen-hu, 1862-78
Anglo-Russian Rivalry 1900 Revolution in Persia 1905	Yang Tseng-hsin governor 1912-1928 Dungan Revolt 1932-34 Sheng Shih-ts'ai 1932-44;Ili Revolt 1944-46 Sinkiang submits to Communists, 1949	Revolution, 1911 REPUBLIC, 1912 Communists in Shensi, 1935 Communist Govt. in China, 1949

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GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

000 I. **The Physical Setting**

- **A. Location and Importance**

- **B. Surface Features**

- **C. Climate**

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- **B. The Principal Minerals**
  - **1. Petroleum and Power**
    - **a. Petroleum and Oil Shale**
    - **b. Coal**
    - **c. Reported Fusionable Materials.**
    - **d. Hydro-electric Power**
  - **2. Iron Ore and Ferro-Alloys**
    - **a. Iron Ore**
    - **b. Ferro-Alloys (Manganese, Tungsten, Molybdenum, and Nickel)**
  - **3. Non-Ferrous Metals**
    - **a. Copper**
    - **b. Gold and Platinum**
    - **c. Silver and Lead**
    - **d. Aluminum and Bauxite**
  - **4. Non-Metallic Minerals**
    - **a. Salt and Gypsum (Anhydrite)**
    - **b. Borax**
    - **c. Jade and Other Precious Stones**

- **C. Minerals of Secondary Importance**
  - **1. Magnesite and Cement Making**
  - **2. Pyrite and Sulfur**
  - **3. Asphalt and Ozocerite**
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III. Population

- A. Introduction

- B. General Distribution and Some Regional Characteristics

- C. Population Trend and Its Significance

000

1. The Changing Trend of the Northwest in Comparison with other Major Regions
2. Population Increase of the Northwest by Provinces

D. Distribution of Population by Provinces, Occupation, and Urban Centers
   1. Distribution by Provinces and their Average Densities
   2. Distribution by Occupation
   3. Distribution of the Urban Centers

E. Population Problems
   1. Traditional Antagonism Between the Moslems and Chinese
   2. The Uighur Autonomy

F. Northwest As An Outlet for Chinese Overpopulation
   1. Extension of Arable Land by Irrigation and Soil Conservancy
   2. Soldier Colonization
   3. A Resume of Possibilities and their Limitation

GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

I. The Physical Setting

A. Location and Importance.

13 Lanchou, the capital of Kansu, is the geographic center of China. If one draws a horizontal line from west to east and a vertical line from south to north, he finds that the northwest quarter of China just covers the whole area of Sinkiang, Kansu, and Chinghai or Koko Nor. Owing to scanty rainfall, a great part of the area is a vast desert, dotted with oases and strips of cultivation, It is generally classified as the interior continental desert and steppe region of China.

771 From the viewpoint of geographic location, Northwest
184 China, especially Kansu Province, is a transitional zone of
cultural variations. Religions, for example, are different.
From Kansu northwestward to Sinkiang, the majority of the
inhabitants are Mohammedans. Contrarily, southeastward to
China proper, there is more Buddhism and Christianity.
241 Again, Kansu furnishes a natural boundary for economies.
233 From the eastern end of Kansu southeastward the area is
mainly agricultural, while the area northwest from Kansu is
182 largely a pastoral region. People there are adapted to a nomadic
life with a relatively self-sufficient economy. As a result, the
trading activity is small. It is limited to a small village or an
isolated oasis.

131 The area is adjacent to the Mongolian People's Republic on the north and northwest and the Tibetan Plateau on the southwest. Moreover, it lies in the path of direct communication with Soviet Russia through the narrow plain of the Kansu Corridor by way of Sinkiang in the extreme northwest. It is an important part of China as a strategic pivot linking Asia and Europe and it is the great joint between Inner Asia and the Pacific coast.

133 B. Surface Features.

The physical features of northwest China generally may be classified as plateaus. However, viewed in terms of the present relief of Kansu, the high lands are all located along the southern border of the province. They are generally called the Ch'i-lien-shan, the Nan-shan, or the Southern Mountains. This mountain range forms the natural boundary between Kansu to the north and Chinghai to the south. There are a few passes situated in this mountain range with an average height of 12,900 feet. The length of the Chi-lien-shan is roughly estimated at 570 miles. Its east end is dissected by the streams of the upper Yellow River into a few isolated

133 mountains, notably the Chin-ling and Mei-chang, forming the boundaries of southern Shensi and northern Szechwan. Water separates the low lands between the mountains, and there are several notable basins such as Han-chung Basin. Except in the Chin-ling section, the mountain range is rather bare and has little vegetation. The slopes along the Chi-lien-shan are strewn with pebbles, stone debris, and red deposits of the gravels. Valleys form vast corridors several miles wide between the mountain ranges. In the central area, where the topography is more level, pebbles, sand dunes, pastures, and swamps appear. The Chi-lien-shan region is suitable primarily for a grazing economy. However, most of the flat [241] land in the valleys has been opened for agricultural use. Spring wheat, millet, linseed, and colze are grown nearly everywhere in the region and form the major foodstuffs of the people.

The Chi-lien-shan is the major mountain range in this section [103] of Northwest China. It has received various names. The eastern end of the range is called the Liu-pan-shan or the "six coil mountain." The upper Yellow River cuts a gap through the links of the mountain range so that the Liu-pan-shan is an isolated mountain from which the Yellow River runs north and northeastward. The Wei River, one of the major tributaries of the Yellow River, runs along the south edge of the Liu-pan-shan eastward to Shensi Province, along the northern piedmont of the Chin-ling-shan eastward to Shensi Province, along the northern piedmont of the Chin-ling-shan. North of the Wu-sha-ling, or Dark Sand Peak, 120 miles northwest of Lanchou, a narrow strip of land extends along the northern foot of the Ch'i-lien-shan. From here westward, the land is relatively flat and plain. This area is called the Kansu Corridor. It is the important passageway to the Northwest of China.

All streams, as well as meltwater, come down from the Ch'i-lien-shan and run toward the north or northeast. Some streams disappear into the desert after a short distance. This is the case almost everywhere in Northwest China. This is one of the main reasons why agricultural products cannot be evenly distributed and dependably developed in the area.

Geologically speaking, the Tertiary formation appears in a number of basins in Kansu Province. The beds are generally composed of red clays, conglomerates, red sandstones, and gypsum. The geological structures remain the same to the mountain ranges of both the north and the south, the Ch'i-lien-shan and the Ho-li-shan, which is submerged into the Mongolian Gobi and the semi-steppes. They are mainly composed of Silurian and Devonian structures resting unconformably on older

133 formations. The unconformity and faults are due to the mountain making movement in the Palaeozoic and Mesozoic stages. All these constructional mountains extend from northwest to southeast, paralleling each other.

Although the Ch'i-lien Mountains provide a natural screen between Kansu on the north and Chinghai on the south, there are many passes in the mountainous areas. Generally speaking, all the passes are around 9,000 feet high. For instance, Pien-tu-k'ou, on the upper stream of the Hung-shui is at the elevation of 8,100 feet; Peh-yai-k'ou on the upper stram of Shan-tan-ho is at the height of 9,800 feet; Wu-lung-k'ou on the upper stream of Kou-shui is at the height of 8,400 feet. All of these are well-known passes. However, Pien-tu-k'ou is the short-cut from the central portion of Kansu to the main section of Chinghai Province, and it covers the shortest distance from Chiang-ye to Sining, the capital city of Chinghai.

The topographical features of Kansu are rather open and simple on the west and northwest in contrast to the southeast, where the land has suffered local deflections and dislocations from earthquakes. The Shu-le River runs through the northwest corner of Kansu, and projects westward to the eastern border of Sinkiang Province. The altitude is about 3,000 feet. There are fewer mountains in the northwestern section of Kansu, simply a few hilly lands merging into the desert. Although the Shu-le River is the major water system in western Kansu, water constantly sins and disappears into the sandy gravels after it runs down from the hilly lands.

South from the Ch'i-lien-shan is the Chinghai Plateau. Linking with the Tibetan Plateau to the south, it forms the huge plateau region of west China. The Kun-lun mountain ranges run through the core of the area, projecting eastward to form a few paralleling ranges. The southwestern section of the area is much higher and its topography is rugged in comparison with the northern section. Two notable basins, the Tsaidam and the Sining, are situated between the Ch'i-lien Mountains to the north and the Kun-lun Mountains to the south. In the western sections of the area there are numerous lakes and streams which are the sources of the most important river systems of China, namely the Yellow River and the Yangtze River. The Tsaidam Basin is swampy. Its elevation is estimated at some 8,100 feet with the western edge of the basin much sharper than the eastern margin. The Chinghai Basin, in the eastern section of the area, is the most essential one. It is named after the salt lake, Koko Nor. Sining is the major city [633] in this basin. It is not only the pivot station between the Mongolian Gobi and the Tibetan Plateau but also the economic and political center of Chinghai.

133 From the provinces of Kansu and Chinghai northwestward is the former province of Sinkiang, or the New Dominion. The remoteness of Sinkiang from China Proper is emphasized by its sise and the physical difficultires. Of the five gigantic mountain ranges in Asia, Sinkiang has three: the Altai, the Tien-shan, and the Kun-lun Mountains. The Tien-shan, or the Celestial Mountain, runs through the middle of the province and divides Sinkiang into two parts - northern Sinkiang and southern Sinkiang. Between the northern slope of the Tien-shan and the southern piedmont of the Altai Mountain, the Dzungarian Basin is located. This is covered by gravels, sands, and pebbles. On the other side of the Tien-shan, the Takla-Makan desert is situated. This part of Sinkiang is called the Tarim Basin. Locally, the Tarim means "the cultivable land." Here the important Tarim River runs along the north edge of the desert eastward to the Lop Nor and furnishes irrigation water to the people who live there. The Kun-lun Range forms a great mountain chain on the southern border of Sinkiang adjacent to the Tibetan Plateau. The topographical features of the province can be divided into five major divisions. They are: the northern mountain region or the Altai division; the Dzungarian Basin; the Tien-shan region; the Tarim Basin; and the Kun-lun region.

The northern mountain region extends from the northern fringe of the Dzungarian Basin to the Mongolian Plateau. The major mountain range in this region is the Altai. In Mongolian altai means "gold." The Altai mountain range is not only the boundary between Sinkiang to the west and Mongolia to the east, but the northern end of the range also functions as the boundary between China to the south and Russia to the north. From China's side, the mountain is not very high and the slopes are relatively gentle. The height is approximately 4,500 feet although a few peaks are about 12,000 feet high. There are a few small plains, for example the Burchun (Pu-er-chin) Plain, which is approximately 1,200 to 1,500 feet above sea level. The plain is formed on the right bank of the Kara Irtis River which originates from the Altai and runs westward to Lake Zaisan.

The Altai mountains are a block faulting structure. Faults appear on both sides of the mountain range. Only the middle part remained stationary as a horst. The ridge goes from the northwest to the southwest and disappears into the Mongolian Gobi. The southern slope of the Altai mountains is dominated by numerous rolling and dome-shaped hills where the Burchun and Urungu Rivers originate. On the southwest side there is a broup of dome-shaped mountains. The Tarbagatai Mountain, where Chuguchak (Ta-cheng) district is located, is the major group of this section. This part is around 2,100 feet above

133 sea-level, and it joins the Burchun plain on the east. The E-min River originates from this group.

The Dzungarian Basin: Dzungaria was the name derived from a Mongolian tribe who lived in this area for a long time. The basin covers the area from the fringes of the Burkan Plateau and the Burchun Plain at the north, the Ili Plain at the west, and the Cheng-hsi Basin to the south, along the piedmont of the Tien-shan. The basin is triangular in shape. The Altai runs from northwest to southeast, so that the east side of the basin is relatively higher than the west side. The surface elevation of the eastern part of the basin is around 1,500 feet, whereas, on the western part, it is only 600 feet in height. All the rivers run from east to west.

The Tien-shan Region: As the Tien-shan range runs from west to east, it separates the province into two sections - southern Sinkiang and northern Sinkiang. The range has been structured by numerous fault blocks; there are many horsts and grabens along both sides of the mountains. Moreover, they vary considerably in height and width and everywhere constitute a strongly marked dividing line between the great basin and the regions to the north. These comprise the wide plateaus of Dzungaria, stretching north to the fringe of the basin with a few well-irrigated, but isolated, areas and fertile plains and valleys. They do not, however, form any regular system and pattern. Since there is adequate moisture, [241] agriculture is to be found both in the valleys and on the plains, especially in the Ili Valley and on the Fou-kang Plain. Farther north on the northern slope of the ranges, grazing land is found. It has, at all times, attracted waves of nomadic nations, from the Huns to the Kazakhs and the Mongols. The continuity of its rampart, the Tien-shan range, offers opportunities to [487] nomadic neighbors on the north for plundering the oases and and trade routes in the south, since the mountain rampart is pierced at intervals by passes which are passable for mounted men and transport during a considerable portion of the year. To the southwest of the Turfan depression the wide valley of Karashahr descends from the grazing plateaus of Yulduz. It always has served as an open gate for nomadic inroads in the northwestern corner of the Tarim Basin. Farther to the west, under corresponding conditions, the great oases of Kucha and Kashgar are equally liable to attack across the Tienshan. The Tien-shan Region is the most important division in the province, because it occupies almost one-fourth of the provincial territory and there are many major cities and oases located on both sides of the ranges.

The Tarim Basin: This is the huge desert area between the

133 Tien-shan on the north and the Kun-lun Mountain range on the south. Generally speaking, this area can be divided into three sections: namely, the core desert area, the piedmont alluvial fans, and the isolated oases. In the core area of the Takla Makan Desert, the absence of moisture bars all animal [361] and plant life. In the alluvial fans at the piedmonts of Tien-shan and the Kun-lun there are settlements and towns. However, they are rather widely separated. The alluvial fans [137] are not all alike. In the higher plateaus of the southern fringe of the Takla-Makan near the Kun-lun ranges vegetation is to be found only at great elevations where the proximity of glaciers provides moisture and allows vegetation to grow for a few months of the year. It also is found in the extremely confined spaces that streams fed by these glaciers leave at the bottom of deep-cut, narrow gorges. Oases are strung singly like a chain, especially along the fringe of the southwestern corner of the Takla Makan desert. They are generally located between the hilly land and the desert and are of different sizes and conformations, depending upon the local relief.

The basin itself is higher on the southwestern corner, near the massive mountain ranges of the Pamirs. The elevation of this part of the basin is around 4,500 to 4,800 feet. It inclines gently towards the east and northeast, where the elevation is around 3,600 feet. Thus, the rivers run from the southwestern mountainous area, along the edge of the Takla Makan and toward the east. East of the Takla Makan is the oval depression of the Lop Nor where the Tarim River ends.

The structure of the basin is that of a depressed part of the Kun-lun range. The southern edge is higher than the northern edge, revealing that the southern edge of the basin was joined with the hilly land of the lower part of the Kun-lun range.

The Kun-lun Region: On the southern flank of the Tarim Basin the Kun-lun range extends in an unbroken line. It starts from the "roof of Asia" - the Pamirs - and forms a gigantic and massive feature of the southern border between Sinkiang and the Tibetan Plateau on the south. On this range lies the watershed between the drainage areas of the Oxus and the Tarim Rivers. East of the Pamirs it separates into several high parallel ranges. These ranges are cut by the Yarkand River and its tributaries, the main feeders of the Tarim. At an elevation of some 16,500 feet above sea level there is the Karakoram pass, which is the only practicable means of access to Ladak and the uppermost Indus Valley. Farther to the east, the Kun-lun raises a practically impenetrable barrier to any sort of traffic. The two rivers which water the Khotan oasis break through the northernmost main range, but their passage ends largely through extremely deep-cut and generally quite

S 133 inaccessible gorges. To the south of the point where the terminal course of the Tarim turns and dies away in the marshes of Lop Nor, the mountains resume an easterly bearing and sink to a lower level. Beyond the eastern extremity of the Tarim Basin, the Kun-lun imperceptibly merges with the Ch'i-lien-shan along the southern edge of the Kansu Corridor. In the western portion its northern slopes, with their aridity and far advanced erosion, closely reporduce the physical features already familiar to us from the Kun-lun. The other branch extends eastward to Chinghai Province, forming the divide of the Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers.

Examination of the topographical features of northwestern China reveals that mountains, plateaus, deserts, and gravels dominate the land forms of the whole area. Level land is present along the various river banks; notably, the Ili Plain, the E-min Plain, the Kara-Irtis Plain, the Urumchi Plain, and at certain portions of the Tarim River. Human activities are largely restricted and limited by the unfavorable topography
S [361] and land forms. Cities are located at the piedmonts of the mountains, and oases are situated along the outer fringes of
S [161] the deserts by the side of water. The population of Northwest China is sparsely distributed through the whole section.

N 132 C. Climate

Particularly in Northwest China, where the great portion of the land is dry and sandy, the success and well-being of the whole agricultural population is bound up with the amount of rainfall, its seasonal distribution, and its reliability. Temperature, which in winter absolutely stops outside activities with its cold and which destroys crops through untimely frosts in spring and fall is next in importance.

The inland provinces of Northwest China are least influenced by ocean winds from the southeast and east, and the continentality is very obvious. The climate of Northwest China undergoes sharp fluctuations of temperature in summer and in winter, and uneven and unpredictable precipitation throughout the year.

According to collected data on temperatures from a few stations in Northwest China, Chiu-ch'uan for instance, the average temperature of January is minus nine degrees Centigrade. Tun-huang is minus seven degrees Centigrade. Because of a lower elevation than Chiu-ch'uan, Tun-huang is relatively warmer even though farther west. In July, Chiu-ch'uan has 23.8 degrees Centigrade, whereas Tun-huang has 27.1 degrees Centigrade. The annual differences of each of the stations in Kansu are over thirty degrees Centigrade. Chiu-ch'uan is thirty-three degrees Centigrade; Tun-huang is

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132 thirty-four degrees Centigrade. The larger the annual difference, the more obvious is the seasonal differentiation.

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132 In Sinkiang, the highest temperature of the year is in July. The lowest temperature of the year is in January, in Southern Sinkiang, and in February in northern Sinkiang. The temperature curve is very sharp. The average temperature for the coldest month of the year is from minus seven to minus sixteen degrees Centigrade. Khotan, in southern Sinkiang, has minus seven degrees Centigrade; whereas Altai, in northern Sinkiang, has minus 16.9 degrees Centigrade. This variation of 9.9 degrees is explained not only by the locations and altitudes of these two places but mainly by the abrrier of the Tien-shan. All the recording stations of former Sinkiang Province generally have a mean January temperature below zero. The only difference is that there are three months below zero in southern Sinkiang and five months below zero in northern Sinkiang.

The obstruction of the Tien-shan greatly influences the climate. Statistics show that all the weather stations in southern Sinkiang have a mild temperature compared with those in northern Sinkiang. This is due to the fact that the former are well-sheltered by the mountain ranges. For example, the difference in latitude from Urumchi to Kucha is only two degrees, but the temperature in January in Kucha is minus fourteen degrees Centigrade and in Urumchi is minus 19.3 degrees Centigrade. Due to topographic differences, the variation is 5.3 degrees.

Summer temperatures are relatively uniform. In Sinkiang, for instance, the range of temperatures is twenty-two to twenty-five degrees. The July average is 24.2 degrees Centigrade at Urumchi, 23.9 degrees at Kucha, 23.1 degrees at Ili, and 22.2 degrees at Ta-chang. Altai, in the extreme north, has an exceptionally low average temperature, only 20.9 degrees Centigrade. In contrast, the stations in southern Sinkiang, such as Kashgar and Khotan, have a mean temperature for July of more than twenty-five degrees Centigrade. The hottest place in Sinkiang is Turfan, which has 33.7 degrees Centigrade in July. This is the place noted as a "fire district" (Ho-chou) in Chinese history. During its hot summer days, the natives retire to underground chambers. There are two explanations for this extreme heat. First, Turfan is in a depression; it is forty-five feet below sea level. Second, Turfan is surrounded by mountains. When the air masses move in, they are warmed and rise in a conventional current.

Continental climate changes rapidly, both daily and seasonally. It differs from south to north. For example, at Khotan the year range is 32.4 degrees Centigrade; at Kucha

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132 it is 37.9 degrees , and at Urumchi it is 39.4. Because of its
topographical conditions, the range at Turfan is greater,
amounting to 40.8 degrees Centigrade. At all the stations, the
yearly range of temperature is above thirty degrees. As to
daily difference, the temperature varies more than twenty
degrees. This is particularly true ~~in summer~~ when the earth
absorbs heat and loses heat more easily.

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132 Rainfall is meager throughout Northwest China. Generally,
it is below 250millimeters. According to some data of the
western stations of Kansu, Chang-yeh District has ninety-five
millimeters; Chiu-ch'uan has eighty-one millimeters; Tun-
huang has forty-six millimeters. The farther inland,
the more obvious is the continentality and the less is the pre-
cipitation. Summer is usually the period of maximum precipitation.
In Chang-yeh District the maximum precipitation is in July,
August, and September. They have almost constantly seventy-
four percent of the rainfall of the year; whereas the winter
months, December, January, and February, have only five
percent. The rainfall of the summer months in Chiu-ch'uan
is approximately seventy-two percent of the year, but it
drops to five percent in the winter months. The variations of
the rainfall of Kansu Province are generally above forty
N percent, an amount definitely insufficient for agricultural
[241] usages. Irrigation in Kansu depends mainly on melting snow
water from Ch'i-lien-shan rather than rainfall.

S Sinkiang is located approximately in the center of Asia.
132 Blocked by the huge mountains and gigantic desert, the moist
[131] air from the ocean can hardly move into the area so the at-
mosphere is dry, except in the northwestern section of the
province where the topography is relatively open toward the
west. When the western winds are strong, moist air is
moved into the province. Rainfall is, therefore, heavier.
According to the statistics, the mean precipitation is 229
millimeters at Urumchi; 280 millimeters at Ili; 274 milli-
meters at Chuguchak; and 149 millimeters at Altai. In southern
Sinkiang all the stations are separated from the ocean by
huge mountains and rainfall is light. For this reason, Kashgar
receives only eighty-six millimeters precipitation a year; Kucha
receives seventy-six millimeters; and Turfan receives twenty-
S nine millimeters. Charklik (Erh-chiang) has only 4.5 milli-
[161] meters in a year. It has been reported that in the Han Dynasty
there were a thousand families living in the district. In 1943,
there were only three families with some eleven persons
remaining. The meagerness of precipitation through the years
and the encroachment of the desert are the major causes for
the rapid decrease of the population in Charklik. In some

S 132 places not even as much as 4.5 millimeters falls through the year. There are no longer a series of records showing either the temperature or the precipitation of the area, but the available data show that the total precipitation consists of snow water as well as summer rain in certain parts of the province.

N 132 In the geographical distribution of rainfall there shows a marked contrast between the shady side of the mountainous areas and the oases. On the whole, the southeastern part of Kansu and Shensi receive a relatively greater rainfall than the northwestern sections. For instance, Wu-wei district, in the southeastern section of Kansu, has a comparatively high precipitation, and Chiu-ch'uan, because of its location in the northwestern section of Kansu, has a precipitation that N [241] is relatively low. The former is considered an area of agricultural dominance; the latter, due to less precipitation, makes for agricultural uncertainty.

Because the warmer southern air has been blocked by the Nan-shan and Chin-ling on the southern border of the region, the temperature of Kansu and Shensi is relatively lower than those places in the same latitude in eastern China. For instance, the January temperature in Peking is minus 4.7 degrees Centigrade; in Chiu-ch'uan it is about minus nine degrees Centigrade. In July the temperature in Peking is 25.3 degrees Centigrade, whereas in Chiu-ch'uan it is 23.8 degrees Centigrade. This is due not only to the influence of location - one near the coast and the other inland - but also to the fact that the mountain range runs from west to east as the barrier which shuts off the warm, moist winds from the southeastern coastal areas of China.

S 132 Furthermore, the distribution of precipitation of Sinkiang differs from south to north of the Province. The mean annual precipitation at Kashgar is 89.4 millimeters of which over two thirds, or around seventy three percent, falls in the spring and summer. At Urumchi it is 228.8 millimeters, of which twenty-four percent falls in winter; thirty-four percent falls in spring; fifteen percent falls in summer; and twenty-seven percent falls in autumn. At Kashgar the precipitation is greatest in summer and at Urumchi it falls largely in the spring and autumn months. The Takla Makan desert absorbs the limited moisture from the air. However, in northern Sinkiang the topographical features are comparatively open so that the Arctic Oceanic winds blow toward the area more easily. Thus, precipitation is evenly distributed throughout the year.

S [241] The dry air reduces cloudiness and thus increases sunshine. The agricultural activities of the area depend largely upon the brilliant sunshine for melting snow on the mountains for irrigation.

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132 irrigation. There is, therefore, a common saying in the area that sunshine equals rainfall.

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132 Generally speaking, Northwest China is affected by the high pressure of the Mongolian Plateau. It is windy throughout the year, particularly in the spring. There are also local cyclones on the Gobi desert during the hot summer. These cyclones are relatively short-lived and remain within one area. Winds blow more strongly in the spring than in other months of the year, because at this time the center of the high pressure area is moving toward the northern part of Central Asia and Northwest China is just beyond the edge of the high
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[132] pressure. Since Sinkiang is in the high pressure circle in the winter, the wind blows calmly. When the strong winds sweep down to the ground in spring or summer they do much damage to agricultural crops. Therefore, the places which face such strong winds are the places where agricultural products are relatively poor.

In summary climate is modified by topography and the distance of the area from the sea. Northwest China is located in the interior of China and is remote from seas. The huge mountains and the gigantic deserts render the climate generally dry throughout the year. According to Koppen's classification, the area lies in the zone of B climate; that is, the potential evaporation exceeds precipitation. Owing to topographical features' influence upon climatic changes, it is always drier on the southern and sunny sides of the mountains than on the
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[132] northern and shady sides of the ranges. In southern Sinkiang, for example, the climate is classified as a dry desert type; whereas, in northern Sinkiang, it is a steppe climate. This difference is mainly due to the amount of precipitation. In the steppe regions the precipitation is always greater than it is in the desert area.

In Northwest China, the temperature changes rapidly from day to day and season to season. Precipitation is greatest in the summer months but it is not reliable.

II. Mineral Resources.

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A. General Distribution and Some Specific Importance

Northwest China is a poverty-stricken area, due in part to insufficient rainfall and also because it was until recently, practically an unexplored region in regard to its natural resources. Although the coal reserve of Shensi is known to be rich (next only to its close neighbor, Shansi,) (if reported recent discoveries in the Northeast are left out of consideration), it has not been mined to any great extent due to the lack of a nearby market. The only other promising mineral is the

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135 oil field which was discovered near Yümen in northwest Kansu
N during the latter part of the last war. Though several wells
[315] had been drilled and a small refinery plant established, oil
[489] production was never large due to shipping and transportation
difficulties. (It might be noted that construction of the Kansu-
[497] Sinkiang Railway has been completed up to Yümen in July
1956. Tank cars may now replace trucks in the transportation
of Yümen oil.) Despite these adverse factors, the Peking
Government's planned economy gives top priority to the
development of the known and the search for the unknown
mineral wealth of China's Northwest.

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315 Thirteen construction projects were completed in the Yümen
Oil Field, China's biggest oil center, in the spring of 1955.
A number of these projects now enable Yümen to produce
N eighteen percent more heavy lubricating oil and fifteen percent
316 more kerosene. (NCNA April 22, 1955). A large coal field
was discovered in Kansu in April, 1955. It is reported the
new discovery with a total of approximately thirty-two million
metric tons is four times as large as the A-kan-chen colliery
of Kao-lan (Lanchou) county, one of the major coal mines
in the province.

S Work has been started by three oil prospecting teams sent
N to Sinkiang and Chinhai provinces by the Northwest Geology
315 Bureau under the Ministry of Geology. The prospectors are
[654] operating in Turfan and Dzungaria Basins, Sinkiang and in
Tsaidam, Chinahai, to locate oil-bearing structures, oil
shales, heavy feldspar and other minerals. (NCNA April
19, 1955). One of the plans for 1955 was to complete the
prospecting of several oil-bearing structures in the Turfan
Basin and obtain the data to design a modern shaft mine in the
Urumchi coal field (American Consul General, SCMP, June
1-30, 1955). In addition, rich coal deposits have been discovered
in North Sinkiang, particularly in the Ili Valley.

According to 1955 reports, new oil fields were discovered
and drilled, e.g., at Tu-shan-tzu, south of Wu-su, and new
S coal fields were discovered in Sinkiang. Up to now, eight coal
N fields are being worked along the foothills of Tien-shan in
316 Sinkiang, which form one of the largest coal fields in China,
ranking third among all the provinces. In coal reserve,
Sinkiang is next only to Shansi and Shensi. The present doal
reserves of Sinkiang are estimated at 35,040 million metric
tons and can last for three hundred years at the present
daily output rate of 320,000 tons.

Iron ore and ferro-metals like tungsten, manganese, molybdenum and nickel, as well as some non-ferrous minerals, like gold, platinum, copper, lead and zinc, and aluminum have been discovered and some even worked, especially in the province of

S N 316 [648] Sinkiang. The discovery of uranium and some other fissionable materials has been reported there. While rumors that Sinkiang is being built up into an ataomic arsenal for Russia remain to be confirmed, nevertheless it seems to be of particular strategic importance in the building up of a joint Sino-Soviet Inner Asian fortress.

S N 315 [648] Under a previous Sin-Soviet agreement concluded in 1937, the U.S.S.R. carried out prospecting and drilling in regard to petroleum exploitation. Fields were discovered in several localities, and a refinery was built at the Wu-su field, which, completed in 1940, had a daily capacity of a thousand barrels. This refinery was closed, however, in 1943. The largest field discovered to date, some forty miles in length, is located at An-chi-hai. No estimate of reserves is available at present, but on the basis of known fields and producing wells, Sinkiang has China's most extensive and abundant reserves, far outstripping those of Shensi, Kansu and Szechwan. Moreover, the oil from Sinkiang bores is reportedly of better quality than that found in other provinces in the Northwest.

S 315 316 648 Before the Sino-Soviet Agreement of Moscow on March 27, 1950, the mineral exploitation of Sinkiang was carried out sporadically and on a very small scale, with inefficient local mining methods predominating. Under the terms of the 1950 Moscow Agreements, a joint Sino-Russian petroleum company was formed with Russian-supplied technicians and equipment to undertake prospecting, surveying, working, and refining or petroleum and gas. Two other similar corporations were also organized to explore and exploit the non-ferrous and rare metals. By agreement the products of the corporation were to be divided equally between China and the U.S.S.R., as well as running expenses and profits. Leadership of the corporations was to be assumed by representatives of the two contracting parties in rotation for periods of three years and the corporations were to be staffed by an equal number of citizens from each of the two countries. The agreements were supposed to be valid for thirty years. (China Weekly Review, July 1, 1950, p. 82). It has been reported that all three Sino-Soviet joint corporations have been transferred to Chinese ownership, although with Russian advisers, since the beginning of 1955. At the same time, the Peking Government, together with Sinkiang authorities, sent out three large survey teams to search for new mineral deposits.

N 135 Northwest China has a great variety of minerals, only a few of which have been even partially developed. In addition to the rich oil fields of both Kansu, Sinkiang, and possibly Shensi, and the abundant coal deposits of these three provinces, other recently discovered minerals are as follows: rich copper deposits

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135 in Kansu province; in addition, bornite, presumed to be very rare in the eastern hemishpere, has been discovered in southern Shensi province, leading to the belief that China may have rich additional bornite deposits. (China Monthly Review, May, 1953, p. 75.) In addition, several new copper deposits were found at Pai-cheng, Urumchi, Kashgar and Ili in Sinkiang province.

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135 Rich iron ore deposits have been discovered with a proved reserve of as much as 47,537,000 metric tons in Sinkiang, sixt among all the provinces. (1945 Mining Report, China Geological Survey). In addition, some new iron ore deposits were found in Urumchi, Kucha, Pai-cheng, Wuka, Ta-cheng, and I-ning. Together with the discovery of some high quality tungsten ore in Wen-chuan of Sinkiang and some manganese ore in Kan-ku and Yung-teng of Kansu, Sinkiang possesses practically all the basic elements for the development of iron and steel industries.

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135 There are many inland lakes and dried up lake basins all over the northwest provinces, among them the Tsaidam of Chinghai and Tarim of Sinkiang, two of the largest inland drained basins in the world. They provide the basic sodium salts. The almost inexhaustible and widespread salt and soda deposits in Kansu and particularly in parts of Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang together with the nearby rich oil fields provide a sound basis for the development of chemical industries.

While the mineral resources of northwest China are still being surveyed and their actual extent is not known, the outlook appears promising, particularly in the province of Sinkiang.
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[131]
[161] All in all, northwest China with an area of 412,159 square miles and a population of 35,359,525, endowed with mineral wealth, has great prospects of becoming one of China's major industrial centers in the future.

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B. The Principal Minerals

1. Fuel and Power

a. Petroleum and Oil Shale

Until recently, oil refineries in China have been crude, most of them having been manufactured locally; the only ones of any size are located at Shih-you-ho in Kansu and at Tu-shan-tzu in Sinkiang. New refinery equipment was ordered from America at the end of the war, which provided a modern installation capable of handling greatly increased production and making oil products of a much better grade from the Shih-you-ho plants at the Yü-men field in northwest Kansu. Some similar modern refinery equipment has been bought from the Soviet bloc, reportedly Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, for the

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N 315 new oil plants at Tu-shan-tzu in Sinkiang. Undoubtedly, the
S exploitation of the Yü-men oil field of Kansu has been consid-
[315] erably increased in the last two years. At a conference on pet-
N roleum research, called in May, 1954, by the Ministry of
315 Fuel, Popoff, a Russian professor, laid great emphasis on the
648 development of Yü-men oil fields, where Russians have been
177 working side by side with German, Czech, and Rumanian oil
experts (KM Oct. 1, 1954). Towards the end of 1953 the Russian
Atlas (sic!) was experimenting there on an improved method
of oil exploitation which was to be introduced in 1954 (PD
Feb. 9, and June 23, 1954).

N Special emphasis on oil prospecting and drilling are given
315 by the Communist Government. Throughout the nation, geological
654 surveying and prospecting plans since 1953 have been the most
inttensive in China's history. Total Government investment
in surveying in the Northwest in 1953 was nearly seven times
more than the previous year. Twice as many oil wells were
planned to be sunk in 1953 as compared to 1952, while work
on other mineral reserves topped previous years' quota by
thirty-three percent.

The bureau in charge of prospecting and surveying mineral reserves in the Northwest trained nearly 2,000 workers in drilling, surveying, drawing, and analysis in 1953. (Geological Report, China Monthly Review, May, 1953).

N The first drilling for oil was made some sixty years ago
315 at Yen-chang in northern Shensi province. During the Anti-
Japanese war, China spent large sums to equip the China
National Petroleum Corporation's field at Yü-men in Kansu.
At present, the major production is at Shih-you-ho near
Yü-men in the most northwestern part of Kansu at the foot of
N the Nan-shan. There the possible oil-bearing formations ex-
[133] tend 700 miles, with a width of some tens of miles. Seepages
are known in four localities, but only a few anticlines have
N been developed. Drilling started in 1939, and the yield amounts
[433] to several thousand barrels a day. The oil has a fifteen percent
paraffin base. Prospects in Sinkiang appear even more pro-
S mising, with oil on both sides of the Tien-shan Mountain Range.
315 Drilling at Wu-su, west of Urumchi and in the northern foot-
[648] hills of Tien-shan began in 1935, under Soviet direction. Its
[433] current yield is only a few hundred barrels a day. However, some
new fields have been discovered and new wells drilled in other
parts of the province.

N Recently, both oil-extracting and refining industries have
315 been growing rapidly. Refining facilities in northwest China
S with its five oil regions distributed in north Shensi, West
[315] Kansu, central Kansu, and Ho-hsi corridor and Sinkiang have
been substantially extended. Petroleum development is one of

315 the factors that should soon turn the once poor and desolate expanses of the Northwest into a major industrial area. At the National Petroleum Exhibition, held in Peking in December 1951, an illuminated chart showed that the Northwest is one of the principal sources of oil in the country. (China is rich in oil, China Reconstructs, No. 2, May-April, 1952).

Oil Development in Shensi:

In 1925, Mr. Brouyard, Chief Engineer of the Cheng-tai Railway (a branch of the Peking-Hankow Railway - from Cheng-ting in West Hopei to Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi province), in making a survey for a proposed line from Taiyuan to Sian, the capital of Shensi, explored the petroliferous region east of Yenan, along the Yen-shui and the ravines, locally known as "petroleum ravines," above and below Yen-ch'ang in northern Shensi. An oil plant has been established in Yen-ch'ang, but the cost of transport has confined its market to the adjacent area in Shensi. The present plant at Yen-ch'ang is small and poor, even for handling the small amount of crude oil produced there. Some deposits of oil shale are found in the southern part of the province, in the districts of Pao-chang and Chung-shan.

The North Shensi Basin lies in the north of that province, [131] roughly between thirty-five and forty North Latitude and 107 and 111 East Longitude. The boundary on the east is the Huang-ho or Yellow River, and the oil seepages lie in that part of the basin south of the Great Wall in the valleys of Yen-shui, Lo-ho, and Wei-ho rivers. In Yen-ch'ang, from [648] 1907 to 1914, the Chinese drilled several shallow wells, and from 1914 to 1916 the Standard Oil Company of New York drilled two wells to 1,950 feet and 2,700 feet. This company also drilled five other wells in the basin in the three years they were there, the deepest being 3,500 feet, but results were not satisfactory. After this the Chinese drilled some thirty more wells, but none yielded much oil. Because of the smallness of the seepages and the unfavoragle geological structures, the basin cannot be considered promising. (See Table 1.)[1]

Oil Development in Kansu:

The oil reserves of Kansu province are among the richest in the country. China's biggest oil field, Yümen, is located in the northwestern part of the province, and the largest production at present comes from the Shih-you-ho plant. A long sinuous basin stretches some 700 miles northwest with a width of some 100 miles in the east part and from a few miles to sixty miles in the west. Mountain masses border the basin on the northeast [133] and southwest. The oil beds are located in loose sandstones and conglomerates of upper Cretaceous and lower Tertiary age. Possibly the oil originated in Permian or Jurassic formations,

[1] [See p. 128--Analyst]

315 and more oil sands may be found in the sands between the [133] source beds and the present shallow reservoirs, which would increase the reserves a great deal. Oil seepages have been discovered at Wen-chu-shan, south of Chung-yüan (36.37 by 104.32), Shan-hsien-tzu, south of Yung-teng (36.44 by 103.24); Ching-tu-chen, north of Yung-cheng (38.17 by 102.07) and near Yü-men (40.15 by 97.13). Only one oil field has been developed in this basin - the Shih-you-ho, southwest of Yü-men at approximately 39.46 by 97.33 and near the last seepage.

In 1937 the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company sent a party of [648] geologists in to examine the field. After a study of its report the Chinese Government decided to develop the Shih-you-ho anticline. Actual drilling started in February, 1939, on the crest of the anticline near the oil seepage and sent to 492 feet and produced twenty barrels a day from two small oil sands. A second well nearby to a depth of 656 feet gave thirty-five barrels a day. These wells were drilled on the floor of the canyon by two small cable rigs and a small boiler. Then two rotary drills with Diesel engines were brought in from the coal mines. Nineteen holes in all were drilled up to [433] March, 1944, the deepest being near 1,400 feet. Number 18 well at 1,313 feet came in with 10,000 barrels a day, but blew out cratering the hole. On account of small refinery capacity, only 4,000 barrels of crude could be handled a day. Until a larger and better refinery can be brought in, the wells now drilled supply the crude oil needed. The oil is a paraffin base, with 15.5 percent paraffin content, which is difficult to handle at low temperatures in that part of the country. It is impossible to estimate the potential reserves at present, but the extent of the anticlinal structure offers great promises. A geologist who visited the field in 1943 said that there may be twenty-six to forty-six million barrels of recoverable oil in the pool. [133] Within the radius of eighteen miles of this field are three other anticlinal structures in the Tertiary sediments that warrant investigation. Other likely structures will probably be discovered as the basin is thoroughly examined.

315 The production of oil at the Yü-men field increased to 433 4,000,000 gallons in 1946. With the completion of thirteen construction projects in early 1955. its production has been considerably increased as well as greatly improved in the refining process of the oil produced. According to press reports, the Yü-men oil fields reported over-fulfillment of production targets for the first quarter of 1955. The oil fields administration stated that output targets for gasoline, kerosene, diesel, and lubricating oil and other items were surpassed by seven to fifty-one percent in the first quarter. (NCNA, April 14, 1955). It was also said that a number of the newly-completed projects

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

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[433] now enable Yü-men to produce eighteen percent more heavy lubricating oil and fifteen percent more kerosene. (NCNA April 22, 1955).

Numerous new oil-bearing structures and seepages have recently been discovered around Wu-chung, Ku-yüan, Hua-ting and some other districts in Eastern Kansu province. A recent report stated that preparations are now being made to drill a deep test well on the biggest structure which extends over 120 square kilometers around Wu-chung. (See Table II.) [1]

S Oil Development in Sinkiang:

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[135] To the west of Kansu lies Sinkiang, a province rich in minerals, particularly oil. Recent prospecting reveals that Sinkiang has excellent oil possibilities.

There are two basins, the Dzungarian in the north and the Tarim in the south. Seepages have been found in both and the prospects of finding petroleum are good. The Dzungarian Basin is enclosed between the Tien-shan Range on the south and the Altai mountains in the north. Seepages are reported at Ching-shih-hsia near Chuguchak (Tarbagatai or Ta-cheng) (46.45 by 83.40), near Kuldja (Ili or Ining) 43.48 by 81.17), at a place southwest of Sui-lai (44.21 by 86.19) and at Urumchi (Tihua) (43.48 by 87.36). The Tu-shan-tzu field is about five miles southeast of Wu-su, (location approximately 44.15 by 85.0). In the district of Wu-su there are also oil seepages at Ssu-su-mu, Chiang-chun-kou, An-chih-hai-ho, and Ta-shih-tan.

The Tarim Basin lies south of the Tien shan and north of the Kunlun and Altyn Tagh mountains in southern Sinkiang. It is occupied by the great Takla Makan Desert, one of the most barren spots on earth. A small, undeveloped oil field is said to exist at Hei-tzu-erh-po near Kashgar (39.27 by 75.59), and there are oil seepages at Su-ta-che, Shui-mo-kou, Tun-ho, Ssu-cha-kou, Wensu Aksu (41.06 by 79.58), at Shang Wu-pu in Sha-che, Yarkand, Hsiao-kuai in Sha-wan and at Kucha
S (41.40 by 83.04). From the geological formation, which con-
[133] sists of a thick series of Tertiary strata containing marine Eocene beds in the western part of the basin and which underlie the basin, it is thought that the oil possibilities are good. Much work will have to be done to map the structures.

Drilling has been started at Hung-tung-shan in Kucha, at Hsi-ho in Tarbagatai (T-cheng), Tu-shan-tzu south of Wu-su, Urumchi, Turfan, and Kashgar (Shu-leh). Petroleum is obtained to the west of Urumchi, where the oil is scooped from the surface of water with buckets. The petroleum is of black color. Petroleum can also be found from Shih-ho to Manas in the Urkashar Mountains, and also between the caravan stations of Kurtu Anchihai-ho in the district of Wu-su. The richest

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[1] [See p. 128--Analyst]

315 petroleum resources are between the last two stations extend-
ing in a north-south direction with a length of forty miles; the
petroleum is yellow and easy to refine. The oil from Sinkiang
is reportedly of better quality than that found in other provinces
in the Northwest of China. One of the main centers of petroleum
exploitation is at Tu-shan-tzu, five miles south east of Wu-su,
on the Western Highway of Urumchi; there exist wells over
2,275 meters in depth.

[133] The intermittent Tertiary oil sands are said to lie between
a light green shale above, and the sandstone below. No record
of the drilled stratographic sections is available. The Sinkiang
[648] provincial authorities employed two Russian drilling experts,
and in 1935 they began to test the field with modern drilling
rigs. Some time later the Russians took over the project and
after 1939 increased their efforts to develop a producing field
safe from enemy action. In 1942, only three or four of the
seventeen known wells drilled were producing, and only one was
flowing, the others being pubped. Yield was said to be ten to
[433] thirty tons per well per day. Other wells were being drilled,
but it is not known how many were completed. In 1943 there
[648] was some disagreement between the Soviet and Chinese Gov-
ernments and the Russians left the field. In August, 1944, an
American oil man visited the field and reported that the Chin-
[433] ese had uncapped six producing wells and were producing about
fifty tons of crude oil a day. The wet gas was wasted as there
was no equipment for saving it. The oil is thought to have a
paraffin base, similar to that of Kansu. Sample distillation
gives nineteen percent gasoline, twenty-three percent kerosene,
and the remainder, black oil and residue.

At Tu-shan-tzu in Wu-su, there are more than thirty oil wells being drilled. There is a fairly good refinery which makes it the best oil-producing center of Sinkiang. In addition to gasoline and kerosene, it produces lubricating oil for airplanes.

At Taklak small oil wells are drilled by the natives along the Kun Alik Range to the south east of Taklak in Wen-su, northwest of Aksu. The natives work on a small scale during the Spring, Summer, and Autumn. At Hung-kou and An-chiu, southeast of Wu-chia, oil wells were drilled in the late 1940's, but no oil is produced in Hung-kou, although the natives extract some paraffin wax from the oil sands. However, oil is obtained from the well in An-chiu, but the output was only two to three gallons a day in 1949-50. (See Table III.)[1]

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654 Oil prospecting teams were sent to Sinkiang by the Northwest
Geology Bureau under the Ministry of Geology in early 1955.
They went to the Turfan and Dzungaria Basins (as well as
Tsaidam of Chinghai province) to locate oil bearing structures,

[1] [See p. 129--Analyst]

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315 654 oil shales, heavy feldspar, and other minerals. By mid-June, 1955, as a result of an air survey to prospect for oil in Sinkiang, in addition to ground teams with magnetic and gravitational methods in the search for oil, the secret of a petroleum river has been leaked out from a state oil refinery. (American Consul General, SCMP, June 1-30, 1955; June 16, p. 3-5), and ten promising areas for petroleum production are discovered.

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315 Oil prospecting in Chinghai:

No actual drilling and production of oil are reported from Chinghai, but the province has been prospected extensively for oil since early 1955. Promising discoveries of oil-bearing structures have been increasingly revealed.

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[654] Two oil-prospecting teams were sent to Chinghai under the supervision of the Ministry of Fuel Industries and the Ministry of Geology. A new oil field was first discovered southeast of Hsi-ning, the capital of Chinghai province. Oil wells for trial production are reported to be sunk there. (NCNA, April 26, 1955). New Oil-bearing structures have just been discovered in the Tsaidam Basin in Changhai province. (Am. Consul General: SCMP June 1-30, 1955, p. 27).

The Tsaidam Basin is one of the concentration points of present day oil prospecting and more oil bearing structures have been increasingly discovered in the area. (NCNA, June, 1955). In order to do the prospecting work, members of the Youth Prospecting Corps are dispatched there, and they have reported new discoveries of oil structures in the basin.

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[654] Following the recent discovery of the four layer oil structure by the fourth Sub-company of Number 632 Company of the Northwest Geological Bureau, the Number 104 Company under the Chinghai Petroleum prospecting Bureau of the petroleum prospecting General Bureau discovered at the foot of the northern slopes of the Kunlun mountains, a three layer oil structure in May, 1955. (Am. Consul General: SCMP June 1-30, 1955, p. 28). As to the exact locations of these new discoveries and their possible reserves, no data are available. Recent reporters however say that the newly discovered oil deposits in the Tsaidam Basin and at Karamai Northwest of Urumchi have even greater prospects than the Yü-men field (N. Y. Times, August 15, 1956).

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135 b. Coal

Northwest China is particularly rich in coal. About twenty-nine percent of China's coal reserve lies in Shensi alone, formerly considered second only to its neighbor Shansi, if claims of recent Manchurian discoveries are discounted).

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[135] With some new discoveries, Sinkiang claims a coal reserve next only to Shansi and Shensi provinces. Thus the Northwest

N 135 region, even excluding Shansi, ranks high and accounts for about half the coal deposits of all China. The known coal S [135] reserve of Shensi amounts to over 72,950 million tons and that of Sinkiang is over 35,000 million, about half that of Shensi. Most of the coal deposits of the Northwest are of good quality and have been exploited very little. Thus they provide sufficient fuel for industrial development for a considerable length of time.

N 316 Some New Coal Discoveries:

Some new discoveries of coal deposits have been reported. In addition to the previously mentioned, newly discovered big coal field in west Kansu, which is estimated to have a reserve four times that of A-kan-chen colliery, one of the major coal mines in Kansu, new coal deposits are found in the vicinity of Ching-tai in north Kansu in 1954. Large scale and detailed prospecting is now under way. Also, many prospecting teams are searching for mineral deposits in the Chiu-chuan (Su-chou) district of northwest Kansu and in the Tsaidam Basin of Chinghai province. (FBIS, Daily Report, No. 102, 1955). Mining machinery and other equipment are now being sent from Sian, the capital of Shensi, to the site of the deposits. Drilling teams arrived and have been working since early May, 1955; it is said when put into operation, the new coal field will supply Lanchow, the capital of Kansu, and Kansu-Sinkiang Railway and the Paotow-Lanchow Railway lines, both of which are now under rapid construction. (NCNA April 24, 1955). Deposits of good quality coal have also been discovered in the Tsaidam Basin, Chinghai, where oil is being prospected. The coal deposits consist of seven seams totalling some twenty-five meters in thickness. They are suitable for open-cut working (NCNA, June 19, 1955).

S 135 In Sinkiang, coal deposits are widely distributed. They are found in the vicinity of Aksu, Kucha, Kurin, Turfan, Urumchi, along both shores of the Ili river, and in the north of Chuguchak. In addition to the above-mentioned places, high quality coal deposits are located along the northern slope of the Tien-shan mountains in Wu-su district. The Sinkiang coal belongs to Jurassic formation. The deposits are of exceptional good quality with thick seams. Most are bituminous and some may be good for coking industrial uses.

Sinkiang's coal deposits were estimated at over 35,000 million metric tons in 1955 (32,000 million in 1950), fourteen percent of China's total. The richest coal beds in the province are those of the Ili valley and near Urumchi. There are good anthracite beds in both places. Similar beds are also found S 316 near Aksu, Kucha, Yenchi and Hissar. Geological teams were sent in early 1955 to investigate the two large coal fields in

S 316 Sinkiang. One lies near Urumchi, the capital of Sinkiang and the other is in the Kuldja area in the Ili river basin. Data are collected for designing a modern coal mine in the Urumchi coal field where large deposits of good steam coal have been proved to exist. The two coal fields will in time supply fuel for the Lanchou-Urumchi-Alma Ata Railway Line which is now under rapid construction.

N 316 Coal Mining and Its Production:

While the Northwest leads in coal reserve among the major geographical and administrative areas, its production is still small compared to the Northeast and North China. This has been mainly due to the difficulty in transportation and backward mining techniques. At present, the only mining of importance takes place in Tung-kuan near Sian in Shensi, at A-kan-chen near Lanchow in Kansu and ad Urumchi in Sinkiang. They are close to the populous administrative centers of the three provinces. The coal mine at Tung-kuan is connected by a xixty mile long sideline of the Lung-hai Railway at Hsien-yang which is close to Sian, the capital of Shensi. A number of

N [655] the small mines in Tung-kuan are still privately owned. But since 1954, the Government has taken over control of production and sale of ninety-five percent of the coal production in these

N [466] mines. The villagers were conscripted to transport the coal by mule collie carrier and ox cart (TKT, June 17, 1954). In addition, primitive coal mines for local use are also found at Pai-shui, Pu-cheng, and Lung-hsien.

The chief coal mine worked in Kansu is in A-kan-chen, near Lanchow, where primitive methods are still used. There are other coal mines in Liang-tang, Wu-tu, Min-hsien, Tien-shui, and Cheng-hsien. Small coal mines are also located along the eastern foothills of the Ho-lan-shan Range between the districts of Chung-wei and Teng-kou in former Ninghsia province. Production will be increased when adequate machinery is supplied.

S 316 Coal mining in Sinkiang is also carried on mainly by primitive methods which are crude and cumbersome, Up to the present the coal mined has only been used locally. Because of the primitive nature of mining, many accidents occur and the fatality rate is high.

The major coal producing areas are at Ta-cheng and Tihua and Hami on both sides of the Tien-shan mountains. Considerable coal mining is done on a small scale for local consumption as fuel, but extensive development of coal reserves must await the completion of the Kansu-Sinkiang Railway. At present, eight coal fields are being worked near Tihua (1955-56), which extend to about fifty kilometers, having thirty seams. In addition to Urumchi, coal deposits are apparently also being

S 316 worked at Kitai (Ku-cheng), Sui-lai, Kucha and Aksu. Table IV shows the general distribution of coal reserves and their production.

c. Reported Fissionable Materials

It has been reported that fissionable materials such as S uranium and thorium are produced in Sinkiang province. [648] It is even rumored that the province is being built up into an atomic arsenal for Soviet Russia and Communist China, although no definite information is available. Perhaps this is an exaggeration, for present means of communication and transportation are below the minimum that would be required for running the complicated machinery necessary for atomic plants. Nevertheless it is pointed out that "... in the city of Arason (A-shan), Ili county, an abundant amount of wolfram and uranium is mined. In Conca (Ku-ch'eng), Urumchi country, uranium is mined. It is reported that in a concealed mine at Ulugcat city on the Russian border of Kasgar (Kashgar), thousands of persons were occupied with mining. Copper, gold, and oil were obtained from the Ulugchat area, and the concealed mining activities show that there are also mined some strategic minerals. (Bughra, Mehmet Emin: Doghu Turkestan, pp. 84-85).

N 377 d. Hydroelectric Power:

Except for the thermoelectric plants of Sian, Lanchow, and Urumchi, no hydroelectric power is known to be in existence in the four provinces of Northwest China. It was reported the S Urumchi power plant can produce forty percent more electricity [377] than the sum total produced in Sinkiang province prior to the recommission of the plant in December, 1953. While this, on the one hand, indicates the inensified production of electricity production in the provincial capitals, like Urumchi, it shows on the other the limited development of electric power plants S in the region of the whole Northwest. A power generator was [377] recently installed in Urumchi, and another at Ulapo in the province of Sinkiang. (KM Sept. 15, 1955). However, a gigantic scheme of water power development is planned along the mid-Yellow River course.

N According to Li Jui, a member of the Yellow River planning 377 commission, a plan to tame and exploit the Yellow River, by 653 building forty-six dams from the Lung-yang gorge above Kuei-teh in eastern Chinghai and San-men (in west Honan) gorge below Tung-kuan of eastern Shensi for hydroelectric development and irrigation, was passed by the National People's Congress on July 30, 1955. (Li Jui: China's Sorrow will be no more - the Taming and Exploiting of the Yellow River, People's China, August 6, 1955, pp. 9-15). The actual work of the plan to harness the Yellow River was started in 1954. The plans call for two large hydro-power stations to be built, one at Liu-chia

377 and the other at San-men which will give an annual output of
253 110,000 million kilowatts of electricity, ten times the nation's
total output of power in 1954.

In San-men gorge, where the river is narrow and its bed solid igneous rock, a dam and reservoirs will be built. The dam will be some 295 feet high and detain in its huge reservoir water to a level of 1,150 feet above sea level. The reservoir will be able to hold back some 47,086,344,000 cubic yards (7,923,600 million imperial gallons) of water. At San-men gorge, a great million kilowatt power station is to be built with an average output of 4,600 million kilowatt hours, equivalent to sixty-four percent of the country's total output of electricity in 1952. A big electricity supply network in central China as well as over the vast rich basins of Wei-ho and Fen-ho rivers in Shensi and Shansi respectively will be built around the San-men gorge; over 2,623,400 acres more land will be irrigated before 1967, for the water levels and the huge waterhead above the dam - the water above it may be close to 230 feet higher than it is below.

At Liu-chia, above Lanchow, another million kilowatt hydro-
electric power station will be built with an annual output of
5,230 million kilowatts. It will not only supply ample and
cheap electric power to the new industrial enterprises in and
around Lanchou and Hsi-ning, but also would free the city of
Lanchow from the menace of inundations caused by the overflowing
of the river during a flood. In addition, large tracts of land
311 in Kansu as well as Inner Mongolia will be brought under
503 irrigation. Navigation between Lanchou or even Hsi-ning
along the Huang -shui, a tributary of the Yellow River, and
Paotou in Suiyuan will also be improved.

The two great power stations will mark the completion of the first phase of the plan in the fifteen years ending 1967. Thus the completion of these multiple-purpose plans for flood control, power generation and irrigation works to be built along the mid-course of the Yellow River will bring a new phase in the industrial and agricultural development of the region.

2. Iron Ore and Ferro-alloys

135 Northwest China has a fair amount of iron ore deposits and some ferro-alloy minerals, such as tungsten, molybdenum and nickel.

a. Iron Ore:

Iron ore deposits are found in all the four provinces of Northwest China. In Shensi province, iron ore is widely spread in the Chin-ling and Pa-shan Mountain ranges - extending west to Kansu, east to Honan, and south to Szechwan provinces. It is relatively more concentrated in the districts of Feng-hsien

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135 and Liu-pa followed by Lüeh-yang, Tsu-nan, Chenan and Hsihsiang,
N where primitive mining has been carried on by native methods. The
316 total annual production is less than 2,000 tons.
[433] In Kansu, iron ore is mined in the districts of Liang-tang,
N Hui-hsien, Cheng-hsien, Hsi-ku, Yung-tang, Tien-shui, and
[433] Wen-hsien. The total output is about 25,000 tons, while the total
reserve of Kansu is said to amount to 12,600,000 metric tons.

Iron ore deposits have been reported in Chinghai, but no further data are available.

S In Sinkiang, iron deposits are distributed both in the northern
135 and southern parts of the province. The largest vein is the
ore which occurs at Ali in Kucha with a reserve of nearly
three million metric tons and a content of thirty percent. It is
specularite ore. There is another specularite ore deposit in
the hills west of Urumchi. It has a reserve of 750,000 metric
tons with a content of twenty-five to forty percent. Other iron
ore deposits are found at Pai-cheng, Chang-chi, Fu-yüan, and
Ta-cheng. However, the vein of Khara Balgasun mountain
S near Turfan is historically the best known to the Chinese. The
316 iron mines at Kizil near Yarkand are also of high quality.
Extensive iron beds are also reported at Yengi Hissar and in the
Ili valley. At present, iron ore is mined mainly in Kashgar.
Before World War II, there were some four or five smelting
furnaces in operation with a yearly production of 150 tons or iron.
S Now, according to 1955 reports, in Urumchi a steel factory is
327 producing agricultural implements, etc. There is a factory
[398] for repairing automobiles, and one for producing machine
[392] tools. They are modest, but this does not mean that other
factories, about which the press is silent, do not exist.

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S With regard to the distribution of iron ore in Sinkiang and
135 the northwest as a whole, the following two tables may be found
useful. (See Tables V and VI.)[1]

b. Ferro alloys:

Tungsten, molybdenum, and nickel have been reported in the province of Sinkiang, and manganese in Kansu. With regard to their distribution and reserves very little information is available. Tungsten is produced at Chi-ka-tai, Ho-ssu-tai and Chu-li-kun, north of Wen-chuan-hsien in Sinkiang. A reserve of 8,600 metric tons is estimated for the three deposits; mechanized mining with Soviet equipment has started. Molybdenum is produced at Na-lu-kou and Pa-tu-lu-kou in Ching-ho-hsien. A total reserve of 2,000 metric tons for the former and 7,000 tons for the latter are estimated. The ore is reported to have a content of sixty-five percent WO_3. Manganese ore is found at Hsi-wan of Kan-ku Hsien and Shan-lan-men-shih of Yung-teng-hsien in Kansu. The former has a reserve of 200,000 metric tons with a content of 41.47 percent MnO_2 and the latter

[1] [See p. 131--Analyst]

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135 has a reserve of 700,000 metric tons. Pozdneev, D. M.,
mentions that nickel exists in Sinkiang in his Ocherki Stran
Dal'nego Vostoka (Essays on Far Eastern Countries), pp.
164-66, but no further data are available.

3. Non-ferrous metals

Among the non-ferrous metals of northwest China Copper, gold,
S platinum, silver, aluminum, lead and zinc are relatively
316 important. The air approach to the Koz-tokai mining area of
[508] the Sinkiang Non-ferrous Metals Company is a vast snowbound
area on the eastern side of the Altai Range on the Sino-Soviet
S border. A smooth highway runs from the airfield to the mining
[491] town. (Urumchi, Uighur, Feb. 1, 1955, 1150 GMT. -B. cited
by FBIS, No. 25, Feb. 4, 1955).

S a. Copper:

N Rich copper deposits have been found in Shensi, Kansu, and
135 Sinkiang. In addition, bornite, presumed to be very rare in
the Eastern Hemisphere, has been discovered in south Shensi
province, leading to the belief that China may have additional
rich bornite deposits. Sinkiang also has considerable copper
ore deposits of high quality. It is the most important non-ferrous
metal resource of the province. It is found in the Ili river
valley, in the northern foothills of the Tien-shan and in the
S Pamir Mountains, near Kashgar. The copper ore mined near
N Kashgar is reported to have a content of thirty to forty percent
316 pure copper and the deposits spread over 600 square miles.
The copper ore mined near Kashgar contains thirty-five
percent iron and sulfur. That mined at K'ang-shan, Pai-cheng,
Urumchi, I-ning, and Sui-ting is also notable. Since native
methods are inefficient, some mines originally worked were
forced to close, i.e., those near Urumchi, Kashgar and west
of Ili. Many other local deposits are known. Before World
War II the copper output in Sinkiang was 150 tons a year. In
1930 a state copper melting factory was put into operation in
Kashgar which, in addition to processing copper ore, also
minted copper coins. The following two tables indicate the
distribution of copper mines of Sinkiang and the copper ore deposits
of Northwest China in general (Tables VII and VIII.)[1]

S b. Gold and Platinum:

135 Gold is particularly rich in Sinkiang. It is widely spread,
stretching from the Altai on the north to the Kunlun-Altyn-tagh
mountains in the far south.

The names of Altai and Altyn Tagh Mountains mean gold in
the Mongolian language. Nuggets weighing as much as forty-four
ounces have been found here. Pigeon-egg sized nuggets are
also found. Platinum is reputed to exist in the Altai mountains
S too. Rich gold mines are found in the vicinity of Khotan,
316 Karagaitash, Sorghal, Keriya (Yü-tien) Cherchen, Yarkand,

[1] [See p. 132-- Analyst]

S
316 and Karashar. Both placer and lode or vein gold are mined.
S Placer gold is mined in the Ili River, the Kashgar River,
[804] Alintu River, etc. From 100 poods of ore, two to three zolotniks of gold are obtained (one pood : 16.38 kg. and one zolotnik:
[433] ninety-sixth part of a former Russian pound). One lode mine
is said to have 1.6 ounces a ton. Placer gold is also found in
Chinghai. Gold has been exploited systematically in both
primitive and modern ways. Where water is available, gold is
obtained by washing; where water is not available, by sifting
the dirt in wind. The yearly gold output of the province is said
to total 100,000 ounces. Gold mining operation in the Altai
mountains has been on the increase since 1917 when some 10,000
S miners extracted gold valued at over 60,000 taels. In 1942
[439] thousands of mines were said to be operating in the district
though most of the gold mined is reported to have gone to
Soviet Russia. It is claimed that in the Altai Hou-kou field, a
two and a half pound gold nugget was mined. Cherchen (Chieh-mo) and Keriya (Yü-tien) are the richest gold deposits of
southern Sinkiang. It is said that gold is so plentiful in Sinkiang that all Moslem families have their own caches hidden
N away. Gold is panned at irregular intervals from the Hsi-ning
316 and Ta-tung rivers and their tributaries in Kansu province.
(See Table IX.)

S c. Silver and Lead: Lead is most extensively distributed in
135 Sinkiang; it is next only to copper in its wide spread.

Silver-lead ore is located in Burlutugai, near the Sairam
Lake north of Kucheng and some other places. Lead content
S in the ore is up to thirty percent. Mining is carried on very
[316] primitively. Lead mining has been carried on at Wu-shih,
Yenki, Wusu, Paicheng, and Kashih. At present, only the
deposits at the last two places are being worked. Output is
very low because of the backward working methods. Silver is
much in evidence at Khotan and Karashar.

d. Aluminum and Bauxite

Rich aluminous ore deposits are located in the north of Kucha near Baldir, also in the vicinity of Yu-tien (Keriya) and some other places. In addition, bauxite from which aluminum is extracted, has been found at Ho-feng (Hishih-Tologai) in Sinkiang.

N 4. Non-metallic Minerals:

135 The important non-metallic minerals of Northwest China are salt and gypsum as well as jade and other precious stones.

a. Salt and gypsum.

Ninghsia of Kansu, Chinghai and Sinkiang are extraordinarily rich in salt. The numerous lakes and dried up lake basins provide the basic sodium salt. In eastern Alashan of former Ninghsia province, the Kilantai and the Charatai Dagasu are the most

N 135 famous salt basins in Northwest China. The latter is thirty-five miles in circumference and covered with a layer of fine salt two to six feet thick.

The Kilantai salt, commonly known as red salt, exports from T'eng-kou on the Yellow River to the markets of Shensi and Kansu (Ninghsia) each year, besides large amounts of salt.

The gypsum reserves have not been estimated by the geological survey of China, so no figures are available. The Northwest provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and Sinkiang are the principal producers. S [135] The Taklak gypsum deposit in Wen-su-hsien (41.19 by 79.50), Sinkiang, has been surveyed; with a ten meter thick bed, it is estimated the deposit contains more than 100,000,000 tons. Another gypsum bed at Pai-ch'eng, Kucha (41.45 by 83.04), with a five-foot bed, is estimated to contain 11,000,000 metric tons. A gypsum bed twenty meters thick at Ha-chia-tsun (36.17 by 63.33) in Yung-teng-hsien (36.44 by 103.24), Kansu province, was estimated to contain 500,000,000 metric tons of gypsum. A gypsum bed at Hsi-ning-hsien (36.37 by 101.49), Chinghai province, covers fifty square kilometers with the gypsum bed running from ten to thirty meters.

(See Tables X and XI.)

N b. Borax:

317 Borax is produced in Chinghai province by gathering the top soil near saline lakes or dried-up lake basins, the "Tsaidams." The salts are boiled, and the liquid is evaporated. These crude salts are sent to Huang-yüan-hsien (36.42 by 101.13) for refining and separation of the borax. Raw materials are gathered in Tsaidam Basin, at K'o-erh-ko (36.35 by 100.12) and other places.

Amonium chloride is often found as a residue where Jurassic coal beds have burned out the coal seams. S [317] At Ko-hsi-erh-ta-ko and Sa-mu-chi-ta-ko in Kucha county (41.45 by 83.04), Sinkiang, ammonium chloride is dug and sold to silver workers for welding; the amount is small. S [433] At the Wu-chi-kou coal mine (39.01 by 106.03) Ping-lo-hsien, Ninghsia, production is over ten kilograms of ammonium chloride a year. Production can be increased if demand is warranted.

S c. Jade and other precious Stones.

135 Jade and precious and semi-precious stones such as rubies, topaz, jasper, sapphires and emeralds are found and produced in Sinkiang, particularly along the Kunlun mountains in the southern part of the province. S [439] They are imported via Yümen (which literally means Jade Gate) at the extreme northwest of the Kansu corridor, to the rest of China.

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135 C. Minerals of Secondary Importance.

Many other minerals, both metallic and non-metallic, have been discovered in the Northwest, particularly in Sinkiang. Among the metallic ones are antimony, zinc, tin, mercury, pyrite, etc. Among the non-metals are magnesite, graphite, sulfur, arsenic, nitrate, asbestos, alum, asphalt, ozocerite, marble, limestone for cement making, etc. Since mining operations have not yet begun in most cases, it is impossible to predict whether these will prove to be worthwhile, with the exception of magnesite and limestone for cement making.

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135 1. Magnesite and Cement making:

Large deposits of magnesite are found at Tzu-hu county (38.50 by 105.32) of former Ninghsia province, with a reserve estimated at 38,000,000 tons. A modern cement plant is being built in Kansu province. The cement plant will be the first of its kind in thisprovince, and it will be able to meet local demands for cement. Housing for the workers, an extension railway line and a long distance telephone linking up the site were completed at the end of 1954. (FBIS. No. 25, Feb. 4, 1955).

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316 2. Pyrite and Sulfur

Production of sulfur is reported in the vicinity of Khotan, Sinkiang. A pyrite deposit is also reported in the Tsai-ku area of Shensi province at the junction of the districts of P'u-cheng, Pai'shui, and Cheng-cheng (or about 35.03 by 109.33). The field is 3.5 miles square, extending on both sides of the Lo-ho River, with veins one to two feet thick. Reserves were given as 4,000,000 tons with a sulfur content probably reaching fifty-three percent, making it the best in the world. (Ref. Industrial Monthly, June 1, 1944, Sian). This may be the same as the Han-chiao-ho field. As China turns to industrialization, the demand for sulfur and sulfuric acid will increase.

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3. Asphalt and Ozocerite

In the region of Lake Ayar, large deposits of asphalt and ozocerite are found, but so far they have not been worked.

4. Graphite

Graphite is found at Mei-hsien (34.18 by 107.43) in Shensi province.

III. Population

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161 A. Introduction

The Northwest Region covers the provinces of Shensi, Kansu (including Ninghsia), Chinghai, and the newly established Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region in the former Sinkiang Province. Sinkiang alone is larger in area than France, Germany, and

SR 131 161 Italy combined, but the population of the whole Northwest Region is only about thirty-five million.

Northwest China is an area of 1,232,159 square miles, one third the size of all China, with a population only 5.8 percent of the nation's total. It represents, however, a great complexity both geographically, culturally, and ethnically.

N 133 161 (171) (132) The region is characterized, even more than the nation as a whole, as a unity with diversity. Its entity is partially cultural with a predominant religion of Islam and a common historical as well as political background. While climatic conditions are relatively uniform, ranging from semi-arid to arid of the extreme temperate continental type, its physiographic features very considerably. In addition to the thickly peopled humid and mild Han-chung Basin in Southern Shensi, there are large low-lying rich fertile riverine plains along the Wei-ho, Huang-shui, and some parts of the main Yellow River, as around Lanchou of Kansu and near Yin-chuan (Ninghsia) plus the Ili valley of Sinkiang and numerous small oases scattered along the foot of the snow-capped high mountain ranges of Nan-shan or Chi-lien, Kunlun, and Tien-shan. They are thickly populated areas either in large stretches or isolated pockets. Next come the vast plateaus and deserts of Alashan, Khara Gobi, Takla Makan, and Northeastern Dzungaria forming an extension of the Great Gobi of the Mongolian plateau. Each of them is enormous, e.g., Takla Makan desert occupies half of the Tarim Basin (910,000 square kilimeters). They are practically uninhabited except for a few small oases scattered here and there. Next are the arid and semi-arid upland basins of Tsaidam and Koko Nor in the province of Chinghai and Southern Dzungaria of northern Sinkiang. The semi-arid steppes are occupied by pastoral nomads, while the ared portion is either inhospitable or very thinly populated. Last come the lofty mountains. Some of them are snow-capped with alpine pastures and forests like Tien-shan, Nan-shan and the Altai mountains. Some of them are barren and rugged like the Kunlun, Bayan Khara, and Altyn-tagh. The former provide natural bases for the development of transhumance and lumbering, while the latter precludes any permanent human settlement, except for a few high mountain passes which are occasionally traversed by traders and travelers, such as across the mountains of Kunlun, Bayan Khara and the Pamir.

N 172 As to historical and political relations with China, there are two distinct parts. Shensi and Kansu (excluding Ninghsia) are the sites of ancient Chinese culture - the archaeological finds of the "Oracle Bones" of the Shang Dynasty and the Yang-sha pottery in Shensi and Kansu date back at least to one to two millennia B.C. The Wei-ho valley plain is the cradle of Chinese civiliation.

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N civilization. The former provinces of Ninghsia, Chinghai,
*175 and Sinkiang are China's frontier dependencies. While Ninghsia
635 was part of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang is the homeland of
S 175 the Turkic peoples, Chinghai forms a transitional area between
635 the Tibetans and Mongols on the southwest and northeast
as well as between the Chinese and Uighurs in the southeast
and northwest repsectively. Although these borderlands were
first brought under China's political control during the Han
Dynasty at the beginning of the Christian Era, their political
ties to China were not consolidated until recently.

S In order to check Tsarist Russia's aggression towards
175 Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) after her occupation of the Ili
648 valley, China sent an expedition under General Tso Tsung-
635 t'ang in 1871 to reconquer the region and to make it a province
under the name of Sinkiang (literally "New Dominion") in
1881.

N In view of Russia's continued southward encroachment from
*175 Siberia upon Outer Mongolia and Britain's from India northward
648 to Tibet during the Chinese Revolution at the end of the Manchu
635 Dynasty in 1910-1912, China carved Ninghsia out of Inner Mongolia
and Chinghai out of greater Tibet, thereby creating two special
districts with Yin-chuan and Hsi-ning as their centers under
the provincial administration of Kansu in 1913. By 1928, they
were made into two separate provinces. However, quite
unexpectedly, following the formation of the Inner Mongolian
Autonomy, the province of Ninghsia was abolished and has been
added to Kansu province in 1955. (In May 1956 the Alashan
and Edsingol regions have been detached from Kansu province
and incorporated into the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region.
Precise boundary demarcations are not yet known.) Although
S
N the political control over these frontier dependencies of
635 Sinkiang, Chinhai, and Ninghsia has been strengthened gradually
162 by the subsequent changes of their administrative status in
relation to China, they still remain as "pale" areas in the
distribution of Chinese population and culture. That is, the
inhabitants of these borderlands are essentially ethnic minority peoples such as Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs, Monguors,
Khirgiz, Kazakhs, etc. They are non-han Chinese peoples
with an increasing touch of Chinese cultural influence and an
increasing number of Chinese elements among the various
native groups.

S The annexation of these frontier territories to China has
N brought about an artificial connection between the Chinese and
635 the non-Han Chinese minority peoples, both nomads and settlers.
186 Until now, the natives do not seem to have been influenced
[563] much by administrative unity. Not much sympathy is exchanged
between the Chinese and Lamaist Tibetan or Mongol; even less

S
N between the Moslems and the Lamaists.

635 186 As a result of the aforesaid complexity of its geographic basis as well as its intricate historical and political background, the Northwest's population problems are as complicated as its S 635 648 intermingling ethnic composition. For many years , the extreme northwestern province of Sinkiang suffered from continual conflict between China and Russia, although with the introduction of the Communist regime, the conflict seems at least temporarily resolved.

N 47 361 178 The development of industrialization in present day China is concentrated in the Northwest. New towns have been emerging in barren mountains and in deserts, such as Shih-yu-ho (near Yü-men), Tu-shan-tzu, (south of Wu-su) and Shih-ho-tzu on the western highway of Urumchi between the towns of Manas (Sui-lai) and Ulan-Wusu. The first two sprang up because of the drilling of promising oil wells in the Chi-lien and Tien-shan mountains.

N 647 816 The China Academy of Sciences announced in December, 1955, that in 1956 a number of new research divisions will be established in the Northwest: a Petroleum Research Bureau in Lanchow of Kansu, an Agro-biology Bureau in Wu-kung, Shensi, an Archaeological Research Bureau in Sian, a Geo-physical Research Bureau and a Veterinary Research Bureau. (Jen-min jih-pao Dec. 16, 1955, NCNA. May 11, 1956).

N 816 185 435 [648] Last November, the Northwest Branch of the China Academy of Sciences held a meeting at which, with the assistance of the Russian Korshekov an ambitious plan was formulated for the economic development of the Northwest in the coming fifteen years, with emphasis on survey of natural resources, study of petroleum and rare metals, exploitation of non-ferrous metals, agronomy, soil science and animal husbandry. In these N [873] discussions, the professors of three schools of higher education, the Northwest University, the Northwest Industrial College, and the Northwest Agricultural College, took an active part. (Kuang-ming jih-pao Dec. 13, 1955; NCNA. May 11, 1956).

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B. General Distribution and Regional Characteristics.

The Northwest Region has an average density of 28.6 persons per square mile, as compared with the average density of 160 per square miles for the whole country. It has the smallest number in population among all the major regions of China, as the following shows:

Major Regions	Population (1953 Census)
North China	55,749,000
Northeast China	41,732,000
East China	162,682,000
Central and South China	176,331,000

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161 (Continued)

Major Regions	Population (1953 Census)
Southwest China	98,193,000
Northwest China	35,358,000

In the distribution of population densities, the Northwest is not comparable with other major regions except Tibet and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region as the following indicates:

Major Regions	Average Density per Sq. Mi.
Northwest	28.6
North	623.0
Northeast	214.0
Central and South	400.0
Southwest	222.0
Tibet & Shangtu Area	3.0
IMAR	17.0
Whole country	160.0

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162 Of the 35.3 million people of the Northwest, 28.8 million are found in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu, only 6.5 million in Chinghai and Sinkiang. This contrast between the true Han-Chinese occupied eastern part and the multi-minority peopled western portion is sufficient to portray the unevenness of the population distribution. It becomes even more obvious when this distribution is expressed in terms of the size of the land occupied. Shensi and Kansu, including Ninghsia, have an area of 313,801 square miles which gives an average density of ninety-one persons per square mile, while Chinghai and Sinkiang have an area of 1,010,000 square miles with a density of 6.5 per square mile. The density of the eastern portion without Ninghsia would be increased to 126 persons per square mile, for Ninghsia has at most 800,000 people in an area of about 91,500 square miles. However, the larger density of Shensi and Kansu without Ninghsia is still below the average of the country.

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241 Broadly speaking, apart from the general uneven distribution between the eastern and western parts of the region, their distribution displays a special pattern. To the southeast of Nan-shan and Alashan mountain ranges and within the mid-drainage of the Yellow River and the Han-chung Basin, people are concentrated in the fertile valley plains where irrigation is possible, and also in the terrace dry lands of the Liu-pan hills where the annual rainfall is generally below fifteen but above ten inches which, though hardly adequate, is sufficient for growing millet, kaoliang, and even some spring wheat. Population is spread out more evenly in large expanses such as the Han-chung Basin, Wei-ho valley plain, and around Lanchou, a confluent basin where the Tatung, Huang-shui and T'ao-ho converge on the Yellow River, or in long stretches as in southeast Ninghsia between the Alashan Range and the Yellow River course.

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161 Beyond the Alashan, Nan-shan, and Ta-chi-shih mountains in
133 most parts of Chinghai, western Kansu including most parts
of former Ninghsia covering the Alashan and Khara Gobi
deserts and all Sinkiang, where the annual rainfall is generally
below five inches except in the higher elevations, the small
population is intensely concentrated in a number of small
isolated oases scattered along the base of the snow-capped
high ranges. Numerous snow-fed mountain streams come down
the Nan-shan, the Kunlun, the Tien-shan and the Altai.
[312] Before they disappear in the nearby deserts, they provide a
reliable source of water for irrigation. Hence a string of
487 oases are scattered between deserts and mountains. The so-
312 called Kansu corridor along the Nan-shan, the Silk Road
361 along the Kunlun, the Tien-shan nan-lu (Southern Road)
161 and the Tien-shan pei-lu (Northern Road) along the south and
north foothills of the Tien-shan (Celestial Mountain) Range
are all developed along these oases which provide the only
available natural stations along all the trade routes through
Northwest China and Central Asia. These oases are the sole
centers of human settlement for agriculture, horticulture,
animal husbandry, and pastoralism. Since they are so intensively
487 cultivated and populated, in most cases they form administrative
361 hsien or county seats, i.e. from southeast to northwest along
634 the Kansu corridor, Ku-lang, Wu-wei, Yung-chang, Shan-
161 tan, Chang-yeh, Lin-tse, Kao-tai, Chiu-chuan, Yü-men,
An-hsi, Tun-huang, etc. Along the Silk Road at the foot of
the Kunlun Mountains east-westward are No-chiang, Chieh-mo,
Keriya (Yu-tien), Tse-leh, Lo-pu, Ho-tien, Mo-yü, Pi-shan,
Yeh-chang, Sha-che, Ko-ko, Yingihissar (Ying-chi-sha),
Shu-le, etc. Along the Tien-shan
nan-lu, east-westward are Qumol (Hami), Shan-shan, Turfan,
Ho-sho, Yen-chi, Korla, Lun-tai, Ku-che, Pai-chang, Wen-su, Aksu, Ke-ping, Pa-chu, Ka-shih, Shu-fu, etc. Along the
Tien-shan pei-lu, east-westward are Barkul (Chenhsi), Chitai,
Urumchi, Chang-chi, Ching-hua, Sui-lâi, Wu-su, and Ching-ho
to Sui-ting in the Ili valley. Thus the distribution of population
occurs in clusters or isolated pockets of densely peopled
areas, dotted along the foot of the high mountains, but separated
by desert wastes.

361 In the enclosed upland Tsaidam and Koko Nor Basins of
233 Chinghai province, a small number of nomads exist mainly in
the part which is oriented toward and exposed to the limited
311 moist wind, where the grassland is suitable for limited grazing.
The location varies from basin to basin. In the Tsaidam, the
pasture is found in the southeastern part, while in the northwestern
part lies the Koko Beile Desert. In the case of the Koko Nor Basin,
the climatic orientation is reversed. Similar conditions prevail

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361 also in Dzungaria. There a large expanse of pasture land
233 prevails more in the south along the northern foothill slope
311 of the Tien-shan than the north along the southern side of
the Altai.

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161 C. Population Trend and Its Significance
1. The Changing Trend of the Northwest in Comparison with Other Major Regions.

The population of the Northwest as in the rest of the country has been on the increase in spite of the limited arable and irrigable land resulting from inadequate rainfall, and the mountainous terrain, as well as the frequent earthquakes in
N Kansu and repeated Moslem disturbances. It was reported that
[731] more than 246,000 people were killed by the great earthquake
[165] of Hai-yüan, Ching-ning, and Tung-wei in eastern Kansu in
[669] December, 1920, and the Moslem uprisings of 1861-1874,
1895, and 1944. Long before the 1953 census was taken, there has been an incessant influx of people in large numbers. A gradual increase is marked by various estimates and reports.
S For example, in regard to the population estimation of
[161] Sinkiang Province, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1910
gave the figure of 2,670,000 and 2,519,579 in 1923; the record taken from "Le Temps" of April 5, 1934, is around 5,000,000. According to a nation-wide regional survey taken by the Agricultural College of Nanking University in the period from 1928-1933, the annual rate of natural increase of the Northwest was at 11.5 per thousand which was exceeded only by the North China Plain, as illustrated by Table XII.[2]

N According to the 1953 census report for the nation as a
163 whole, the average birth rate is thirty-seven per thousand,
165 average death rate, seventeen, and average annual natural
increase, twenty.

Table XII clearly indicates that the annual natural increase rate of the Northwest is due to a smaller death rate rather than a higher birth rate as compared with other regions. This might be the result of a healthier, drier climate rather than better living conditions or medical care. The 1953 census report gives an even larger natural increase for the nation due to a higher birth rate and a lower death rate. The gradual
N population increase of the Northwestern provinces is also
161 shown by Table XIII.[2] this table shows a considerable increase
for the provinces of Shensi and Kansu (including Ninghsia)
S especially. As for Chinghai and Sinkiang, although the increase
[161] is not so pronounced, nearly one third of a million for the
former and 1.1 million increase for the latter are indicated. These bring a total increase of over thirteen million (more than half the original number in seven years) for the four

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[1,2] [See pp. 135-136--Analyst].

N 161 provinces of Northwest China. How much resulted from natural increase and how much is due to recent immigration, is hard to say, because there are no available data. Nevertheless, N judged by some current information, the large increase of S [167] population of Shensi and Kansu is probably due more to natural increase than to immigration, while the cause for the relatively small increase of Chinghai and Sinkiang is perhaps just the opposite.

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D. Distribution of Population by Provinces, Ethnic Groups, Occupation, and Urban Centers

(See Table XIV.)

Before the abolition of Ninghsia in 1955, its population was less than 800,000 living in an area of about 90,000 square miles with a density of about eight persons per square S mile. At that time, the density of former Kansu Province was [161] eighty per square mile. Thus the average population density of Chinghai, Sinkiang, and former Ninghsia would be about the same, seven to eight persons per square mile.

N 635 162 Shensi: The population of Shensi Province is predominantly Chinese, concentrated in the Han-chung Basin and the Wei-ho Valley Plain. The former is in the southern part of the Province, drained by the upper Han River flowing into the Yangtze at Kankow. The latter is in the east central part of the Province, drained by the Wei-ho which enters the Yellow River above Tungkuan. The Han-chung Basin and Wei-ho Plain are the two most densely peopled areas of the province of Shensi and the whole Northwest Region. Northern Shensi is hilly and mountainous. It is more thinly populated. There are about four million Mohammedans or Chinese Moslems known as Dungans. They are distributed more in the northwestern part of the province. In addition, a small number of Mongols are found near the Ordos in the north.

Kansu: The former province of Kansu is fairly populated and known as the "Secondary Homeland" of the Moslems in China. The number of Dungans amounts to nearly one third, while the true or Han-Chinese account for about one half of the total population of the province. The rest are Mongols and "Fan" natives. The Mongols are distributed mostly in the former Ninghsia Province; there are the Alashan Mongols scattered in the desert of Alashan in the east, and the Ölöt (Oirat) Mongols along the Ta-hei-ho or Jo-shui or the Edsin River in the west. The "Fan" natives are found in the southwest close to Chinghai Province. They are related to the Tibetan family. Thus they are often called Hsi-Fan or Western Fan or Tsang-fan, the Tibetan natives. The Shero-Yögur, Sarigh-Uighur and Monguor form smaller minority groups.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1

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162 Chinghai: The total population of Chinghai province is just over one and a half million. Althoug it is the smallest in number it is the most varied in composition, and it is the most unevenly distributed. About two thirds of the total population live in the few counties of the Hsi-ning district along the Huang-shui (Hsi-ning-ho) and Ta-tung and the main upper Yellow River in the eastern part of the province. These counties originally belonged to Kansu and were added to Chinghai when the province was formed in 1928. The remaining third is widely scattered. As a result of the territorial shift in provincial administration, the population of Chinghai is predominantly Chinese. The Chinese and Dungans plus some Moslems (Salars) are distributed mainly in the eastern portion of the province. According to a questionable report some 25,000 Salars have recently moved from Sinkiang into the province of Chinghai. Also a small group of Kazakh have recently migrated into Chinghai. Some of them are found in the extreme Northwestern part of the province, bordering Sinkiang.

The next important elements are the "Fan" or Tibetans and Mongols. The Tibetan "Fan" are found in the higher parts of the province, such as the Nan-shan Mountain Belt in the north and the Ta-chi-shih massif in the southeast and Yu-shu district, or open plateau areas south of the Baian Khara divide, drained by the upper Yangtze River. The Mongols, Monguors (Tu-jen) and Oirats are found essentially in the upland basins of Tsaidam and Koko Nor.

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162 Sinkiang: Sinkiang is the largest province in size, covering one sixth of the country-s total area. It is twelve times larger than the province of Hopei. It has the smallest population among all the provinces except Chinghai . Apart from the north and southwest part of the Dzungarian Basin and the Ili Valley where they are more evenly spread, the people are concentrated in isolated clusters of oases scattered around the Takla Makan Desert in the Tarim Basin. The main portion of the population of Kashgaria or the Tarim Basin is concentrated in these oases at the edge of the desert and along the foot of the encircling mountains. The valleys of the surrounding mountains are occupied by nomads and semi-settled natives leading a pastoral life.

The composition of the 4.8 million population of Sinkiang is most complicated. Sinkiang is known as a "Natural Museum of Ethnology of the World." Here one finds Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Turks, as well as some Indo-Europeans living side by side. As Pevtsov has said: "From the ethnological point of view the natives of Kashgaria resemble a mixture of ancient

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771 Aryans of the Iranian branch with Turco-Mongols. By religion they are Sunna Moslems; they are very friendly toward foreigners.

162 (181) The Kashgarian population is known as gentle, good natured, honest, and of unusual hospitality." (Pevtsov, M. V : Puteshestvie V Kashgariiu i Kun-lun, Journey to Kashgaria and Kun-lun, P. 53).

Out of the 4.8 million population, the Turkic people constitute by far the largest group in number. They amount to 3.7 million and include the Uighurs or Eastern Turks, Taranchi, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Tatars. The Uighurs are the largest, numbering 3.6 million. They are distributed mainly around the Tarim Basin. The Mongols are the second largest including the Olöts, Torguts, Khoshuts, Chahar, Urianghai, a mixture between Turkic and Mongols or rather Mongolized Turks. There are over 300,000 Kazaks and over 70,000 Kirghiz. They are distributed mostly in the north and south Dzungarian Basin respectively.

The Chinese and Dungans form the third largest group with a total of over 300,000 of which two thirds are Chinese. (Not counting the newly arrived large number of the Chinese Armed Forces). The small number of pure Chinese consist of officials, merchants, and colonists. They are distributed mainly in 7 southern Dzungaria and the Ili Valley. They are on the increase as a result of the intensified economic development of the province. The Manchus are small in number with a total of about 5,000 consisting of Solons and Sibos. They represent the remnants of the old Manchu guards and officials. Both the Chinese and Manchus are found largely in the big towns north of the Tien-shan and in the Ili Valley, except Hami which lies south of the "Celestial Mountain" Range.

Chinese colonists in Sinkiang, even though small in numbers, exhibit a rather variegated pattern. There are the soldiers who came into the region during the campaigns of Tso Tsung-t'ang and of whom many remained first in military colonies (tun-t'ien) and later as free settlers. They were mostly from Hunan province and Hunan Chinese were for a time so conspicuous in the region that Sinkiang has been referred to as "Little Hunan." Petty merchants who followed Tso's bandwagon were mostly from Peking and Tientsin and again many of them stayed and expanded their businesses after the campaign was over. Among these, down to the present, Sinkiang is referred to as the Great Western Camp. Later autocratic governors such as Yang Tseng-hsin and Sheng Shih-ts'ai drew their fellow provincials into the region. The most recent [167] wave of settlers however came from the provinces of Kansu, Shensi, Shansi, and Szechwan, most of them driven by famines; a poor lot altogether, trying to forget the vicissitudes of life by indulging in opium. A sprinkling of Chinese from Manchuria can also be found in Sinkiang, remnants of the evacuated armies of

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162 the Ma Chan-shan and other leaders of resistance against the Japanese aggression in Manchuria (See Northeast, History).

The Indo-Europeans are essentially Russians who number about 15,000, and another 9,000 are Tajiks (Sari Kolis or Iranians). They are found mainly in the large towns of Kashgar, Yarkand, Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kuldja, Khotan, Keriya, and Qomul.

N 2. Distribution by Occupation

162 In general, the Northwest is mainly agricultural, and pastoralism prevails in the higher and colder parts of the country. The Chinese and Dungans are essentially agriculturalists with some engaged in trade and industry, besides working as official administrators and soldiers. They live in villages and towns. Among the Turkic people, the Uighurs, (who are commonly called the "Ch'an-t'ou" or "Turan-heads" by the Chinese and to the Russians are the "Sarts" and the Taranchi), are oasis-dwellers, engaged largely in horticulture, animal husbandry and handicraft. The Uzbeks are city dwellers engaged in business and handicraft.

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162 In regard to the occupation of the people living in Southern Sinkiang, Pevtsov said: "Population of Kashgaria (Tarim Basin) is close to 2,000,000 people. The people are divided into three groups: the settled people , the shepherds and the nomads. The settled population amounts to 1,800,000 people; they inhabit the areas surrounding the desert or the oases. The nomads and the shepherds are not more than 200,000. They occupy the mountainous areas of the encircling mountains." (Pevtsov, M. V.: Puteshestvie V Kashgariiu i Ku[illegible]-lun, p. 52).

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162 The Mongols are pastoralists, or semi-nomadic as are the Kažakhs and Kirghiz in Dzungaria and most of them live in the Tsaidam Basin of Chinghai and Hsi-t'ao or Alashan Desert or former Ninghsia province.

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[162] The Manchus of Sinkiang, like the Chinese, are city dwellers. They are found mainly in Dzungaria and the Ili Valley of north Sinkiang. They are largely merchants and traders - middlemen between the Russians and the Turkic people.

The Tibetans are engaged mainly in mixed farming, animal husbandry and some agriculture, raising some hardy crops for their own use, besides rearing yaks, cattle, some sheep and goats.

Both the old Russian residents and the newly arrived refugees are mainly technical laborers - small artisans, such as electricians, miners, road construction crews, car drivers, etc.

The Tajiks lead a semi-settled and pastoral life.

000 3. Distribution of the Urban Centers (See Table XV)[1]

E. Population Problems

1. [See p. 137--Analyst]

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N **B. Population Problems**

563 1. Traditional Antagonism Between the Moslems and the Chinese

578 Of the many problems in regard to the population of North-
669 west China, the traditional antagonism between the Moslems
648 and the Chinese, together with its international complications,
175 is by far the most serious. Moslem uprisings have been frequent and often caused great massacres on both sides. In most cases the Moslem disturbances are supported and made use of by ambitious neighboring powers, particularly Russia - both Tsarist and Soviet. In 1871 Tsarist Russia used the 1861-1874 Moslem disturbance as a pretext to occupy the Ili Valley and then force China to cede the lower part of the Valley, west of Khargos to Russia. Time and again Russia took advantage of Moslem troubles in Sinkiang to make some special territorial, political and economic demands in the provinces, i.e., free trade in Sinkiang by the Ili Commercial Treaty of 1851 and the cession of the territory west of Tarbagatai by the treaty of Chuguchak (Ta-cheng) in 1864.

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648 Sinkiang had always been a center of international intrigue between Russia and Britain for the spoils of Central Asia, as well as the barometer of power relations between Russia and China. (See Foreign Relations).

S 2. The Uighur Autonomy

642 Under the Chinese Communist Regime, Sinkiang became
177 the Uighur Autonomous Area in September, 1955. A National
[668] Autonomy for Sinkiang was first recommended by General Chang Chih-chung, a liberal Nationalist Government high official in 1946-49. He was "influenced by views of American politicians who insisted that the principle of self-government should be applied to Sinkiang also - an illusory wish for a people which stood between Russia and China, like a mouse between two cats." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955).

S A continuous great influx of Chinese to Sinkiang has
167 occurred, which is particularly marked by the present-day
708 Army Construction Corps and the presence of the Corrective
466 Labor Force. The soldiers are sent to meet the urgent demand of labor to undertake the gigantic construction program and the latter, estimated at several hundred thousands, are condemned to forced labor in the thinly populated border areas. (See: Labor).

S "Since the Chinese Communist troops entered Sinkiang,
642 the rulers have always been Chinese, and at present, with
668 the introduction of autonomy, this Chinese domination is the
177 more emphasized." (CNA. No. 103, October 7, 1955). Furthermore, Government officials are transferred from Peking to Sinkiang in large numbers. On August 21, 1955, seventy-nine officials from the "First Grade Offices" of the Central Government left Peking for Sinkiang; at the same time

642 668 177 it was announced that altogether 1,000 officials from the same offices (the majority of them Party and Youth Corps members of whom one tenth are higher officials), will be transferred to Sinkiang to serve in the Regional County and Ch'ü offices and in the Economic Projects. (People's Daily, August 21, 1955).

The politico-economical development of Sinkiang follows the same pattern as that of the interior of China. All the detailed facts of using Chinese in party meetings, introducing a new currency in place of Sinkiang currency, etc., show that Autonomous Sinkiang is an integral part of China. The sufferers in the whole process are the aboriginal inhabitants of Sinkiang for they are expected to make the greatest sacrifices, greater even than those of the population of the rest of China, for the economic and military strengthening of the Communist world.

668 631 177 162 At the beginning of the new regime in 1949, Sinkiang was called (as it had been under the Nationalist Government) a province - divided into ten special districts and these were subdivided into seventy-nine counties. In 1954, Five Autonomous "Chou" were established. Four of them were established in July, 1954. They contain three counties each, while the former special Districts contained, on an average, ten counties each. The population of three of these Autonomous "Chou" is 57,000, 98,000 and 135,000. Three of the Autonomous "Chou" were Mongolian and the other two were Moslem. In November, 1954, the largest Autonomous "Chou" was established in the Ili Valley, called the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Area with a population of 70,000 (P.D. December 6, 1954, or NCNA December 2, 1954).

On September 20, 1955, it was stated that the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region was to replace "Sinkiang Province." It was also announced that the establishment of the smaller Autonomous "Chou" within Sinkiang had now been concluded with the establishment of five Autonomous Chou and six Autonomous Counties (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 14, 1955).

In fact, however, the population in these Autonomous Chou and Autonomous Counties does not exceed 500,000, which is less than one tenth of the total population of Sinkiang which is officially set at 4,780,000 people. (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 15, 1955). Thus the extension of autonomous rule is limited - a sign that the erection of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Area itself has only a token significance in spite of the fact that the Uighurs number 3.6 million constituting seventy to eighty percent of the total population of the province.

631 131 668 177 The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region is not an easily accessible area. In the past, its geographical isolation has been aggravated by the seclusion policy of the Communist regime for

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631 political and military reasons. After the last British Consulate
131 of Kashgar was closed, the curtain has become even more
668 impenetrable there than in any other part of China. Not even
172 Chinese are allowed to travel into Sinkiang without special
(648) permits.

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F. Northwest As An Outlet for Chinese Overpopulation

The Northwest Region has been long regarded by the Chinese as one of the major outlet areas for China's overpopulation. Once the plans to conserve water and soil are completed - especially along the Yellow River in Shensi and Kansu - arable land will be considerably extended. But water and soil conservancy will involve a lot of problems before the land is actually made productive - not to mention that its sustaining capacity is limited. Therefore the Northwest as an outlet for China's overpopulation is tentative and should only be regarded as a partial and temporary solution.

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1. Extension of Arable Land by Irrigation and Soil Conservancy

According to plan the irrigated area in the mid-Yellow River Basin will grow from 12,717,000 acres at present to some 19,105,000 acres. Agricultural output in the irrigated area will more than double. Annual grain output will increase by 6,741,000 long tons and cotton by 590,000 long gons. The loess regions with their barren mountains and desolate gullies covering 143,000 square miles, will become a land of plenty. Most of the land for irrigation development under the project will be in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu. ("China's Sorrow" Will Be No More - The Taming and Exploiting of the Yellow River, by Li Jui, People's China, August 6, 1955, p. 9-15).

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The area of arable land in Sinkiang has also been extended, but it is not easy to ascertain by how much or by what means. In 1953 it had reached twenty million mou, 4,100,000 more than in 1949 (PD. August 28, 1955); in 1954 more than 5,000,000 mou above 1949, i.e. a total of 21 million mou (KM. September 15, 1955; by 1955 22 million mou (PD. October 31, 1955).

According to the above figures, the increase between 1949 and 1955 would be six million mou. But there appear some discrepancies with other information. The difficulty is that the 1950 data for the extension of arable land in Sinkiang was not 16 million but 18.195 million mou (Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, p. 25, 1950). Thus if the present data are reliable, the 1949-55 increase would be three million mou instead of six million, of which 1,100,000 mou are due to the labor of the Army Agrarian Production Troops.

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According to official reports, in 1953, 1.6 million tons of food stuffs were produced in Sinkiang (PD. August 28, 1955). About the production in 1954, it is known that there was an

433 increase of 11.5 percent in the combined areas of Inner Mongolian, Sinkiang, and T'ung Autonomous Area in Kweichow. (KM. October 4, 1955). Supposing the increase in Sinkiang was ten percent which owing to the heavy natural disasters in 1954 is probably too high an estimate, it would mean 1.76 million tons of food stuffs in 1954, i.e. about 430 catties per head. In this context, a report which claimed that food production is 747 catty per head was published (KM. September 15, 1955).

311 312 185 Soil conservation is just as important as water conservation in land reclamation in arid and semi-arid areas. Human survival in Sinkiang for over 2,000 years has been involved in a continual fight against the aridity of the climate and the central Asiatic agricultural alkali, salt-saturated soil. Every year's floods convert even hitherto fertile lands into alkali, sterile soil. There are "Kariz" wells which are connected by underground canals, reaching a total length of 2,500 km. between Hami and Turfan only. This is evidently a means of combating the impermeability of the soil, which makes surface irrigation harmful.

503 653 According to 1954 Government Reports, 50,000 long or short canals with a total length of 30,000 km. have been repaired by the Army and by the people. (PD. August 28, 1955). In an October 1955 report: 1,600 canals are under repair and also 1,500 wells have been added (PD. October 21, 1955).

311 312 185 Large scale irrigation and water conservancy work are at present in the state of planning only: survey works are going on at the Manas and Urumchi Rivers and at the Turfan Basin for the future building of larger irrigation works and hydraulic power stations. (PD. October 31, 1955). But to fight against alkali soil will remain a continuous problem in land reclamation in Sinkiang as well as elsewhere in the arid and semi-arid Northwest of China. It was reported in 1955 that 300,000 mou of alkali land were reclaimed around Chigalik Lake in the northeast Hami area, and southwest Aksu. Rice has been planted in the former too, and cotton in the latter area. How long will the newly reclaimed land reclaim productive under the ever-increasing accumulation of alkali in the soil is still a problem which remains to be solved.

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2. Soldier Colonization

Although no data concerning the exact number of Chinese soldiers in Sinkiang are available, the figures must be enormous - judged by the gigantic work undertaken by Chinese soldiers under the name of "Production and Construction Troops of the Sinkiang Military Area." One million one hundred thousand mou (166,000 acres) of the three million mou extended arable land during the period 1949-55 are due to the labor of the Army

433 Agrarian Production Troops. More than 40,000 mou are
648 using machines bought from Soviet Russia. The Army Agrarian
167 Production Troops themselves produced 31,000 tons of winter
466 wheat crop on 440,000 mou (124 catty per mou) in the spring
of 1955. They are expected to produce 23,500 tons of cotton on 150,000 mou (310 catty per mou) in the same year. (PD. October 9, 1955). Eighty thousand out of the 150,000 mou cotton are at the Manas River (PD. June 29, and October 1, 1955). Forty-five percent of the total agricultural work of the Army troops is now being done by machines. (Report of Tao Shih-yu eh, Cf. CNA. No. 103, p. 2 or PD. September 27, 1955). In 1954 the total cotton cultivating area in Sinkiang was 800,000 mou. In 1955 it was supposed to be increased to 1,160,000 mou (PD. March 9, 1955).

The working troops of the Army are also developing virgin soil with the help of 184 tractors. The development of 600,000 mou south of Tien-shan chain of mountains was planned for 1955. It was reported in May and June 1955 that the troops had already broken up 20,000 mou of virgin land. Around Urumchi, one tractor works ten mou in an hour.

The Army is also taking part in the industrial development of Sinkiang and since 1950 has been constructing a textile mill, and iron and steel plant, a cement works, a power generator factory and coal mines. (PD. April 4, 1952; KM March 3, 1954; PD March 13, October 30, 1954 and July 14, 1955: KM September 16, 1955; and PD September 27, 1955).

"It would seem strange that the regular Army should engage in all these works. The production and construction troops which undertake the most arduous labor in inhuman, primitive conditions, undoubtedly consist of that multitude condemned to corrective labor in the border areas, of whom the Ministry of Public Security spoke of as people who will never come back from the border areas." (Cf. CNA Nos. 53 and 56.)

167 In addition to the exile of corrective laborers, a great number
466 of youngsters, boys and girls (apart from thousands of Party
cadres and several hundred thousands of soldiers) even from
177 Junior Middle Schools are also being transferred to Sinkiang. In
one single group 540 such youngsters traveled from Nanking (PD. August 26, 1955). The idea probably is that these youngsters going at an early age to Sinkiang will be more easily acclimatized.

3. A Resume of Possibilities and Their Limitations.

433 It has been estimated that the planned annual increase of 6.2
million long tons of grain can at most support another two million people at the present low standard of living of an average Chinese peasant. At least three million mou of irrigated land have been added in Sinkiang from 1949-55. It is said that in Sinkiang 110,000,000 mou could be added to the present 22,000,000.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
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433 Under land reform in Sinkiang, on the average, 2.5 mou were
S distributed per person. (PD. August 28, 1954). According to
[161] the 1953 census - Sinkiang has a population of 4,873,608. That means the average acreage per head would about 4.5 mou instead of 2.5. Taking this as a basis, the estimated 110,000,000 mou of possibly extended land for cultivation can accommodate nearly another fifty million people; that will be ten times larger than its present population.

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311 Land reclamation by the development of irrigation in
Chinghai province and former Ninghsia along the Kansu
312 Corridor is not as promising as in Sinkiang and the mid-
185 Yellow River drainage area of Shensi and Kansu, because of the limited amount of snow over the nearby high mountains. Another three million people (twice its present population) would be the most that Chinahai could support by land reclamation for agriculture and pastoral development.

Summing up all the possibilities, an approximate total of another fifty-five million people which is nearly one and a half times the amount of its present total population can be supported at the present standard of living by the development of irrigation in land reclamation in the whole Northwest Region of China. According to the 1953 Census, the Northwest has
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[161] a total population of 35,359,525 with an annual natural increase at a rate of twenty per thousand as the Chinese Communists claim. That means an addition of more than 700,000 people are added by natural increase each year. In approximately seventy years, another fifty-five million people will be added to its present population by natural increase only. But in view of an annual natural increase of nearly twelve million for the whole population of China, the Northwest can be used as a reservoir for the nation for a period of only four years. Therefore the Northwest is extremely limited as a population outlet for China. And the conversion of 110 million mou into arable land in Sinkiang is itself a gigantic task to fulfill; and conservancy of soil and water can hardly cope with the natural increase in population. Land reclamation in the Northwest should be regarded as a means of improving the living standards of the people rather than as an outlet for any further increase of the population.

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TABLE I. Distribution of Petroleum Wells in Shensi Province.

Location	Year Drilled	Depth, meters	Past Production	Lat. &Long.
Yung-ping, 57 km. NW of Yen-ch'ang	1914-16	667	small	36. 57 x 109. 57
Yen-ch'ang 158. 3 meters west of city's West Gate	1907-36	83-923	1-6 bbls/day	36. 30 x 110. 08
Fu-shih (Yenan) 4 km. NE of Fu-shih	1914-16	1,000	only show	35. 31 x 108. 86
Chung-pu 25 km. WSW of Huang-ling (Chung-pu)	1914-16	833 - 1,182	only show	35. 12 x 109. 03
Tung-kuan 22 km. NW of Tung-kuan	1914-16	933	no data	29. 17 x 106. 35

TABLE II. Distribution of Petroleum Wells in Kansu Province.

Location	Year Drilled	Depth, meters	Past Production	Lat. & Long.
Lao-chun-miao, Chiu-ch'uan county, 70 km. W of Chiu-ch'uan city	1943		776, 076 bbls in 1942	39. 46 x 97. 47
Tun-huang 20 km. NW of Tun-huang city	1943	100-475		40. 19 x 94. 32
Shih-you-ho SW of Yü-men	1937	492 ft.to 656 ft.	20 bbls/day 35 bbls/day	39. 46 x 97. 33
	1944	1, 400 ft.	10, 000 bbls/day	
	1944	1, 313 ft.		
Yü-men, near city	1944		4, 000, 000 gal in 1946 from the Yü-men Field	40. 15 x 97. 13

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TABLE
III. Distribution of Oil Wells in Sinkiang.

Location	Year Drilled	Depth, meters	Past Production	Lat. & Long.
Ssu-çha-kou, k5 km W of Urumchi	1934	shallow	small	13, 51 x 87.16
Ching-shih-hsia (Kaiavusun) or Hsi-ho) 95 km SE of Tarbagatai	Not available	seepages	fair	46.04 x 83.34
Tu-shan-tzu, 25 km SE of Wu-su	1934-42	2,275	From few hundred bbls (1942) to 1000 bbls in 1946; now 10-30 tons a day.	44.18 x 84.54
Hung-tung-shan (Kolayalun)	Not available	seepages	50 tons a day from 6 uncapped wells (1944)	42.06 x 82.47
Nan-shan, 40 km. W of Shu-fu, to the W of Kashgar	Not Available	seepages	small	29.32 x 75.31
Taklak, along Kunalik Range 50 km NE of Wen-su	Not Available	seepages	small	41.40 x 80.12
Hung-kou and An-chiu, SE of Wu-kia (Urukhe-kiati)	Not Available	seepages	2-3 gal/day(1949)	38.04 x 74.50

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TABLE IV. China's Northwest:Coal Reserve Distribution by Provinces.[1]
(Reserve in million metric tons and production in tons)

Province	Anthracite	Bituminous	Total	Production(1955)
Shensi	750	71,200	71,950	650,000
Kansu	59	997	1,656[3]	110,000 (240,000 in 1947)
Ninghsia(now belongs to Kansu)	173	284	457	140,000
Chinghai	240	584	824	40,000
Sinkiang		31,980	31,980[2]	180,000

1. Mining Report, 1945, Chinese Geological Survey, cited by Nelson Dickerman:Natural resources of China, Foreign Minerals Survey, II, No. 7, (1948) Washington D. C. U.S. Bureau of Mines and also by George B. Cressey: China's 500 Million, 1955.
2. Present coal reserve of Sinkiang is estimated at 35,040 million metric tons.
3. A new discovery of 32 million metric tons of coal in 3arly 1955 should be added to Kansu's total reserve.

TABLE V. Iron Deposits in Sinkiang Province*

Locale	Deposit	Comment
Aksu	Ko-kan-chia	two deposits not of highest quality
	Tieh-pen-erh	" " " " " "
	Ko-la-pu-la-ko	
Ching-chi	Meng-ko-tu-ling	
Fu-yüan	Shui-hsi-kou	seven furnaces installed with 600 catties pig iron capacity
Sui-ting (Ili)	So-erh-ko-ling	
Pai-cheng	Ming-pu-la-kou mtn.	mining area of each said to be less than a mile square
	T'a-erh-chi mtns.	
	Ya-se-la-min mts	
	Neng-li-ha-ta mtn	
	K'o-shih-ko-ko-pa-shih mtn.	

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
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TABLE V. (Continued)

Locale	Deposit	Comment
Ta-cheng(Chuguchak)	K'o-la-ta-fu-pan to Ch'erh Shan	vein 130 miles long largest in province
T'a-pan-cheng	unnamed	
Yengi Hissar	I-Ko-jih-ya-yen mtn A-ha-mai-ti mtn.	

* Noris, Martin R.: Gateway to Asia, Chap. IX, pp. 113-14.

TABLE VI. Distribution of Iron Ore Reserves of N. W. China by Provinces*
(Reserve in 1000 metric tons, and production in metric tons)

Province	Proved	Estimated	Total	Percent	Production
Shensi	4,847	6,000	10,847	0.50	1,800
Kansu	2,196	310	2,486	0.10	24,000
Ninghsia	5,079	2,500	7,579	0.35	
Chinghai		5,000	5,000	0.23	
Sinkiang	47,537	1,200	48,737	2.23	

*PAI, CC: General Statement on the Mining Industry. Geological Survey of China, special Report, No. 7, Dec., 1945.

N.B. 1. The total iron ore reserve of Shensi has been raised from 0.5% to 2.3% of the nation's total. That would give it an approximate total of 50,000,000 metric tons.

2. The total iron ore reserve of Kansu has been raised to 12,600,000 metric tons.

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TABLE VII. Chief Copper Ore Deposits in Sinkiang*

Locale	Deposits	Comment
Sui-ting (Ili)	Wu-tsu-tao shan	
I-ning	Ha-erh-han-tu Shan	
K'ang-shan	unnamed	
Karashar	Ku-erh-tai shan	
Kashgar	Wu-lan-wu-su river	20% pure copper
	Su-hun-shan	40% pure copper
Kucha	New copper works	
	Old copper works	
	Su-pa-shih works	
Pai-cheng	Ho-se-erh works	
	Ko-ta works	
	Kung-po works	
	Upper works	
	Lower works	
Ta-pan-cheng	San-chia shan	
Tihua	Chai-o-pao	

*Noris, Martin R.: Gateway to Asia, Chap. IX, p. 117.

TABLE VIII Distribution of Copper Deposits of Northwest China

Province	Location of Deposit	Content	Remarks	Lat. & Long.
Shensi	Yu-feng-chia(Lo-nan)	10% Cu	Malachite 3,780 tons (metal	
Chinghai	Ta-hsia (Lo-tu Hsien)	5.3% Cu	worth investi-	36.33 x 102.16
	Wei-chang-kou(Hsün-hua)	45% Cu	gating	35.38 x 102.35
Sinkiang	Gorban Bogdo (Tihua)		" "	43.42 x 88.18
	Jorga (Pai-cheng)		" "	
Wen-su, Turfan, Aksu, Yenchi (for the rest see previous table.)				

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TABLE IX. The Best Known Gold Fields of Sinkiang*

Locale	Field	Comment
Altai	Tung-kou Hsi-kou Chien-kou Hou-kou Chung-kou Ha-hsiung-kou	
	Pan-tang-kou	2 1/2 lb. nuggets mined; highest quality
Barkol (Chensi)	Hsiao-liu-kou	
Cherchen (Chieh-Mo)	unnamed	
Chi-tai (Ku Cheng Tzu)	unnamed	
Sui-ting (Ili)	Chio-li-Ko R.	
Keriya (Yutien)	A-ha-ta-Ko Shan Chia-pa-shan Yu-mo-chiang Shan	
Sui-tung	unnamed	
Ta-cheng (Chuguchak)	Ha-tu-shan	placer, between T'a-erh-ta-mu-tu and Su-erh-tu rivers
Tihwa (Urumchi)	unnamed	

* Noris, Martin R.: Gateway to Asia, Chap. IX, pp. 114-17.

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TABLE X. Distribution of Salt and its Production in Ningsia, Kansu and Chinghai Provinces in 1942 and 1943 (Production in metric tons) Source: Stephens, Harre E.: N. W. salt, American Embassy, Lanchow, Kansu, China, Jan. 29, 1945)

Province	Field of Deposit	Lat. & Long.	1942 Production	Total	1943 Prod.	Total
Ninghsia	Tsa-han-chih (Lake)	38.20x104.42	39,040		30,244	
	Ho-twen-chih "	39.24x104.40	9,400		12,381	
	Ya-pu-lai "		10,500		5,600	
	Chi-lan-tai "	39.40x105.43	16,200		2,089	
	Hui-on-pu (Earth)	37.28x106.41	175		750	
	Tung-hu-chih (Lake)	37.40x104.55	700		460	
	Ba-in-chih (Earth)(?)	38.18x104.15	35		254	
	Hung-yen-chih "	38.02x104.58	155		16	
				77,105		51,978
Kansu	Hsi-feng-chen(Lake)	35.45x107.28	2,700		5,004	
	Tsao-shan-chen "	35.20x107.59	1,500		2,712	
	Kao-tai (earth)	39.21x99.58	2,800		2,055	
	Chang-hsien "	34.38x104.40	1,400		1,076	
	Su-mu-shan "	38.30x103.20	500		815	
	Tang-chia-hai "(?)		330		453	
	Kan-yen-chih "		200		417	
	Yen-kuan "	34.18x105.19	420		393	
	Pai-tun-tzu "	37.30x104.05	750		367	
	Hsiao-hung-kou "	36.43x105.26	160		351	
	Ma-lien-ch'uan "	41.10 x94.47	425		347	
	Ma-chia-T'sun	36.18x103.30	430		233	
	Lin-hsia	35.34x103.14	135		215	
	Hsia-ho (Lake)	35.12x102.30	20		174	
	La-pai (Earth)		290		112	

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TABLE X. (Continued)

Province	Field of Deposit	Lat. & Long.	1942 production	Total	1943 prod.	Total
Kansu (Continued)						
	Pei-wen (Lake)	38.50x101.14	130		104	
	Liu-chia-wan(Earth)		100		51	
	Pa-pan		45		19	
				12,335		14,898
Chinghai	Cha-chia (Lake)	36.48x 99.23	1,700		2,427	
	She-an-tang(Earth)	36.23x102.53	25		28	
				1,725		2,455
	GRAND TOTAL			91,165		69,331

TABLE XI. Distribution of Gypsum Deposits of Northwest China by Province

Province	Field of Deposit	Location
Shensi	Lin-tung	34.24x109.13
Chinghai	Hsining	36.37x101.46
Kansu	Ha-chia-tsun, Yung-teng	36.37x103.33
Sinkiang	Wen-su	41.15x79.55
	Kuche	41.43x82.54
	Pai-cheng	41.46x81.52

TABLE XII. Population Increase of the Various Regions

Major Regions	No. Places Surveyed	No. Farm Families invest'd.	Birth Rate*	Death Rate*	Natural Increase
Northwest	14	5,648	35.0	22.0	11.5
North China	26	10,816	40.2	26.6	13.6
Lower Yangtze	21	9,849	38.5	28.3	10.1
Southwest	20	5,343	46.2	35.6	10.6
Southeast	12	4,540	37.7	31.2	6.5
	93	36,196	39.3	28.2	11.1

*per 1,000

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TABLE XIII. Population Increase of the Northwestern Provinces.

Province	Population (1946 Nanking Govt.)	Population (1953 C.P. Census)	Differential Increase
Shensi	9,956,055	15,881,281	5,925,226
Kansu	6,528,726)		
Ninghsia	721,518)	12,928,102	5,677,858
Chinghai	1,384,956	1,676,534	291,578
Sinkiang	3,730,051	4,873,608	1,143,557
	22,321,306	35,359,525	13,038,219

TABLE XIV. Distribution of Population by Provinces, and Their Average Densities

Province	Population (1953 census)	Area in sq. mi.	Density
Shensi	15,881,281	72,618	219
Kansu (incl. Ninghsia)	12,928,102	241,183	54
Chinghai	1,676,534	257,553	7
Sinkiang	4,873,608	660,805	7
TOTAL	35,359,525	1,232,159	28.6

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TABLE XV. Distribution of the Urban Centers

Province	Cities	Approx. Population	General Remarks
Shensi	Sian	560,000 (1951)	Administrative & Industrial Center
	Nan-cheng(Han-cheng)	50,000 (1951)	Commercial
	T'ung-kuan	10,000 (1951)	Strategic
Kansu	Lan-chow (Kao-lan)	150,000 (1951)	Adm. & Trade Center
	Yin-chuan (Ninghsia)	80,000 (1951)	Capital of former Ninghsia Province
	Hsia-ho (Labrang)	5,000	Lamasery; religious center
Chinghai	Hsi-ning	50,000 (1951)	Admin. & Trade Center
Sinkiang	Urumchi (Tihua)	80,000 (1951)	Capital, strategic, com'l. & industrial center
	Chitai (Ku-cheng-tze)	30,000 (1931)	Wool Trade center
	Kuldja (I-ning)	30,000 (1931)	Com'l. center, built by Chinese 1762
	Turfan	100,000 (1931)	Com'l. center
	Kashgar (Shu-fu)	80,000	Industrial & com'l. center.

ETHNIC GROUPS

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  - 2. The Chinese Peoples
  - 3. The Mongols
  - 4. The Indo-Europeans
  - 5. The Manchus
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- 4. Origin and linguistic affiliation

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- 2. Language and religion
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G. The Sarigh-Uighur (Chinese: Huang-fan)
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Additional Readings

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
NORTHWESTERN CHINA
ETHNIC GROUPS ON A LINGUISTIC BASIS
on the basis of Western sources
Note: The reader's attention is called to the fact that Chinese live in cities scattered throughout Sinkiang and Chinghai.
CHINA
KAZAKHS
CHAKHARS
MONGOLS
(OIRATS)
KIRGHIZ
TAJIKS
NEW UIGHURS or EASTERN TURKS
MONGOLS sparsely inhabited
ALASHAN MONGOLS
SARIGH-UIGHURS
SHERA YOGURS
MONGUORS
CHINESE MUSLIMS
SALARS
MONGOLS
TIBETANS
MUSLIM-TIBETANS
CHINESE
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Compiled by: U. Posch
Prepared by: J. Kolars
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UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON.

following page 140

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Sinkiang AI1

S
N 1. Introduction
121 Linguistic principles, rather than racial aspects, are used as
197 the standard for the division and description of the various ethnic
563 groups of the Northwest. The Communists also use a linguistic
division in their census. It would be impossible to deal with many of these minorities in terms of race, since most represent racial mixtures, e.g. the New-Uighurs, the Mongols, the Monguors, etc.

S
N The Northwest Region includes the four former provinces of
635 (1) Sinkiang with a total population of 4,873,608
161 (2) Kansu with a total population of 12,938,102
(3) Chinghai with a total population of 1,676,534
(4) Shensi with a total population of 15,881,281 (according to 1953 census).

(Although Shensi is included in the Northwest region it has not been considered in the following pages, since it has an exclusively Chinese population.)

S A. The Ethnic Groups of Sinkiang
162 1. The Turkic peoples

The main racial group in the former Chinese province Sinkiang is Turkic and is composed of the following tribes:

1) New Uighur (or Eastern Turks)	3,600,000 people
2) Kazakhs	300,000 "
3) Kirghiz	70,000 "
4) Taranchi	43,000 "
5) Uzbeks	8,000 "
6) Tatars	5,000 "
	3,426,000

S
[114] It should be noted that the Taranchi are listed separately in Communist sources although they are in no way different from the New Uighur. Taranchi means "inhabitant of the country" in contrast to the New Uighurs seventy per cent of whom live in towns and cities.

2. The Chinese Peoples

In terms of the population figures, the second racial group is Chinese:

1) Chinese	about 210,000 people
2) Dungans	about 100,000 " (Chinese Moslems, whose total figure for China as a whole is 3,599,350)

3. The Mongols

The third racial group is composed of Mongols who consist of the following tribes:

1) Ölöts	15,000 people
2) Torguts	18,000 "
3) Khoshuts	21,000 "
4) Chahar	8,000 "

162

5) Urianghai 4,000 people

4. The Indo-Europeans

The remainder are Indo-Europeans and are in two groups:

1) Russians about 14-15,000 people
2) Tajiks about 9,000 " (also called Sarikolis or simply Iranians)

5. The Manchus

The Manchus, with the subgroups Solons and Sibos, are a recently extinct racial group. They merged with neighbouring Turks or Chinese or were absorbed by them. They forgot their own language about 40 or 50 years ago. The main group, consisting of about 10,000 persons, used to live in the Ili valley and the town of Ili. The present regime still constantly lists these three groups.

6. Summary of population

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Number	Group	No. of people in thousands	Areas in which they live
1	New Uighur	3,000	In the area of Kashgar, Yarkend, Khotan, Cherchen, Aksu, Kucha, Kuldja, Turfan, Barkul, Hami, Chuguchak.
2	Kazakhs	300	Along the Tekes River and Kunger River, in the area of Chuguchak, on the border of Sinkiang, and Kazakhstan, on the border of Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang.
3	Kirghiz	70	On the border of Sinkiang and Kirghizistan, between the area of Tekes River, the mountains north of Aksu, Uch-Turfan, Yanigshahar, Tashkurgan.
4	Taranchi	43	In the Ili region.
5	Uzbeks	8	Mostly living in cities, especially in Kashgar, Yarkend, Kuldja and Chuguchak.
6	Tatars	5	Exclusively living in the cities of Yuldus, Urumchi, Kuldja and Chuguchak.

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7	Chinese	210	scattered all over Sinkiang, the bulk being in the triangle of Charchlike, Hami and Kuldja
8	Dungans	100	the same as No. 7
9	Olots	15	on the Tekes River and Kashr.
10	Torguts	18	in the Tien-Shan between Kuldja and Karashar, on the tributaries of the Black Irtysh
11	Khoshuts	21	in the Altai in the area of Chuguchak and along the Yuldus River
12	Chakhar	8	in the Borokhoro mountains
13	Urianghai	4	in the Altai, in the area of Chuguchak
14	Russians	15 - 16	live in the cities only, mainly in Kashgar, Yarkend, Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kuldja, Guma, Khotan, Keriya and Qumul
15	Tajiks	9	the main bulk lives at the Sinkiang-Afghanistan border, especially in the towns of Ktash Qurghan and Yanighissar

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B. The Ethnic Groups of Kansu

The main racial group in the province of Kansu is the Chinese who number more than twelve million. Other ethnic groups are the Mongours (Mongols), the Turks (Salars and Sarigh-Uighurs), and finally the Tibetans.

Number	Group	Number of people in thousands	Areas in which they live
1	Chinese	10,500	everywhere within the province

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No.	Group	No. of People(in thousands)	Areas in which they live
2	Chinese Mohammedans	1,500	Mostly in the northern and western part of the province
3	Mongours	30	In the area which is enclosed by the Pingfan River, Tatung River, Hsining River and the Yellow River westward of Lanchou
4	Tibetans	40	scattered over the area which is enclosed by the Ping-fan River, Tatung River, Hsining River and the Yellow River
5	Sarigh-Uighur	5	on the northern slopes of the Nanshan, south of Su-chou
6	Mongols (Torguts and Ölöts)	?	The Torguts live in the area west and east of the Edsin gol and north of the line Ansi Su-chou. The Ölots live in the Alashan, north of Kan-chou and Liang-chou and the Chukhushan mountains, also north of the Lung-shan.

C. The Ethnic Groups of Chinghai

The main racial groups in the province of Chinghai are the Chinese, the Tibetans, the Chinese Moslems, the Salar Turks, the Mongols (Ölöts from Alashan) and the Mongours or Tu-jen.

No.	Group	No. of People (in thousands)	Areas in which they live
1	Chinese	576	Mainly in the southeastern part of Chinghai, also along the Nan-shan mountain region, bordering Kansu and Sinkiang
2	Tibetans	417	In the Kuku-nor area, in the Dang-la mountain range and at the headwaters of the Yellow River

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No.	Group	No. of People (in thousands)	Areas in which they live
3	Chinese Moslems	138	In the capital Hsining (19, 000) in the districts of Ta-tung, Huang-chung, Huang-yuan, Min-huo, Hua-lung, Hsun-hua, Meng-yuan, Also in the cities of Ho-chow and Lin-hsia.
4	Salars (Turks)	50	In the area of Hsun-hua, south of the Yellow River, and around Payen-Jung, southeast of Hsining.
5	Mongols	33	In the area north of the Kuku-nor, south and north of the Tsaidam swamps and in the area of the Bayan Kara Shan mountain range.
6	Mongours	72	West of the Kuku-nor in the area of the tributaries of the Ta-tung River, Hsi-ning River. Some of them live south of the Yellow River around Kuei-te.

II. The Turkic People of the Northwest

563
101 A. The New Uighurs (or Eastern Turks)

The Turks of Sinkiang call themselves after the cities where they live, e.g. Kashgarlik, Turfanlik, Kuchalik, etc.... After [668] the Communist Revolution the Communists introduced the term Uighurs for the Eastern Turks, living in the Ili District. The term later was adopted by the Chinese.

563
144 1. Physical characteristics

In one sense the Eastern Turks are the descendants of the old [187] Uighurs who migrated to present day Sinkiang during the ninth cen- [175] tury A.D., Later they had mixed with Indo-european tribes and other Turkish tribes of the Chagatai Ulus (empire) and to a small degree also with the Mongols. Thus, in the terminology employed by E. Frhr. von Eickstedt, "Rassenkunde und Rassengeschichte der Menschheit, Stuttgart, 1934, the Eastern Turks show many europid and some turanid racial characteristics, and only a slight degree of mongoloid traits.

142 A more detailed description of the average physical type of 141 Eastern Turkestan is as follows: dark hair and eyes, (sometimes lighter occasionally blue eyes), white or yellowish skin with some- 563 times a slight inclination to brown, middle or tall stature, on the average 1680-1700 mm., with a tendency toward obesity. The head is definitely brachycephalic with a length-width index of 85-87, a longish-oval face, with wide cheek-bones, a straight and rather prominent nose, eyes lacking the mongoloid fold, and everted lips.

2. Economy

433 The main occupations of the Eastern Turks are horticulture, 563 agriculture and animal husbandry. The Eastern Turks breed camels, horses, sheep, and goats. They are famous for their fertile fruit-orchards, which are mostly artificially irrigated. Handicraft is fairly developed, but has no economic significance.

3. Religion

771 The Eastern Turks are Moslems, adherents of the Sun sect. 563 However, they display an attitude towards religion. This does [793] not refer to the leading religious clergy who form a kind of a gentry together with the nobility of the rich landowners.

4. Social organization

178 In contrast to the Kirghiz, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks, the Eastern 614 Turks have lost their clan system and tribal organization completely. 563 There is no antagonism between the Eastern Turks and 186 the remaining Turkic tribes, although the nomadic Turkic tribes 563 exhibit some contempt of the Eastern Turks. However, there is an old and remarkable hatred between the Turks and the Chinese, due partly to the greater efficiency and industriousness of the Chinese.

212 5. Literature

563 a. literacy

The Eastern Turks still use the Arabic script. Until recently
[668] there was at least 95 per cent illiteracy. The Communist regime
apparently has successfuly attempted to fight illiteracy.

b. literature and folklore

538 Since Chagatai times the Eastern Turks have been the bearers
178 of an amazing literature and folklore. For over a hundred years,
563 this intellectual life has been declining. Now nothing remains but
primitive samples of that literature which was so famous and influential upon various Turkic peoples.

101 B. The Taranchis

563 The Taranchis are ethnically, linguistically, culturally and
genetically the same as the Eastern Turks. Those New-Uighurs
175 who were defeated by the Chinese at the middle of the 18th century
and fled to the Russian part of the Ili Area, the Russians called
Taranchi, a name that has remained ever since.

C. The Kazakhs

1. Origin and physical characteristics

Prior to the Russian Revolution the Kazakhs were called Kirghiz. Many times they are referred to as Kazakh-Kirghiz, or Kirghiz-Kazakhs or Kirghiz-Kaisaks. The original homeland of the Kazakhs was southern Siberia between the Yenisei River and the Ob River. According to Abulgazi and Rashideddin the Kazakhs were a very small tribe which expanded after the Mongolian conquest and after frequent mergings with Mongolian clans. This
[144] explains why the Kazakhs resemble the Mongols so much. In fact
80 per cent of the anthropological features of the Kazakhs are
[142] mongoloid, i.e. a strong and square-built trunk with relatively
short legs, wide and round heads; in profile only a slight curvature of the occiput (back part of the head) can be seen; the face is wide and flat, high cheek-bones, and typical mongolian eyelid, the nose is flat, hair and eyes are black or brown, the lower jaw is wide and strongly built.

2. Social organization

a. the khanate

563 The Kazakh hordes first belonged to the Chagatai Empire and
175 later to the Golden Horde. During the sixteenth century they formed
619 their own Kazakh Khanate.

b. the tribes

563 The Kazakhs living in Sinkiang belong mostly to the Orta Dzhuz
619 (middle horde), consisting of the following five main tribes: (1) Atagni, (2) Naiman, (3) Argin, (4) Uvak-Girei and (5) Kipchak.

c. the clans

[614] The clan organization among the Kazakhs is very well preserved.

563 Known clan names of the Middle Horde are the following: Chakchat,
619 Chardzhid, Turtul, Karaul, Karakisak, Kandzhagali, Achai, Tarakli,
614 Kulchan-Argin, Kundelen, Usun, Tanabuga, Karabalik-Kipchak.

3. Economy

563 The Kazakhs are still nomads. The rear camels, horses,
233 sheep and goats. In contrast to the Eastern Turks who live in
433 brick and mud houses, they live in felt tents. The Kazakhs are
[342] famous horse and camel breeders. Sheep play the most important
role as sources of wool and meat. Like the Kirghiz and the Mongols,
the Kazakhs have carefully explored, selected and defended summer
pastures and protected valleys for the winter time.

563 The Kazakhs are very proud and independent. They dislike
181 any political supervision and are known to have avoided tax collectors by crossing the borders to Mongolia or Soviet Russia.

4. Literature

563
538 The Kazakhs have a huge folklore which is being handed down
[173] from generation to generation. They still use the Arabic script,
[212] but only a small percentage of noblemen and clergy are literate.

5. Religion

563 The Kazakhs are Moslems, belonging to the Sunna sect, but
771 they are in no way passionate and ardent believers like, for instance,
the Turks of Persia. Their nomadic life obviously does not permit
strict observance of the Islamic regulations.

D. The Kirghiz

1. History

101
175 Prior to the Communist Revolution the Kirghiz were called
563 Kara-Kirghiz or Burut. When the Kirghiz were driven out of Mongolia by the Kara Khitai (shortly before 924 A.D.), some moved
southwest into the areas where they now live.

563 The Kirghiz are subdivided into two wings: Ong-the right one,
and Sol-the left one. Like the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz have a very
[619] well preserved clan system. They are believed to represent the
[614] oldest Turkish tribe. As far as their physical characteristics are
[144] concerned, what has been said about the Kazakhs is also true for
the Kirghiz; i.e., the Kirghiz also had mixed with Mongol clans
at a very early period.

2. Their regulation

[147] The Kirghiz have a reputation for being extremely resistant
to rigorous climate, hunger and diseases. They are well known
[181] for their wit and sense of humor. Although most are illiterate,
[212] their vivid folklore is handed down in every single tent and many
Kirghiz tribesmen are able to quote thousands of rhymes from
[538] their epic songs.

3. Economy

563 Their weather-beatend faces show that they live in the moun-
361 tains. They breed horses, camels, sheep, goats and yaks. When
233

563 summer comes, they take their cattle way up on the pastures of
361 the mountains. The winter forces them to descend and to spend
233 some months in the more protected valleys.

4. Religion

563 The Kirghiz are Moslems of the Sunna Sect. Their script is
771 Arabic and is known only by noblemen or clergy. The only Moslem
[212] rule which is strictly observed is that of abstaining from eating
[262] pork.

5. Changes under Chinese Communist rule

563 In order to fight illiteracy the new Chinese Communist Govern-
871 ment erected schools for the Turks of Sinkiang in almost all villages,
668 towns and cities. The Chinese claim also that the process of making
177 them sedentary has brought remarkable progress to the Kirghiz.

E. The Uzbeks

563 1. Physical characteristics

[369] Only a few thousand Uzbeks live in Sinkiang, and they live ex-
clusively in the cities. Outwardly they are utterly different from
[142] the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs, since they represent the alpine,
europide and Iranian type of Turk. They show long, narrow faces,
[141] heavy hair growth, brown, sometimes blue, eyes, no Mongolian
fold, sharp prominent noses, white skin, body height 1700 to
1840 mm. Mongoloid features rarely can be found. In most cases
Uzbek are the same physical type as the peasants of the European
Alps.

2. Economic activities

[463] The Uzbeks live as merchants, inn-owners, and craftsmen in
[369] Sinkiang cities. They are more educated than any other Turkish
[871] tribe of Central Asia, since they have absorbed a great deal of
Persian culture. Many Uzbeks speak Persian as a second language,
[191] and Chinese as a third (like the Eastern Turks), while Kirghiz and
Kazakhs know only their mother tongue.

3. Religion

The Uzbeks are Moslems of the Sunna sect. Kirghiz and Kazakhs
[771] call the Uzbeks Sart, which simply means Turks who broke away
from their nomadic way of life and became merchants.

4. Origin and linguistic affiliation

The Uzbeks, living in Sinkiang came from Soviet Uzbekistan.
[101] They received their name from Ozbek, a fourteenth century Khan
of the Golden Horde.

The Uzbek language can be considered as the direct descendant
[197] of the Chagatai written language. Even today the difference between
written Uzbek and the Chagatai language is very small.

F. The Salars

[131] 1. Physical characteristics

The Salars live in Hsün-hua-t'ing on the right bank of the

563 Huang-ho and in the surrounding villages. They are also found on
[131] one section of the road from Hsi-ning to Ho-chou. They differ
considerably from the average type of Chinese Moslems. They
[142] are tall and lank. They have large and not flat noses, black and
level eyes, cheekbones not prominent, long face, thick eyebrows,
full black beard, retreating forehead, flattened occiput, brown but
never yellow skin. Thus they are similar to the Turks of Chinese
Turkestan.

2. Language and religion

[197] The most remarkable characteristic is their language which
might be called a corrupt Turkish. In religion they are strict
[771] Hanafis and show great respect to their clergy. However, for the
[273] most part they are rather given to the drinking of spirits. Even
the lowest classes sometimes are acquainted with the Arabic alpha-
[212] bet. They are said to have received their present form of religion
[175] from a reformer named Maming-hsin (Muhammad Amin) who taught
about 1750.

3. Social organization

[173] The Salars are believed to have settled in their present habi-
tat during the Yuan or Ming dynasty. They claim to have migrated
from the Samarkand area. According to Schramm, who quotes
[614] General Ma Fu-hsiang, the Salars are subdivided into the "inner
five clans" and into the "outer eight clans" (Chinese: kung). The
[197] latter lost their original Turkic language and now speak Tibetan.

The Salars are said to preserve clan traditions very well and
[614] they do not marry anyone who does not belong to one of the Salar
clans. They also have a reputation for being very fanatical Mos-
[771] lems, and have participated in all the Moslem uprisings of the
17th, 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.

G. The Sarigh Uighur (Chinese: Huang-fan)

[175] When Mannerheim visited the Sarigh-Uighur in 1907, there were
only 100 families to be found. This small tribe lives in three vil-
[361] lages on the northern slopes of the Nanshan Mountains, in the area
of Tun-huang, Su-chou and Kan-chou. They have preserved their
[178] tribal name and their Buddhist religion but they gave up their Uighur
[212] script during the eighteenth century and adopted the Tibetan script.

[177] 1. Physical characteristics

Mannerheim describes them as generally having excessively
563 prominent cheek bones. But he also saw several people with oval
142 shaped faces and not strikingly prominent cheekbones. However,
in general the type of face is short and somewhat broad. Some of
the women have thick noses. The mouth shows neither thin nor
thick lips. The eyes are small and the distance between them is
also normal. (Mannerheim obviously employs European standards
when he talks about "normal" or "average.") The corners of the
eyes were open and there was no inner epicanthic fold. Their hair

563 and their thin beards were black. They were of average height
[142] and no corpulent people were observed.

2. Economic activities

[233] The Sarigh-Uighurs are breeding horses, cows and sheep. Their
economic position seems to be very poor. Even the richest man owns
[556] only a few horses and cows. They live in homesteads. Their clothing
[291] is Chinese in style.

H. The Tatars

1. Economic activities

Only a few thousand Tatars live in Sinkiang. They represent
a very distinctive Mongoloid type of Turk. Most of the Sinkiang
[167] Tatars had fled from the former Kazan Khanate in the Volga
region after the Communist Revolution. Some, however, have
lived in Sinkiang since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
[463] Despite their small numbers the Tatars have had remarkable in-
[441] fluence as merchants and traders due to their high education.
[871] For a long time they have been the middlemen between the Russian
merchants and the Turkic tribes.

2. Religion and literature

[771] The Tatars are either Moslems or Christians. Their litera-
[538] ture is very well-developed and illiteracy is practically unknown.
[212] In Sinkiang they still use the Arabic script.

III. The Mongols of the Northwest

A. The Mongols of Sinkiang

1. General characteristics

The Mongolian tribes of Sinkiang are all Oirats or Western
[167] Mongols. Only the Chahar Mongols, who were transferred from
Inner Mongolia by the Manchus, are Eastern Mongols. A small
group, the so-called Uriangkhai, are considered to be Mongols,
but in reality they are Turks who have adopted Mongolian as their
new language.

a. tribes

[619] The Western Mongols (Oirats or Ölöts) of Sinkiang consist of
two tribes: the Koshuts and the Torguts. They all speak a West-
[197] ern Mongolian dialect, very similar to Kalmuck, formerly spoken
in the Kalmuck Socialist Republic.

b. religion and economy

[771] All Western Mongols are faithful Buddhists. They are said to
be very uniform in their customs and habits. They are all pastoral
[233] nomads and breed horses, camels, sheep and yaks. They still live
[342] in collapsible tents. The clan system is well preserved.

[614] 2. Physical characteristics

563 Employing Eickstedt's terminology, the Western Mongols repre-
[141] sent the Mongoloid race, and are one of its purest examples: the
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body skin is brownish or yellowish and brachycephalism is found in more than 92%. They have high cheek bones, the nose is flat and the eyes show the typical Mongoloid eyefold. The eyes are either black or brown, sometimes even light brown. The hair is also black or dark brown, coarse and straight. Hair growth is sparse. The average height is about 1670 mm. The trunk is strongly built and the legs are rather short in comparison to those of the Uzbeks or Tajiks.

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3. Relations with non-Mongols

There is no animosity between the various Mongol tribes, but there is a definite antagonism between the Mongols and the Kazakhs and between the Mongols and the Chinese.

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4. History

The Western Mongols are direct descendants from the Oirats of the great Mongolian conquest. At least, since 600 A.D. they have lived in this area. Some of the Torguts are recent immigrants or, more accurately, returnees. They left Russia in 1771 and returned to their homeland, Dzungaria.

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As far as social organization is concerned, the Oirats are said to represent the old Mongolian pattern. Tribal leaders inherit their political positions, and property is considered in terms of pastures and cattle.

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5. The leagues

The Mongols of Sinkiang were organized into three leagues:
(1) the Unen Susuqtu League, consisting of ten banners of Torguts
(2) the Batu Setkhiltu League, consisting of three banners of Khoshuts
(3) the Ching Setkhiltu League, consisting of three banners of Khoshuts and seven banners of Uriangkhai.

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B. The Mongols of Kansu

1. The Mongours

a. history

The Mongours are the most important Mongolian tribe living in Kansu. They are known under various names. Potanin called them Shirongols, the Chinese call them Tu-jen, the Olots and Torguts call them Dalda or Doldo, the Tanguts call them Cha-hor, but the Mongours themselves use only the latter term.
N
*563 The Mongours have been studied by Father Schram who states that the Mongours
*175 came to Kansu in the course of the Mongol conquests in the thir-
[167] teenth century and that furthermore the Mongours were already
M settled in the Hsi-ning area when the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)
175 was founded. The Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911) "benefitting by the
[167] experience of the Ming succeeded in organizing the country, primarily by subduing the neighbouring tribes of Kokonor, assigning definite territories to each of them and placing them under the jurisdiction of an Amban in 1732; having thus removed the danger of forays by nomadic tribes they were able to develop the country

N *563 *[175] peacefully, stimulating both agriculture and commerce. Development of the country was dependent on control of the neighbouring M [175] tribes."

b. language

M [197] The language of the Mongours is completely different from Western or Eastern Mongolian. There is no communication between the Mongours and Torguts or Ölöts, etc.

c. clan divisions

N *563 M 614 According to Father Schram there exist six Mongour clans in the Hsi-ning district and ten in the district of Nien-pei. (He uses the term "clan" to designate a group who share a common territory, a common surname and a common chief.) The names of the clans are: (1) Ch'i, whose chief is said to be an offspring of Chingis Khan; (2) Ch'eng; (3) Li; (4) Na; (5) Wang, and (6) Chi. The names of the Nien-pei clans are: (1) Ch'i; (2) Li Nan-ko; (3) Li Hua-nao; (4) Chao; (5) Ah; (6) Kan; (7) Chou; (8) Yeh; (9) Hsin; (10) La. As the names indicate, Chinese influence was strong.

During the Ming and Manchu dynasties, Tibetan and Chinese frequently were absorbed by the Mongour clans. Mannerheim reports that the Shera Yögur (another subgroup of the Mongours) have preserved their old Mongolian clan names, like Tokshu, Orge, Sultus, Turgush, Kargos, Arlat, Kong, Lantshak, Socka, Kongrott, Temyrt or Temurtshin, Jaglakyr, Tshungsa, Tshangban, Rkomdjuk, Glan, Kyrgyz, Andjan, Tuman and Uirot. There is a strict observance of clan exogamy.

2. Physical characteristics

N *563 M 142 [144] Since the Mongours are either of Mongolian, Turkish (Sha-to), Tibetan, or Chinese extraction, their physical appearance is not at all uniform. Mannerheim's description shows this variety of physical features: The Shera Yögurs are of medium height and not badly built. They have well-formed hands and feet and narrow wrists and ankles. There is nothing about them of the coarse and vulgar appearance which distinguishes the Kalmucks. Stout people are never seen - many of them are even remarkably thin. Their faces are neither exceptionally long and narrow nor short and broad. Though some have pronounced cheekbones, wide cheekbones are rare, and in many individuals they are not at all protruding. The mouth is normal, with neither thin nor thick lips, the nose straight and of a good shape. Some, however, have wide turned-up noses, with very little bridge to them. Among the majority, the distance between the eyes was rather wide. It is overgrown by the eyelid in childhood, but with age, this peculiarity almost disappears. Their eyes are black or dark, with slight changes in them, but no blue eyes were observed by Mannerheim. Their hair is black or quite dark, sometimes curly, the children often having brown hair. The men are never bald, but often become very gray and, judging by the women, the growth of hair is not particularly good. They

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*563 have very scanty beards, and there is seldom any growth of hair
M
142 on the body.

e. economic activities

N The Mongours gave up their nomadic way of life and became
*563 farmers. They cultivate barley, wheat, peas, rapeseed, colza,
M hemp and potatoes. The second important economic resource is
[241] livestock, consisting of horses, cows, mules, pigs and sheep.
[233] The Mongours are also good hunters and fishermen. The Mongours
[433] now live in brick and mud houses resembling their former tent
(yurt).

M Until recently the Mongours wore their national costumes.
[291] However, when the Communists took over they ordered them to
[177] wear only Chinese clothing.
[771] By religion, the Mongours are Lamaist-Buddhists.

2. Other groups

Besides the Mongours, there are Ölöts and Torguts living in Kansu. They are similar in all respects to the Ölots and Torguts of Sinkiang.

C. The Mongols of Chinghai

1. General characteristics

Due to the new partition of the province, some of the Mongours
N now belong to Chinghai Province. Very little is known about the
[177] Eastern Mongols living around the Tsaidam and Kokonor areas.
However, all explorers' reports say that they have become more
N and more Tibetanized and are forgetting their own Mongolian
[233] language. They are still pastoral nomads like the Ölots and the
Torguts of Sinkiang.

N
2. Hordes

*563 When Tafel (between 1905 and 1908) travelled in the Chinghai
619 area he found the following groups of Mongols:
361 (1) Wang-ka or the horde of the Chinghai Wang, consisting of 150-
*[175] 350 families, of which one group nomadized on the Dulan-gol,
west of the Kokonor, and the other group lived around the monasteries of Gomba-soma and Minia-ta;

(2) the horde of the Muri Wang, about 50 families, which nomadized on the upper course of the Ta-tung River;

(3) the horde of the Kukut Bei-le, about 200 families, which nomadized around the Serkhe-nor, northeast of the Tsaidam swamps;

(4) the horde of the Kurluk Bei-tse, about 800 families which nomadized around the Bagha Tsaidam area;

(5) the horde of the Merkhe Bei-tse westwards of 4; there is no information about population figures.

(6) the horde of Shui-hia Bei-tse in the valley above Bamba; there is no further information about population figures.

(7) the horde of the Gobi Gung, which nomadized in the area of Tankar;

/Chinghai Mongols/

*563 (8) the horde of the Tsinkuk (Tsunkuk) Gung near the monastery
619 of Gomba-soma and in the Tsunkuk valley (no population figure
361 given).
(9) the horde of the Dunkur Gung, consisting of a few families nomadizing in the area of Dunkur Monastery south of Tankar;
(10) the horde of the Chabcha Gung, 30 families, nomadizing east of Gungga-nor;
(11) the horde of the Taijinar Dzasak, about 1000 families, nomadizing at the southern edge of the Tsaidam swamps;
(12) the horde of the Dzun Dzasak, about 500 families, also nomadizing at the southeastern edge of the Tsaidam swamps;
(13) the horde of the Barun Dzasak, about 250 families, nomadizing southeast of the Dzun;
(14) the horde of the Harchiu (Kara Chut) Dzasak, about 40 families nomadizing north of the Dabasun-nor;
(15) the horde of the Morchi Dzasak, which is composed of a few families, nomadizing in the valley of Lala, southwest of Dankar;
(16) the horde of Torgho Dzasak, 120 families, nomadizing around Shara-khoto;
(17) the horde of the Gomi Dzasak, 30 families, northwestward of Kue-te;
(18) the horde of the Ta-tung Dzasak around Ta-tung-ch'eng (no population figure given)
(19) the horde of the Dia-shir Dzasak, westward of the Kurluk Bei-tse.

*563 P. K. Kozlov presents in his Mongolia i Kam, (Petersburg, 1906)
631 another subdivision of the Chinghai Mongols. He subdivides the
24 banners into two brigades:

a) Dzun edeget (left brigade)
   1) Tsing-hai Wang, 130 families (Tafel: Wang-ka)
   2) Kökdd Beili, 200 families (Tafel: Kukut bei-le)
   3) Kurlik Bei-si, 800 families (Tafel: Kurluk Bei-tse)
   4) Bukhain Gun, 4 families (Tafel: ?)
   5) Arokholin Gun, 25 families (Tafel: Dunkur Gung)
   6) Sham Gun, 15 families (Tafel: presumably Gobi Gung)
   7) Torgut Dzasak, 30 families (Tafel: presumably Torgho Dzasak)
   8) Tsulgen Dzasak, 30 families (Tafel: ?)
   9) Chonon Dzasak, 30 families (Tafel: ?)
   10) Harakchut Dzasak, 30 families (Tafel: Kharachut Dzasak)
   11) Kurlik Dzasak, 24 families (Tafel: ?)
   12) Taijinar Dzasak, 600 families (Tafel: taijinar)
b) Barun edeget (right brigade)
   1) Muru Wang, 80 families (Tafel: Muri Wang)
   2) Erkhe Bei-le, 60 families (Tafel: ?)
   3) Chun Bei-si, 10 families (Tafel: presumably Shui-hia Bei-tse)
   4) Hargi Bei-si, 150 families, (Tafel:?)
   5) Dondogo Gun, 10 families (Tafel: presumably Chabcha Gung)

*563 631 6) Muru Dzasak, 40 families, (Tafel: Da-tung Dzasak)
7) Charagolchin Dzasak, 4 families (Tafel: presumably Damba Dzasak)
8) Baga-nor Dzasak, 1 family (Tafel: ?)
9) Khalkha Dzasak, 3 families (Tafel: ?)
10) Tsunkuk Dzasak, 60 families (Tafel: probably Tsinkuk Gung)
11) Barun Dzasak, 280 families (Tafel: Barun)
12) Tsun Dzasak, 300 families (Tafel: Dzun)

3. Probable extinction

*563 [162] [177] According to M. Hermanns, the total population of the Chinghai Mongols does not exceed 18,000 people. Since the Mongols of the Chinghai region have very few children - two at the most - and since sinification as well as Tibetanization appears to be rapid, the extinction of the Chinghai Mongols is to be expected in the near future.

IV. The Tibetans of the Northwest

A. General Characteristics

The province of Chinghai is inhabited by sixty-six Tibetan tribes, called by the Chinese "tame" in contrast to the "wild" tribes inhabiting the Kokonor region.

*563 771 795 Lattimore and Father Schram point out that the Tibetan tribes easily subdivide into new tribes which observe strict clan exogamy. The Tibetans are Lamaist-Buddhists of the Yellow Hat Sect in the northern districts and of the Red Hat Sect in the southern districts. Shamanism is also still existant among the Tibetans. Some Tibetans living in the district of Hsün-hua have become Moslems.

B. Physical Characteristics

*563 142 The Tibetans belong to a race which is called protosinide. Their characteristic features are: middle to tall stature and very muscular. The legs are considerably longer than the legs of the Mongoloids. The color of the skin is light brown and the facial skin copperish red. The lips are thin. The nose is long and prominent. The head is large and long. Round heads appear only among the Ngo-loks. The face shows a sharp relief. Usually they lack the Mongoloid eyefold. Eye color is generally brown. Body hair is considerably stronger, thicker and denser than among the Chinese or Mongols.

C. Economic Activities

*563 241 233 The Tibetans are either nomads who breed yaks and sheep or farmers who cultivate oats, peas, wheat, cabbage, and turnips. They use the same agricultural tools as the Chinese farmers.

V. The Chinese Moslems

*563 A. Population
795 According to Paul Cwick, there are about 100,000 Chinese
[162] Moslems living in Sinkiang, about 300,000 in Ning-hsia, about
1,500,000 in Kansu and about 138,000 in Chinghai. For China as
a whole the total figure amounts to 3,599,350.

1. Physical characteristics and economic activities

*563 The overwhelming majority of Chinese Moslems seem to be
795 of Chinese extraction, but undoubtedly there are Chinese Moslems
144 of Turkish and Indo-European extraction. The latter origin can
142 be deduced from statements made by Father Cwick. He says that
many Chinese Moslems of Chinghai have blond hair, blue eyes and
prominent eagle-noses. Filchner says that the Hui-hui (the Chinese term for the Moslems) are different from the Chinese, having
taller and stronger bodies, oval skull shape and prominent noses.
*563 Fuad Kazak states that the Chinese Moslems (also called Dungans)
795 also differ from the Chinese in terms of their martial tendencies.
181 Certainly their numerous uprising affirm this statement. Father
Schram reports some Chinese sayings about the Chinese Moslems:
"One Moslem asleep is more intelligent than ten wide awake Chinese,"
or; "The food of the Moslems is tasteful, but their words are not
to be trusted," and "out of ten Moslems nine are thieves." All
report concordantly that the Chinese Moslems are very eager,
keen, shrewd, and successful traders and merchants, farmers
[441] and innkeepers. They are known for their skilled salesmanship
"in the grain trade and the buying and selling of horses, mules,
oxen, sheep, wool, hides and lamb skins." (Schram)
[505] The Chinese Moslems also have a near monopoly on the boat and
raft traffic of the upper course of the Yellow River.

2. Religion

*563 Some of the Chinese Moslems believe in the Sunna tradition
795 and part believe in the Shia. Many Chinese Moslems still exer-
771 cise Sufism (mystical submergence into the idea of God, mystical meditations and so forth). While the Sunna-believers stick
to the traditional Islamic interpretation and the commandments
of the Koran, the Shia-believers do not recognise hereditary religious leadership. Since everybody "who is graced by God" can
become a religious leader, the Shia believers are split into many
groups.

3. Relations with other groups

*563 a. Chinese
795 The Chinese consider the Chinese Moslems as foreigners and
186 even barbarians. The animosity between these two groups is
extraordinarily violent. The Chinese Moslems have never missed
an occasion to annihilate the Chinese as, for instance, in the
second half of the eighteenth century when the northwest of China

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*563 saw tremendous uprisings. But the Chinese shared in this violence.
795 When they defeated the Moslems, it was their custom to massacre
186 even women and children. (see section on Attitudes and Reactions)

b. Turks

The Chinese Moslems are on good terms with the Turks, and are reported to have feelings of kinship with them. Generally, this has been true even though the uprising of the 1930's ended in skirmishes between Chinese Moslems and the Turks.

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B. History of Islam in Kansu

There are no exact data on the introduction of Islam into
795 Northwest China, but it is believed that the major conversion to
174 the religion of Islam took place during or after the Yüan dynasty
779 (1260-1306). It is unlikely that the first conversion appeared as early as the end of the Tang dynasty (618-906). Richard Wilhelm states, and it is true, that the first Moslem missionaries came to China at the end of the seventh century (Richard Wilhelm, Geschichte der chinesischen Kulture, München, 1928, 238 ff). Islam came to China by two routes, through Turkestan and then from Canton.

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*563 The first Moslem revolt took place in Kansu as early as 1648.
795 Two hundred years later Yaqub Beg (1865-1877) ruled the newly-established Islamic empire from Kashgar. Russia, England, and
*175 Turkey officially recognized him. Yaqub Beg had an army of 50,000 men.

N
The Moslems of Kansu tried to establish another Islamic empire
[648] (1861-1874). They conquered the western part of Mongolia, but the T'ung-chih emperor (1861-1875) defeated them completely. Another uprising in 1895 was equally unsuccessful.

N
When the Communists took over Northwest China in 1949-1950,
*[668] they granted the Chinese Moslems the rights of religious freedom and autonomy. (see section on Constitutional System)

N
*563 The communities of Chinese Moslems adopted the classical
795 Arabian educational system, i.e., each mosque has so-called
871 medresse (schools) connected with it, where boys are taught to
N read the Koran, etc. This is one reason why illiteracy is so
[212] seldom found among Chinese Moslems.

VI. The Indo-Europeans of the Northwest

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A. The Tajiks or Iranians or Sarikolis

1. General characteristics

S
In the southwestern part of Sinkiang there lives a small Iran-
[131] ian tribe called Tajiks, Iranians or Sarikolis, who are farmers,
[181] merchants and traders. They have a reputation for being very
[197] intelligent. They speak an Iranian dialect which is very closely related to Persian. The Tajiks very often speak Turkish as a
[191] second language, and the merchants even speak Chinese.

563 2. Physical characteristics
142 Racially they are described as Europoids of the Dinaric sub-
[144] division. They have long, small faces with prominent and convex
noses, and their skulls in most cases show occipital bulges.
Their bodies are slender. Their hair is brown or black, but, in
a few cases, also blonde. Their eyes are usually brown, but not
as dark as the eyes of the neighbouring Kirghiz.

3. History and economic activities
563 The Tajiks have lived in this area for over two thousand years.
Their predecessors were the Iranian people who spoke the Saka
[186] language. Between the Tajiks and the Turks an excellent relationship prevails, but there is an old animosity between the Tajiks and
the Chinese.

[241] Due partly to their skilled irrigation system, the Tajiks cultivate oats, vegetables and barley with great success.

B. The Russians

The Russians living in Sinkiang can be divided into three groups.
The first group consists of those merchants who maintained trade
with the cities of Sinkiang for more than a hundred years and who
usually lived in Chuguchak, Kuldja, Kashgar and Urumchi. The
[167] second group consists of refugees who fled Russia after 1918 and
became technical laborers, chauffeurs, electricians, miners, road
constructors and so on. The third group consists of those Russians
563 whom the Soviets sent to Sinkiang for political reasons. They main-
648 tained Soviet Consulates in all the major cities of Sinkiang and had
a very numerous staff. Soviet propaganda had a remarkable influence between 1920 and 1949. According to recent reports of Turkish refugees, the Russians still have military detachments in
Sinkiang.

Additional Readings

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LANGUAGES

000 I. Turki
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  - 1. Phonetic bases for subdivision of Turkic languages
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II. Mongolian Dialects

- A. Western Mongolian or Kalmuck

- B. The Monguor Language

III. The Tibetan Dialect of the Chinghai Region

IV Chinese Dialects in the Northeast

V. Concluding Remarks

LANGUAGES

I. Turki

A. Dialects

197 The main language spoken in Sinkiang is Turkish. The Turks themselves, however, call their language Turki. Sometimes, when denoting their local dialect, they use terms such as Kashgarlïk (i.e. "a man from Kashgar"), or Kashgar türkisi (i.e. the Turkish language of Kashgar"), or Turfanlïk ("a man of Turfan"), or Turfan türkisi ("the Turkish language of Turfan"), etc. Among Western linguists, the term "Eastern Turkish" is widely in use, and we shall use this term only; since the Communist revolution of 1917, however, the term "New Uighur" also has been introduced. The Soviets apply this designation to the 100,000 Turks who inhabit the area of Jarkent and Alma-Ata in Kazakstan at the headwaters of the Ili river, some parts of Kirghizistan, and the area of Andijan and Ferghana in Uzbekistan. They are of the same linguistic family as those who live in Sinkiang. Prior to the Soviet Russian revolution, the New Uighurs were called Taranchi, "inhabitants of the country."

East Turkish represents one of the dialects of the widely diffused Turkic language family. Closely related to Eastern Turkish are the Turkic languages spoken in Turkey, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Uzbekistan, and the Soviet and Persian Azerbaijanian regions. The Turkish inhabitants of all these areas have no difficulty in communicating with each other.

1. Phonetic bases for subdivision of Turkic languages

194 The Turkic languages are subdivided according to certain characteristic phonetic features. For example, in the word dokuz~tokuz, "nine," the last sound is represented by -z in all Turkic languages except in Chuvash. There it is represented by -r, i.e. tăχχĭr, "nine" (this might also refer to the extinct languages of the Old Bolghar and Old Khazar). The Common Turkic intervocalic *-d- or *-ð- (a phoneme which resembles the English -th- in "that" or "those"), in the Common Turkic word aðaq, "foot," becomes ataχ in Yakut; adaq in Soyot (or Tuva, for which the name Uryankhai was also used) and Karagas; azaq in Sagai, Kacha, Koibal, Kïzïl, Küärük, Cholim, Beltir, Kamas, Sarïgh-Uighur, and Shor; and ayaq or ayaγ respectively in Turkey Turkish, Chagatai, Eastern Turkish and all the remaining Turkic dialects.

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194 Another phonetic criterion, commonly used in subdividing the ayaq group, is the suffix of the present participle -an or -γan (γ indicates the voiced counterpart of -ch in the German "ach"), e.g. qal-an or qal-γan, "remaining." In this respect

193 subgroup, again, is divided into the so-called taγ-lïq and
194 tau-lï, "inhabitant of a mountain range" sections. This refers to the transformations which take place as far as the noun-forming suffix -lïq is concerned. It also refers to the changes of the final consonant -γ in the word taγ, "mountain" in the various dialects, i.e. daγ in Osmanli, taγ in Soyot and Karagas, tā in Oirot, tō in Kirghiz, and tau̯ in Kazakh and Karakalpak. In this respect, Eastern Turkish belongs to the taγ-lïq ("mountain inhabitant") section.

2. Position of Eastern Turkish

197 To summarize the facts concerning the classification of Eastern Turkish and its position within the family of the Turkic dialects, the following scheme should be applied: Eastern Turkish belongs to the dokuz languages, ayaq division, qal-γan subdivision, taγ-lïq section.

3. Derivations

Without doubt, the Turkic languages are related to the Mongolian, Manju-, and Tungusic languages, and together with them form the so-called Altaic language family. The oldest substratum of Korean is undoubtedly of Altaic origin. Many linguists believe that the Altaic languages and Finno-Ugrian (Uralian) languages constitute one large linguistic family.

With the exception of the Chuvash, and to a lesser degree the Yakut languages, the Turkic dialects demonstrate a striking resemblance and uniformity. Even the oldest known Turkish dialect, the so-called Old Turkish, or Uighur, as represented by the inscriptions on stone slabs erected in honor of the Khans of the empire founded by the Northern Turks in 682, differs amazingly little from modern Eastern Turkish, its closest descendant.

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B. General Characteristics of the Turkish Dialects.

1. Vocalic harmony

Vocalic harmony is one of the most remarkable features of the Turkish dialects. This means that in one and the same word, including the suffixes, only front vowels (e, i, ö, ü) or back vowels (a, ï, o, u) are permitted to appear; e.g. front vocalic stems: köpek, "the dog"; yüzük, "the ring"; bilezik, "the bracelet"; back vocalic stems: topuk, "the ankle"; yatak, "the bed"; yastïk, "the pillow". The rules of vocalic harmony must also be followed in adding suffixes to the stems: examples of back vocalic stems with back vocalic suffixes are: quduq, "the fountain"; quduqning, "of the fountain"; pičaq, "the knife"; pičaqči, "the knifemaker"; bala, "the child"; balaları, "their children"; examples of front vocalic stems with front vocalic suffixes are bėš "five"; bešindži, "the fifth;" inɛk, "the cow", inɛkim, "my cow"; tüš "the dream", tüšüm "my dream";

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194 köz "the eye", közöm "my eye."

2. Consonantal harmony

Another phonetic feature of the Turkic dialects is a certain type of consonantal harmony. This means that certain consonants appear in connection with front vowels or back vowels only; e.g. there are two k-sounds in Turkic dialects, a front one (somewhat like the front k in "came") and one produced further back in the mouth (somewhat like the back k in the German "kann"). The symbol "q" is used to designate this second k-sound. The first k-sound appears with front vowels only, e.g. keldim "I came," the second one with back vowels only, e.g. qïldïm "I made."

3. Grammar

193 Since the Turkic dialects belong to the Altaic language family, grammar is a matter of suffixes. This means that declension, conjugation, and comparison, in the broadest sense of the word, are expressed by suffixes and not by prefixes, infixes or ablaut as in the Indoeuropean or Semitic languages. These suffixes are attached to invariable stems, e.g.:

qïz "the girl," qïzlær "the girls"
öj "the house," öjdɛ "in the house"
qïl "do, make," qïla "doing, making," qïlγai̯ "I shall do"
kašγar "Kashgar," kašγarlïq "inhabitant of Kashgar"
kel "come," keldim, kelding, "I came, you came"
beg "duke," begim "my duke"

4. Distinctions between Turkic and Indo-European

193
197 The following are the principal syntactic and grammatical differences between the Turkic and Indo-European dialects.

The Turkic dialects:

1) have no grammatical gender
2) have no definite articles
3) have a special posessive declension, e.g. baγ "the garden," baγïm "my garden," baγïn "your garden," baγïmïz "our garden," baγïŋïz "your garden (plural)"
4) have a large number of verbal derivations, e.g. qïlmaq "to make," qïldɯrmaq "to cause to make;" ačmaq "to open," ačilmæq "to become opened;" bermɛk "to give," berišmɛk "to give to each other," berinmɛk "to give oneself"
5) have postpositions instead of prepositions, e.g. pičaq birlɛ "with a knife," öj tcün "for the house"
6) place the attributive modifier in a position preceding the noun, i.e. the modifying word precedes the modified, e.g. čoŋ öj "the big house" but öj čoŋ "the house is big"
7) do not use the plural forms of nouns if these are preceded by numerals, e.g. iki öj "two houses" and not iki öjlɛr
8) replace the verb "to have" by the verb "to be," e.g. gɯl "the rose," gɯlɯm "my rose," gɯlɯm bar "I have a rose" (verbatim: my rose is existant)

193 9) express a negative verb by a special suffix, e.g. qïlmɑq
197 "to do, to make," qilmamɑq "not to do, not to make"
10) have a special interrogative suffix -mɯ and do not change the position of the words within a sentence as Indo-European languages do in interrogative sentences, e.g. baɣqa yol bardɯr "there is a road to the garden," but baɣqa yol bar mɯdɯr? "Is there a road to the garden?"
11) replace confunctions by participial or gerundial constructions, e.g. bolmɑq' "to be or to become," bolsæm "if I were," the suffix -sæm could be defined as a conditional converb.

197 C. Eastern Turkish and its Subdialects

Although Eastern Turkish is a highly uniform dialect, from an accurate linguistic point of view, several subdialects can be distinguished.

1. The Southern subdialects

The Southern subdialects are spoken in the southern and southwestern part of Eastern Turkistan and in the cities and oases of Kashgar, Yarkand, Yengi Hissar and Khotan. On the basis of the small amount of material which we possess about them it can be shown that the subdialects spoken in the Kerya, Cherchen, Maralbashi, and Aqsu oases also belong to the Southern Subdialect group.

2. The Northeastern subdialects

The Northeastern subdialects, also called Kucha-Turfan-subdialects, are spoken in the cities and oases of Kucha, Qarashær, Turfan, and Qomul. [193] The peculiarity of these subdialects is the existence of long vowels which do not appear in [194] the other subdialects. Furthermore, among Northeastern subdialects vocalic harmony is not as strictly observed as in the other subdialects of Eastern Turkish. This is due to the influence of the surrounding Uzbek dialect which lost some of its vocalic harmony as a result of contact with the Iranian languages.

3. Taranchi subdialect

[167] The so-called Taranchi subdialect is spoken in the Ili valley and around the cities of Kulja and Jarkent (Dungan: Samar) by Turks who migrated to this area in the nineteenth century. They came from Kashgar, Yarkend, Khotan, Aqsu, and Turfan. The peculiar phonetic feature of the Taranchi subdialect is the absence of the most characteristic back Turkic ï-sound.

However, these slight differences among the subdialects do not present the slightest obstacle to the possibility of communicating.

193 D. The Phonetic System of Eastern Turkish

194 Eastern Turkish has eight front vowels: i, ü, ä, e, ö, ɛ,

193 ə ; and a. Eastern Turkish has eight backvowels: i, ɯ, u, o, æ
194 ə, a, and ɒ.

1. Scheme of the vowel system of Eastern Turkish

	front:	central:	back:
closed:	i, ü	i, ʉ	ɯ, u
half closed:	e, ö		o
half open:	ɛ	ə	æ, ə
open:	a		ə, ɒ

2. Scheme of the consonantal system of Eastern Turkish

	Explosive		Nasal		Lateral		Tremulans		Fricative		Half vowel	
	v*	uv	v	uv	v	uv	v	uv	v	uv	v	uv
Labials	b	p	m	m̥			ř		β		w, u̯	
Labial dentals									v	f		
Dentals and alveolars	d	t	n	n̥	l		ṙ	r	z	s		
Supradentals	ɖ	ʈ	ɳ		ɭ							
Palato alveolars									ž	š		
Alveolar palatals									ʑ			
Palatals	dʑ	č							j		i̯	
Front velars	g	k	ŋ						ɣ			
Back velars		q							γ	χ		
Laryngeals										h		

* v means voiced, and uv means unvoiced

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3. Transcription of Eastern Turkish

The transcription of Eastern Turkish used in this paper is the so-called " Association Phonetique Internationale, " according to M. Heepe (The Principles of the International Phonetic Association, L'Ecriture Phonetique Internationale.) Prior to the Linguistic Conference of Copenhagen, however, the investigators of the Eastern Turkish dialects used other systems of transcription. Therefore a table showing all the earlier systems is presented.

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E. Script

The Arabic script is still in use in Sinkiang. In 1940 the

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang A11

In 1940 the
212 Taranchis of the Ili valley, especially those living in Russian
177 territory, abandoned Latin script in favor of Russian script. There is no doubt that in several years Russian script will have replaced Arabic script among the Turks of Sinkiang. This statement is based upon three reasons: 1) in 1917, at the time of the Soviet revolution the Eastern Turks of Soviet territory established a new literary language, the so-called New Uighur literary language. Soviet scholars in Moscow determined the final form of the grammar, vocabulary, and orthography of the new language and also determined the type of literature which could be published. Undoubtedly this will influence the literature of the
[668] Eastern Turks. 2) The forthcoming Turkish nationalism will consider any achievement in this direction as a national aim rather than as an element of secondary sovietization. 3) The Chinese Communist government is contemplating the replacement of the Mongolian and the Arabic alphabets by the Russian.

F. Tables of Transcriptions

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114 Table I. The scientific systems of transcription for Eastern Turkish used by Radloff, Le Coq, Hartmann, Kunos, Raquette, and the API (Association Phonetique Internationale)

Radloff	Le Coq	Hartmann	Kunos	Raquette	API
i	i	i [illegible]	i, [illegible]	i	i
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
—	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
—	—	—	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
—	—	—	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	—	—	—	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
—				[illegible]	[illegible]
—	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]
					[illegible]

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Table I (continued)

Radloff	Le Coq	Hartmann	Kúnos	Raquette	API
b	b	b	b	b	b
p	p	p	p	p	p
t	t, t	t	t	t	t
		—	—	s	[s]
ǯ, ǰ	ǧ, ǰ	ž, ǧ	ǯ	ǰ	dʒ
č	č	č	č	č	ʧ
ḥ	ḥ [h]	ḥ	ḥ	ḥ	h
χ	χ	χ	χ	χ	χ
d	d	d.	d	d	d
			—	ð	[z]
r	r	r	r	r	r
z	z	z	z	z	z
		—	—	ż	[z]
	ž	ž, j	ž		ʒ
s	s	s	s	s	s
š	š	š	š	š	ʃ
		—	—	ṡ	[s]
	—	—	—	ẓ	[z]
	—	—	—	ṭ	[t]
	—	—	—	ḍ	[z]
	' ʿ	—	—	'	—
γ	γ	γ	γ	γ	γ
f	f	f	f	f	f
q	q	k, q	k	q	q
k	k	k	k	k	k
g	g	g	g	g	g
l	l	l	l	l	l
m	m	m	m	m	m
n	n	n	n	n	n
ṅ	ñ ng, ŋ	n, ñ	ŋ	ñ	ŋ
v	v	v	v	v	v
	w	w	—	w	β, w
h	h	h	h	h	h
j	y	i	j	y	j

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Table II. The Arabic symbols which are still in use.

ب	b	ر	r	غ	γ	آ, ا	a, ɒ, ɛ, æ, e, i, ï, u̇, u, o.
پ	p	ز	z	ف	f	ع	a, ɛ, æ, i, ï, u̇, u, ö.
ت	t	ژ	ž	ق	q	و	a, ɔ, o, u, ɯ, u̇, ü, ö, ø.
ث	s	س	s	ک	k	ه	a, ɛ, æ, e, i.
ج	dʒ	ش	š	گ	g	ى	a, æ, ɛ, e, i, ï, eį.
چ	č	ص	s	ل	l	او	ɔ, o, u, ɯ, u̇, ü, ö, a.
ح	h	ض	z	م	m	اى	ɛ, e, i, ï.
خ	χ	ط	t	ن	n		
د	d	ظ	z	و	v, w		
ذ	z			ه	h		
				ی	i		

212 Table III. The Russian symbols which are in the process of
177 introduction.

Аа
Бб
Вв
Гг
Дд
Ее
Жж
Зз
Ии
Йй
Кк
Лл
Мм
Нн
Нънъ
Оо
Өө
Пп
Рр
Сс
Тт
Уу
Үү
Фф
Хх
Цц
Чч
Шш
Щщ
Ьь
Ъъ
Ыы
Әә
Юю
Яя

G. Sketch of Eastern Turkish

193 As Eastern Turkish is an agglutinative language, the dialect can be described most simply by presenting the index of suffixes, the only grammatical means of modification. With the use of such an index, the general reader when knowing the meaning of a stem, should be able to figure out the grammatical function of the suffix concerned.

The genitive suffix: -nïŋ, -niŋ
quduq "the fountain," quduqnïŋ "of the fountain"

The dative suffix: -ɣa, -gɛ
öj "the house," öjgɛ "to the house, in the direction of the house"

The accusative suffix: -nï, -ni
ɯj "ox," ɯjnï "the ox" (direct object)

The locative suffix: -dæ, -dɛ
qïz "the girl," qizdæ "at the girl's, with the girl"

The ablative suffix: - dïn, - din
kül "the ashes," küldin "from the ashes"

The plural suffix: -lær, -lɛr
jürɛk "the heart," jürɛklɛr "the hearts"

The diminutive suffix: -ča, -čɛ
baɣ "the garden," baɣča "the little garden"

The professional suffix
ötmɛk "to pass by," ötmɛkči "the passer-by"

The suffix of ordinal numbers: -indʒi, -ïndʒï, -ůndʒi, -ɯndʒï
beš "five," bešindʒi "the fifth"

The possessive suffixes:
1. pers. sg. -ïm, -im, -öm, -əm, -ům, -üm, -ɯm, -um, -om, -əm
2. pers. sg. -ïŋ, -iŋ, -öŋ, -əŋ, -ůŋ, -üŋ, -ɯŋ, -oŋ, -əŋ
3. pers. sg. and pl. -si, -sï, -i, -ï
1. pers. pl. -ïmïz, imiz, ömiz, -əmiz, -ůmiz, -ümiz, -ɯmïz, -omïz, -əmiz
2. pers. pl. -iŋïz, -iŋiz, -öŋiz, -əŋiz, -ůŋiz, -üŋiz, -ɯŋiz, -oŋïz, -əŋïz

193 e.g.	baɣïm "my garden"		baɣïmïz "our garden"
	baɣïŋ "your garden"		baɣïnïz "your garden" (pl.)
	baɣï "his, her, its garden"		baɣlæri "their garden"

The suffix forming the present participle: -æ , -ε
qïl "do, make," qïlæ "making, doing"

The suffix forming the conditional: -sæ , -sε
bolmaq "to be, to become," bolsæm "if I were"

The suffix expressing impossibility: -al-, -εl-
ber "give", berεlmεdi "he was not able to give"

The suffix forming verbs out of nominal stems: -la, -lε, -læ
tišlεmεk "to bite"

The suffix forming the negative participle in the present tense: -mas, -mεs, -mæs
körmεs "not seeing"

The suffix forming the past tense:
1. pers. sg. -dïm, -dim, -dum, -düm, -dəm, -döm
2. pers. sg. -dïŋ, -diŋ, -duŋ, -düŋ, -dəŋ, -döŋ
3. pers. sg. -dï, -di (refers also to the plural)
1. pers. pl. -doq, -dɔq, -dük
2. pers. pl. -dïŋïz, -diniz, -duŋïz, -düŋiz, -dəŋiz, -döŋiz

e.g. qïldïm, qïldïn, qïldï, "I did, you did, he (she, it) did," etc.

The suffix forming the past participle (converb): -ïp, -ip, -up, -üp; -op, -əp, -öp
čir "enter, come in," čirip "after having entered"

The suffix forming the past participle (converbum terminalis): -ɣač, -gεč
qïl "do, make," qïlɣač "when you do"

The suffix of the participle expressing habitual activity: -ɣaq, -qaq, -gεk, -kεk ; ur- "to push, to beat, to strike, to hit," urɣaq "beating something habitually"

The gerundial suffix expressing "in order to": -ɣali, -ɣæli, -gεli ; kör- "see," körgεli "in order to see"

The suffix which forms a gerund: -ïɣ, -ïq, -uɣ, -uq. -ig, -ik, -üg, -ük
qïl "do, make," qïlïɣ "the doing, the making"
bil "know, understand, comprehend," bilik "the knowledge, learning, erudition, comprehension"

The suffix forming the future participle: -ɣo, - u, -qu, -gü
kel "come," kelgü "one who wants to come, will come, wishes to come"

539 H. Specimen of Eastern Turkish Literature
Turkish text (transcription)

1 æs salam ælejkum [illegible]
haq rasul [illegible]

2 æs ælejkum [illegible]
haq rasul [illegible]

3 haq rasul [illegible]

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4 *haq rasul ekrem učun jete deja: jaratt*
maŋa usta bolsaŋiz dʒ[illegible] (dʒavabim) šol du

5 *olar kim du ərkige qadəm qojəlla*
olar kim du jemej ičmej tojəlla

6 *olar kim du oγlin qurban etle*
oγlum ašiq bolsaŋiz maŋa dʒavab be

7 *pejyambejm du ərkige qadəm qojəlla*
melajik du jemej ičmej tojəlle

8 *ibrahim du ismajilni qojdek sojəlle*
maŋa usta bolsaŋiz dʒavabim šol du

English translation:

1 Peace be with you, my dearest Gharib
Out of what has God created the honored prophet?
2 Peace be with you also, Juneid of Baghdad
God has created the highly honored prophet from light
3 How many rivers has God created because of the highly honored prophet?
4 Because of the highly honored prophet God has created seven rivers
If you are my teacher, this is my answer
5 Who is it, who became satiated without eating or drinking?
6 Who is it, who has sacrificed his son?
My son, if you love me, give me an answer
7 It is my prophet who has set his foot upon the heavenly throne
It is the angels who became satiated without eating or drinking
8 It was Abraham who slaughtered Ismail like a sheep
If you are my teacher, then this is my answer

I. Other Turkic Dialects of the Northwest

19

1. Phonological differences

The remaining Turkic dialects of the Northwestern region, namely Kirghiz, Uzbek, Tatar, Salar and Sarigh-Uighur are somewhat different phonetically from New Uighur. Since all these Turkic dialects stem from one and the same original Turkic language, namely Common Turkic, phonological differences on the basis of the latter may be discussed if they are

19 pertinent and unusual as far as mutual understanding is concerned. The Common Turkic initial consonant q- is generally preserved in all five dialects mentioned above. The word for "black," qara, is pronounced the same in Kirghiz, Tatar, Uzbek, Salar (where it alternates with xara) and Sarigh-Uighur. In a few cases the Common Turkic q- developes into g- in Salar, e.g. New Uighur: q[illegible]arm," appears as gol, id. The Common Turkic final -q is generally preserved as such but in Uzbek and in Salar it frequently becomes a -x, e.g. Osmanli: yanaq "cheek", Kirghiz: džāq; Uzbeg: yanaq "cheek bone", Salar: yanax. Another possible development of the final Common Turkic -q is that to -ɣ in Uzbek and to -g in Salar, e.g. Tatar: baliq "fish", Salar: paliɣ. The intermediate Common Turkic -q- is preserved as such but occurs in Salar as --x-, e.g. Uzbek: oqu "to read", Salar: uxu-. The Common Turkic initial consonant k- is preserved as such in all five dialects. Only rarely does it become g- in Salar, e.g. Uzbek: kömüš "silver", Kirghis: kümüš, Tatar: kömüš, Salar: kümiš; but the Uzbek: Kömür/"coal" becomes gümir in Salar. The final Common Turkic consonant -k is preserved as such in all five dialects. However, in Salar it can become a -x, e.g. Uzbek and Kirghiz: ek- "to sow", Salar: äx- "to plow". The Common Turkic voiced stops, -ɣ- and -g; in intermediate and final position undergo very characteristic phonetic developments.

1) The Common Turkic group -aɣ occurs in Kazakh and in Tatar as -au, in Kirghiz as ō and in Salar as -ag or -aɣ, e.g. Taranchi: taɣ "mountain, Kazakh and Tatar: tau, Kirghiz: tō and Salar: tag or taɣ.

2) The Common Turkic group -aɣa is preserved in all five dialects. However, in Kirghiz it often becomes contracted, e.g. Kirghiz and Tatar: aɣač "tree", Kazakh: aɣaš, Uzbek: äɣäč, Salar: agaš; but Taranchi: taɣar "bag, sack", is pronounced in Kirghiz as tár.

3) The Common Turkic group -aɣï occurs in Kirghiz as ō, in Kazakh and Tatar as au and is preserved as such in Salar and Uzbek, e.g. Uzbek: aɣïz "mouth", Kirghiz: ōz or ōs or ūz, Salar: agsï "his mouth" (only the form with the posessive suffix of the third person singular is recorded).

4) The Common Turkic group -aɣu is preserved in Uzbek and in Salar when it constitutes the first and second syllable of a stem, but it is not preserved as such when it constitutes the second and third syllable of a word, In Kirghiz and in Kazakh it became contracted to a long ū and in Tatar it developed to avë or ewë, e.g. Middle Turkic: yaɣuq "next, close, near", Chagatai: yavuq, Kirghiz: ǰūq, Kazakh: žūq, Uzbek, yauq.

5) The Common Turkic group -oɣ occurs in Kirghiz, and Kazakh and Tatar as long ū; in Uzbek as oɣ or uɣ; and in Salar as ug, e.g.

19 New Uighur and Uzbek: toɣ- or tuɣ- "to be born or to give birth to a child", Kirghiz and Kazakh and Tatar: tū. Salar has only one word recorded which contains the Common Turkic -oɣ namely ugrí "thief", which is pronounced in Uzbek as oɣri.

6) The Common Turkic group -oɣa was preserved as such in Uzbek, became a long ō in Kirghiz, and in Kazakh and in Tatar it has been transformed to uɣa, u'a or ua, e.g. Uighur: boɣaz "goiter" or "pregnant", Uzbek: boɣaz, Kirghiz: bōz "pregnant" Kazakh: buɣaz, Tatar: buaz.

7) The Common Turkic group -oɣu occurs in Kirghiz, Kazakh and Tatar as a long ū (in the latter also as uvê and êwê); in Uzbek it has been preserved or was transformed to avu; in Salar it has been preserved as ogu, e.g. Uzbek: oɣul "son", Kirghiz, Kazakh and Tatar: ūl, Salar: oɣul.

8) The Common Turkic group -uɣ became a long ū in Kirghiz, uv in Uzbek, ə in Tatar and simply u in Salar (or ī when constituting non-first syllables) e.g. Uzbek: yuv- "to wash", Salar: yu-.

9) The Common Turkic group +uɣu has been preserved as such in Uighur, Chagatai, Kirghiz and Kazakh, e.g. buɣu "male deer."

10) The Common Turkic group *-iɣ became -eɣ in Uzbek (or has been preserved as -iɣ); it remained in Kirghiz and Kazakh as -ij and was transformed to -êj in Tatar, e.g. Uzbek: yiɣ- or yeɣ- "to stock up, to collect", Kirghiz: ǯij-, Tatar: ǯêj-.

11) The Common Turkic group +iɣi remained as such or became eɣi or igi in Uzbek, -ij or a long -ī in Kazakh and occurs in Tatar as êyê or long ī, e.g. Uzbek: yeɣin "heap, pile, hoard", Kirghiz: ǯíyin, Kazakh: ǯijn or ǯīn.

12) The Common Turkic group +äg is represented in Uzbek by -eg, in Kirghiz and Kazakh and Tatar by a long -ī or by -ij, e.g. New Uighur: beg " a native official ", Tatar: bêj, Salar: peɣ.

13) The Common Turkic group +ägä is preserved in Uzbek as -ege-, in Kirghiz as long ē and in Kazakh as -iyä- e.g. Uzbek: yegen "nephew", Kirghiz: ǯēn, Kazakh: žiyän.

14) The Common Turkic group +-ågů is represented in Chagatai as-ågi-, in Kirghiz and Kazakh as -ůgů-, e.g. Chagatai: tågil "not", Kirghiz and Kazakh: tůgůl.

15) The Common Turkic group +ägi is represented in Uzbek by -igi- or -egi-, in Kazakh by a long ī, in Tatar by -êgê-, in Kirghiz by -egi- and in Salar by e, e.g. Chagatai: tågirman "mill", New Uighur: tögurmań, Kirghiz: tārban or tegirman, Kazakh: tīrman, Salar: termen (recorded in this form which obviously does not show the long ē).

16) The Common Turkic group +-ög is represented in Uzbek by -ök, -öj, or ō, in Kirghiz and Kazakh as -új, -öj, or -ū, in Tatar by əj and in Salar by -úg, e.g. Taranchi: bōråk "kidney", Kirghiz: böjrök, Kazakh: bújrök or būrök, Tatar: böyör, Uzbek:

19 büjräk, New Uighur: böräk, Salar: bügürix.

17) The Common Turkic group +-ögä- is preserved as such in Uzbek, but occurs as -ögö- in Kirghiz and as -ügê- in Tatar, e.g. Uzbek: ögäj "step-", Kirghiz: ögöj, Tatar: ügəj.

18) The Common Turkic group +-ögü appears in Uighur as such, in Kirghiz and Kazakh as -üyü- and in Tatar as -öyö; e.g. Uighur: ögür "herd", Kirghiz and Kazakh: üyür, Tatar: öyör.

19) The Common Turkic group +üg is preserved as such in Uzbek or alternates with -ug; in Kirghiz and Kazakh it became -üj and in Tatar -öj; e.g. New Uighur and Uzbek: tüg- "to tie a knot", Kirghiz and Kazakh: tüj-, Tatar: töj-.

20) The Common Turkic group +-ügä is preserved as such in New Uighur, but became in Kirghiz and Kazakh -ügö-, e.g. New Uighur: yügän "holder", Kirghiz and Kazakh: ǯügön.

21) The Common Turkic group +-ügü- is represented in Kirghiz and Kazakh as -üyü-, e.g. Chagatai: tügün or tüyün "knot", Kirghiz and Kazakh: tüyün, Tatar: töyen.

22) The Common Turkic group +-ig develops into -ij or long ī; e.g. Chagatai: čig "raw", Tatar: čī.

23) The Common Turkic group +-igi is preserved as such in Taranchi, Uzbek, Kirghiz and Kazakh, but occurs as -êgê- in Tatar; e.g. Chagatai and Taranchi: yigit "young fellow", Uzbek: yigit, Kirghiz and Kazakh: ǯigit, Tatar: y[illegible]êt, Salar: igit.

24) The Common Turkic group +-igü- is preserved as such in New Uighur but became -iyi- in Kirghiz; e.g. Chagatai and New Uighur: kigür- "to lead in", Kirghiz: kiyir-.

2. Phonetic development of the consonants.

1) The Common Turkic consonant +y- is represented in Uzbek, Chagatai and Salar by y- but in Kirghiz and Kazakh by ǯ-; e.b. Uzbek: yaγmur "rain", Salar: yaγmïr, Kazak and Kirghiz: ǯamγïr.

2) The Common Turkic prelingual voiceless stop +t- is preserved in all dialects. A peculiarity of Salar is the development of +t- before +i, +ï and +ü to ǯ- (dž-) in intervocalic position and to č- otherwise.

3) The Common Turkic intermediate +-d- (+-δ-) is represented by -y- in all five dialects. Only in Sarigh Uighur it became -ž-; e.g. Salar: ayax "foot", Chagatai, Kazakh and Uzbek: ayaq, New Uighur: ayaγ, Sarigh Uighur: ažaq. Again Salar develops +-d- before +i and +ï to -ǯ- (-dž-) or -č-; e.g. New Uighur: āyïq "bear", Uzbek: ayiq, Salar: ačïx.

5) The Common Turkic affricate +-č- (in intervocalic position) is preserved as such in New Uighur, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tatar and Salar but became š- in Kazakh; e.g. Chagatai, New Uighur and Uzbek: očaq "stove", Kirghiz: očoq, Tatar: učaq, Salar: očag, Kazakh: ošaq.

19 6) The Common Turkic spirant *s- is preserved as such in all five dialects; e. g. New Uighur, Uzbek: sač "hair", Salar saš, Kirghiz: čač (< sač on account of assimilation), Tatar: čäč< säč. Kazakh: šaš< saš.

7) The Common Trukic consonant *š (in all positions) becomes s in Kazakh but remains š in Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tatar and Salar, e.g. Chagatai, New Uighur, Kirghiz, Tatar, Uzbek: baš "head", Kazakh: bas, Salar: paš.

8) The Common Turkic consonant *-z (*-z-) is represented by z or became devoiced to s; e. g. Uzbek: qĭz "girl", Salar: kĭs, Tatar: kêz.

9) The Common Turkic labial *b- is preserved as such in Uighur, Chagatai, New Uighur, Kirghiz, Kazakh and Tatar, but becomes voiceless p in Salar. In the latter it also can result in b or v due to sandhi; e. g. New Uighur and Chagatai: bår- "to give" Kirghiz and Kazakh: ber-, Tatar: bir-, Salar: ver-, but Uzbek: bir "one" becomes in Salar pir.

10) The Common Turkic labial * -p- inconsistently results in -b-, -v-, or -m-, or is preserved as -p-; e. g. Uighur: tobĭq "ankle", Tatar: tobuq, Kirghiz: topuq or tomuq.

11) The Common Turkic nasals *m, *n and *ŋ are generally preserved as such. The same is true for the Common Turkic liquids *r and *l.

3. Vocalism

As far as vocalism is concerned, only Tatar differs greatly from all the other Turkic languages spoken in Sinkiang.

1) The Common Turkic *u becomes o in Tatar: e. g. Uighur: bulut "cloud", Tatar: bɵlɵt (ɵ is a vowel between o and u).

2) The Common Turkic *a results in å in Tatar; e. g. Common Turkic: čač- "to strew", Tatar: čåč-.

3) The Common Turkic *ĭ resulted in a reduced vowel ə̂ : e. g. kĭz "girl", Tatar: qə̂z.

4) The Common Turkic *o resulted in u in Tatar; e. g. Uighur: bol- "to be", Tatar: bul-.

5) The Common Turkic vowels *å and *e resulted in i in Tatar; e. g. Uighur: kel- "to come", Tatar: kil-.

6) The Common Turkic vowel *ö resulted in ů in Tatar; e. g. Uzbek: kȯl "lake", Tatar: kůl.

7) The Common Turkic *ü resulted in ɵ in Tatar; e. g. Uighur: kůn "day", Tatar: kɵn.

These phonetic changes make it difficult for the Uzbeks, New Uighurs, Kirghiz and Kazakhs to converse with the Tatars.

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II. The Mongolian Dialects

A. - The Western Mongolian or Kalmuck

In linguistic usage the term Kalmuck applies to West Mongolian or Oirat.

563 or Oirat. The Kalmucks proper are , or rather were, only a
[01] group of the Oirats (Western Mongols). As a people they have
[619] ceased to exist. The Western Mongols are divided into the
Torgut, Khoshut, Ölot and Dörbet (also called Dzungar) tribes.
175 As the pressure of the Chinese government became too strong
563 in the early 17th century some Khoshuts migrated into the Kokonor area. The Torguts moved into the steppes (1618) between the Urals and the Volga and submitted to the Russians. In 1673 the Dorbets, and in 1675 the Khoshuts, who had not migrated to the Kokonor area, followed their lead. However by 1771 Russian domination had become so oppressive that the Oirats decided on a return migration. Only a small part of the 400,000 people and their animals that wandered back arrived in their new home, which was now called Dzungaria (Mongolian: zöůn gar "right
[131] wing"). One group settled in the eastern part of Tien-shan, another small group at the southern edges of the Gobi, at the Kokonor and another in the Chinese province, Kansu.

19 Linguistically speaking, the following changes have occurred:

1) The Kalmuck language has contracted the groups *aɣu, *egů, etc. to long vowels:

Common Mongolian	Mongolian	Kalmuck
*caɣaɣan "white	čaɣan	tsaɣān
*qaǰaɣar "bridle	qaǰaɣar	ɣazār
*qaβalɣa "gate"	qaɣalɣa	χālɣə
*čiɣiraɣ < *tiɣiraɣ "massive"	čigiraɣ	tširəG "solid"
*daɣuda- "to call"	daɣuda-	dūn "voice"
*toɣari- "to turn"	toɣori-	tȫr- "to go around"

2) I-breaking has occurred:

Mongolian	Kalmuck
biraɣu "calf"	bürǖ
miqan "meat"	maχn̥
sira "yellow"	šarə
milaɣa "lash"	maĺā

3) I-breaking did not occur in some instances; rather *i has assimilated the vowel in the following syllable:

Mongolian: ǰida "spear" Kalmuck: džidə < *ǰide

4) The Common Mongolian affricatives *č and *ǰ became in Kalmuck *ts and *z respectively. Only before *i did they remain as *tš and *dž:

Mongolian	Kalmuck
čaɣan "white"	tsaɣān
časun "snow"	tsasŋ
čisun "blood"	tsusn̥
ǰekegůn "cold"	zekůn
ǰelkei "thief"	zelkā

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19 but before *i:

Mongolian	Kalmuck
bičig "letter, writing"	bitšig (or bitšịg)
čimügen "hammer"	tšimgn̥
čirai̯ "face"	tširī

5) The Common Mongolian *e became *ö in certain positions:

Mongolian	Kalmuck
ebüsün "hay"	öwsn̥
ebüdüg "knee"	öwdəg
ebedčin "disease"	öwtšn̥
elgü- "to hang"	ölgə

6) The Written Mongolian (old Mongolian) diphthongs have developed into long vowels in the Kalmuck language:

Mongolian	Kalmuck
dalbaγai "large and flat"	dalwaγā
duldui "iron rod"	duldū
gei "handle of an axe"	gē
moγai "snake"	moγā
alγui "name of a plant"	alγū

7) The Common Mongolian vowels have developed into front vowels before the Common Mongolian *i:

Mongolian	Kalmuck
bari- "to seize"	bär-
qari- "to come back"	χär-
sayin "good"	sän

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B. . The Monguor Language

*563 One of the strangest Mongolian languages is Monguor, because it preserves still some Middle Mongolian peculiarities and also
[197] because it is under the influence of initial forms which are charac-
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[197] teristic of Tibetan. Those Mongols who call themselves Monguors live in the Chinese province of Kansu and practice nomadic animal
M breeding as well as some agriculture. The Chinese call them
[101] Tu-jen. The Mongols of the Mongolian People's Republic call them Dolot. The sub-group of San-chuan Mongols (Monguor)
[361] live north of Kuan-ting. The Santa live south of the Yellow River and east of Tao-ho. The sub-group of the Shera-Yogur live around Kan-chou, Su-chou and Tun-huang. All these tribes are Buddhists with the exception of the Santa, who have become converted to Islam. Culturally the Monguors, at least partially, appear to be mongolized Turks and Tibetans.

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19 The following observations may be made about the Monguor language:

1) The Monguor language has preserved the Common Mongolian *p or *φ as *f and as *χ:

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Common Mongolian	Mongolian	Monguor
*ɣon "year"	on	fån
*ɣodun "star"	odun	fōdi
*ɣarban "ten"	arban	χarwan
*ɣeki "head, beginning"	ekin	χggi
*ɣirů "to pray"	irůge	śurō-

(It must also be added that the Common Mongolian *p or *ɣ becomes ś in Monguor before the following *i, as seen in a previous example).

2) A special characteristic of Monguor is that in the very same word a Written Mongolian hard consonant (medially) becomes soft, but the Written Mongolian initial soft consonant becomes hard.

Mongolian	Monguor
ekin "head"	χggi
burčaɣ "pea"	p'dźiaǵ
bičig, "letter"	p'udźig

3) The Written Mongolian consonant *t and *k were so strongly aspirated in Monguor that they became *tś:

Mongolian	Monguor
tata- "to pull"	tśida-
tejiye- "to feed"	tśudźie-

4) Written Mongolian *o and *ö converged to *o; and written Mongolian *u and *ů converged to *u:

Mongolian	Monguor
ebůdůg "knee"	udig
bödne "quail"	bodono
ɣurban "three"	gurān
odun "star"	fōdi

5) Written Mongolian vowel *i after *b became *u:

Mongolian	Monguor
bičig "letter"	p'udźig
bi "I"	bu

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III. The Tibetan Dialect of the Chinghai Region

The Tibetan dialect of Chinghai has never been studied, although some, like Potanin, Prževalski, Hedin, Filchner, Rockhill, Täfel and Ekvall have made some brief remarks about it. The following statements are made on the basis of the few words and phrases reported in their diaries and articles.

1) The Tibetan Chinghai dialect, like Lhasa Tibetan is a monosyllabic tonal language presenting the typical phonological, morphological and syntactical features of the Tibetan-Burmese subgroup of the Indo-Chinese language family.

2) The Chinghai dialect may be subdivided into two branches: that of the sedentary Tibetans (rong-skad "valley speech") and

19 *563 that of the nomadic Tibetans (drok-skad "steppe speech"0.

3) All reports agree that the sedentary Tibetans and the nomadic Tibetans have no difficulties in understanding and conversing with each other.

4) According to Prževalski the pronunciation of the Chinghai Tibetans (he calls them Tanguts) is somewhat like Lhasa-Tibetan, i. e. the initial clusters of consonants become either single stops, affricates or sibilants, e. g. dkrigs-pa "dark, dim" becomes tig-pa; bkrabs-pa "selected" becomes tab-pa; glang-chen "elephant" becomes lang-chen; sgyug-mo "mother-in-law" becomes jug-mo; mgo "head" becomes go. Furthermore, the final consonants are either completely omitted or they change the pronunciation of the preceeding vowels, e. g. las "business, enterprise" is pronounced like lai or la; lus "body" is pronounced like lui or lu; chos "religion" is pronounced as choi or cho. The same is true for other final consonants of stems ending in -g and -d.

5) According to Ekvall some nomadic Tibetans have preserved the pronunciation of those clusters of consonants (prefixes) at the beginning of words, although the method of pronunciation seems to be hard to describe. Ekvall says: "One or two of the variations of the nomadic dialect that I have heard have preserved most of the value of the prefixed and super-added consonants. The pronunciation of such combinations as brgy- is a remarkable performance. But the mean of nomad usage has been content to indicate the presence of these prefixed and superadded consonants by half-pronounced consonants, or by variations of breathing, etc., preceding the main initial consonant. Most, if not all, of the final consonants are pronounced at least partially, but the use of tones unobtrusive and the three vowels, i, u, and a have all become centralized until there is very little difference." Ekvall: 1939, 67.

6) The main difference between the two dialects, the sedentary rong-skad and the nomadic drok-skad, seems to be that the first one lost all final consonants with the exception of -n and -ng, while the latter one has preserved all of them with the exception of -s.

7) Besides these two, there are other Tibetan dialects spoken in the Chinghai area, namely Ngolok and Tebu, which are completely unexplored. It is believed that these are an archaic Tibetan, since especially the Ngoloks have kept apart from other Tibetans.

[212] Literacy is not a rare phenomenon. Thousands of Tibetans live in monasteries where they learn the Tibetan written language. Exact figures concerning illiteracy are unknown.

19 576 *563 [127] The following examples are taken from K. Futterer's, W Filchner's and A. Tafel's travel books which present a few greeting formulas in Chinghai Tibetan as it is pronounced especially in the area between Kokonor, Tossun-nor and the

19 576 *563 [127] Amne-machin mountain range.

Written Tibetan	Chinghai dialect
nang-mo-bde-legs	Tafel: nang-mo-de-leg
"good morning"	Futterer: nåñ-mo-de-le
t'ugs-rje-ch'e	Tafel: t'ür-je-ch'e
"thank you"	Futterer: t'ug-je-ch'e
k'yod-lam-na-bde-bar skyod-chig "happy continuation of your trip"	Tafel: k'yö-lam-na-de-bår-työ-chig

194 *563 As far as the pronunciation of skyod goes it varies from tyod, tchod, ktchod, työ, tchö, to ktchö. Unfortunately there is almost no material available on the phonetics of the Chinghai dialect. The only attempt to deal with this matter has been made by Uray Geza who says, in his Kelet-Tibet-Nyelvjárásainak Osztályozása (Dissertationes sodalium instituti Asiae interioris, Budapestini, 1949), that the Tibetan stems beginning with the clusters py- became sh- and the clusters kr-, dr- and pr- always become ch-, e.g. s-phan "eye" is pronounced like shan, x-dre "devil" is pronounced like che, d-krig-s-pa "dark" is pronounced like chig-pa, s-sprang-po "beggar" is pronounced like chang-po.

191 *563 The sedentary Tibetans very often speak Chinese as a second language, but the nomadic Tibetans rarely speak any other language than their native tongue, although some may understand Mongolian, since they nomadize in neighboring areas.

*668 212 177 [191] The Communist government is promoting literacy by publishing political pamphlets and elementary schoolbooks in written Tibetan. There is no doubt that the younger generation will become literate to a high degree. They also may become bilingual since Chinese is an obligarory language for all minorities.

IV. Chinese Dialects in the Northwest

19 A preliminary linguistic survey has been made only within the territory of Shensi and Kansu in the northwestern part of China. There is fairly good material on the phonological structure of the dialects of the fifty districts in Shensi and two in Kansu. These Chinese dialects belong to the northwestern branch of the Mandarin dialect. They exhibit the phonological features of the Mandarin dialect, such as the complete loss of the final stops -p, -t, -k or -ʔ. Usually they have only four tones; in-p'ing, ang-p'ing, shang, and ch'ü. The words which originally had the u-sheng tone have been redistributed into the other tones.

The dialects in this area are marked by the following phonological characteristics:

1) Existence of initial ŋ- and ŋ-.
2) Disappearance of the diphthong -ai.

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19 3) Predominance of nasalized vowels, -ã, and ɛ̃

4) A group of words like cha, ch'a, sha, etc. have ts-, tsh-, s-, respectively.

5) These dialects show a different treatment of words like chu, ch'u, shu, ju, etc. While in some dialects they have ts-, tsh-, s-, z-, (or rarely tʂ-, tʂh-, ʂ-, ʐ-) plus -y, in other dialects they have pf-, phf-, f-, v- respectively plus -u.

6) The following contrasts are observed only in some of these dialects:

- a) Contrast between n- and l-
- b) Contrast between v- and u-
- c) Contrast between s- and ç- before -i
- d) Contrast between -ɛ̃ and -əŋ

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[167] Areas with Chinese minorities are found in Sinkiang and the U.S.S.R. The Mandarin-speaking officials, merchants, soldiers, and criminals who went to the larger cities of Sinkiang (i.e. Urumchi, etc.) in frequent waves of migration, resulted in the predominance of the Mandarin dialect in these cities. Descendants of the Chinese Moslems, under the name of Dungans, migrated from the provinces of Kansu and Shensi in the second half of the 19th century. They still preserve their native Chinese language with minor changes. The center of the Kansu dialect is the Alexandrowka settlement, in Kirghizstan, in the vicinity of Frunse (former Pischpek). The center of the Shensi dialect is Karakunuz, in Kazakstan, which lies not far from the city of Tokmak.

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197 The phonological structure of the ancient northwestern dialects of the 8th and 9th centuries is demonstrated in scme Chinese texts which were discovered in Tibetan transcription at Tun-huang. These ancient dialects,, presumable of Kansu, do not seem to be directly ancestral to the modern dialects described above. The striking features of the ancient dialect, as revealed by the Tibetan spellings in the thousand character classic are the different develepment in -i and -u; the distinction between m-: 'b-; n-: 'd-; (ŋ): 'g; and the partial loss of the final -ŋ.

V. Concluding Remarks

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191 Most of the Western Mongols of the Northwest region speak Chinese as a second language. The percentage of those who are bilingual is rather high (about two thirds). The Monguors, however, rarely speak a second language. Very few individuals know Chinese or Tibetan. Among the Turks the percentage of New Uighurs who speak Chinese is very high, due to the fact that they live side by side with the Chinese. The same is true for the Tatars, Uzbeks and Tajiks, whose employment in trade forces them to learn the main language of the country. Those Turks who live in the moun-

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191 lingual. Among a few of them though, Russian is known.

A few of the sedentary Tibetans of the Chinghai area acquired Chinese as a second language. The Chinese Moslems learn Arabian to a very limited extent; otherwise they speak only Chinese. The official policy in regard to language education among the minorities makes the study of Chinese obligatory as a second language.

S Besides the approximately 3 million speakers of Eastern
197 Turkish, there are about 300,000 Kazakhs, about 70,000 Kirghiz
162 and about 5,000 - 7,000 Uzbeks who also speak Turkic dialects. The population figures of the Salars and Sarigh-Uighur are unknown but there are only a few thousand individuals.

Besides those people, we find about 60,000 Mongols who live in Sinkiang and who speak a Western Mongolian language. We refer to this language as Kalmuck.

S Many sources report that Manchus and Tungus live in
563 Sinkiang, but in reality they became extinct 30 years ago. When the Altaist John Ramstedt visited them before the First World
S War, only very few older individuals were stillliving. The
[191] younger generation already spoke Turkish.

S Some 15,000 Tajiks living at the Sinkiang Russian border
[177] have become gradually Turkified. The Tajiks speak an Iranian
(197) language closely related to Persian.

S The approximate number of Chinese-speaking people is about
[167] 300,000. It is well known that thousands of Russians migrated to Sinkiang since the revolution of 1917. Although it is impossible to get the present Russian census figure, a total number of 25,000 cannot be regarded as too high.

S The Arabic script is used by the New Uighurs, Kazakhs,
N Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Tatars, Salars, and Tajiks, while the Sarigh
212 Uighurs of Kansu use the Tibetan script, having abandoned their old Uighur script during the XVIIIth century. According to the newly printed political pamphlets in Kazakh and Uighur, some modifications now occur in regard to diacritical marks; e. g. Kazakh writes for the vowel "o" the Arabic و while Uighur writes ۆ the Arabic, or Kazakh uses for the vowel "a" the Arabic letter ا while Uighur writes it the following way ئا

The Mongolian script is used by the Ölöts, Torguts, the Alashan-Mongols, the Chahars and Uriangkhai.

The Chinese Moslems use both the Chinese and the Arabic scripts, although the latter usage is more or less confined to religious purposes.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

000 I. **The Nomads**

- A. **The Nomadic Turks**
- B. **The Western (Oirat) Mongols**
- C. **The Nomadic Tibetans**

II. **The Sedentary Peoples**

- A. **The New Uighurs**
- B. **The Sedentary Tibetans**
- C. **The Monguours**

III. **Relationships between the Chinese, the Chinese Moslems and the Sedentary Tibetans**

Additional Readings

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

I. The Nomads

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556 A. The Nomadic Turks (Kazakh, Kirghiz and Uzbek)
The distinguishing feature of the social structure of the nomadic
611 Turks of the Northwest is that social status is acquired by wealth
428 (sheep, cows, camels and horses) or by descent. Descent among
the nomadic Turks is always patrilineal, and a modified form of
[425] ultimogeniture is found. As the sons of each family marry, each
one receives an equal share of the family's wealth. This includes
a winter pasture. Only the youngest son inherits the father's
property (tents, precious furniture, etc.).

621 The smallest social unit is the family; a number of related
563 families constitute an aul which is at the same time the migration
[592] unit in regard to pastoral nomadism.

[233] Unrestricted authority is held by the patriarch of the family.
[622] The patriarch of the most influential family (measured in terms
of wealth and family connections) becomes the chieftain of an aul.
621 A certain number of auls constitute the great aul. The latter
563 possesses a common property brand which is called tamga (the
614 tamga marks are to be found mostly on the left side of animals,
422 on tents and on gravestones. The tamgas are believed to be of
totemistic origin and therefore thought to be a very old institution.
Their purpose, obviously, is to distinguish and identify herds and
other property.

614 The great aul (which might also be called a sub-clan) is led
563 by a chieftain whose title is bäk, beg, biy, bey, or pex, depending
upon the Turkic dialect concerned. The chieftain of such a great
aul functions as a leader and as a judge whose duty it is to mediate
and to appease in disputes between single persons, families
and auls. Several great auls constitute a clan, which is also led
by one of the bäks of the great auls. Several clans together form
614 a tribe which is led by a khan or sultan and finally two or three
619 tribes constitute a horde which in turn form the nation; e.g., the
563 Kazakh have four hordes, the Kirghiz two, etc. Sometimes it is
621 difficult to decide what constitutes a great aul or sub-clan and
614 what is actually a clan. An extended family may have the function
596 of an aul; a great clan may have the function of a clan; while a
563 declined clan only has the function of an aul.

A Kazakh Turk could define his position within his own people
[829] by stating that he belongs a)to the Turkic race b) to the Kazakh
nation c) to the Middle horde d) to the Kipchak tribe e) to the
Toru Aibgyr clan f) to the Shashli sub-clan (great aul) g) to the
Boshai branch (aul) and h) to the Janay sub-branch (extended family).
614 For the Kirghiz and Kazakhs, a clan can be defined as a
563 social group which, by force of either real or putative consanguinity,

614 common migrations, and military alliance, was forced to unite into
563 a large grouping. Clan solidarity is extremely strong. Even after
the old tribal constitution was abolished in Soviet Russia, workers
of the same kholkhoz felt they belonged to a new clan and observed
clan exogamy, which, in this case of course, had no genetic basis.

The oldest clans emerged many centuries ago and were named
after totem-animals, or after famous tribal leaders (e.g., Özbeg
Khan after whom the Uzbeks are named). Some of the Kirghiz clan
names of totemistic origin are bugu "stag", sary bagish "yellow elk",
chong bagish "great elek", etc. Among Turkomans one finds many
clan names of totemistic origin, e.g., ak okuz "white ox", qara
okuz "black ox", ailar "bear", burgut "hawk", due "camel", kulan
"wild donkey". The aul, great-aul and clan are all connected by
[602] blood relationships real or imagined. The feeling of kinship is
[621] highly developed, and manifests itself in mutual assistance in military activities and in cases of cattle losses due to theft, disease,
or lack of precipitation.

The clan assumes joint responsibilities for the welfare of
the whole group, in general, and for the deeds committed by indiv-
[672] idual members of the clan. The clan also takes collective action
[681] in cases of theft or murder suffered by any clan members. Graz-
[423] ing land is never individual property but belongs to the aul, great-
aul or clan. Bäks and khans form the nobility which is called
[565] aq süyek "white bone" in contrast to the commoners who are
called qara süyek "black bones".

563 Most members of the nobility claim to be descendants of
Chinghis Khan and a considerable number of the bäks and khans
565 undoubtedly belong to the old steppe aristocracy. However, a
wealthy patriarch, with a reputation for being a fair judge, who
was chieftain of a numerically rich aul or great aul could become
a tribal leader by popular consent.

The white bones regard marriage between white bones and
black bones as unsuitable.

In addition to the white bones and the black bones there exists
[567] a third stratum, consisting of descendants of slaves who were
officially freed during the middle of the last century. They do
not own herds, not even single heads of cattle, but function as
shepherds, farmhands, servants, etc. However, some cases are
known of poor farmhands (after the abolition of slavery in Russia
in 1857 which affected the tribes living athwart the Sino-Russian
border so that they too decided to abolish the institution of slavery
about 1869) gradually acquiring cattle and therefore ascending into
the higher stratum.

The Kirghiz are not ruled by a bäk or a khan, but by elders
563 whose functions, however, are identical with those of the bäks
622 and khans. The elders "manap" are elected by popular acclaim,
and they, in turn, fall under the leadership of an aga-manap

563 "chief-elder". The charismatic character of such an elder is of
622 prime importance. His wealth, his public influence, his reputa-
[554] tion, his military ability and his moral integrity form the basis
of his social status.

692 Internal order is maintained by unwritten common law. Judges
563 act by custom and conscience alone. When a cause of action arises,
671 the litigants, in lieu of blood-vengeance, agree to refer the matter
to a court of their own choosing and to abive by its decision. Either
both sides agree on one or two bäks to settle the case, or each
selects a bäk, and a third man is chosen as arbiter. Civil and
criminal law are not distinguished. Crimes are really torts, and
[674] can be settled out of court by compromise. Hence, the criminal
[681] is not punished; he simply pays damages, which represent a sort
of compounding of the earlier lex talionis. Custom prescribes a
681 graded schedule of damages, ranging from a wergild (kun) of 100
563 horses, 1000 sheep, or 50 camels for homicide, through lesser
payments in cattle for adultery, fraud, and serious personal injuries or assault, to a horse and a robe or skin for slander,
breaking a finger or tooth, and minor assaults. The full wergild
must be paid for killing a man, one-half for a woman or slave,
and one-third for a child under ten. The circumstances and intent are not considered. However, a man pays no penalty for
killing his child, slave or adulterous wife. For cattle theft, a
man must restore the stolen animals and, in addition, pay twice
their number as damages. For rape of an unbetrothed girl he
must marry the girl, give her father the usual bride-price, and
pay him a fine of nine head of cattle.

563 Usually before a boy reaches the age of ten, his father seeks
584 a wife for him. Neither the boy nor the girl has much voice in
the transaction. Since the nomadic Turks practice strict clan
[614] exogamy the boy's father must select a girl of suitable qualifications from another clan. He then sends matchmakers to her
father to arrange the bride-price "kalym". Except where a
563 brother and sister are married by exchange to a sister and
583 brother, marriage is always by purchase. The bride-price,
584 payable in horses, cattle, sheep and camels, varies with the
means of the groom and the desirability of the bride, forty animals
representing perhaps an average kalym. In return, the bride
takes with her from her father's home a dowry, much inferior in
value, consisting usually of a yurt, a riding horse or other
animals, a chest of clothing, rugs, beddings, and other house-
[582] hold articles. Marriage is deferred until the children attain
[884] their majority.

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Sinkiang AI1
Kazak RQ2

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The Kazakh Nation

and its tribal organization

1) The Great Horde (Ulu-jüz)
  a) Tribe Uissün with the clans:
      Sikhym
      Jamys
      Tämir
      Shymyr
      Botpai
      Kurulus
      Bäsh tün bala (the five equal children)
      Sirgäli
      Ysty
      Otakshy
      Jalair
      Shapas
      Kangly
2) The Middle Horde (Orta-jüz)
  a) Tribe Argyn with the clans:
      Kara kesäk
      Shar Jitim
      Janshar
      Tört aul with aa) Atygai
                 bb) Altai
                 cc) Terbish
                 dd) Tabakty
      Borshy
      Karpak
      Basäntin
      Agysh Kalkanam
      Kanjygaly
      Kosugan
      Kök shal
  b) Tribe Naiman with the clans:
      Bulatty
      Tärs tamgaly
      Baganaly
      Sadyr
      Ergänäkti
  c) Tribe Kypchak
  d) Tribe Kiräi with three sub-tribes:
    1) Abak-Kuräi with the clans:
      Jantykai
      Jadyk
      Shiräüshi

/The Kazakh Nation/

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Itüli
Karakas
Mulku
Shubar aigyr
Mürkit
Itüngmün
Jüs taban
Sary bas
Shimoyin
2) Kara-Kirüi with the clans:
Murun
Bai Jigit
Tört aul
3) Tarakty

e) Tribe Kongrat with the two sub-tribes
1) alty ata kökting uly (the six sons of father Kök)
2) alty ata köktöngshü (six fathers Köktönshü)
3) The Little Horde (Kishi-jüz)
a) Tribe Alshyn with two sub-tribes:
1) Alim ulu with the clans:
Kara sakal
Kara kisük
Kitü
Tört kara
Shümököi
Shikti
2) Bai-ulu with the clans:
Adai
Sherküs
Tana
Bai-bakty
Maskar
Kysyk-kurt
Isün -tümir
Jappas
Alasha
Tastar
b) Tribe Jütti uru (the seven confederated tribes)
with the clans:
Jagalbaily
Küptü
Tama
Tabyn
Kerüit
Telüü
Ramadan

Note: The Kazakh of Sinkiang belong mostly to clans of the Great Horde

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The Kirghiz Nation

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1) Horde: The Right Flank (Ong)
   - a) Tribe Bugu with the clans:
     - Tselek
     - Torgo
     - Bapa
     - Yeldün
     - Talabai
     - Serike
     - Bor
     - Dölös
     - Kongrat
     - Monguldur
     - Sayak
     - Udu
     - Shykmayat
     - Kala
     - Assan-tukum
     - Aryk-tukum
     - Küchük
   - b) Tribe Sary-bagysh with the clans:
     - Saru
     - Kala
     - Monguldur
     - Shykamat
     - Sayak
     - Assik
     - Dölös
     - Kongrat
     - Mundus
     - Kitai
     - Yetigün
   - c) Tribe Soltu with the clans:
     - Yetigün
     - Kuchu
     - Saru
     - Monguldur
     - Mundus
     - Assyk
   - d) Tribe Edigüna with the clans:
     - Dölös
     - Saru
     - Kongrat
     - Monguldur
     - Mundus
     - Sayat (incomplete)
     - Kaba
     - Shykamat
   - e) Tribe Chong-bagysh with the clans:
     - Askaly
     - Toro
     - Macjak
     - Ush-tamga
     - Kandabas
     - Kosh-tamga
     - Kuan-duan
   - f) Tribe Cherik ('army') with the clans:
     - Ak-chubak
     - Bai-chubak (incomplete)
2) Horde: The Left Flank (Sol) (no tribal names known)
   Known clan names are:
     - Saru
     - Besh-beren
     - Mundus
     - Töngtörüp
     - Kuchu
     - Kükürön
     - Yetigün

Note: The Kirghiz who nomadize in Sinkiang belong mostly to the tribes Bugu and Soltu and Chong-bagysh.

The Uzbek Nation

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1) Tribe Kytai with the clans:
    - Sary Kytai (yellow Kytai)
    - Otartshy
    - Kanjygaly (with leather straps on the saddle)
    - Kosh-tamgaly (with double tamga)
    - Tarakly (with combs)
    - Balgaly (with hammers)
2) Tribe Kypchak with the clans:
    - Tort-tamgaly (with four tamgas)
    - Sary-Kypchak (the yellow Kypchak)
    - Togus Bai (the nine principalities)
3) Tribe Kyrkmün-Yüz with the clans:
    - Kara-koily (those with black sheep)
    - Karacha (blackish)
    - Kara-sirak
    - Chapanashly
4) Tribe Yüz (hundred) with the clans:
    - Karapcha
    - Tygyryk
    - Pürchüyüs
    - Koyan Kulakly (those with rabbit ears)
    - Ergünükli
    - Solakly
    - Khankhoja-kytaisy
    - Haji-kytaisy
    - Tuyakly (those with hoofs)
    - Sirgüli (those with ear rings)
5) Tribe Kangly
6) Tribe Naiman
7) Tribe Ming
8) Tribe Künügüs
9) Tribe Mangyt
10) Tribe Uch-ru consisting of the three groups:
    - a) Mesit
    - b) Yaby
    - c) Tama
11) Tribe Sarai
12) Tribe Burkut
13) Tribe Allat
14) Tribe Bükhrin
15) Tribe Batash

[167] Note: It is impossible to say to which tribes or clans the Uzbeks of Sinkiang belong since most of them came to Sinkiang as single individuals and not in the form of a tribal migration.

B. The Western (Oirat) Mongols (See also IMAR. Social Structure)

563 After the decline of the Mongolian Empire in the 14th century,
175 the Western Mongols (the tribes Choros, Khoit, Khoshut and
Torgut) of Dzungaria established the so-called Oirat Federation.
Its social structure is best summarized in the Oirat codex
[671] Chaghajachi yin bichik "Book of the Judges", based on the Jassa
of Chingis Khan.

563 Life within the extended family is absolutely patriarchal.
596 Although polygyny is not mentioned in the codex it is an accepted
[595] part of the society. The children of concubines are legitimate.
[671] The order of precedence among the children depends on the
[851] social status of their mothers.

After the father's death, the eldest son inherits everything,
563 including the father's wives and concubines with the exception of
428 his own mother. Inheritance as well as descent follows the male
line.

563 Among the Western Mongols clan exogamy is strictly observed,
614 especially among the Torguts and Khoshuts of Sinkiang. Marriage
583 entails the payment of a bride-price of at least two horses, two
cows and twelve sheep. The bride-price for an aristocratic girl
is considerably higher and consists of several dozen camels,
563 horses and sheep. If a wife is divorced she is not permitted to
586 take with her anything which has been given to her by her husband.

563 According to the Chaghajachi-yin bichik the Oirats were organ-
631 ized into ail, khoshun (banners) and aimak. In Sinkiang there are
two khoshun of Torguts, one khoshun of Khoshuts and seven khoshun
of Uriangkhai. The Khoshuts of the Alashan Area and the Torguts
of the Edsin Gol Area each constitute one khoshun. Each khoshun
lives on land and pastures with well-defined boundaries.

563 The same source details the various strata of Oirat society.
565 It subdivides the entire Oirat population into three groups. The
nobility (taiji) belong to the first group, the darkhans (soldiers,
warriors, flag-bearers who are tax-exempt people) belong to the
second group, and the kara kümüm (plebians) belong to the third
group. Cutting across these other divisions is the highly respec-
ted group of monks (Llama, Ho-brog or pandit) who are also tax-
exempt.

563 The Oirat princes are subdivided into six different ranks:
565 a) Ch'in-Wang b) Chün-Wang c) Beile c) Beise d) Chen-kuo-kung
554 and f) Hu-kuo-kung. The Oirat taijis have four ranks, e.g., the
rulingleader of a khoshun who is called khoshun-u jasak is a
taiji of the first rank. Besides these ranks honorary titles
exist such as: erdeni "jewel", darkhan "master", tüsiyetü "pil-
lar, support", daiching "hero", dalai "ocean" and batur "hero"
[651] etc. The Khoshun-u jasak is the ruler of his banner. Commoners
pay him tribute in the form of cattle or agricultural products.

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631 In administering the khoshun, the khoshun-u jasak appoints an aide who is called tusalakchi taiji. The administration of the military affairs of a khoshun rests in the hands of the jakirokchi and his aide who is called meiren-i janggin. After the death of the khoshun-u jasak his eldest son inherits the title and position. S [565] The aristocracy and the clergy are highly respected by the kara kümün. The members of the Oirat aristocracy belong to very old Mongolian clans "otoks" which repeatedly had intermarried with Manchu or Tibetan aristocratic clans.

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[177] The Communist Government in Peking has abolished the rights and titles of the Mongol aristocracy of Sinkiang, Chinghai and Kansu.

C. The Nomadic Tibetans

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184 In terms of race, religion, language and origin, the nomadic and the sedentary Tibetans are fundamentally one people. Yet the great difference in subsistance economy has produced too many distinctive cultural traits to permit discussion of the Chinghai Tibetans as a whole. In recognition of this cleavage, the sedentary Tibetans will be discussed separately as part of the general sedentary population.

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[592] The basic unit of social organization is the encampment or "tent-circle" comprising a group of households from five to eighty or more, who band together for cooperation and protection. Within the encampment the households may represent related families but this is not necessarily the case. Frequently the encampment's population will have been augmented by sedentary Tibetans who have chosen life in the steppes. Moreover, changes in affiliation do occur, so that one or more tents from one group may secede and join another encampment. N [622] According to Ekvall (1939) most frequently the actual authority rests in the hands of the rgan-po (elders), who are men of substance and influence. There also is an individual titular head, formally selected, who acts as spokesman for the group.

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592 Membership in the individual black tent consists of the man, his wife and their offspring. If the sons are married, they and their wives sometimes are included as members of the tent. Occasionally also the husband of a daughter will live with his wife's people. However, a statistical survey by Yü Hsiang-wen revealed that 38 per cent of the tents housed a nuclear family. In addition to those linked by birth and marriage, the tent's members may include one or several servants or hanger-on who help in the work in return for the protection and hospitality of the tent. N [562] [422] Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the tent's inhabitants consist of the woman and her husband because the wife is the master of the tent and of its contents, just as she is the master of the products of the herds, although the husband owns the tent and the herds. 000 In those cases where a man has more than one wife, each

/The Nomadic Tibetans/

In those cases where a man has more than one wife, each
*563 wife must have her own tent which will be within the area of the
595 encampment assigned to the husband. Within the tent the wife
593 frequently has full authority. It is she who welcomes and looks
574 after the guests and to whom farewells must be formally made.

As is the case with most of Tibet, the problem of polyandrous
*563 unions remains unclear. One authoritative source assigns such
595 unions to the nomads, and another will insist that it is a phenom-
114 enon of the sedentary Tibetans. Each produces logical explanations for its appearance in the one and not in the other. Moreover, the Tibetans themselves will state arbitrarily that it is commoner in one group or the other, but again there is no unanimity of opinion. Out of all the conflicting accounts, it can be deduced that polyandry exists, probably, in both nomadic and sedentary Tibetan populations and that peculiar local situations account for its prevalence in one or the other area. However, it is doubtful that it is uniformly practiced by any section of the population. Side by side with polyandrous families, moreover, polygynous unions are also found. Most common, is a more or less brittle monogamy.

*563 Since the people of the black tents practice transhumance,
233 their nomadic activities are measured in terms of elevation,
221 rather than actual distance covered. From late spring through fall the encampments as units climb to successively higher pastures and then descend again. Winter finds them at their lowest elevation and the group is no longer a tent-circle. Instead of the
[342] regular circular arrangement of the yak-hair tents, the winter
settlement may consist of sod-covered huts, which may be of
[361] wattle and daub construction, rammed earth, tent-roofed sod walls or similar materials. There is no regular arrangement of the huts, because the factors which led to the arrangement of the campsites are not operative.

The different activities around the year help dictate the limits of communal action. The short growing seasons of the successive pastures, necessitate frequent shifts. Thus eight or nine movements between winters are not uncommon. The tasks of striking camp, keeping the herds along the route and reestablishing the circles involve maximum cooperation from all involved. None can travel with impunity ahead or behind the others. The encampments represent military units because raids and stealing herds are recognized as rungs on the ladder to success.

*563 In winter, the activities are more diversified. Gone is the
constant vigilance against human and animal foes. Gone too, is
221 the necessity of frequent, simultaneous uprooting and reestablishment. Life is conducted at a more leisurely and individual
*563 pace. Many of the nomads form trading caravans, which will
221 journey beyond the settlements of the Tibetan farmers to trade
437 their wool, hides, and other products among the Chinese Moslems. These caravans may be composed of some of the men of a single

*563 encampment, or they may consist of a group of friends or relatives.
221 Some go only to the neighboring farmers, but more gain is to be
[437] found in the trade at the border. Winter also is the time for weaving the yak hair cloth, for preparing and repairing equipment, and
for visiting and gossip. The period of high festivity is approaching.
*563 The traders return from their travels and the nomads flow en
221 masse to the monastery centers for the observation of the mid-
796 winter festival. During the festivals religion is combined with both
792 pleasure and business. Almost every family has its representatives among the monks so that family reunions heighten the gaiety
[443] of the season. Trade is brisk for the monastery centers are also
[584] market towns. Maidens contract alliances with the swashbuckling
young nomads, and some of these affairs ripen into marriages.
Business of another nature may also be contracted at this time.
*563 Once the spring movements commence, the nomads find it advisable
221 to travel with a minimum of baggage both for actual convenience of
579 movement, and to lessen the loss incurred should a raid occur.
Thus advantage is taken of this opportunity to store one's valuables
[792] in the care of the monastery, and more particularly with a monk re-
[488] lated to the owner. From mid-winter until the horses are too jaded
in early spring, the major occupation can only be described as robbery
and attempted robbery. Large-scale caravans from other parts of
Tibet and from China make the most desirable prey.

Ekvall and Yu reported that the winter grazing grounds belonged
*563 to the encampment, and that the territories in which the pastures
423 were located, and assigned, were the property of the larger units
621 (or tribes, as they are sometimes called) consisting of a number of
619 encampments. The winter hay fields were individual's own property.
*563 These units might be under the jurisdiction of a chief or they might
423 form a rather loose confederation without marked central authority.
622 In some instances the actual "chief" might be one of the local
[792] monasteries, whose head will exercise civil authority over the
laity. Infrequently a chief might even control several larger units,
in which case he would be referred to as gyalpo or "king." But
*563 even the most nearly autocratic chief exercised caution in asserting
622 his position, lest a disgruntled encampment, or some tents, might
628 leave his jurisdiction for the welcoming embrace of some other
chief. The latter would then have complete information necessary
for conducting a successful foray against the first group. Thus,
just as within the encampment, the actual authority in these larger
units rested in the hands of a council of elders, representing each
of the component encampments.

*563 Although there are clans in Tibet which have played important
614 roles in the history of some of the ruling families, they perform
no major function among the Tibetan nomads. The encampment is
[621] not based on clan affiliation. Such affiliations even cross the lines
of the larger units. (Cf. Ekvall, 1939 and Yu, 1947). The clan

/The Nomadic Tibetans/

N The clan
*563 as such owns no property. It serves only as a geneological record
614 of importance in determining who are not legitimate marriage mates.
[421] The clans are patrilineal, but the clan affiliations of both parents
limit the choice of possible spouses.

N
*563 Beyond the larger unit, Ekvall states "...the Tibetans acknow-
648 ledge no law or control beyond that of the tribe. About seventy years
ago some of these tribes paid token-taxes to the Chinese government
[651] as a sort of yearly tribute, but even that has gone out of practice; and, though in a vague way the Tibetans acknowledge the 'emperor's household,' i.e., the Chinese government... to all practical purposes Chinese law is completely ineffective in the region. Not only are the tribes independent of the Chinese government but they are even more independent of each other...." (1939 p. 50-51.)

N
*563 Lhasa has almost as little influence as Peking. It has no poli-
792 tical control over the area, but it still remains the prime ecclesiastical authority and the goal of every prospective pilgrim-trader, i.e., every Tibetan.

N
*563 Despite the rigors, the feuds and the dangers of Tibetan nomadic
554 life, it presents a very strong attraction for both the nomadic and
556 the sedentary Tibetan. By attaching himself to a nomadic encampment a young and poor ex-farmer can become a social, as well as a literal, climber. Success and prestige are measured in terms of
N influence and wealth. The high road to these is the road of the
[579] nomad, with his herds and his golden opportunities to acquire wealth rapidly by removing it from its previous owner and by trading. With his wealth, regardless of how acquired, he can be lavish with
N gifts and donations to a monastery. This lavishness combined with
[574] the ability to entertain guests liberally, adds to the individual's influence and with influence he has prestige, therefore success. The sedentary man or woman who succeeds in making himself valuable to a nomadic tent is well on the way to becoming a self-made nomad.

II. The Sedentary Peoples

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A. The New Uighurs (Eastern Turks)

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175 Some socio-historical considerations are necessary for a better understanding of New Uighur social structure. No clear concepts about the transformation of the New Uighur to a sedentary population have been advanced to this time. However, the following hypotheses are presented. Until the eighth century the New Uighurs (or simply the Uighurs, as they were known at that time), were a predominantly nomadic people. After the collapse of the middle Turkic empire in 744 A.D. Chinese influences upon all the Turkic peoples in Sinkiang became increasingly stronger. This is brought

/The New Uighurs/

563 out clearly by the Orkhon inscriptions in which the Khaqan com-
121 plains bitterly of the Turkic susceptibility to Chinese culture,
175 and the rapid sinification of his people. In this sense, sinification
meant that the Turkic tribes gradually gave up their nomadic life
and settled in more permanent camp sites. These events had
strong repercussions on Turkic social structure, which moved
from kinship to function and territory. After the New Uighurs
had been expelled from their ancestral lands by the Kirghiz in
840 A.D. they settled around the Tarim Basin. They had to
[177] abandon their nomadic way of life and to learn Chinese irriga-
tion practices in order to survive and to maintain a certain level
of productivity.

563 Thus the New Uighurs established what may be called an
175 irrigation civilization. Class lines in New Uighur society became
565 more flexible. Whereas noble status was based on descent in
554 the nomadic era, high social prestige and, therefore, high
status was now attained by wealth gained through efficient
labor and irrigational practices. Nearly all the irrigation
canals were dug by collective effort. However, the actual
water right of each farmer was in proportion to the quantity of
labor he contributed to the digging. Irrigation regulation was
entirely a matter of self-government. The Mirab, or keeper
[624] of the registry and person in charge of water distribution, and
his assistant the Kokbeshi, were chosen by the village. This
meant considerable social mobility, though traces of a more
rigid class structure remain. For example, the Aqsaqal is
the successor to the former tribal chieftain, but unlike the
former he is chosen from among the villagers, and his office
[771] is not hereditary as was that of the tribal leader. Class lines
based on racial distinctions do not exist among the New Uighurs,
since the unifying factor in the society is not race but religion.
[582] Should a New Uighur marry a Chinese woman, she becomes a
member of the community by "baptism."

563 The following distinctions may be noted in the New Uighur
565 class system as a whole:

[423] 1. About two-thirds of the New Uighur population belongs to
the small peasantry, holding title to one to three acres of irri-
gated land. On rare occasions a small peasant may till up to
thirty acres. Politically, this social stratum has little or
no power, unless they participate as a group in a mass move-
ment.

[423] 2. About one-eighth of the New Uighur population belongs to
the "landed gentry" holding title to fifty or more acres. All
their land usually is rented to tenant farmers, who pay the
landlord up to eighty per cent of the land's produce. Politi-
cally, this segment of the New Uighur class structure is the
strongest, or at least it was, prior to 1949. Usually the com-
munal leaders are elected from this segment of the population.

/The New Uighurs/

563 A small percentage of these landlords have invested their
565 wealth exclusively in irrigation projects since water constitutes the most profitable commodity.

563 3. The rest of the New Uighur population is subdivided into
565 the following social groupings: a. The clergy (Muezzin,
793 Iman, Mullah, etc.) constitutes a very important segment
[871] of the social structure. In its hands the education of the
youth rested up to 1949, and it played an important role in shaping the character of the community. As the representatives of the mosque, they are not only the spiritual leaders of the community, but they are also the administrators of the land belonging to the mosque.

563 This land came into the possession of the mosque as be-
565 quests from pious Moslems. Thus, the mosque is not only a
795 spiritual, but also an economic, center. In addition, the
[423] mosque serves as a social welfare institution, in that it cares
for all those persons of the community who are unable to make a living.

563 b. The merchants constitute the last segment of the
565 New Uighur class structure. After the Arab conquest of Inner
441 Asia, the merchants enlarged and promoted existing trade
centers, thereby acquiring greater wealth and influence. It is noteworthy that most merchants in the Northwest are Moslems. In their hands rest not only most economic activities, but also the dissemination of Turkic and Arab culture. In the merchant ranks, the Chinese found willing and able officials who enjoyed the same privileges as did the Chinese administrators. However, in the Moslem uprisings, these officials aligned themselves with the Moslem population, and often assumed leadership in these movements of rebellion against the Chinese rulers. It may be presumed that to a large extent the Moslem uprisings in the Northwest were incited by the merchants.

563 Among the New Uighurs residence is bilocal. Dwellings
[591] are usually occupied by extended families who either form an
economic unit, or work as individuals or a family group on the
fields or irrigation projects of a wealthy landowner. Polygamy
[595] is practiced by the wealthier Moslems, especially the merchants
[556] of Sinkiang, who have wives at different trading centers and
therefore become the masters of several family units. The
[851] children resulting from these marriages are all treated as
[428] equals. Inheritance follows the rules of primogeniture. In
[562] contrast to the nomadic peoples of Sinkiang, whose women oc-
cupy a relatively high and valuable position, the women of the
sedentary peoples of the same area, the Turkic women, are
held in low esteem. The Sinkiang nomad must buy his bride

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/The New Uighurs/

563 **The Sinkiang nomad must buy his bride**
[184] with a bride-price, but the sedentary Sinkiang bride is given
away by her father. In addition he even pays all wedding expenses.
[583] Marriages are arranged by a "go-between", who usually
[584] occupies a higher social position than either the bride or
groom's families. As in all Moslem communities, divorce is
[586] a relative simple matter for the male. Therefore, a considerable
[589] number of women without family attachments are present
in all Uighur communities. These unattached women are usually
engaged in employment as tailors, cooks, or weavers, and
thereby form a distinct social unit. As a rule they are identified
with the household of their employer.

In general, all Uighurs are individualistic in character.
563 However, the structure of the community with its irrigational
621 problems gives them a collectivist outlook on life in parts.
182 The families that form such an Uighur community are by no
[181] means bound together by kinship obligations. Their communal
cooperation rests exclusively on the fact that without collective
effort and labor the community would perish.

Prior to 1949, no organized youth groups existed in Uighur
563 communities, since in any Islamic community the male child
[561] begins to participate in the activities centered around the
mosque at a very early age. All other youth groups were discouraged.
The young Uighur man becomes a full member of
[585] the community at the time of his marriage. He will receive
[885] title to any land or water rights only upon the decease of the
eldest male member of his family. Until then both he and his
wife work as members of the extended family group. A young
merchant usually will act as his father's representative until
the father's retirement from business affairs or his death.

563 Merchants are bound together in "guilds". However, these
441 associations are not official institutions but were natural outgrowths
of the merchants' self-protecting interests. Should
any member of the community be guilty of not paying his debts,
he will be prosecuted by the members of such a "guild", even
though he may have moved to another community. In each
locality or city, the merchant's "guild" is organized under the
leadership of an aqsaqal, who functions as a public official.

Individuals of the Uighur community who do not inherit any
563 land, move to non-irrigated areas which nevertheless show
166 possibilities of being irrigable. These new irrigation projects
241 are usually undertaken as the collective effort of several
425 families who move as a group to such a new area. This practice
may explain population increases in Uighur occupied
areas.

563 New industries and the further development of natural
resources may have some influence upon Uighur social structure,
178 since these factors increase the wealth of both the

/The New Uighurs/

S
563 individual and the community. Natural resources to not seem
178 to be of prime importance in Sinkiang. However, their exploita-
[31] tion through free or forced labor will further break down Uighur
S kinship ties and thereby alter the social structure. In recent
[464] times large numbers of non-Uighur laborers have been intro-
duced into the area, further augmenting alien cultural elements.

S
563 Uighurs participating in small-scale home industries and
438 handicrafts are organized under the leadership of a Chong-usta.
622 Unlike the merchant's "guild" aqsaqal, he is not a public official.

S Under the Manchu system the Bäks (communal leaders) were
563 classed in five degrees of rank, ranging from the third to the
554 seventh degree of the Chinese official scale. 1. Ak'im Bäk-
[631] local governor; 2. Ishkhan Bäk - Assistant Governor; 3. Shang
[647] Bäk - Collector of Revenue; 4. Katsanatch'i Bäk - same as
[692] above; 5. 'Hatze Bäk - Judge; 6. Mirabu Bäk - Superintendent
of Agriculture.

S As discussed previously, the Mirabu Bäk was also the offi-
[312] cial having authority over water rights and water distribution.
In practice the Manchu Amban, highest Manchu official in a given
area, chose the Ak'im Bäk who, in turn, chose his own subordi-
nates.

S
563 Farm units were organized as follows: Ten such units were
241 lead by an On-bashi, fifty by an Illik-bashi, one hundred by an
Yüz-bashi. The duties of the Bäks and Yüz-bashis mainly con-
554 sisted of keeping and collecting registers and taxes. This gov-
ernmental organization was abolished officially by the Chinese
Revolution in 1911. However, traces of this structure are
still found today.

S
563 The whole Uighur social structure certainly will undergo
far-reaching changes under the Communist government. How-
668 ever, at this time only hypotheses about these changes can be
177 advanced. As new cultural and political structures are imposed
on the society, kinship ties will be further loosened. The Uighur
communisty and its structure will take on new characteristics,
as old institutions disappear and new ones are introduced.
Except, perhaps, for the nuclear family, social groupings
will be brought more and more into accordance with the new
ideals of the society.

N B. The Sedentary Tibetans

*563 Much that has been said about the nomadic Tibetans holds
equally true for their sedentary counterparts. Again the basic
[592] unit is the group of families living together. In the sedentary
[361] community, the village may be composed of from a dozen to
seventy, eighty or even more houses arranged adjacent to
N each other. The roofs of the normally two-storied buildings
[342] are close enough to form a pathway, and are used as such.

/The Sedentary Tibetans/

*563 There is more rigidity about the village organization. The
621 sedentary Tibetans generally have a formally selected village
[622] headman. But again the council of elders has considerable
[623] authority. Groups of villages are organized into a larger unit,
[632] nor is it uncommon for villages and encampments to be joined
together in such a larger unit. A monastery is more apt to
[792] have authority over a group of villages than over the strictly
nomadic people. However, like the nomads, the sedentary
[622] Tibetans give very little recognition to any authority beyond
that of the ecclesiastical or lay chief of the "tribe". Ma Ho-t'ien,
in his Diary of Travels in the Border Region of Kansu,
Chinghai and Tibet makes frequent reference to the inability
of the Chinese officials to exert any sort of authority over the
border-Tibetans and other sources also record the absence of
any effective government beyond the local level.

The village itself represents a very tightly-knit organization,
economically and politically, as well as physically.
[423] Houses, housesites and the fields belong to the individual
families, but the grazing lands and forests are community
property. Use of the pastureland is available to all, but the
village may place certain restrictions on the quantities of
timber that may be taken for specific purposes.

*563 Just as the nomads act simultaneously in moving their
621 encampments from one site to another, so the sedentary
241 Tibetans also insist on simultaneous group action within the
village. The first day of spring planting, determined by horoscope,
[787] sees all the villagers proceeding to their individual
[292] fields in their best clothing. The fields are ploughed simultaneously.
The seeds are sown at the same time in each field.
And, when harvest time comes, all the fields must be completely
harvested in the time that it takes the smallest field
to be harvested with a small hand sickle. If one's fields are
too large one hires extra help. During the course of the
growing season all the villagers periodically parade through
the fields carrying the holy books on their heads. These communal
activities have both religious and economic bases.
From the viewpoint of the religion, if the days have been
[787] selected as auspicious, they are auspicious for the community's
members as a whole. It is when the spirits of the ground,
[776] the demons of hail and misfortune can be allayed or propitiated
[782] that determines the best days for performing the needed tasks.
From the viewpoint of economics, when the ground has been
plowed and the seeds planted, the fields are encircled by a
community fence to prevent onslaughts by roaming animals.
[625] A community watchman also stands guard. It also means that
[486] the villagers can collect a tax from caravans that pass through
[651] their lands. Once the fields have been harvested, the community

N

*563 fences and the watchmen no longer function and it would be fool-
621 hardy to leave crops standing.
241 Within the household, the composition is similar to that of
N the nomadic tent, although there may be less non-kin hangers-on
*563 and a higher frequency of joint-family occupancy. Should the
592 family be a polygynous one, the wives will live in the one house,
(595) instead of each having her own. In some cases, the actual
family may be divided into nomads and farmers with full occu-
pancy of the house occurring only during the winter season.
When this happens, usually the father and one son care for the
N herds while the other sons remain on the farm. Upon the death
[768] of the father, the properties (i.e., the herds and the fields) are
no longer kept together and the fission of the family occurs.

N C. The Mongours
*563 At least until 1949 Mongour social organization retained a
M reflection of the land allocated by Chingis Khan to his sons,
173 brothers and leading generals. As may be seen clearly in
565 Monguor social structure, the definite differentiation between
nobility and subject population resulted from these allocations.
The nobles are very much concerned with their claims of des-
cent either from the imperial family or from other noble
"founding ancestors" whereas the commoner population shows
little concern with its genealogical pattern. However, the sub-
ject population is closely related to the noble rulers, in a way
that was partly tribal but later became feudal.
N Each noble was obliged to furnish a definite number of troops
*563 depending on the size of the territory and the population of which
M he was the nominal head. It appears likely that the Monguor
565 social groupings began to form as early as Yüan and Mongol
[701] rule. Generally speaking, the Monguor commoners are des-
cendants of families that were already subject commoners in
the Mongol period, with later additions of families of Chinese
M and Tibetan origin. There are 17 Monguor clans and four
[614] general types of clan leaders. Some of these clans were orig-
inally formed by descendants of the Yüan dynasty (Ch'i and
Lu clans), and others by military commanders, who though
commoners by birth, were given subject families to rule over,
as a reward for their services.
N Each genealogical register of the clans starts with the
*563 appointment of a T'u-ssu, (the office of the T'u-ssu, clan
M chief, being elective or hereditary). The present rank of
614 T'u-ssu was first created by appointment in the Ming dynasty.
554 Each T'u-ssu, with his offspring, forms a unit known as his
M "bone." Since primogeniture prevails in Monguor social
[428] organization, the oldest son of the T'u-ssu inherits the clan
leadership after his father's death.

/The Monguors/

N
*563 leadership after his father's death. It is noteworthy that by
M the beginning of the present century, the T'u-ssu was no longer
614 living with his noble kinsmen, but was living in a separate and
554 distinct family, each of which formed an independent economic
565 unit. Therefore, some T'u-ssu were rich, others poor, and the status differentiation, that previously had been determined by wealth disappeared. Thereafter, noble families functioned economically in the same manner as their subject families. In each clan the nobles were subdivided into small units called "houses." Some clans have three houses, some four or five, some as many as thirteen. Each noble family recognizes the house to which it belongs. In each clan the first branch is called the Great House, the second is called the Second House, and so on.

The number of houses that had been established according to the number of sons of the "founding" ancestor has been retained as a genealogical principle. Nobles identify themselves, for example, by referring to what "house" they belong. Since Ming times, the T'u-ssu personally came to be regarded as the ruler and "possessor" of subject commoners. In former times each group of nobles collectively was the "possessor" of the subjects. Subjects and territory were assumed to have been assigned by the emperor to the clan as a whole. If a noble was at odds with his clan, he could either leave the clan, taking with him a proportionate number of the clan's subjects, and join another clan, or he could found a new clan.

Collective ownership of subject commoners by consanguinial noble families is logically stronger in a nomadic economic structure than in an agricultural one. Memories of this concept, however, persist among nomads who have become farmers.

M The rules of succession to the office of clan chief did not
[428] allow for competition. However, there are, in fact, elements of inheritance, of choice or selection, of the consent of the governed, and of appointment by the overlord. Any chief succeeds to office according to definite clan rules, namely, he must belong genealogically to the nobles who are descendants of the "founding ancestors." When a T'u-ssu dies, all heads of the clan's noble families together with the heads of prominent commoner families convene to choose a successor. There is a social inequality between commoners and nobles, that should prove difficult to eliminate completely.

N When the Ming dynasty invested them with the title of T'u-ssu,
*563 the headmen ceased to be simple chiefs of clans and became instead
M Chinese officials whose rights over their hereditary subjects were
614 modified by their duty to the Chinese rulers. The institution of
554 T'u-ssu or "local chief" was really one that had been developed
648 for the special purpose of administering non-Chinese tribal
175

N
*563 groups on the frontier of the Empire. The T'u-ssu thus had a
M double role, he functioned as a "native chief" and as a Chinese
614 official.
554
648 The most important clan chiefs who were granted the title
175 of T'u-ssu in Ming times were those of the Ch'i and Lu clans,
who were descendants of the Imperial House of the Mongol dynasty,
and the Li clan of the Shato Turks. From this time on the Monguours
remained faithful defenders of the frontiers, first under the Ming
dynasty and later under the Manchu dynasty. The Shato origin of
the Li clan is corroborated by the Chinese Annals. Shato tribes
are noted to have lived between Hsi-ning and Kan-chou as early as
939. The supposition that tribes of Turkish origin, bearing Turkish
names, still live in the country is therefore not unreasonable.

N During the centuries in which the Monguors lived on the Kansu-
*563 Tibetan frontier, Chinese and Tibetan families enrolled in the
M seventeen Monguor and Shato clans, in addition to the original
614 Mongol stock, and in addition to the Turkish people mentioned.
175 It is very likely that especially in the period from 1368 to 1723,
648 only stray Chinese families enrolled in Monguor clans. Later
177 in times of peace and wealth, there were probably not many Chinese who joined Monguor clans. It must be said, however, that
while the Monguors have absorbed or at least partly absorbed Chinese individuals and families, the Chinese culture is absorbing
the Monguor society as a whole. The Monguors feel their culture
is lower than that of the Chinese.

In addition to the Chinese, large numbers of Tibetans enrolled
in Monguor clans. However, they have probably joined the Monguors
in a way differing from the enrollment of the Chinese. When Chinese
M or Tibetans enrolled in the Monguor clans, they became plain clans-
[565] men and commoners like ordinary Monguors.

N The T'u-ssu received the "ownership" of the territory of his
*563 clan from the emperor. These territories were usually assigned,
M according to a military plan, as a buffer zone, at a time when
614 the Monguors were still exclusively nomads. It may be supposed
554 that the T'u-ssu were bound to live in their territories.

423 The distinctive mark of the commoner is bondage to his
N respective T'u-ssu. Commoners were subjects "granted" to a
*563 chief, to serve him in time of peace and to fight under his com-
M mand in time of war. The military importance of a T'u-ssu was
614 therefore dependent on the number of his families of commoners.
565 Although the social condition of the commoners was not that of
554 slaves, as pointed out previously, the basic distinction between
nobles and commoners still existed in recent times. The first
duty of a subject was to never abandon his overlord. Ideally speaking, the T'u-ssu and their subjects were bound together for all
time. The subjects could not leave their lord in order to pass

/The Monguors/

N
*563 into another lord's service. If they attempted to do so, the punishment
M was death. After the great rebellion of the Moslems (1862-
614 1878), however, the military power of the Monguor gradually declined.
565 No T'u-ssu after that time really wielded any true power.

554 The principle of corvee, to which the Monguor were still liable,
[466] is founded on the vassalage which previously bound the nomads to
the "service" of the chief. Although they neither tilled the soil nor
paid taxes, nonetheless they were real vassals.

N The register of all noble families is kept at the seat of the
*563 T'u-ssu. Even the daughters, and the families into which they
M marry, are noted. A noble is also entered in the book of genealogies.
614 However, the names of unmarried sons are not inscribed,
217 because they presumably have not produced sons for the clan.
565

When the Monguor first settled in their frontier territory and
N began the transition from nomadism to agriculture, there was
*563 probably considerable social distance between the commoners and
M the nobles. With settled life and the increasing dominance of agri-
174 culture, noble families, like commoner families, became increasingly
565 dependent on their ability to manage their own farms. Local
M prestige was determined more and more by wealth and ability, and
[554] class became secondary.

N The Monguor village consists of a group of families living in a
*563 well-defined territory and subject to the immediate authority of the
M village chief. All villagers till the soil, and the population is large
621 or small according to the fertility of the soil and the extent of the
622 pastures. Nobles and commoners live in the same kind of house,
565 and they gain their livelihood in the same manner. Therefore, their
substance and wealth are not sharply differentiated.

N Until 1922 the extended Monguor family was a patrilineal, patri-
*563 local family under the authority of the grandfather, or the great-
M grandfather if he survived. No family usually exceeded four generation.
596 Property and wealth were owned collectively, but authority
[421] over the property was unequally concentrated in the senior generation.
[561] Polygamy in Monguor society is decidedly an economic question,
[595] since polygamy does not go well with residence in a common courtyard.
The breakup of an extended family is visibly symbolized when
one of the nuclear families sets up its own kitchen. The position of
M chief or head of the family normally passes by primogeniture to the
[428] eldest son of the first wife of the previous head. In every family,
rich or poor, noble or commoner, the head of the family is also
the religious chief, the family administrator, and the family representative
in dealing with higher authorities outside the family. In
his administration of the family, he has authority over all the community
M property. The breakdown of the extended family usually
[182] takes place when the grandfather dies. It is very seldom that his
[768] surviving sons remain united under the authority of the eldest son.
[428] More commonly, the sons divide the property and "build their own
kitchens.

000 kitchens."

N . For all members of the same generation, the Monguors use the
*563 same term differentiating according to sex. The extended family
M provides a framework of social support for the nuclear family, the
601 latter consisting of a father, mother and their children. Adoption
59 of sons by childless couples is practiced.

N Exogamy is the first rule of marriage and is strictly observed
*563 among the nobles. There are no marriages between nobles and
M commoners in the clan, since all individuals bear the same clan
565 name. However, there are exceptions to this rule, especially whe
582 the clan structure breaks down. The status of the wife is inferior
614 to that of the husband. Relationship between two families connected by marriage is clearly seen in the special role of the maternal uncle, who has a powerful influence over his sister's child and ove the family into which his sister's child is born.

N The basis on which Monguor property is divided is that fact tha
*563 under the patrilineal system, the entire extended family is the own
M of fields, cattle, houses, agricultural implements and money. Ind
421 idual property is restricted to a few personal possession. The son of a man who has died, are entitled to receive and divide their fath share.

N
*563 III. Relationships between the Chinese, the Chinese-speaking
361 Moslems, and the Sedentary Tibetans

Agricultural Chinese, Chinese Moslems and sedentary Tibetan
all live in villages for the sake of protection and in accordance wit
a tradition of settlement that is continent-wide and probably older
N [171] than history. The area is typical of the farming economy that is
found all the way across the northern half of China. The crops ar
[241] the same and the manner of life is similar. The villages, whethe
N Chinese, Moslem or Tibetan, are alike not only as to spatial char
*563 teristics but as to their function in the social organization. The
621 counties may be administratively divided into districts, "roads",
[631] "directions", but the basic unit of control is the village, with a
village head-man who is largely responsible for the maintenance
[622] of law and order and for the observance of government regulations
N The larger villages have their own "family protective associations
[701] and organized units of the militia. The smaller ones have no such
organization, but are recognized by the county administration as
self-administering units.

N It is not clear whether there are such intermediate divisions
*563 as hsiang, chen and chü between the villages and the county organ
621 izations. It seems probable, however, since the National Govern
631 ment has put the Northwest provinces under an administration sys
tem similar to that of other provinces. In practice, such division

*563 must have had few, if any, effects upon everyday life, or the village
621 units would not have been so important in the local administrative
631 system. The very common pattern of market-town surrounded by
farm villages exists in the Northwest. Like those in China Proper,
*563 the Northwest market towns are the outgrowth of those villages which
361 are situated on main roads or at strategic points. The market
632 towns fill the same kind of social, economic and cultural roles here
443 as they do in other parts of the country.

*563 In areas where both Chinese and Chinese-speaking Moslem
farmers live, there are three types of rural communities. The
621 first includes the all-Chinese villages which greatly resemble
the villages in North China. From twenty to thirty families constitute the average population in these villages. When some pecu-
[443] liar quality, such as its location on a well-travelled road, makes a
[632] village acceptable to an entire district, it becomes a market town.
Eventually it may grow to the proportions of a city. Whenever the village grows so large that those whose fields lie on the periphery can no longer go back and forth each day, it begins to break up. The families with the very distant fields become the nucleus of a new settlement.

*563 In a Chinese village communal life is exhibited in several ways.
621 One is by religious observance, particularly the conduct of the
771 ritual connected with ancestor-worship and veneration of the past.
At stated times throughout the year - especially at the New Year, and during the second, fifth, and eighth moons - festivals honoring certain deities or commemorating religious events are held. Such a festival is always a communal matter. All contribute money for
[794] the furnishing of trappings proper to the affair, some are concerned
with organizing the celebration, others carry images in the procession, and still others collaborate with the priests, - Buddhist or Taoist, - in the performance of the various ceremonies. Such religious festivals are not altogether a matter of the calendar, for additional services are often held in times of drought or other community disasters.

*563 The village or community theatrical is another communal activity.
545 Generally the plays are given for the enjoyment of the people. The
621 entire community shares the responsibilities and enjoys the fun.
In small Chinese hamlets in the Northwest even a funeral is very
*563 much a community affairs. Virtually everyone has a part in the
621 mourning, feasting, burying, and attendant religious activities.
769 Also annually in early spring during the feast of Ch'ing-ming, the
[764] Chinese in the Northwest, as in other parts of China, decorate the
graves, make various offerings of food and drink, burn paper money and incense, and bewail the dead. The graveyards are not necessarily communal, but Ch'ing-ming is observed universally and no one can abstain from participation without arousing comment

*563 and a certain degree of reproach. On the other hand, prompt ob-
621 servance of the rites at least creates a feeling of fellowship. It
769 is primarily a personal matter, but nevertheless, the entire
community responds, just as in the case of the spring planting,
and for the same reason. Each finds comradeship in working
with the others in whatever concerns the welfare of the community.

*563 There are farm villages in which live only Chinese Moslems.
621 Physically, the community structure is similar to a Chinese vil-
184 lage. These Moslem villagers live in the same kind of houses and
do the same kind of farming. The streets of the villages also have
795 a similar arrangement. But the Moslem people's religious-com-
munal life is distinctively different from that of a Chinese village.
[346] In every Moslem village there is a small public building that is
used as a mosque. In this building the children of the village gather
[871] at regular periods to receive religious instruction. They learn
the Arabic alphabet and phonetics so that they are able to read
the sounds of necessary prayers and religious formulas, even if
[785] they cannot understand them. The Moslems are very faithful in
their observance of the fast of Ramadan. During the fast, they
[796] eat nothing between sunrise and sunset. At night they eat a com-
munal feast. The community fires blaze all night and people call
and shout to each other. Before darkness falls, pious bearded
men say their prayers in public places. One or two of the elders
may preach the points of theology, quoting the Koran in oddly
mutilated Arabic. On such an occasion the Moslems refer to them-
selves as "we" and to the Chinese in the nearby villages as "they"
[794] As in the case of the Chinese temple, the building and upkeep of
the mosque is a communal matter. Assessments are made and
cooperative effort is initiated; and, of course, as a project, it
rivals and competes with the Chinese temple.

The Moslem villages are comparatively more-organized, or show
more community spirit, than the Chinese villages. Like their
Chinese counterparts, the Moslem villages are administered by
their village elders who always intervene in the meager relations
between the villagers and the local or county government. The
county government makes no distinction between Chinese and Chi-
nese Moslem villages. The two types of villages have almost no
[578] relations with each other. There is always antagonism between
Chinese and Moslem villages. The two peoples have been and
[798] still are mutually practicing segregation. Factors which are re-
sponsible for the antagonism or segregation are mostly religious
habits and ideals. In addition, while the Chinese have a higher
population gain, the Moslems are economically more successful.
Both of these facts may be sources of jealousy.

*563 However, in numerous economic activities, there is non-
184 admitted cooperation or division of labor between the Chinese
628 and the Chinese Moslems. This has held true especially for
Moslem enterprise and Chinese skill.

*563 Moslem enterprise and Chinese skill. For example, not many
184 years ago in Tao-chou Old City, Kansu, there was an extensive
628 industry of casting brazen pots and kettles for the Tibetan trade.
325 The metal used was from old Chinese square-holed coin that is
439 no longer used. This coinage was bought up and transported by
476 small Moslem trader-muleteers and then sold to the Chinese artisans, who did the casting. The finished product was sold again to the Moslems, who took it into the Tibetan country as an article of trade. Thus, by Moslem enterprise a market was found for the product of Chinese skill, which kept the foundry fires going a good part of the year. However, this coöperative effort would be interrupted by the frequent disputes between the Moslems and the Chinese authorities. In the rural towns and urban cities the
*563 general pattern of division of occupations and vocations is that the
184 Moslems follow the more adventurous subsidiary callings, which
628 require more hardship and daring. Such occupations as innkeeper,
369 trader, muleteer, carter, soldier, and the like attract proportion-
463 ately more Moslems than Chinese. The Chinese, on the other hand, tend to monopolize the handicraft occupations. They make the best carpenters, silversmiths, blacksmiths, masons, and tailors. There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, Moslems prepare and make up furs, probably because the handling of sheep and lambskins was closely associated with the butchering trade which, except for pork, is Moslem. Second, the Turks in Sinkiang are good carpet weavers. "The Turkestan carpet-weavers practice a family trade, using cow or camel hair in natural and in dyed shades. The boys sit before the handloom and weave very rapidly, with no apparent pattern to follow. They are working out the conventional design which has been done by their own family for many generations, for the patterns are traditional and no one would think of varying them." The Chinese show greater aptitude, at least greater preference, for the scholarly callings; they are school teachers, accountants (even in Moslem firms) doctors, engineers, and administrative officials in the civil service.

The cooperation or division of labor is limited exclusively to
*563 the towns and cities. In the rural communities, the Moslems and
184 Chinese have not chosen the way of tolerant cooperation. There
621 is practically no strictly farming village which has an equal mix-
162 ture of the two groups; in every case the village is predominantly one or the other. Generally, the population is composed almost entirely of one group with only a few hangers-on of the other. In the basic occupation of the village - farming - cooperation is found
[578] only among people of the same racial group. Between the Chinese and the Moslems the rivalry is of sufficient intensity to eliminate or segregate one of the parties. There are villages in which live both Chinese and Chinese Moslems although in very small number. In every case, however, the representation of the two groups is not numerically equal, but is predominantly one or the other.

*563 Unless the occupations of the minority are specialized and not coveted
463 by members of the dominant group, there is always the phenomenon
621 of the majority group attempting to usurp the callings or occupational
578 opportunities of the minority group and hoping that the minority
group eventually will leave the community. Under such conditions,
antagonisms always exist between the two groups in the same farm
community.

The Chinese in the predominantly Tibetan districts are organized
*563 in exactly the same way as the Chinese in the predominantly Chi-
621 nese Moslem areas. Again the village is the important unit of
184 organization, the village organization is integrated in the county,
and the village authorities are answerable to the county magistrate.
[651] These Chinese villages are taxed far more heavily than the Tibetan
villages. The Tibetan villages, in many aspects are similar to the
[361] Chinese villages. Generally, the Chinese villages are in predom-
inantly Chinese sections while the Tibetan villages are in predom-
inantly Tibetan country. But some of the Chinese villages are
quite far up in Tibetan country. In their culture these conform
more to the Tibetan pattern than to the Chinese. In both groups
the village is of supreme importance as a social and political unit
[162] of organization. The villages are much alike in size, the average
village having a population of between twenty and thirty families.

In organization and function the Chinese and Tibetan villages show differences. Within the organization of the Chinese village there is not only a compact family unit but a clan system as well. The sedentary Tibetans, on the other hand, have no clearly defined clan organization, and their family is much looser than among the Chinese. Nevertheless, the Chinese village organization permits a considerable degree of individualism, whereas the Tibetan village communal activity completely overshadows individual activity. This is probably because the Chinese family and clan compete with the village organization, thereby acting as a check on the exercise of village authority. It may be that Chinese frontier life necessarily entails greater liberty of action and individual initiative. In everything related to communal properties and communal activities, as well as in all matters regulating the time of planting, harvesting, etc., the Tibetan village acts with a solidarity and unanimity that is comparatively lacking in a Chinese village community in the same area. In spite of these differences, the subsistence routine is substantially the same for the Chinese farmer and the Tibetan farmers, and the village of the one has a close resemblanc to that of the other.

*563 Although there is a great deal of culture contact between the
628 Chinese and Tibetans in the same areas, an interesting feature is
that contact is quite one-sided. The agents, almost without excep-
177 tion, are Chinese. The contact can be called reciprocal only to the

177
*563 degree that the Tibetan community as a whole exerts an influence
628 on the Chinese migrants within it. The movement of migrants is
unilaterally from the Chinese communities into the Tibetan country.
*563 The Tibetans go into Chinese sections to visit, but they do not attempt
628 to settle down and make their way among the people. Most of the
167 Chinese who go to the Tibetan sections intend to stay. This one-
177 sided movement of migrants is attributable chiefly to two causes.
Population pressure makes the fallow fields of the Tibetan villages
very tempting to the land-hungry Chinese. Moreover, for a number
of reasons, the Tibetan country is the traditional refuge for the Chi-
nese of nearby communities whenever rebellion or banditry is rife.
The Chinese, with their large families, constitute a population
reservoir from which the overflow passes into any group which
lacks a similarly strong population pressure. The Tibetans, and
especially the village people of the Choni district in the Northwest,
offer no such resistance, for unquestionably their population is
*563 decreasing. Then, the Tibetan country repeatedly has been a most
628 effective shelter for refugees from the Moslem rebellions and from
the disturbances caused by bandits and contending armies. In such
167 circumstances the closely-integrated Tibetan community acts more
727 promptly and efficiently to defend itself than does the Chinese com-
177 munity. By habit, the Tibetans are armed to an extent unknown among
the Chinese. The Tibetans are rather soft-hearted toward refugees,
[181] especially if they are destitute. By Tibetan custom the right of
refuge has been a basic one, and when it is reinforced by the claims
of acquaintance and the functioning of the "guest-host system" this
right of refuge can open a path into the most exclusive Tibetan
communities.

The process of contact between the Chinese and the Tibetans is
*563 also contained within the mechanics of intermarriage, which is of
582 two kinds: the matrilocal, in which the Chinese man takes his place
177 as son-in-law in the Tibetan home, and the patrilocal, in which
[591] through his wife's connections he is able to set up his own home in
the Tibetan community. When a young Chinese is taken into a
*563 Tibetan home as a son-in-law, he naturally becomes as much like
177 a Tibetan as he can. If other factors do not bring him into further
contact with Chinese culture, he may become very much of a
Tibetan. His children will be brought up as Tibetans. After a
generation of two only a Tibetan nickname may remain to indicate
the Chinese ancestry in the family. However, when a Chinese man
marries a Tibetan wife and establishes his own home, he generally
attempts to set up a Chinese home and to maintain the Chinese mode
of living and outlook. This is true especially if any Chinese members
of his family - mother, brothers, or other relatives live with him.
Thus, the family serves to push the Chinese frontier into the Tibetan
country. A single Chinese living in a Tibetan community sooner

*563 or later is assimilated. But if a Chinese family goes there to live
177 it will remain Chinese and will attract other Chinese families. After
[167] [621] a few decades the whole community becomes Chinese.

In addition to familial cross-contacts, there are others of a
*563 strictly economic character. Certain craftsmen, such as carpenters,
463 blacksmiths, and millers, very easily obtain a foothold in a Tibetan
177 community. They find very poor competition from most of the
621 Tibetan artisans, although once in a while there is a Tibetan workman of outstanding skill and reputation. Much of the village trade also will gradually pass into the hands of the Chinese traders. Also, poor Chinese come to the Tibetan villages as laborers, lumbermen and charcoal burners.

*563 An isolated Chinese migrant in the midst of Tibetan influence
167 and environment undoubtedly would become Tibetan. But actually
621 this situation does not exist. Behind the individual Chinese and reinforcing him in successive stages is sustained population pressure
177 from the Chinese country. One by one, others follow his lead and press into the Tibetan community through the opening he has made. Once a number of Chinese families are established in a village, they are sure to become dominant simply as a result of the differential birth rates. Slowly the community becomes increasingly like a Chinese village. Finally, Chinese influence is paramount because the agents who exert that influence and spread that culture have a definite advantage over the Tibetans. They can talk the language of Government officials and wealthy merchants and traders, and they have superior business acumen and industry. The village oil-press or grist-mill eventually passes into the hands of a Chinese if, as is more usual, he has not started it himself. So the Chinese members of the village community forge to the front. After a certain length of time, a once-Tibetan village will become very much like a Chinese community. Even when the village has become all "Chinese", however, the quiver shrines of the mountain gods at the highest mountain peaks still are tended and replenished annually. Thus certain aspects of Tibetan culture and religious observance persist despite the otherwise complete transformation of the Tibetan village into a Chinese one.

There is little information about social classes and land tenure
*563 in the far Northwest. However, the general impression is that in
565 the central and eastern parts of Shensi and in the important cities
423 of Kansu, where the population is mainly Chinese, the patterns of social distinction and land distribution are similar to those of China Proper. The Chinese in these areas and in all the other provinces
[184] have fundamentally the same culture, with only some minor local variations. For this reason, the reader is referred to the section on Social Structure in the General Handbook.

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THE FAMILY

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Additional Readings

THE FAMILY

S
N **I. Introduction**
.121 Northwest China is heavily populated by national minorities.
59 In the province of Sinkiang, the Chinese even form a minority group
563 and the Turkic Moslems constitute the majority. Therefore, in a
discussion of the family in this area, general statements applying
to the population as a whole would not apply, but a distinction has
to be made between several different ethnic elements.

For the purposes of the present section, the following rough
division suggests itself: (a) Turkic sedentary Moslems; (b) Turkic
nomadic Moslems; (c) the Dungans or Chinese Moslems; (d) the
Tibetans; (e) the Mongours; (f) the Mongols, and (g) the Chinese.
The last two groups are discussed in detail in their respective
handbooks, the IMAR Handbook and the General Handbook of China.

S Among all Moslems Islam forms the ideal concept of the family.
N In Islamic society the institution of the family has always been one
779 of primary importance. The family is considered the basic essen-
59 tial of human civilization. Having a family, and being a dutiful
183 member of one, is not only regarded as necessary, but is expressly
581 a religious obligation. Marriage, the step leading to the establish-
S ment of a family, is a sacred contract into which each Moslem must
N enter. A Moslem who, without just reason, does not marry and does
[589] not establish a family, is considered almost as a heretic.

S The family's function is primarily for reproduction of the group
N and the continuation of the family. The institution of the family,
59 furthermore, provides security and peace of mind for its members.
182 The family man is respected and esteemed in Moslem society; he
[554] is considered honorable and trustworthy. An unmarried man is
[589] likely to be looked upon with some suspicion and distrust.

S Since the family plays such a significant role in Moslem society,
N there is great emphasis on its unity and closeness. This is probably
59 best expressed in the following quotation from the Koran, "...and
779 Allah has made wives for you from yourselves and has given you
183 sons and daughters from your wives." This closeness resulting
from the blood relationship is extended to all other phases of
family life.

S Love and compassion should underlie all the relationships
N within the family. In relations between a man and his wife, or
593 wives, between one kin to another, love is stressed as the basis.
S A man's behavior within his family reflects his attitude toward
N society as a whole. If there is love in his heart for his family,
[829] he will also have compassion for others and be of service to society.

S In the family, the man's position is always superior to that of
N the woman, regardless of his age. The wife is, accordingly, put
592 in an inferior position to that of her husband, being under his con-
593 trol completely. The head of the house holds unquestioned authority

S N 592 593 over the members of the household. Full obedience and respect is expected from the children, who are obliged to take care of their parents when the latter reach old age.

S N 595 779 Islam allows a man to have more than one wife. The truly religious person will not exceed four wives.

S N 779 829 Islam grew in a tribal society and retained many of the loyalty concepts relating to the tribes. After his own family, a man owes loyalty to his tribe. This attitude is strongly reflected in the religious writings. As Islam spread, these concepts were carried to societies, other than those residing in the Arabian Peninsula.

II. The Sedentary Moslems of Sinkiang

A. Family Organization

S 121 592 In this discussion the concept of family refers to a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage or adoption and having a common budget and common property. Persons remaining in the family and those temporarily absent are included. Servants or relatives temporarily visiting with the family are considered members of the household, but not members of the family unit.

S 592 563 Among the Turkic Moslems of Sinkiang the family consists of a man, his wife or wives, and their unmarried children. In some cases it may also include their divorced or widowed daughters. Occasionally the married sons stay with their family for a short period. Each family unit occupies its own separate house. One may have a few households to take care of, in the case that one has more than one wife. S 595 563 Polygamy is permitted according to Islamic law. However, the majority of the men and particularly the peasants, cannot afford to keep more than one wife at a time. Wealthier people and well-to-do travelling merchants often have more than one household. Each wife is usually kept in a different section of town, or in different towns altogether (this is the case when the husbands are merchants and officials who travel to a great extent). The familiar harem of other Moslem countries hardly exists as such in Sinkiang. S [562] [152] The individualism of the women, the freedom allowed to them and their jealous nature and temperament make it impossible for a man to keep more than one wife under the same roof. This factor complicates the nature of the nuclear structure of the family, and sometimes results in one man's having similar obligations to more than one household.

S 563 [162] [587] Families usually are large, regardless of their wealth or poverty. It is considered a disgrace for a woman not to have many children. This is one reason why a man often prefers to marry a divorced woman with child (a son preferably), who has already proved her ability to bear children.

/Sedentary Moslems of Sinkiang/

563
592 The focus of the family is on the sons, who above all provide
562 the continuity of the family, and also aid the family economically
before they establish their own households. Among the lower
[565] classes, daughters also often are very desirable. There is always
a chance that a daughter, particularly if she is good-looking, will
bring a wealthy husband to the family. The family expects nothing
[582] of their son after the age of 15 or 16 when he marries and sets up
a household for himself.

A statement can be made, applying particularly to the seden-
563 tary Turkic Moslems in Sinkiang, that the relationships within the
592 family are not as fixed and close as they are in China proper.
593 This is due mainly to the factor that the institution of the family
182 as a whole is loosely bound and unstable. Membership in the fam-
ily nucleus changes often with the frequent conclusions and dissolu-
tions of marriages. A great degree of permanency exists among
the agricultural population, but most of the city-dwellers are sub-
ject to constant permutations.

563
593 The Islamic relationships between husband and wife are the
178 basic patterns existing in Sinkiang, but they have been modified by
local customs, and are less rigid and extreme in severity.

593 The husband-wife relationships are not based on equality, legal
562 or otherwise. The differences in the family positions of the hus-
563 band and wife are mainly a manifestation of the general attitudes
toward men and women in Islamic society. A woman is considered
a weak and irresponsible being, who is subject to impulses and
whose behavior is largely irrational. Man, being the superior of
the two, is given the authority and place of importance within the
[671] family. Islamic law, which established the man as leader and
[779] head of the family, obliges him not to misuse his power and to be
generous to those who depend on him. In practice, the preroga-
tives accompanying the husband's superior position are often
abused for his own advantage.

In Sinkiang the women's position is not as low as in other Moslem centers. The wife enjoys some rights which give her a certain degree of independence and freedom. Under certain circumstances, which will be discussed later, she can obtain a divorce on her own initiative, and she has some property rights. According to Islamic law her foremost obligation is to respect and honor her husband. Obedience to the husband is stressed in theory but is not as fully practiced. Women here participate in economic life to a greater degree than in most Moslem countries, and have some rights themselves. Consequently, they also enjoy a better social status. The Moslem women of Sinkiang appear with their husbands in the presence of male visitors, while in other Moslem countries they are forbidden to appear in the presence even of their husband's father or his elder brother. In Sinkiang a woman frequently leaves the house unaccompanied, without asking the

593 permission of her husband. This is unheard of among orthodox
562 Moslems. These few incidents are indicative of the general
563 attitude in Sinkiang to women and the place they occupy in society
and in their families.

563 The father-son relationship is very important, particularly
593 when the son has not yet established a home for himself and is
living at his father's house. The father initiates his son in a trade
[868] and provides a wife for him. In most cases the father provides
[584] his son with a strip of land or some property after he is married
[425] to start him in life. After his father's death, the son inherits his
[428] property, and his prestige and social status (if he has any). However,
(171) the relationships of father-son is not as seriously regarded
as it is in China, where it carries such an immense value. The
son does not always stay with his father. In some cases of divorce,
[586] it may be agreed that the mother will take care of the son, in which
even the son is subject to his mother's influence. Otherwise, the
mother-son relationship is not as important as that of the father-son.
The mother's influence on her son's life is not as significant
as it is on the daughter.

The father-daughter relationship is much looser. The father
has much less contact with his daughter than with his son. He is
mainly interested in marrying her off and making some profit out
of the marriage deal. If he is an orthodox Moslem he may hardly
see her at all, the custom being that men eat separately. The
[582] daughter leaves home at a very early age (twelve to fourteen) to
get married, and if she is not divorced, her father is likely to see
her very few times after she has left home.

The mother-daughter relationship is closer and warmer. Both
stay home, and the mother's duty is to teach her daughter household
duties and social manners. Mother and daughter are likely
to maintain a fairly close relationship even after the daughter's
[586] marriage. In general, in cases of divorce, the father will keep the
sons and the mother will keep the daughters, and the small children
who are nursing. Exceptions do occur where the mother keeps
all the children, or the father agrees to take care of a daughter.
The arrangements depend on the agreement reached between the
parents, and on their economic conditions.

Primarily as a result of the unstable family conditions, the relationship between brothers is the loosest of the family ties. In many cases brothers may not be full brothers, but may have a different mother or a different father. In the lower classes, brothers often go to seek fortune in a different town or a different section of town, and lose complete contact with each other. Fortune, wealth, and social status may also put gaps between brothers. They generally do not know each other very well and lose complete contact after their own marriages. Brother-sister relationships hardly ever attain a close association. The girls leave home at an

563 early age, and during their stay at home they are occupied in
593 different phases of the household.

563 The families of the lower classes often comprise economic units,
592 particularly among the farmers, artisans, and small merchants.
565 The family as a whole is engaged in the economic tasks of gaining
184 a livelihood. The father trains his sons to assist him in his profession, and eventually to take over and inherit their father's place. The father thus need not hire any assistants, but gets the necessary aid from his own family. Usually one son stays with his father, while the others, when they are old enough to establish their own households, go and seek their fortunes elsewhere. But while belonging to the nuclear family, all the sons participate in the economic activities.

The well-to-do families do not, as a rule, comprise such units of production. Some of the sons may be studying and training for future positions as officials, while others may actively participate in their father's business.

563 Most families in the lower brackets, i.e., the majority, cannot afford to send their sons to schools; they cannot afford the fees,
592 nor spare the time in which their sons might be participating in
565 the economic activities. Thus the family takes upon itself the
184 additional tasks of educating the children and teaching them the
86 religious customs and rituals, and social manners. The child
[871] learns how to perform the most basic rituals of the Moslem religion, to recite a few prayers in Arabic, and to behave according to the local social customs and standards.

Larger kin groupings are hardly existent among the Turkic
563 sedentary population of the Northwest. Since the family unit's ties
602 are so loose, it is impossible to maintain relationships with relatives who do not belong to the immediate family. No ties of everyday life keep them together, and no economic obligations are required from relatives, other than the most immediate ones. In the well-to-do families, there might be some additional ties involving property and inheritance, but otherwise there is little closeness in the relationships of the members of the clan.

563 The immediate family is the only social unit to which the indi-
593 viduals feel loyal and attached. However, under the circumstances, these attachments are not too strong. This may constitute one of
684 the main reasons that adultery and lack of loyalty to a spouse are
[593] not as severely regarded as they are by the orthodox Moslems. With the loose laws of marriage and divorce in Sinkiang, many in-
[586] cidents of possible adultery are prevented because the husband
[587] and wife are able to attain a legal separation and remarry. Where cases of adultery do occur, the women are the main subjects for punishment. The husband of an adulteress is entitled to punish his wife and to cease to treat her kindly. There is not much that a woman can do to a man if he has switched his loyalty.

/Sedentary Moslems of Sinkiang/

563 548 [588] Prostitution is not widespread among the Moslem Turks, and in many places it is hardly known. Travellers who are separated from their wives often will contract temporary marriages when they are in strange towns for a length of time. At the time that this marriage is contracted, a future divorce is written also. There are, however, quite a few Chinese prostitutes in the main cities where the Chinese reside in great numbers.

B. Marriage and Divorce Customs

563 582 Among the Moslem Turks of Northwest China the marriage age is usually 12-14 for girls, and 15-16 for boys. The Islamic religion considers incestuous such combinations as the following: brother and sister, uncle and niece, stepfather and stepdaughter, aunt and nephew, stepson and widowed stepmother, etc. Besides these restrictions, it is considered unethical to marry one's daughter to an infidel, a Chinese, a Tibetan, a Hindu, or a Mongol.

563 584 Matchmaking is a necessary prelude to marriage. The matches are usually concluded by the parents while the individuals concerned have little to say in the issue. It is not uncommon for parents to arrange their children's marriage before they reach marriage age or even soon after they are born. Next to the parents, the matchmakers play the most important role in the conclusion of a marriage. In some places the matchmakers are close male relatives of the bridegroom's father; in others, this role often is given to women, who engage in concluding deals of this kind.

The usual procedure is for the matchmakers, authorized by the father of the boy, to go to the prospective bride's parents to discuss the matter with her father. If they receive the consent of the girl's parents to consider the matter, they go back to the boy's father and inform him of the developments. He then sends a present of a sheep to the girl's house five or six days later, and comes with his family to discuss the gifts that his son is going to give the bride and arrangements for the wedding. The former [583] issue usually involves much bargaining and disputing. The young man pays no actual bride-price for his wife, but he has to give her gifts consisting of clothing items and jewelry. The value of the presents often depends on the wealth and social status of the bridegroom's family. Once an agreement has been reached, the sheep is slaughtered for the occasion and the engagement of the couple is celebrated. The wedding gifts are brought to the bride's parents, and their acceptance is considered the final conclusion of the agreement.

563 585 If it is the first marriage of the girl importance is attached to the wedding ceremony. Her parents extend an invitation to a great many relatives and friends or, if rich, they may invite the whole village or the whole neighborhood to the celebration. The mullas, who will conduct the religious ceremony, are also present. The

563 585 musicians' presence is as important as that of the religious representatives, since music continuously accompanies the festivities. Money is given to beggars, the fees of the mullas are paid, and food is placed in front of the musicians. The marriage ceremony is not very complicated. The mulla says a few prayers over the bride and groom and pronounced them man and wife. After the ceremony the bride is led to the house of her husband. The bride's [152] leaving her family is accompanied by the wailing of her mother, who is supposed to exhibit great sorrow at her daughter's departure. The daughter is supposed to respond likewise. When reaching the house of her husband, she is to resist entering the house, and it is up to her husband and his relatives to lift her over the threshhold into the house. The wedding festivities can go on for days, after which the young couple also is obliged to give a party for those who were invited to celebrate their wedding.

563 585 885 Once a woman is married, she belongs to her husband's family, even if he dies. Her full social stature is only reached after she is thirty. Her husband then gives a party to celebrate her becoming a jawan (a mature woman). She is now entitled to privileges and social position which were barred to her as a very young woman; she is also worth more on the marriage market.

563 586 In many cases, these very early marriages are failures and soon are dissolved. The husband has no difficulty in getting a divorce from his wife. He can conclude a divorce suit against his wife, in front of the qazi (a Moslem judge), without her being present. The fees for divorce are very little. The wife, although not as free to petition for a divorce as her husband, can request a divorce in six cases: if her husband beat her, having no serious reason for doing so, and her body still retains the signs as evidence; if, without consulting her, he took another wife; if he had stopped supporting her for six months; if, without her consent, he has taken her away from her regular place of residence for more than three days; or if he becomes insane or a leper.

The wife can, in this case, assemble her personal belongings and go back to her parents. The husband then proceeds to give her full freedom by repudiating her. The demands that the woman [587] puts on him are very few--he is to support her for a hundred days, after which she is free to remarry. The husband has no such restrictions about remarriage; he can remarry on the same day on which he secured a divorce.

Alimony is the main issue in divorce cases. When the wife initiates divorce proceedings the husband may refuse to pay alimony, and the wife may even have to give him a substantial sum of money to induce him to let her go. His final consent always is necessary for a divorce to become valid, otherwise, the separation would not be considered a legal divorce. The matter of the children is settled by both parents, but the father really decides

563 whether he is going to take all the children, only the boys, or none
586 at all. If the wife has to take care of the sons, the husband is
required to pay toward their maintenance.

563 The weakness of their position and the looseness of the marriage
369 tie undoubtedly bear hard on the women in towns, who have no secur-
562 ity in their home life. They are subject to divorce at any time, and
586 then may be left with no proper alimony to take care of their needs.
The men are given great freedom to act according to whim. Cases are frequent where husbands have legally deserted wives, leaving them with one or more children to look after and insufficient or no maintenance. Conditions are better in the country; but even in towns the position of women is somewhat better than in most other Moslem societies.

III. Nomadic Moslems of Sinkiang

121 A. Family Organization
59 Among the nomadic Turkic Moslems of the Northwest the pat-
182 tern of family organization is somewhat similar to that of the
563 sedentary Turks, with two major distinctions; (a) there is an ele-
184 ment of stability in the family institution of the nomads, in spite
of the existent facility for dissolving marriages and contracting new ones, and (b) the influence of Islam is not nearly as strong as it is among the sedentary peoples. These differences are manifested in all aspects of family life, including its nuclear structure. The family unit consists of a man, his wife, and their unmarried
563 children. Cases of divorce and temporary separations are much
586 more rare than among the sedentary Moslems, and consequently
184 the divorcee or separated daughter that often belongs to the sedentary family is absent in the nomadic family. Each family occupies
563 its own tent. The tents of the married sons generally are close
592 to their parents' tent, and close contact between the various house-
342 holds is maintained.

In size, nomadic families equal those of the sedentary popu-
563 lation. Many children, especially sons, are considered a mani-
592 festation of God's blessings. Due to the way of life and dependency
[162] on economic cooperation the relationships within the family are
[184] maintained on a much closer basis. The wife shares much more actively in the economic burden. She takes care of the house, milks the animals, utilizes their products in many different ways (milk products, hides, wool, etc.). The husband's life is less burdened by economic tasks: taking care of the cattle, guarding them, setting the camps, selling, bargaining and hunting. The
[593] relationship between husband and wife is not as greatly influenced by the edicts of Islam. The women are less subject to the complete authority and mercy of their husbands, and to limited social contacts.

563 Children and parents relationships differ also. They are charac-
593 terized by a much greater economic interdependence. The children
[369] of the city-dwellers have a certain degree of economic independ-
[434] ence, and have a small income of their own at an early age, but
no opportunity of the sort presents itself to the nomadic children.
[868] The sons help their fathers and learn from them how to manage
the livestock, how to shoot and hunt, how to bargain and sell, etc...
they remain attached to their families even after marriage, having
no separate property of their own.

[868] The daughters have much to learn from their mothers, in
preparation for the many responsibilities that they will have in the
future, and their help around the house is extremely valuable and
necessary. A daughter, however, does not retain her relationship with her family after she is married, but shifts her allegiance to her husband's family.

563 In the nomadic society, families constitute definite units of
592 production. This is the basis for their unity and close cooperation.
It is almost impossible for a couple to get along without the help of their children and it is rare that their children would be able to become economically independent. Moreover, the family framework provides for the educational, religious, and social needs for the individuals comprising it.

563 B. Marriage and Divorce Customs
184 Among the Turkis of the plains, for example at Kashgar,
562 women are at a discount, wives are cheap and divorces even cheaper.
583 Among the mountain people (particularly among the Kirghiz) how-
[586] ever, girls are at a premium and the would-be-bridegroom or his
father has to pay a heavy brideprice, which usually amounts to ten
to thirty yaks or their equivalent in other kinds of livestock. When
563 a boy has reached the age of six or seven and therefore may be
584 expected to survive until manhood, his parents ordinarily betroth
him to a neighbor's daughter of similar age. This betrothal is
known as the qalam. The female relatives of both parties play a
[583] leading part in the lengthy haggling about the brideprice which
precedes it.

563 When all yaks have been paid, and the young people have reached
585 the age of fourteen and sixteen years respectively, the bride's
people invite all the neighbors to a feast at which the marriage is announced. The bride and bridegroom remain in their tents in the background and do not attend. The feast and announcement, known as the nikah, constitute the wedding, there being no other ceremony. However, the bridegroom cannot yet take his bride to his own home. She continues to live with her parents for a period of two to five months, during which the latter make and furnish an aq-oi (tent with its felts, rugs, wall hangings, screens, pots, pans, milk bowls, and other necessary items. The bridegroom continues

S
563 to live at his own home if its near, otherwise the bride's parents
585 lend him an aq-oi. He visits the bride every week or ten days.
These visits are supposedly secret. Her father must not see the
bridegroom entering or leaving his bride's tent.

When the aq-oi is ready, the bridegroom takes the bride away to his own place, over some show of resistance made by the girl's relatives.

S
563 After a year, the girl can divorce her husband by returning
586 the price paid for her. Divorce is not very common among the
nomads, and the price paid for it is much higher than that among
the Turkis of the plains. The bride's father would usually be
very reluctant to return the price paid for his daughter except for
extremely grave reasons.

IV. The Chinese Moslems

N
121 Little information is available on the family structure and
relationships among the Chinese Moslems. The family relations,
59 as in all other Moslem communities, are supposed to be regulated
[779] by the Shari'a (Moslem law) but the details of the code are not well
known to the Chinese Moslems, nor are they observed with great
care as far as they are known. What alterations have been produced
by the influence of the surrounding Chinese is not known from the
meagre amount of available information. Many of the Chinese
N
769 Moslems observe the traditions of ancestor worship that form such
*563 an important unifying factor in Chinese family life. Often they
possess ancestral tablets which stand side by side with Moslem
778 religious objects.

N
*563 Intermarriage between the Chinese and Chinese Moslems oc-
curs often under certain conditions. The fact that the woman is
582 not Moslem is not an obstacle to marriage with a Moslem; it is
797 even thought to be meritorious to bring women of other faiths over
to the true religion by marrying them. On the other hand, Moslem
women are strictly forbidden to marry a man of another faith.
The non-Moslem women who marry Moslems, although officially
converted to Islam, in many cases bring their religious customs
to the family, and the children are reared with both traditions and
beliefs.

N
The main differences between the Chinese and Chinese Moslems
*563 appear to be in the ceremonies of marriage and divorce. A Mos-
585 lem priest usually is invited to preside over these occasions. In
586 addition to the Chinese-style ceremony, the Moslem priest will
793 recite a few prayers over the newly-wed couple or will give an
18 additional affirmation to the dissolution of an unsuccessful marriage.

N
In general, the Chinese Moslems have much more in common
*563 with the Chinese than they do with their Turkic coreligionists.
184 The law and traditions of the country play a more important part
in governing the family relations, than the religious law.

V. The Tibetans of Chinghai

A. The Family Organization

581 Among the Tibetans of Northwest China almost any form of
59 marriage that will further the family interests is acceptable.
Property and the problems of serving it, avoiding its division, and
*563 increasing it, seem to underlie most marital variations. Mono-
gamy, polygyny, and fraternal polyandry exist with various modi-
fications, and the nuclear structure of the family differs accord-
*563 ingly. The most common and least complicated arrangement in
592 this region is that of a husband, his wife, and their unmarried
children. The family may also include several grandchildren born
[848] to unwed daughters. Considerable freedom is allowed to young
[836] people before marriage and their offspring are accepted without
reservation. Sons often will stay with their parents after marriage,
[591] and sons often bring their wives into the family and remain with
their parents. A daughter also may bring her husband into her
*563 family, but this occurs generally when the family has no sons.
583 The Mag pa (male bride) suffers no disgrace. He joins his wife's
591 family, and if the family is sinified to the extent of having a family
name, takes her family name. He calls her relatives his own,
severs all relations with his own family, and assumes all the duties
and rights of a son.

*563 Where polygyny occurs, the unit will include one or more addi-
595 tional wives, who will each live in her own tent, if the husband is
rich enough, and if they do not get along together. Polyandry is
not uncommon. In this case, the nuclear family includes the head
of the household (the eldest married son), his brothers, his wife
(or wives) and the children who are all considered his offspring,
regardless of which brother is the actual father. Parents usually
*563 retire to their own separate dwelling, as soon as their eldest son
593 marries, and leave him the authority and the responsibilities of the
head of the house.

*563 Tibetan families are not as large as either the Chinese or the
162 Turkic. There are many attempts to explain this phenomenon,
such as the prevalence of venereal diseases which have reduced
their productivity considerably. Some refer to the hardships of
rearing children in such a difficult and hostile climate, some claim
the desire to space until child "no longer needs milk" (ca. 4 yrs),
others blame the facts of polyandry and the celebacy of a large
portion of the male population.

*563 The focus of the family is on the sons, who provide for the con-
tinuity of the family . There is much greater degree of stability
593 and permanency in the Tibetan family than there is in the Turkic
182 family. Sons can fulfill obligations to the State, such as military
service and tax collecting. They help to preserve estates and

*563 avoid increased assessments.

593 The relationships between husband and wife have no religious
[182] basis. The Tibetan woman has a great degree of freedom: she
[562] has an opportunity to choose her mate. Women also have certain
[584] property rights, which give them a more secure position in the
household and in the society as a whole. However, a Tibetan
woman does not enjoy full equality with the men.

*563 The family is held together chiefly by economic factors. Fre-
592 quent migrations and the scarcity of sources of livelihood neces-
sitate close family cooperation. Individual opportunities are prac-
tically non-existent, except for joining the clergy. Otherwise it
[591] is very rare for a son to leave his father's household, and start
living on his own. This may occur, when a son wants to marry
against the wishes of his parents; or when a younger brother is
dissatisfied with his secondary position in the family and does not
get along with his eldest brother.

*563 Where fraternal polyandry is practiced, the relationships
between the brothers are naturally very close. They all are con-
595 cerned with and derive a living from a common property. They
593 all share the same house and the same wife.

The Tibetans are not very conscious of the existence of a clan
*563 system but they do have some regulations influencing their rela-
582 tionships within the framework of the clan. They cannot marry
[614] their blood relations of the degree of first and second cousins on
either side. A younger brother is permitted to marry the widow
of his elder brother and the father is permitted to marry the widow
of his son. The children of tribal chiefs have to conclude marriage
*563 with people from the same social level of other tribes. Allegiance
619 to the tribe is stressed. Tribal relationships involve many obliga-
tions from its individual members, as well as prerogatives derived
from belonging to this social and political grouping.

*563 B. Marriage and Divorce Customs

The Tibetan boys marry around the age of 16-20 and usually
582 take a girl a year or two younger than they are. Marriage either
584 may be arranged for the couple by their parents or contracted by
themselves. The first is true particularly for the children of tribal
chiefs and high officials. To find one who matches them in power
and status, marriage must be arranged with another chiefly family.
This is usually done through the parents.

*563 Should the parents select a mate for their child, the boy's
584 father looks for a bride for his son. When he has a girl in mind,
he sends a middle man to her father to discuss the matter. If
[787] her family is interested, the boy's and girl's horoscopes are given
to the lamas who decide if the two parties fit harmoniously. After
the lamas have given their approval, the next step in concluding
the marriage is taken. The bridegroom's family sends gifts to

/Tibetans of Chinghai/

*563 584 The bridegroom's family sends gifts to the bride's family. The acceptance of the gifts implies that the daughter's hand is promised. The day is then set for the wedding.

[431] Those who marry by their own choice do not have to go through this complicated procedure. If the parents consent to their children's choice, the regular ceremony will take place.

*563 After the wedding date has been set the bride's family starts
585 preparing her dowry. On the wedding day both families invite
lamas to their homes to chant sutras. The groom's family asks
(583) relatives and friends to go to greet the bride at her home. When
the bride is properly dressed in her best clothes, she follows the
greeting party back to her fiance's home. Members of her own
family accompany the bride halfway and then return. When the
bride reaches the groom's family, she occupies a humble place
in the tent. The relatives and friends drink and feast for a few
days. On the third day, the young couple go to visit the bride's
family. The latter then summons their relatives and friends and
celebrates for a few days. When a groom is taken into the bride's
[583] family, the ceremony will be similar, but he will occupy the place
of honor in the tent.

*563 585 593 If the young couple marries without parental consent, they may go to live in the home of some relatives for a few days. Then the young man will return to his home to negotiate the matter with his parents. If his parents finally give their consent, he then goes to discuss the matter with his wife's parents. The couple will live with the family that has approved of their marriage. If both families object and the two are determined to continue their life together, they may leave their families and form their own household.

*563 585 [184] The wedding ceremony is not always performed. Many of the poor people have no wedding ceremonies at all. A decision to get married and form a family will suffice.

[586] Once a marriage is concluded it cannot be annulled by outsiders. Regardless of whether it be the man's or the woman's parents who protest against the marriage, they do not have the legal right to annul it. They may withhold wealth and property from the couple, but they cannot take other steps.

*563 586 Divorces are not too hard to obtain. They occur, however, with much less frequency than among the Turks of Sinkiang. If, the couple does not get along well, or if the wife proves barren, she can be sent back to her father. The husband will have to pay her father a price in horses, yaks, tea, or cloth. The young husband may treat his wife badly and she may complain to her father who sends for a middle man to arrange the matter. If the middle man, after talking to the husband, learns that he insists on a divorce, he will report it to the wife's father. The matter then becomes one of bargaining. The middle man sits with the father and the husband while the two dispute the price of the divorce, and he usually helps them reach an agreement. If there are children,

/Tibetans of Chinghai/

N
*563 the father invariably keeps the sons, but a daughter sometimes
586 goes with her mother. /

VI. The Mongours

M
594 A. The Family Organization
596 Schram describes the typical Mongour family as being "patrilineal, extended and patrilocal". The extended family is composed
[611] of a number of closely related nuclear families. A nuclear family
[591] consists of a man, his wife and their unmarried offspring. The
N extended family is usually headed by the grandfather, or the great-
*563 grandfather, if he is alive; his wife, his sons, and, if they are
married, their wives and children compose the rest of the family.
M In the richer families, occasionally the concubine, or concubines,
[556] and their offspring also belong to the extended family.

M The extended family has a common courtyard, around which
[361] the separate dwellings of the nuclear families are grouped. The
property is owned by the group as a whole, but the head of the family has the most authority over it. The common kitchen, hearth
and chimney symbolize the unity of the extended family. This fact
is often expressed in Mongour sayings like "our family has only
M one chimney," or "we all eat out of one cooking-cauldron." Thus,
[182] the breakdown of an extended family is symbolized by one of its
[252] nuclear families setting up its own kitchen and beginning to cook
its own food. Within the extended family, the nuclear families are
M well defined. The identity of the nuclear family is emphasized by
[342] the fact that it has its own room within the quarters of the extended
family. In it are kept some personal possessions, like clothing.
M After eating the main meal of the day with the rest of the extended
[264] family, each nuclear family returns to its own room.
[342]

The family head is the religious chief, family administrator
N and family representative in dealing with higher authorities. Each
*563 spring, on the occasion of the ceremony venerating the ancestors,
M he represents the family in general meetings of the clan. Nor are
592 his duties confined to the family religious rites. As head of a
554 family, he also is required to attend shamanistic ceremonies in the
[769] village temple. Even more important are his economic duties and
responsibilities. He has control over all the community property
belonging to the extended family, and any money due any of its
individual members is deposited with him. He is the one who decides
how this money is to be spent. He also handles all the important
economic transactions of the family, such as buying and selling
cattle and grain. Moreover, the family head directs and supervises the ordinary tasks of cattle breeding and cultivating the fields,
and assigns members of the family to their daily duties. He also
enjoys a certain authority over the private matters of the individuals;
e.g., he makes the arrangements for marriage and funerals, and

N
*563 has the privilege of naming his own children and grandchildren.
M 592 When a granddaughter is to be married, the grandfather usually
554 consults her father before taking any action.

N B. Marriage and Divorce Customs

*563 Among the Mongours marriage is considered not as an optional
M part, but as an extremely necessary part of life. Because of the
581 veneration of ancestors, as with their Chinese neighbors, the Mon-
562 gours regard male children as a necessity for carrying on the an-
[769] cestral cult. Ummarried sons, or childless sons are considered
[771] a calamity. The poorest families will even sell part of their live-
stock and land or go into debt to get a bride for their son.

N Marriages usually are arranged by a go-between, frequently
*563 the maternal uncle of the boy. The brideprice is subject to con-
M siderable negotiations between the two families. The girl chosen
584 usually is two years older than the boy. The acceptable marriage
583 age for boys is between 14-16.

582 Clan exogamy is observed among the Mongours. There is ab-
N solute prohibition against marriage within the clan. The rule is
*563 sometimes overlooked by the commoners, but it is strictly ob-
M served among the nobles. Among the commoners, intermarriage
614 with Tibetans and Chinese has contributed considerably to the
582 weakening of this rule. In such instances, the clan itself is re-
565 garded as not being purely preserved. There is a feeling that it
has been penetrated by foreign elements, and therefore the exogamy
rules need not be observed as strictly.

N Exogamy rules out marriage between children of brothers, but
*563 does not exclude marriage between the children of a brother and a
M sister, because the offspring of the latter belongs to a different
582 clan.

M A widowed wife, if living in the setting of the extended family,
[587] usually becomes the second wife of a brother of her late husband.
However, if the brothers have already divided their inheritance
and are living separately, she is free to remarry whomever she
wants.

N Two exceptional kinds of marriage, probably borrowed from
*563 the Tibetans, were noted by Schram. One is that of "marriage
M to the door post," whereby a girl remains in her family and clan,
588 but takes lovers and bears children. Her children have her patri-
lineal clan name, remain within the family, and are treated as
members of the patrilineal clan. The other is "marriage to the
belt." A girl, unmarried and living with her own family, has
relations with a guest, who leaves his belt, to which she may be
"married" if she becomes pregnant.

N The relationship between two families connected by marriage
*563 is maintained primarily by the maternal uncle. While not being
M 604 part of his married sister's new family, he has a powerful influence

N *563 M 604 over his sister's children. His rights in this regard are manifested mainly in three cases: (1) upon the natural death of his sister's children, they cannot be buried without his permission. The maternal uncle is considered "master of the bones" of the deceased, and has the right to permit the burial, to impede it or to prevent it. (2) If they have been murdered or have committed suicide, he is required to initiate and execute vengeance for the blood of his sister's child. (3) When they are subject to punishment for violating the society's rules, the maternal uncle must punish the children of his sister. Such punishment may range from capital to very minor forms.

N *563 M 586 Divorce is extremely rare among the Mongours. So, too, are cases of repudiation or desertion by the husband. Schram does not mention the way in which a divorce is finalized, nor how long a waiting period, if any, after divorce before remarriage is permitted.

N *563 M 837 Cases of adultery are extremely rare in Mongour society. The people are engrossed constantly with the problem of making a living, and they have little time for complicated affairs. The close physical proximity of life in an extended family makes it extremely difficult for anyone's lengthy absence or a stranger's presence in the home to go unnoticed. Schram concludes that M [577] [184] [114] "The morality of the Mongours who live in villages and are occupied with farming, is undoubtedly on a higher standard than that of the nomad Mongols. Mongour families on the average seemed to me to be happy families that work hard but enjoy life."

Additional Readings

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SOCIAL VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

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H. The Western Mongols or Torguts

Additional Readings

SOCIAL VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

I. Introduction

121
181
183 The Northwest region of China is a most complex subject with which to deal as far as its people, customs and social values are concerned. There has been little or no systematic research done in the past pertaining to the lives of the people in this region. The information available is mostly fragmentary, from writers whose interest was largely in the political, economic and geographic realms rather than in the cultural and social. Moreover, the few traveler-writers who exerted an effort to observe the cultural and social aspects of the people's lives described only those events in which they themselves had a chance to participate. For instance, data on dwellings, food and clothing are more readily available than data which might afford insight into social values. Birth, marriage and burial are more often recorded than other aspects of life routine which yield understanding of moral, legal and ethical concepts. Hence, there is no choice but to discuss social values and customs together in some instances and discard a rigid application of the two terms. As our definition of customs states that the term embraces all the norms classified as folkways and mores, and our definition of social values states that they are matters of convention invested with effect and meaning for all participants, it is permissible here, for the sake of convenience, to treat customs as social values and vice versa. It must be pointed out that when the social values of a group of people can be ascertained, the two entities are dealt with separately.

Because of lack of information, no uniformity in discussion can be achieved. However, an effort is made to give, in the beginning, a general picture of various people in this region, to bring forth similarities and differences in the various cultures which may help to throw some light on the understanding of the people in this region.

Although we have used the terms "social value" and "custom" here in a more flexible manner, it does not permit us to divert our attention beyond the definitions given for such terms. We have followed very closely the original meaning of the definitions except under certain conditions when such diversion was deemed necessary. As this is the case, it is necessary here to redefine the terms more fully.

121
183 Broadly speaking, "custom" is a term embracing all the norms classified as folkways and mores. It connotes an established usage which is contrasted with what is new. That is, a

121 183 custom is "the customary way of doing things." Specifically, custom is an established norm practiced and repeated by a multitude of generations. It is closely associated with folkways and mores, but it designates the traditional, autonomic, mass character of both.

121 181 Social values are defined as modes of conduct regarded as matters of common welfare by an effective consensus of the group; they are such matters as prove to be meaningful, systematic ideas, and become effectively invested principles which guide behavior. Above all, they are matters of convention invested with effect and meaning for all participants.

It should be pointed out that any value is a preference. We must bear in mind that cultural standardization defines and limits choices, and duration of values depends upon the prestige of values it carries.

II. The Region and the People

121 128 Prior to the discussion of the region and the people, it is necessary to call attention to the fact that the general discussion of this section and the following section cover only the pre-Republican period and the period of the Chinese Nationalist administration on the mainland of China. Knowledge of social change in this region under Communist control is lacking, and there is no reliable information pertaining to the true picture of living conditions there. According to Communist propaganda
*[668] there have been tremendous improvements in every aspect of the people's livelihood. These "improvements," however, do not necessarily bring about a basic change in habits, social customs or traditions. No conclusions can be ventured here.

121 *563 In the Northwest region of China one finds Han Chinese, Chinese Moslems, Turks, Mongols and Tibetans. People of different races, though living under identical geographical conditions, each group constructs its homes on the traditional pattern handed down by its ancestors. Each retains much of the old family traditions. The altered conditions called for by circumstances are mostly superficial.

For centuries the people in this area have been largely nomadic, i.e., the Mongols and Tibetans. Their life is simple and mobile; the tribesmen cling to tent living. Those who mix with
[177] the Han Chinese have assimilated some aspects of Chinese culture. For the most part the Han Chinese of the area are poor farmers or traveling merchants who carry on caravan trade. The Chinese Moslems in Chinghai and Sinkiang may be nomadic or sedentary; they cultivate land where the soil is fit for farming, or they move with the seasons to pasture for their animals. In Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia, the Moslems who live among the

N 121 *563 Han Chinese have taken up farming. Many of them have also become small business men dealing in camels, sheep, oxen, furs, skins, et cetera. Often those who have settled in cities are restaurant owners. The Moslems are faithful followers of their religion. Although they have taken on the Chinese way of life, the people have always kept their own identity.

S 101 487 In early times Sinkiang was referred to as Hsi-yü (the Western Region) or as T'ien-shan nan-lu and T'ien-shan pei-lu (Road South of the Heavenly Mountains and Road North of the Heavenly Mountains). These names referred to the natural caravan highways which progress westward from Chinese Kansu on either side of the Heavenly Mountains, weaving along and through the watered and cultivated areas.

S 563 The region has the most colorful mixture of race, custom and habit in existence. There are the dark-bearded Uighurs from Kashgar, in long, bright-colored coats, with their veiled and white-clothed women; there are booted Kirgis from Taghdumbash Pamir; there are the outcast unveiled women from Maralbashi and foreigners from Afghanistan, India, Tibet and Russian Turkestan.

S 178 563 Here the passage of time seems to bring little change. Mixed as they are, the tribesmen of the steppes cling to their time-honored ways, each race maintaining its own traditions. Religion runs the gamut from Mohammedanism and Lamaist Buddhism to Christianity. It is a land of mosques and lamaseries, of centuries-old irrigation ditches, of "Turban Heads" and Chinese Moslems. It is an open land of lean Kalmuch nomads and hard Kirgiz frontiersmen, of Kazakh cowboys galloping across the steppe.

N S 121/*563 Of all these peoples in the Northwest, we have selected for our study seven groups, namely: the Han Chinese, the Chinese Moslems, the Kirghizs, the Kazakhs, the new Uighurs or Eastern Turks, the Mongours, the Tibetans and the Western Mongols. The Mongols of Alashan and Edsingol are now part of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. Their value system and life patterns do not differ appreciably from those of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia. Reference is therefore made to the same section in the IMAR Handbook.

III. Social Values and Patterns of Living of the Peoples in the Northwest

N *563 *175 [463]

A. The Han Chinese

The Han Chinese of the Northwest region are predominantly farmers, artisans and merchants. During China's era of Imperial government, and during the Nationalist period as well, the region and its borders have often been involved in war with the

/The Han Chinese/

*563 minority tribes or bandits, and lately there have been skirmishes
*[175] between the warlords and between the Nationalists and
[651] the Communists. These disturbances have not only deprived the
people of normal livelihood but also increased their financial
burden, as they have been taxed heavily by both the government
[731] and the warlords to support the fighting armies. Moreover, the
region is susceptible to the disasters of flood and famine. The
[167] corruption in officialdom, the banditry, the armies and the disasters
have caused people of means to leave the region and make
[463] their homes elsewhere. Of course there are officials and rich
merchants who have authority in political and economic matters,
but it may be said that the majority of those left behind are
small business men and poor farmers who stay on their land and
struggle for a living.

*563 It should be noted that the southeast part of Northwest China
131 is the place where Chinese civilization and culture developed and
matured. This region, around the Wei and Lo Rivers, referred
to as Kuang-chung, was the most prosperous and well-developed
part of China during many of the Imperial dynasties. According
to Communist geographical division, Kuang-chung, the area
within Shensi Province, is included in the Northwest region. It
is a region of fertile soil, where Han Chinese farmers have
made their homes for countless generations. The regions to the
north and west are populated by the Chinese Moslems, the Mongols
[441] and the Tibetans. As this is the case, many Han Chinese
who remained in the Northwest became merchants who traveled
[439] north to Mongolia and west to Sinkiang with their caravan trade.
There are also soldiers and prisoners who had settled here generations
ago.

*563 Village dwellings are the conventional types of mud huts.
342 Some live in caves, the rich in elaborate caves with fine furnishings,
the very poor in caves scooped out of the porous yellow
[369] earth cliffs. In cities and towns where the wealthy merchants
dwell, one of course finds the traditional big brick home
with several courtyards, as well as modern two-story houses.
But in Pao-chi, most of the people live in caves with regular
doors and windows, dug out of the cliffs.

*563 The eating habits of these people are slightly different from
262 those of the Han Chinese in other parts of China, in that more
flour than rice is consumed. Rich people have no difficulty in
[556] obtaining all the delicacies they desire. Meat, eggs, fruits,
fowl, rice, flour and vegetables are their common fare, but the
poor people can afford only barley flour, millet and salted vegetables
for their daily diet. Tou-fu, soybean cake, is consumed
*563 by rich and poor alike. Clothing in this region resembles that
291 worn by Chinese in other parts of the country. Among nomads
and the poor, sheepskin coats are very common. They are worn
with the fur side inside.

/The Han Chinese/

000 with the fur side inside.

N
*563 The Chinese home is still governed by the patriarchal tradition.
769 The ancestral tablets stand in the place of honor. Ancestor
592 worship, which includes the belief that the spirits of those who
have gone before are always present, profoundly affects the details
of family life and holds the members together, not so much
by affection as by obligation and a sense of mutual responsibility
within the clan.

N
*563 At the New Year, in the shabby mud hut as well as in the
592 elaborate living room of a wealthy home, the family makes obeisance
[796] to the elders in exacting ritual. The essential relationships
[184] which govern social intercourse are rigidly practiced. The
[593] individual maintains a close tie with his family, for he finds in
it the satisfaction of fulfilling the demands of tradition. A male
Chinese considers his home a place which Heaven has entrusted
to him, to hand down to posterity.

N
*563 The annual festivals, such as the seasonal celebrations of the
796 New Year, the Dragon Festival, the Moon Festival, et cetera,
184 are celebrated in more or less the same manner as by the people
of other regions. Customs regarding birth, marriage, funerals
N and burial are also similar; in some places the ritual is
*563 more rigid and conservative. The distinguishing factor here is
829 in the simple home life, as well as in social relations. The attitude
N toward life is more practical because of poverty and necessary
[558] thrift. The preservation of "face" is not regarded as so
essential to prestige and social status. For example, Chinese
people in other parts of the country may have elaborate funerals
for their parents to maintain the prestige of the family, despite
resulting financial worries.

S
N B. The Chinese Moslems (Dungans)

563 1. The People

101 Actually the Moslems are predominantly Chinese. In Asia the
Chinese Moslems are referred to as Dungans, but in Kansu
Province they are called Hui-hui. Dungan is not a Chinese word,
but a term used by the Turks of Sinkiang in referring to the Chinese
Moslems.

S These people settled thickly in Sinkiang Province, where they
[161] form the bulk of both the trading communities and the farmers.
[197] In addition to Chinese they speak a Turkish dialect, and they
distinguish themselves from the Moslems of North China who,
except for their religion, have been almost totally assimilated
by the Chinese.

S
N The Chinese Moslems are a much more courageous people
563 than the local Han Chinese. The Kansu men of this area are considered
181 the most timid of the sturdy North China stock. It is
said that the Kansu men never have ambition, while the other
Northerners are never without it.

/Chinese Moslems (Dungans)/

000 Northerners are never without it.
S N 2. Patterns of living
563 a. Dwellings
342 Houses of the Chinese Moslems are similar to those of the
171 Han Chinese in style and construction. Externally their mosques
S N resemble Chinese temples. There is always Arabic writing
563 carved in wood above the entrance of the mosque to mark its
346 identity. But in Sinkiang the style of mosque architecture is not
S Chinese, and the buildings as a rule have minarets.
N Village life is very much like that of the Chinese. People live
563 342 in mud huts with lattice woodwork, windows and simple furnishings.
35 Well-to-do people in cities and towns, where they usually
[369] congregate in separate districts, live in Chinese style houses
[531] distinguished by the carvings on the windowframes, doorways
S N and woodwork inside, which are of elaborate Arabic design quite
[212] different from Chinese wood carving. In both rich and poor
homes the ancestral shrines and tablets are missing, and in
their places are scrolls with Arabic writings or passages from
the Koran. In the northern and western parts of this region the
living quarters are simpler. There are colonies of flat-roofed
S mud houses built along the cliffs.
N b. Food
563 Food habits are similar to those of the Han Chinese, though
262 Moslems do not eat pork and consider it unclean. Meat is a luxury
184 for the poor. Mutton is preferred, though beef is also used.
S In the western part of the region the very poor use horse meat,
563 though it is forbidden by their religion. Vegetables are a part of
262 184 their daily diet. In the northwest part of Sinkiang, fruits such as
apricots, plums, mulberries, melons and grapes are available,
as well as smaller quantities of pomegranates, apples and pears.
S N Mutton fat, butter and linseed oil are used for cooking. In
563 eastern Sinkiang the style of cooking is influenced by the Per-
252 sian, Chinese and Turkish styles. The Chinese Moslems abstain
from wine, and are not much addicted to the smoking of opium.
They do not like to eat with non-Moslems, especially the Han
Chinese, because they consider pork eaters unclean. Strict followers
of the religion even avoid eating utensils which have been
used by others, and carry their own bread when they travel. No
meat may be eaten unless the animal was killed according to
prescribed religious ritual.
S N The style of dress for both sexes is generally the same as
563 that of the Chinese except for the headdress. The Dungan men
291 can be recognized by their white skullcaps, embroidered with a
faint design in colored thread, whereas the usual cap of the Turk
or Kazakh is colorful and more richly embroidered. Some Dungans
dress in gray and wear white or blue caps. For ceremonial
occasions or worship, the Imams, Ahungs and Mullahs, who sit

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/Chinese Moslems (Dungans)/

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291 within the railings in the mosque and read the Koran, wear white or green turbans, the leader's turban being more elaborate,
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[292] with a tassel hanging down the back. Common people wear pointed octagonal caps of white, red or black, the color distinguishing the sect to which they belong.

Some women dress differently from the Chinese women, and wear a sort of turban hat. Ordinarily their dresses are in dark colors, but they may wear gay colors for festivals. According to ancient custom they must veil their faces in the presence of men, but this custom was abandoned long ago.

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[369] In cities and towns where the Chinese Moslems dress exactly like the Han Chinese, the men can be distinguished by their physical build and features, but the women are not easily recognized.

d. Occupation

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463 Most Chinese Moslems are business men and traders, and most of them also farm. As farmers they are not equal to the Han Chinese, but they excel in dealing with cattle and everywhere they monopolize the beef and sheep trade. They are also merchants, bakers, workers in jade, money changers, and inn and restaurant keepers.

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262 Outside a Moslem-owned restaurant there hangs a sign displaying a water pot surmounted by a dress hat, and two Chinese characters, Hui-hui. The pot signifies ceremonial cleanliness and guarantees that no pork is used. The hat indicates respect to customers. There are also two Chinese characters on the tea pot, meaning "Pure and True."

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784 Formerly their religion forebade the Moslems to become money-lenders, barbers, fortune-tellers, actors, or servants or apprentices to the Chinese. How strictly the people now observe this taboo is not known.

3. Social values

a. Group spirit

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183 The we-feeling is very strong among the Dungans. The whole group will sacrifice time and money for an individual oppressed by outsiders, and fight for him until justice prevails. Endowed with a courageous nature, the Moslem man is willing to sacrifice his life for the welfare of the group.

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[576]
[196] This spirit is shown by overt expression in daily social relationships. The Chinese title Lao-piao (old cousin) is applied even to a stranger of the same religious faith. The word old signifies respect; cousin signifies blood relationship. Hence Lao-piao indicates a feeling of closeness toward all members of the faith. Another expression of this feeling is found in the saying that "every Moslem in the world belongs to the same family."

b. Concept of charity

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431 Many of the values in Chinese Moslem society are based upon

/Chinese Moslems (Dungans)/

S N 563 183 779 431 (651)
religious teachings. According to the religious code it is obligatory for a man of means to contribute a certain amount of his wealth to public charity. Next to worship, this is the most important duty in Moslem society. The original idea of helping the poor and needy evolved into a tax (ten per cent on agricultural produce and two and one-half per cent on animals) collected from all believers for religious and public welfare purposes. Another form of alms, the sadaqa, is a voluntary offering. Public welfare supported by the tax, after the collector's fee is deducted, includes freeing slaves, assistance to persons who became indebted for good reason, making holy war to defend the people and the faith, and aiding needy travelers.

S N 563 796 735
During the month of Ramadan (fasting) donations and offerings are collected for public welfare purposes. The amount is not fixed, and the act of giving is voluntary. A sense of public responsibility is strong among these people. Not only do they give regular allowances to the needy in their own communities, but they help needy outsiders of their own faith.

S N 563 788 554
The Hajjis, or those who have completed the pilgrimage to Mecca, are highly respected in the Moslem community, and wear special badges to mark their distinction. The opportunity to journey to Mecca is the dream of all Moslems.

c. Virtue

S N 563 577 779
It is important for the individual to cultivate the true concept of peace and submission. The concept of peace involves such ideals as mutual cooperation and aid among mankind, mutual understanding among religions and peaceful co-existence of nations to achieve world brotherhood. The concept of submission means to submit oneself wholly to Allah and follow his teachings, sacrificing self-interest for the promotion of happiness for mankind.

S N 563 515
Personal cleanliness, both internal and external, is most important. Cleanliness in eating habits and personal hygiene is thought to develop a clean soul, free of evil thoughts and immoral conduct.

d. Racial superiority

S N 563 186
The Chinese Moslems regard themselves as a special group, superior to their Chinese neighbors. As students and officials, their attitude toward respect for the emperor and for Confucius has, in the past, been one of compromise. Compelled by law to conform, they excused themselves on the grounds that they did so outwardly but not in their hearts.

S N (798)
The old and the new sects of Chinese Moslems, although bitterly hostile toward each other and at times engaged in armed conflict, on the whole present a united front toward the Chinese and the rest of the world.

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/Chinese Moslems (Dungans)/

4. Customs

S a. Religious rites

N According to religious rules, the Moslems are supposed to
563 pray five times daily (sunrise, noon, afternoon, sunset and
779 midnight), facing in the direction of Mecca. Few of the Chinese
782 Moslems besides the Mullahs and Ahungs adhere strictly, but
pray only once or twice a day. To be valid, prayers should be
performed in the mosque, but those who find it impossible to go
to the mosques may pray wherever they are. The call to prayer
S (adhan) is made by the Ahung, or religious leader, and the be-
N
[793] lievers join in saying the adhan. Daily noon prayer is popular,
and the Friday service is the most fully attended.

Public worship cannot be performed by fewer than four per-
S sons. Women may not attend the mosques where the men pray.
N
[562] In some places, women have their own mosques and women
Ahung to direct the prayers and Friday services. Women always
worship as individuals and not as a congregation, though there
may be a number of women gathered together.

S
N The Moslems must be clean when they attend any religious
563 ceremony. Hands and face must be washed, and bathing before
779 worship is common. For this reason all mosques of importance
782 have bathing places annexed. The Moslem becomes unclean by
783 touching such objects as dishes containing pork or any meat not
killed according to ritual, pigs, dogs, wine or excrement.

S The thirty-day fast of Ramadan is fairly strictly observed.
N During this period one is not to eat between sunrise and sunset,
563 and such things as smoking, drinking and sexual contact are also
796 forbidden. In many places, a messenger goes about the Moslem
785 quarters calling out the times for observing or breaking the fast,
779
[203] lest someone oversleep or fail to prepare and eat the necessary
food before daybreak. The end of the fast is celebrated by a
feast.

The aged, ill, insane, travelers, women who are pregnant, menstruating or nursing, persons doing heavy labor or whose lives are in danger are excused from the fast, but if or when they are able they must make up for it. The purpose of the fast is to help the believers maintain pure and pious lives. Fasting is considered meritorious at other times too, except on Friday, Saturday and Sunday.

S b. Naming

N Within seven days after the birth of a child, he must be given
563 a Koranic name, or Ching-ming (religious name). For this oc-
553 casion a feast is prepared, and the poor are fed. If the child is a
852 male and the family wealthy enough, two sheep are killed for the
S occasion. If the child is a girl, only one sheep is killed. To
N arrive at the name, the father holds the child with its face
[788] toward Mecca and repeats a prayer in one ear of the child, then

S N 563 852 [553] [788]

the other. Then he turns over any seven pages of the Koran, and from the seventh word of the seventh line of the seventh page, takes the name. When a male child reaches his seventh birthday he is circumcised and taught to worship.

c. Marriage

S N 563 585 [771]

The marriage customs of the Chinese Moslems, with the exception of the wedding ceremony itself, are the same as those of the Chinese. The bridegroom is accompanied by his father to the bride's home, where the ceremony is performed. The Ahung reads from the Koran, in a manner similar to that of the Christian marriage service, then asks the couple whether they agree to the union.

N *563 585

In Koko Nor (Chinghai) the bride is customarily covered with a piece of red cloth after the ceremony, then lifted by her uncle or brother into the sedan chair and sent to the groom's home. Upon arriving there she is lifted out by her relatives. She wears a veil on the first day and hides in her chamber while relatives and guests sing, dance and feast in celebration. On the second day she receives guests, bowing to each one. Meanwhile the guests present their gifts and congratulations.

S N 563 582 585 [783]

Exogamic marriage is permissable to the extent that a man may marry a Han Chinese woman, who is supposed by marriage to become a Moslem. Before such a marriage the girl must submit to elaborate purification ceremonies to cleanse her from the defilement of her own home. The Ahung officiates at the wedding and the Chinese custom of worshiping heaven and earth is not performed.

S N 563 764

d. Funeral and burial

The funeral customs of the Chinese Moslems are more distinct from those of the Chinese. The dead body is washed ceremoniously by religious leaders from the mosque, who take the garments of the deceased for themselves. The body is then swathed in white bandages, each limb being bandaged separately. Correct performance of this rite is very important. Well-to-do people sprinkle incense on the cloth used for bandages. The wealthy also place large quantities of musk and camphor in the grave. The corpse is placed upon a board under which are the bands necessary for lowering it into the grave, then covered with a bottomless coffin for the trip to the cemetery. The coffin is never interred. The corpse is placed in the grave with head to the north, feet to the south and face toward Mecca.

When the deceased is a woman, only members of the family may look on when the coffin is removed, and only blood relatives, preferably sons, may descend into the grave to arrange the body.

S N 563 763 769

There are elaborate instructions concerning death. Rituals include the recitation of prayers as death approaches, the

S N 563 763 769 making of a will, the giving of alms, rites at the grave, and the recitation of prayers and giving of alms on certain days after death, and on the first, second and third anniversaries.

S N 563 764 The Moslems have their own burial grounds. The mounds raised over the graves are rectangular, not round as in the case of the Chinese. The top of the filled grave must be at least five inches (half a Chinese foot) above the surrounding earth, lest the location be forgotten. A stone may be erected in front of the grave, but the name of the deceased may not be engraved upon it.

S N 563 796 e. Festivals and holidays

Many of the religious festivals are more pagan than Moslem, especially those which are seasonal and therefore not connected with the Moslem calendar. Their celebrations are merely popular gatherings for feasting and enjoyment.

The Moslem New Year (Yengi Yil) celebrates the breaking of the Ramadan fast. The festival takes place during the first three days of the tenth month by the Moslem calendar. Special services are held in the mosques. The people bathe and dress in their best clothes. It is a time of greeting, well-wishing, feasting, visiting and gift-giving. For the Moslems and the Chinese alike, the New Year celebration is the greatest holiday of the year.

S N 563 795 668 177 5. Present day conditions

According to a speech delivered by Burkhan, chairman of the Preparatory Committee of the China Islamic Association, at the Conference of the Asian and Pacific Regions, on October 18, 1952, the Islam religion as well as the customs and habits of its followers are fully respected by the Communist regime. Chinese Moslems are free to practice their faith without interference. It is also said that official circulars from Peking have ordered the people to continue the observance of their important festivals. The tax on the slaughter of cattle for Moslem consumption is abolished, and official holidays are granted on Moslem holidays.

S N [423] In accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law, the mosques may retain their land holdings if the local populace so desire. It is also reported that when the land reform movement was carried out in the Northwest, the land of the mosques was in most cases left untouched. There was also a report of an organized Hajji to Mecca in 1952, which for reasons unknown failed to reach its goal. Special government regulations give Moslem workers in public organizations and educational institutions time off on the more important religious festival days. In military units, factories and schools, consideration is also given to the habits and customs of cadres, soldiers, workers and students of the Moslem faith.

C. The Kirghiz

563
1. The people

Taking Tien-shan as a whole, the Kirghiz form the leading
[771] element of the population. They are Mohammedans of the Suni
order, but they are not strict followers of their religion. Their
[642] system of government is patriarchal, control of the different
[622] sections being vested in tribal elders who enjoy almost unlimited authority. The elders (Manap) are chosen by the people, and
regarded with honor and respect.

[233] The people are nomads whose main occupation is cattle raising.
[241] Only a small proportion of the population engages in farming.

563
2. Patterns of living

342
a. Dwelling

The Kirghiz do not live in houses. The poor live in shelters
[184] made of branches under trees or against overhanging rocks. The
rich live in tents, smaller and less ornate than the Mongolian
yurt but more solid with thick layers of felt. A light tent is
called an aq-ai. It stands a gale very well, as the shape is such
that a high wind presses the structure even more firmly to the
ground. To make it more stable, a large stone is placed in the
tent and the woodwork of the roof is anchored to it by a rope.

The shape and structure of an aq-ai are similar to those of
[354] the Mongolian yurt, but the interior arrangement differs. A fire
always burns cheerily in the middle and a cauldron of mash
[353] simmers upon it. At the far end is the kitchen, which is screened by gaily colored mats of reeds tightly wound with dyed wool.
[251] Here the housewife stores her milk, cream and curds in vast
wooden bowls. When the weather is wet, a row of young lambs
[231] occupies one corner of the tent. They are tethered closely to a
rope pegged down along the walls. Saddlebags, sieves, hats,
[353] wool, coats, skins and so forth are hung along the tent walls.
Piles of rolled-up felts and rugs occupy about a quarter of the
circumference of the tent. The wealth of the owner may be
guessed from the size of the piles.

563 The interior decoration in the tent of a wealthy Kirghiz is
342 often artistic. The walls are hung with embroideries made by
352 the women, and the ground is covered with carpets. There are
353 also pillows covered with multi-colored chintz of Chinese or
Russian manufacture. Furniture is not generally used. There is
[415] an occasional table, a few copper pots and pans, and some brass
jugs used for boiling water and making tea.

563
b. Food

262 Staple foods for the Kirghiz are barley, bread, milk and its
252 products, such as sour cream and qurut, a kind of cheese. In
most tents there are cauldrons of brewing mash, a mixture of
flour and milk. Qurut is made by drying sour cream in goatskin.

/The Kirghiz/

563 When a Kirghiz travels, he brings along a few balls of qurut and
262 supplements them with wild rhubarb and celery which he finds
[484] on the mountainsides.

Bread is made in solid lumps leavened with sour milk. The
[735] poor cannot afford bread. They eat large quantities of mash.
Meat is a luxury. A sheep is killed only on an important occasion, but when the hunter is successful his family enjoys game meat.

c. Clothing

563 The people dress in keeping with the severity of the climate.
291 Men wear long coats padded with cotton-wool. Trousers are
also padded, and tucked into the leather knee-boots. Fur caps are pulled down over the ears to protect them from the bitter cold. Leather slippers are worn inside the boots, and the boots are removed when one enters the tent.

Women's dress is similar to that of the men, except for the headgear. The women's headdress is a large turban of muslin or similar cloth, nine to twelve inches high and of corresponding thickness. For dress, men wear embroidered skullcaps surmounted by sheepskin hoods lined with wool. They also sometimes wear a conical hat with two slits at the bottom to allow the brim to turn up.

3. Custom

563 Girls are at a premium in Kirghiz society, and the father of
583 a would-be bridegroom has to pay a handsome price for the
562 bride in money or its equivalent in livestock (thirty to three
hundred sheep and two to thirty camels). Parents betroth their
563 son when he reaches the age of six or seven, to some neighbor's
584 daughter of about the same age. A bride price is then settled by
583 women relatives of both families. The boy's father pays a first
annual installment, and the girl's father gives the boy a shirt
or coat as a token of the betrothal. Then the marriage contract
is complete. If for any reason the contract is broken, the installments paid are refunded. When the agreed amount has been
563 paid in full and the bride and groom have reached the proper
585 age (fourteen for girls, sixteen for boys), the boy's parents
[582] invite all the neighbors to a feast and announce the marriage.
The bride and groom do not attend the feast, but remain in their
tents all day. There is no ceremony. The feast and announcement, known as the Nikah, constitute the wedding.

563 The bridegroom is not yet allowed to take his bride away
585 from her home. She continues to live with her parents for two
591 to five months, during which time her parents make and furnish
a tent (aq-ai) for them. Meanwhile the boy remains at home, if
it is nearby, or in a tent lent him by the girl's parents. He may
[606] go every seven or ten days and stay with the girl in her tent, but
the visits must be kept secret from her father. If he appears
before his father-in-law, it must be as a stranger.

000 before his father-in-law, it must be as a stranger. At this
563 stage, if the bride has proved to be unfaithful, the boy's father
586 may demand the bride price back and break off the marriage.

563 When the tent is finished, the bridegroom takes it and his
591 bride to his own home. If, after one year, the bride finds her
586 married life unsatisfactory, her father may return the bride
price to her husband and the couple is divorced.

4. Work and leisure

563 General work around the tent is done entirely by women. The
462 women are strong, healthy, and energetic workers. They not
181 only do the housework, but they also milk the yaks, sheep, cows
and goats, weave rugs, make rope and build and pitch the tents.
Men, though strong and able to endure great hardships, incline
[517] toward indolence. They like to play the guitar far into the night.
[534] Nevertheless, they also have work to do. They cultivate the
barley fields and look after the safety of the flocks and herds on
the steep mountainsides.

563 The Kirghiz are sports-minded. Their most common game is
526 baiga, in which the carcass of a sheep or goat is the object of
contention. Forty or fifty contestants, mounted on strong horses,
strive for possession of the carcass. It is every man for himself. One man dashes forward with the carcass and the others
pursue him, trying to tear it away from him. If he is unhorsed,
by fair means or foul, he must yield up the trophy. A fast,
furious, dangerous game, the Kirghiz love it. In it they display
their remarkable horsemanship.

563 The Kirghiz love music and dancing. Only the men dance. The
535 music is provided by a dulcimer, a native banjo and a drum, and
534 much form and ceremony are involved in the dance.

D. The New Uighurs

563 1. The people

The New Uighurs are also called the Eastern Turks. They
[162] comprise about seventy per cent of the population in the southern
[131] part of Sinkiang Province, and some live north of the Tienshan
Mountains wherever the soil is fit for agriculture. They are a
farming people.

The New Uighurs are noted for their gentle character, their
563 honesty, hospitality and complaisance. Criminal offenses among
181 them are very rare; they look upon such crimes as murder,
[674] arson and robbery with a sort of horror. Their houses are never
[342] locked, and their grain is stored in outside repositories.

[251] They are a people who love to make music. Their most common instruments are the dotou, a two-stringed guitar, a six-
[534] stringed mandolin and the tambourine. Boys and young men sing
563 wherever they go, and there are singing beggars and wandering
533 minstrels. The people have love songs, ballads, comic ditties,

/The New Uighurs/

563 [533] songs of poverty and exile, and popular songs of various kinds.

[776] [778] The New Uighurs are great believers in the efficacy of local saints, and there are innumerable shrines all over their region dedicated to saints and heroes.

2. Patterns of living

563 a. Dwelling

342 [184] Most of the people live in small hud houses called öy, or sometimes hānä, which resemble the simple earth, stone and reed-mat homes of the poor farmers of North China. Rich people live in well-built houses with courtyards and gardens.

[354] [352] The typical design of the house is a flat roof upon which small openings are left to serve as windows. The windowframes are equipped with folding shutters, and are closed at night during the winter. The window openings are so small they admit little light, and the interior is always in semi-darkness. Floor and walls are packed with reed mats and earth. The rear of the room is set apart by a partition of squared beams, and has a raised floor. This elevated section, its floor covered with reed mats and thick felt, serves as the bed and also the dining table. Most of the family's time at home is spent on this elevation. The door of the house is so low that one must bend down to pass through it. Almost every room has a chimney.

[251] [352] [351] [184] The flat-topped roof of the house is used for drying grain and other agricultural products. Each house also has a veranda on which plank beds are constructed for use during the summer. Couches of wood or clay under the trees also serve as sleeping accommodations during hot weather. A house with a courtyard is surrounded by a wall of earth. In the southern area, the gardens of the homes are surrounded by hedges.

b. Food

563 262 [272] [273] Wheat and corn are the staple foods of the people. Rice is a luxury used only for entertaining and festival occasions. Meat is preferred to vegetables, and mutton to beef. Chickens, ducks and other fowl are eaten, but not considered especially desirable. The famous Turfan raisins and Hami (Qomul) melons supply large quantities of fresh fruits for these people. Mare's milk is drunk extensively, and the noble drink called kumis, horse milk wine, is considered the most healthful of all sour milk concoctions.

563 262 252 [264] For entertaining, camel and horse meat, beef and mutton are served with fresh fruits, crystalized sugar and kumis. Meats may be boiled or roasted. The most common dishes are grilled mutton and kidney, and cold boiled mutton and liver with bread. The favorite dish, called pilav, is made of the fattest mutton or beef cut into small pieces and cooked with rice, chopped carrot, onion, garlic and seedless raisins, cooked in a large cauldron. Liquid foods are eaten with wooden spoons. Other foods, including thick porridge and pilav, are eaten with the fingers.

000 ing thick porridge and pilav, are eaten with the fingers.

c. Clothing

563 291 Men's clothing consists of a short inner robe (chapan) and white cloth trousers. A gray-brown or dark blue cotton robe is worn outside. The outer garment for winter is lined with cotton-wool or sheepskin. The man girdles himself with a dark blue, brownish or crimson cotton sash. In the summer the men wear skullcaps, which are taken off only when the head is shaved. In winter a warm hat with a wide band of fur is worn over the skullcap. Men wear high-heeled boots. When they go to the mosque to worship, or go to visit friends, they wear galoshes over the boots and leave them outside or in the entrance hall.

Women wear long white cotton shirts, narrow at the bottom. For convenience in nursing, the shirt of the married woman has a front opening trimmed with crimson or pink cotton ribbons. A girl's shirt buttons up the back. The outer garment is a long-sleeved robe reaching to the ground. Sometimes a wide-sleeved short jacket is worn over the robe. No sash is worn by women. Boots are similar to those of the men, except that they are fancier and tighter around the calf.

On hot summer days, both men and women wear only their inner shirts, and children run naked most of the summer. In spite of the fact that the ground is very hot in summer, both men and women usually go barefooted.

[302] The girls wear their hair braided in a number of tiny plaits tied with ribbons. Married women braid their hair and wear the plaits in front. Neither men nor women are often seen without hats. In summer the women wear caps or scarves tied onto the backs of their heads. In winter they wear fur hats similar to the men's. Veiling was a custom strictly observed during the reign of Yakub Bek, but it is now disappearing.

563 301 Like most of their sisters elsewhere, the New Uighur women love jewelry. For dress occasions they wear silver earrings mounted with gems, silver finger rings, and coral or glass beads. When flowers are available, they wear flowers on their heads.

563 276 d. Tobacco

Almost all the New Uighur men, and in fact most of the women smoke and chew tobacco. Pipes for smoking are massive wooden products of native craftsmanship. Hashish is used a great deal in the larger villages and towns, though not in the smaller settlements, and in the big towns there are special houses where hashish is sold.

3. Customs and etiquette

563 a. Marriage

562 58 Unlike the Kirghiz, whose brides are highly valued, New Uighur women are at a discount and no bride price is paid. Men can marry easily, and divorce their wives even more easily.

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600 can marry easily, and divorce their wives even more easily. A
563 farmer seldom has more than one wife, but a city man usually
[595] has at least two, living in different parts of town. The marriage
[369] age for girls is twelve to fourteen; for boys, fifteen to sixteen.
[582] Matches are arranged by parents, and often the children have
[584] known and played with each other for years. Ceremonies are
563 performed at the girl's first marriage. Her parents invite all
585 their neighbors to a feast, at which the leaders of the mosque
are also present. Together the bride and bridegroom eat some
[152] bread dipped in salt water. Customarily the bride and her
mother weep and wail aloud during the ceremony. The mullahs
are paid a fee for performing the rites, and food and money are
given to beggars. All expenses are paid by the bride's family.
The only liability incurred by the bridegroom is the hagg-i-mihr,
a settlement for his wife. Theoretically the wife can claim this
settlement at any time before her death, but it is never claimed
except at divorce, and occasionally this old tradition is omitted.

A procession of musicians accompanies the bride, who rides a pony or donkey or walks in front of the others from the home of her parents to the home of her husband. When she arrives at her new home, she is lifted over the threshold by her husband and his relatives.

[556] Several days after the wedding, the bride's family, if wealthy,
gives one party for the men of the two families, and one for the
women.

b. Coming of age

563 Women do not reach their full social status until they are
562 thirty or older, when they attain the dignity of jawanlik. A
885 woman who has reached this age of discretion is called a jawan,
[302] and is privileged to braid her hair in two long plaits.

This coming of age is celebrated by a feast known as jawanlik
toi, given by the husband. For the first time the woman appears
with her braids, and wearing a special shirt known as the jawan-
chi konglak. After this celebration she is more important in the
home and commands more respect from others. She is also
[581] worth more on the marriage market, as the younger bride has a
tendency to run back to her parents. A New Uighur man would
rather obligate himself heavily to marry a good-looking jawan
than to take a young girl. The word jawan can always be found
[533] in their love songs, as in the following example:

[539] "Who is it who knows what health is worth?
Not the healthy man who has never been ill.
What woman is it that knows worth in a man?
Not the girl who has never been a jawan." (Skrine 1926:203)

c. Remarriage

563 Remarriage is not condemned in New Uighur society. The
587 average man is a lazy, good-natured, easy-going and rather

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563 587 slow-witted fellow. A woman who is quick-witted, energetic and above average in looks can exchange a useless or uncongenial mate for a better one with no difficulty. A New Uighur beauty can count her past fancies by her successive husbands, just as a horse-racing enthusiast in America dates his past life by Derby winners.

563 d. Ceremony of birth

843 844 The expected arrival of a child is kept a secret from all but the husband, as it is believed that publicity may make the birth difficult or even dangerous. The husband secretly summons the midwife, who utters some words during the delivery to drive away evil spirits and protect the life of the newborn.

563 846 On the second or third day after the birth of the child, the parents are visited by close friends and relatives. All bring gifts to the baby. Men traditionally hope for male offspring, women for daughters. A newborn boy generally receives a cow, horse or sheep from his grandfather.

563 852 [553] [854] [302] When the father summons a Mullah to name the baby, it is the occasion for showing the child to close friends and relatives. When the baby is twenty days old, he gets his first bath. He is washed again after forty days, when his head is shaved for the first time. For the shaving, a few boys from five to ten years of age are invited, and one boy of gentle character whose parents are both living is selected to perform the gesture of shaving. The actual shaving is done by a man.

e. Funeral and burial

563 764 New Uighur ceremonies regarding death are more elaborate than the Kirghiz ritual, though both peoples are of the same religious faith. When death occurs, relatives and close friends of the family are informed and invited to take part in the prayers and share the grief.

563 764 793 The corpse is left in the room where death occurred, and no one is allowed to touch it. When the day of the funeral is set, three mullahs are summoned to perform the ablution rituals. They undress the body and place it on folded doors. One pours water on the body, the second washes it and the third turns the body. If the deceased is a woman, the ablution rites are performed by an old religious woman. During the rites, no one but the mullahs may be present in the room.

When the body is cleansed, the mullahs dress it in three white cotton shirts. The inside shirt is short and has an opening in the front. The second is of the same style, but reaches to the knees. The shroud, which has an opening for the face, is placed over the shirts and tied at each end, leaving only the face uncovered.

Then the mullahs carry the body on a felt into another room and place it on a bed, and family members, relatives and friends

563 come to have one last glimpse of the deceased. Tradition forbids
764 a woman to look upon the face of a dead man, a tradition
[793] seldom observed now, but no man, not even the husband, may
look at the face of a dead woman.

Among the poor, funeral services take place on the second
[184] day in summer, the third in winter. The wealthy delay burial
until the third or fourth day to allow time for the relatives to
assemble.

No coffin is used. The body is carried in a felt, placed on a
[793] stretcher and covered with a white sheet. After a mullah reads
a prayer of absolution, four men lift the stretcher and the
[783] mourners proceed to the graveyard. Relatives and friends walk
in front of the stretcher, the Mullahs behind. Women accompany
the procession for a short distance, but never to the grave.

The rites of burial, the position in which the body is placed
[171] and the covering of the grave are similar to those of the Kirghiz.
563 After the mullahs have prayed over the covered grave, the
764 mourners go to the house of a relative where all pray for the
782 deceased. This ceremony is performed in another house because
[784] no fire may be made nor food cooked for three days in a house
in which death has occurred. The rich perform the post-interment
[184] prayers in a tent erected next to the grave, and mullahs
are engaged to read the Koran for a time varying, with the family's
social and financial position, from seven to forty days.

563 Traditionally, close relatives of the deceased, both rich and
765 poor, mourn for forty days after the funeral. They wear black
or white robes with white sashes, and the sons of the deceased
do not shave their heads.

Three days after death, prayer is said in the home of the
[782] deceased. The same kind of prayer, for the redemption of the
dead person's sins, is said on the twentieth day after death, and
again on the fortieth. On the fortieth day after the death, a close
friend of the deceased invites the sons to his home, removes
their mourning robes and shaves their heads. The last prayer is
offered on the first anniversary of the death.

f. Etiquette and manners

563 Among most of the New Uighurs who respect the Moslem tradition,
562 it is the women who keep up the prescribed standard of
576 etiquette. In the presence of guests, it is customary for the
wife to rise when her husband enters the room, and go and sit
near the threshold until the husband seats himself. Also, to
hand him anything she must rise, and offer it with both hands.
Women always wear some sort of headgear when they eat. This
does not mean that the women of Sinkiang are treated as slaves
by their husbands. In general they enjoy considerable independence
compared with women in other Moslem countries.

563 Relations between the New Uighurs are characterized by
576

563 mutual courtesy. In addressing one another they use the polite
576 form of you. The same politeness is demonstrated between wife
and husband. Parents use the equivalent of "thou" to address
their children, servants or workers. Upon meeting a friend or
entering a friend's house they say "As-salam Alaikum," and the
reply is "Alaikum as-salam." They inquire about the health of
the family, then bow and shake hands. Only women kiss when
they meet, and only if they are related. When they part they say
"Khosh," or "Allah Akbar," meaning, "The Lord is great."

563 The more religious women pray before eating or starting to
576 do something. Washing the hands before and after meals is man-
574 datory. Bowls of water and towels are provided at a feast or
264 banquet table, and hands are washed between courses. When a
[782] hostess serves refreshments to a guest, the guest rises, bows
and says "Ishqallah," meaning thank you. Polite speeches are
made by both host and guest on the guest's arrival and depar-
ture. Good manners are regarded as important.

4. Superstitions and taboos

563 The New Uighurs attach superstition to almost everything.
771 They believe in witches, ghosts, charms and talismans. As
mentioned before, they believe in the powers of local saints and
[776] heroes, to whom they have dedicated innumerable shrines, and
[778] certain superstitions connect these shrines with the curing of
disease and the bearing of children. Ancestor worship is also
[769] strong among them, as shown by the popular names of the
shrines.

[756] The people are also firm believers in witch-doctors, and in
magic powers that cure disease, induce love, or sow enmity
[755] between people. Ghosts are much feared, especially the ghost of
[789] a Chinese. People regard the Urumchi Road from Kashgar as a
563 haunt for Chinese ghosts. They believe that if one is haunted he
771 may be able to propitiate the ghosts by leaving money on his
775 doorstep overnight. If the money is gone in the morning, the
[782] ghosts have taken it and will make no further trouble. They also
have a superstitious dread of snakes, and believe that if one
[825] kills a snake, its mate will haunt him.

563 The New Uighurs try to maintain an everlasting fire in their
372 fireplaces, to bring prosperity to the house. Ashes from the
fireplace are carried out at night or before sunrise, for to clean
[777] the fireplace and take out the ashes during the day may bring
563 misfortune to the household. They fear thunder, and during a
821 thunderstorm they pray for deliverance from threatening danger.

5. Religious celebrations and festivals

563 Like the festivals of Moslems the world over, the festivals of
796 the New Uighurs are deeply colored with religious influence.
Besides Fridays, which are generally celebrated, the people
have only three main holidays. Rõse-häyt, Kurban-häyt and

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563 Yengi-Yil (New Year).
796 Rõse-häyt, a solemn holiday, is celebrated in the ninth month
according to the Moslem calendar, and lasts three days. The
[785] holidays follow the thirty days of Rõse fast, which resembles
the Ramadan fast discussed previously. During the three days,
everyone stops work and visits friends and relatives. In each
[574] household, guests are served meats, boiled eggs, fruits, all
[262] kinds of cakes and sweets, and tea.

Kurban-häyt is also a three-day holiday. On the first day,
the orthodox go to the mosques at sunrise and pray for two
[184] hours. After they return to their homes, every adult male in a
[782] rich family kills a sheep. Among the poor, only the head of the
house kills a sheep. These sheep are sacrificed to Allah, who,
[775] they believe, will make their journey to the Garden of Eden
easier after they die. Then there is celebration and feasting.
Musicians play all day long in the streets and bazaars, while
both men and women dance.

Yengi-Yil, the New Year, begins with the first lunar month, and is also celebrated for three days. No services are performed in the mosques at this time. Musicians play, and there are singing, dancing and feasting throughout the community. It is the custom for women to sing on swings constructed for the occasion in the bazaar.

563 Nazara is a celebration observed by the wealthy in connection
796 with weddings, birth and circumcision. The host holds open
house for his friends, and gives bread and meat to the poor. As
184 the rich are enjoying the host's hospitality, the poor are clus-
[735] tering at his gate awaiting the distribution of food. Each re-
ceives a large loaf of bread and a slice of meat, and is expected
to call down the blessings of Allah upon the benefactor. The
hospitality and charity extended by the host are considered to
enhance his merit.

6. Leisure, music and dancing

563 When the crops are gathered and the field work is completed,
517 both men and women like to visit the bazaars in the neighboring
towns. They go for the entertainment, and for the news and gos-
533 sip circulating in the bazaar. The well-to-do give evening par-
535 ties for their friends and relatives, and always there is an or-
chestra at the party, to play for singing and dancing. According
to custom, only two persons dance at a time. They dance slowly
and smoothly, with no quick or lively movements. Their dancing
is very graceful, but monotonous. Party refreshments are cold
meats, pastries, fruits and tea.

563 Although most of the New Uighurs lead a hard and humdrum
517 type of life, they become gay and animated when they sing and
listen to music. They exploit every possible occasion to have a
good time—weddings, birthdays, circumcisions, even ablution

S
563 rites. Even the poor give Tomashan, evening parties, to enjoy
517 themselves.

S
7. Guardians of national customs

563 In Sinkiang, as in most Moslem communities, there are
624 Sheikh-I-Islam, or guardians of public customs and morals. The
554 people elect them, and their title is sanctioned by the district
577 Khukum-Kazay. They receive no pay, but they are accorded
honor and respect. Their duties are to guard over the morals
and customs of the people, and to inspect the quality of goods
sold in the bazaars and protect the consumers' interests. In
the old days, the Sheikh-I-Islam were also to see that the women
veiled their faces and that the men attended the mosques.

E. The Kazakhs

S
1. The people

563 The Kazakhs are one of the important peoples in Sinkiang
K Province. They and the New Uighurs are often referred to as
173 people of one origin. According to legend, the early ancestor of
mankind had two sons. One was timid and mild, the other tough
and quick-tempered. The timid son was diligent in farming, but
the other had no interest in cultivating the land, so he was driven
away from home. The son who stayed on the farm became
the ancestor of the New Uighurs; the other, of the Kazakhs. Another
legend has it that the Kazakhs of Sinkiang are descendants
of the younger brother of Chingis Khan.

S The Kazakhs are nomads who have settled in the northern
563 part of this region, northwest of Ili. Few of them farm. They
K are noted for their horsemanship. Children begin riding when
526 they are very young, and little boys and girls are fastened to
(131) their parents' horses so they will become accustomed to all
(241) kinds of techniques, tricks and fast riding.

S The people belong to the Islam faith. Because of their nomadic
563 way of life they have few mosques. They pray at definite
K times, wherever it is convenient, always standing to face Mecca.

771
2. Patterns of living

782
a. Dwelling

S As the people lead a nomadic life, they have definite periods
563 in the yearly cycle for moving their tents. During the summer
K they journey from one pasture to another; in autumn they are
221 busy shearing the sheep, stringing the hay, harvesting crops
and preparing their winter quarters; the winter is the time for
rest and relaxation.

S During the summer they need light-weight tents. The shape
563 of the Kazakh summer tent is similar to that of the Mongols,
K except that the Mongolian yurt has a round top and the Kazakh
342 tent has a curved tip. This difference can be noted from afar.

The winter dwellings of the Kazakhs are permanent buildings

S
563 of stable construction. The common people build their winter
K tents with walls of interwoven twigs, sun-dried bricks and mud
342 or soil filled with roots of grass. The winter quarters of the
wealthy are of wood or stone. The common tent has but one
K room, shared by the family and their animals. The rich have
[556] numerous outbuildings, corrals for the different kinds of ani-
[184] mals, storage places for the hay, and even stables.

K
The settled Kazakhs are those who have, for economic rea-
[361] sons, adopted the sedentary life of the farmer. Usually too poor
to own animals or the equipment to move around, they stay in
one place for harvesting and making hay. They live the year
around in the same sturdy tent, adding an inner-lining of felt for
protection from the winter winds.

S b. Food

563 The diet of the people is the same as that of the New Uighurs.
K They are meat-eaters, though the very poor cannot afford to
262 have it often. Their special festival dish is horse-meat sausage.
[171] Their specialties for entertaining are fermented mare's milk,
[272] horse-meat sausage and pilav. Brick tea is used in quantities.
Their pilav differs from that of the New Uighurs in that they
substitute dried apricots and dates for onion, garlic and carrots.

S c. Clothing

Both men and women dress like the New Uighurs except for
563 color. The men's inner garments are white, red or purple, and
K their cotton outer robes are black. Women usually dress in
291 white or black. Instead of a cotton sash, a man wears a leather
[171] belt. A rich man's belt is ornamented with stones, coral, silver
[556] or gold. Accessories such as a knife and a leather pouch are
hung on the belt. Instead of a hat, married women wear long
turbans of cotton print. After she has been married for a couple
of years, a woman's colorful turban is taken down by her mother-
K in-law and replaced by a white one. This act indicates that the
[885] young woman has earned a more important position in the family,
and corresponds to the "coming of age" of New Uighur wives.
Young Kazakh girls wear their hair braided like their New Uighur sisters.

S 3. Social values, customs and etiquette

563 Traditions and customs of the Kazakhs are almost the same
K as those practiced by the New Uighurs. Funerals and wedding
769 ceremonies are the same except that the Kazakhs celebrate the
171 anniversary of a death with a big festival, like a birthday or a
wedding, whereas the New Uighurs commemorate the occasion
only with prayer. On this day the close friends, relatives and
family members of a deceased Kazakh bring their own tents and
food to the graveyard. The host provides food and drink. There
are games and races, singing and dancing.

000 One custom peculiar to the Kazakhs involves stealing. The

/The Kazakhs/

S 563 K 685 One custom peculiar to the Kazakhs involves stealing. The Kazakh will steal only from someone who has been unfriendly toward him, and generally he will steal only animals, which cannot be well hidden. The idea behind the act is to show courage, and if the theft goes unnoticed, the thief feels proud of his cleverness. Once the theft is discovered, however, the thief willingly admits he has been outwitted, and submits to punishment. It is customary for the apprehended thief to repay nine times the property stolen; that is, if he has stolen one sheep, he must give its owner nine sheep.

S 563 K 574 The Kazakhs are noted for their hospitality. In theory, they must keep what amounts to open house for travelers, including enemies and strangers, and a guest may stay indefinitely without paying for food or lodging. It would be very bad form for a host to ask a guest to leave. Furthermore, the welfare of the guest is the responsibility of the tent owner. A traveler may claim damages if he has suffered from hunger or exhaustion in the vicinity of any camp ground.

Obviously such laws of hospitality impose a heavy burden upon the host, and for that reason the Kazakhs try to avoid camping near routes of travel. Some even conceal their tents K [556] [554] behind the hills. In practice, the traditional hospitality is kept only by the wealthy, and then, "A visitor is treated well or ill according to the importance of his 'tribe' and the number of his ancestors." (Hudson 1938: 73.) That is, for a guest of importance the host would kill a sheep, whereas a poor visitor would be served only tea or milk.

S 563 K 608 Sworn brotherhood is a practice prevalent among the Kazakhs, a relationship which may be formed between two persons of different blood groups. A very solemn ceremony takes place when two persons take the oath of brotherhood. They may swear on the Koran, or "embrace one another over the blade of a sword or with a dagger at the throat of each other, taking oath that they would be friends to one another for a specific time or for life." (ibid.) Such brothers share each other's happiness or sorrow, and personal and family property. The offspring of the sworn brothers may continue this relationship. Women, too, may fraternize in this way, and it is said that the relationship may even be formed between two persons of the opposite sex.

S 563 K 576 264 574 [171] The Kazakhs practice the same etiquette as the New Uighurs, with a few noteworthy variations. At feasts, the animals to be eaten are always killed in the presence of the guests, to honor the guests and indicate that they are being offered the best. Another strict custom, observed by both men and women, is to wear a hat or cap at meals. If a guest has forgotten his hat, he is given a stick of straw to adorn his head. To eat bareheaded is an insult to the others present.

/The Kazakhs/

S 4. Work and leisure

563 The division of labor between men and women is like that of
K the New Uighurs. Also like the New Uighurs, they love to sing
462 and dance and otherwise enjoy themselves. Because of their
533 hard life, their songs carry a meloncholy quality, and their
535 dance is simple.

[191] It has been mentioned that the people are noted for their ex-
S pert horsemanship. Most of their games are played on horse-
563 back. There are three which may be played by all ages. One,
K similar to the baigi of the Kirghiz, is called "Run for the Sheep."
526 Men on horseback chase a sheep, attempting to drive it along a
designated course to a finish line. With perhaps a hundred horsemen participating, this game may become quite chaotic.

In the "Pick up Race," the riders hold themselves on their horses with only their legs, and bend down from the saddle at full gallop to pick up silver coins from the ground. The one who picks up the most coins and stays on his horse's back longest is the winner.

The third game, "Girl Chase," is commonly played by the youngsters. The crowd selects a boy and a girl, who ride off together to a designated starting point. On the way, the boy is permitted to say anything he wishes to the girl, and she, no matter how provoked or embarrassed, must tolerate it for the time being. When the referee gives them the signal to return, the boy rides hard with the girl in pursuit. If she catches him, she may punish him for his comments by hitting him with her riding whip. This game serves love-making purposes besides developing riding ability.

N
*563 F. The Mongours

M 1. The people

131 The Mongours settled largely, and still live, on the north
361 bank of the Yellow River. The country is adapted primarily to
311 cattle breeding, but most of the plains and the largest of the
valleys have been opened to cultivation. The people were for-
N merly ruled by chiefs, and the clans scattered between two
*563 major tributaries, the Hsi-ning and the Ta-t'ung, of the Yellow
M River. (The word clan is used here to designate a group of
614 people who have a common surname, are ruled by a common
622 chief and share a common territory.) The Mongour clans trace
[175] their presence in the Hsi-ning district as far back as the Yüan
Dynasty (1260-1368). In the Ming Dynasty, a fixed territory was assigned to the chief of each clan, and from then on they enjoyed a peculiar kind of local autonomy under their own clan chiefs.

N The origin of the Mongours has been a puzzle to researchers.
*563 One idea is that they are a mixture of the Aryans and Mongols;
M another, that they are Chinese and Tangut. Some Chinese con-
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174

/The Monguors/

N
*563 sider the Mongours an offshoot of the Mongols; others believe
they are of Sha-t'o Turkish stock, and that they came to the Hsi-
M
144 ning region during the T'ang Dynasty (618-906), but that they
174 were not subjugated by the Chinese until the Ming Dynasty.

The Chinese refer to the Mongours as T'u-jen, or natives,
N
meaning the people born in a certain place, or the original in-
*563 habitants of that place. After the Mongours submitted to the rule
M
of the Ming Dynasty, their chiefs, according to Chinese histori-
648 cal record, became Chinese officials with the title of T'u-ssu.
175 At the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, the fields around the towns
311 in Kansu were irrigated by canals assigned to Chinese military colonists, and the grasslands in the valleys were assigned to the various T'u-ssu for the pasturing of their herds and the cultivation of grains without irrigation. As the Mongours were relegated to the side valleys, they were forced to abandon the more fertile irrigated fields, and for that reason part of them fell back on the pastoral economy which they had not yet entirely abandoned. The present day Mongours may be pastoral or agricultural, depending upon where they are located.

N
2. Patterns of living
*563 a. Dwelling

M
The people were originally nomads who lived in circular felt
342 tents like those of the Mongols. After they settled in Kansu, they lived in houses of the Chinese pattern, built by frontier Chinese.

M
The house is surrounded by walls, forming a square, facing
[351] south, with a small gate at the southwest corner. The house has
mud walls, thatched roof, wooden rafters and beams. Stables
M
and kitchen, separate from the dwelling quarters, are scattered
[343] at the other three corners. Mangers for the cattle are outside
the buildings, under the windows. There are rooms along the side wall where the younger sons of the family dwell, or where
M
grain, wood, saddles and farm implements are stored. The
Mongours like the reassuring nearness of their animals, and at
[231] night the courtyard is crowded with noisy animals such as mules, donkeys and horses.

M
The head of the family and his wife live in the northern build-
[592] ing against the back wall of the enclosure. In the center of the
[594] house is a room used for the reception of guests and for the
family dining room. The chief and his wife have one or two small rooms beside the living room, and the eldest son occupies
M
the opposite room. In each room there is a brick k'ang, a sort
[354] of fireplace with its opening on the outside. The k'ang takes up
[362] most of the room, and there is little furniture except some wooden chests where clothing and food are stored.

N
*563 The youngest married son and his family live in the northwest
M
corner of the courtyard near the kitchen. This is considered the
342 "blessed corner," where many offspring may be expected. Tra-
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N
*563 ditionally, the older sons move out of their parents' home when
M they are married, taking their share of the inheritance with
342 them. The youngest son, the "guardian of the hearth," remains
591 with his parents and receives the residual inheritance. He and
592 his wife are therefore placed in the "blessed corner" to carry
on the prosperity of the family.

N Both rich and poor build their own houses. The young people
*563 of the village all come to help erect the mud walls, and are re-
M warded with a big dinner. The dwellings of the rich have brick
342 foundations for the mud walls, and also painted woodwork inside.
M Every courtyard has a prayer flag (on which prayers are written
[351] in Tibetan) fastened to a pole in the middle of the courtyard, and
[782] at the base of the pole, an oven for fire offerings. In the chief's
[353] room in every home there is a picture of the guardian deity of
the family hanging on the wall, and in front of the picture, a low
[352] table where butter lamps and offering bowls are placed.

N b. Food, drink and tobacco

*563 Although the Mongours are of nomad origin, they do not con-
tinue to use the staple nomad diet after they adopt an agricultur-
M al economy. Meat, milk and milk products become luxuries to
262 the Mongours of Kansu. Because of the scarcity of domestic
[231] animals, meat is seldom eaten except at festivals or celebra-
M tions. For such occasions a sheep is usually killed. Meat is
[252] always boiled, as the Mongours do not like roasted meat.

The Mongours eat beef and pork as well as mutton, and unlike
the Mongols, they eat chicken but never the meat of horses,
M mules or donkeys. A small religious sect among them, known
[794] as "those who fast," never eat meat or garlic, or drink wine.

The staple diet of ordinary people is frugal, consisting main-
ly of tea, bread, noodles made with barley flour, linseed and
colza (rapeseed) oil. Millet is not usually eaten because very
little is grown. Vegetables are raised for sale; only vegetables
pickled in brine and vinegar are eaten daily. Salt, sugar, butter
M and wheat flour are luxuries. Only the wealthy can afford fruit.
[412] Each family has its own grindstone for milling barley flour. The
family also bakes its own bread.

N The Mongours eat with bowls and chopsticks. At home they
*563 lick their bowls clean before taking them back to the kitchen.
M
264 Some always keep their bowls with them, in the breasts of their
415 gowns. They are always licked clean, never washed.

Most families distill their own liquor from barley or wheat.
N
*563 Like the Mongols, both sexes like to drink. Men, especially,
have a weakness for it, and drunken fighting at parties is not
M
273 uncommon. Wine is used for gifts, and is a necessary part of
[431] any festival occasion.

The men are habitual pipe smokers. They smoke the long-
N
*563 stemmed Chinese pipe with a small brass bowl at the end. Some
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N *563 M 276 [372] men make their own pipes from the leg bone of a sheep. The smoking kit, a small pouch holding tobacco, a pinch of tinder and some small flints, hangs on the belt at the waist. The light is obtained by striking tinder against the flint.

c. Clothing

N *563 M 291 [177] The Mongours have always been proud of their national costume, though since the enrollment of some Chinese into their clans, a few communities have adopted Chinese clothing. During the rule of the Chinese Nationalist government, most of the Mongours kept their own costume. M [668] [177] According to Father Schram, who made a thorough investigation of the people, they were not allowed to wear the national costume after the Communists conquered their country in 1949. It is not known whether the Communists are continuing their policy of obliterating the distinct costumes and traditions of the small minorities.

M [171] The clothing of the Mongours is not greatly different from that of the Mongols. Traditionally, the men dress much less elaborately than the women. A man ordinarily wears a dark blue cotton gown, similar to that of the Chinese, that opens on the right side and hangs a little below the knees. The upper part of the gown is loose and a sash or belt is worn at the waist, making a copious pocket in which the man carries his eating bowl and various odds and ends. When working at home, a man wears a gown of roughly woven white wool. Festival gowns of the rich are of silk or satin, and a vest or sleeveless jacket is worn over the gown. The ordinary man wears a cotton gown and jacket for festive occasions, with a plain silk or cotton sash.

In the old days, men wore trousers only when they went to town. Now they regularly wear blue cotton trousers cut in the Chinese style, with the legs stuffed into their cloth-topped knee boots. The tops of dress boots are sometimes embroidered. In winter, leather boots are worn. Few Mongours wear underclothing, and neither men nor women wear stockings.

M [301] Almost every young man wears a silver-plated bracelet carved with Chinese designs, and most men wear finger rings set with coral or turquoise.

The woman's gown is very full, has wide sleeves, and hangs to her heels. It overlaps in front, and buttons down the left side. An outer gown of coarse, unwashed wool is used as a working garment. Because of the natural oil in the wool, the gown sheds water well. A sash or girdle holds both gowns at the waist. Generally the poor do not wear trousers, the two gowns being their only garments.

N *563 M 292 Well-to-do women have elaborate and gaily colored festival dresses, fancy trousers and false sleeves. Like the Mongol women, they wear fancy headdresses and boots for dress occasions. At such times the outer gown is left off and the inner

N *563 M 292 gown, of finer cloth, is blue, green, red or violet. Two or three sets of extensions, of different lengths and colors and edged in contrasting colors, are sewed to the *sleeves of the gown*, giving the impression that several gowns are worn. The gown has a red embroidered color; the boots have black feet and red embroidered tops. The woman's trousers, usually dark blue, are tucked into the boot tops like the men's, but for dress occasions she removes the ordinary trouser legs, which are sewed to a hem just below the knee, and replaces them with richly embroidered legs which she wears outside the boots.

N *563 M 294 292 Women make their own boots, sashes and gowns. A Mongour bride spends months preparing these garments for her trousseau. She generally owns only one pair of fancy boots in her lifetime. She wears them only on festival occasions, and at the age of forty she puts them away and wears plain ones.

N *563 M 302 301 [291] Hair styling and headdress are very important to a Mongour woman. Strict tradition rules both. The young girl wears a small bun, bound with red cord and covered with a shell, on the top of her head, and braids the hair in back into two plaits bound together at the neck with red cords and decorated with shells. She never wears a hat.

N *563 M 302 291 [191] There are nine different hair and hat styles, each peculiar to one Mongour group. The married woman wears the style of her husband's group. In general, these styles resemble those of the Mongolian women. Whereas the Chinese women in this part of China never wear hats, the young married woman of the Mongours is never without one. Around home she wears a simple felt hat; on festive occasions she wears the traditional fancy hat of her husband's clan. If her parents are dead when she reaches the age of forty, she puts away her hats, showy boots, extra sleeves and all other finery forever. If her parents are still M [888] living, she continues to wear these things for a few more years so the parents will not feel they have yet reached extreme old age.

N *563 M 301 Women and girls love jewelry. They often wear three or four bracelets, and three or four rings on the same finger. Married women have elaborate earrings; young girls wear simple ones.

3. Social values and customs

N *563 M 177 [128] [614] There are in Mongour society many practices reminiscent of a matriarchal family structure. Many Mongours, however, have lost their own language, repudiated their Mongour traditions and become entirely Chinese in their social outlook. The following discussion will concern only those people whose clans are called T'u-jen by the Chinese of the Hsi-ning region, and whose chiefs were made T'u-ssu in the Ming Dynasty.

N *563 M 769 614 a. Ancestor worship

Important ancestral rites are performed annually at the be-

N *563 M 769 614 ginning of April according to the lunar calendar, in a festival similar to the Chinese Ch'ing-ming. On this occasion the clan assembles to venerate its ancestors, enjoy a great feast and reunion, and discuss matters of concern to the clan.

On the day of the assembly, the T'u-ssu, the chiefs and elders of the villages and all the family heads go to the graveyard immediately after breakfast, followed by all the other members of the clan. At the graveyard, offerings are made and rites are performed. Then food for the offerings is divided among the families, the oldest generations receiving their portions first.

M [182] [767] This annual veneration of the ancestors serves to reinforce the group unity of the Mongour clan. One of the family heads, usually of the nobility, is appointed to care for the graveyard during the following year. His duties include the collection of contributions and offerings, and the making of repairs. An assistant is assigned to help him with details.

b. Respect for elders and family heads

N *563 M 554 888 The Mongours once lived without chiefs, but never without village elders. Traditionally, the whole power of the clan was vested in the elders, who had the authority to appoint and dismiss chiefs. The village elders still take the most important part in local administration. Elders need not be rich or from noble stock, but they are men of good reputation from the more outstanding families.

N *563 M 554 592 Heads of families are also honored. At public meetings, all are allowed to express their views and defend their rights, but final decisions are made only after the heads of families have spoken.

c. Adultery

N *563 M 684 Adultery is looked upon as a serious crime. If caught, the guilty pair is flogged, the woman on her bare back, the man on bare buttocks and thighs, up to a hundred stripes. The man must confront the husband and make apologies, and present him with a sheep or a pig. A trial is held and fingerprints are taken. Then the pair is led through the village with drums beating while they make public confession of their sin, and they must secure an official statement of pardon.

d. Moral and legal concepts

N *563 M 183 M [593] [587] [421] Both moral and legal concepts of the Mongours seem to be based upon customs, tradition and what the community accepts as just. Some typical social values and concepts are: Wrongs must be righted and injustices corrected. Parents have authority over their children, and husbands over their wives. A widow has the right to remarry or to dispose of herself. Private property must be protected. No one has the right to disturb the peace of the community.

/The Monguors/

N *563 M 621 183 178 The village effectively governs itself, punishing offenders, righting wrongs and maintaining peace. Great stress is placed upon faithful adherence to the old customs, and one of the important duties of the village chief is to see that they are observed. In any discussion about village affairs, the supreme argument is that of old customs. To neglect or forget the customs of the ancestors would undermine the stability and prosperity of the clan. (See Social Structure.) This conviction is M [867] dinned into the ears of the young on every possible occasion. A good test of a prospective village chief or T'u-ssu is his firm and unshakable faith in the strict observance of clan tradition.

N *563 M 621 183 177 178 During the administration of the Chinese Nationalists, the village elders had a real struggle to save their old customs and traditions. Social concepts had been undermined gradually by the enrollment of Chinese into Mongour clans, and in villages where Chinese had become elders, Chinese concepts had seeped in and were creating repercussions among the young Mongours.

e. Stealing and gambling

N *563 M [685] [673] [525] [794] Stealing is considered an unforgiveable sin, and stealing animals is the worst possible form of stealing. All thieves are punished severely; cattle thieves are shown no mercy.

Gambling is not permitted. Any offender must pay a fine, which is used for the upkeep of the temples or the expenses of the spring and autumn religious festivals.

f. Widowhood and remarriage

N *563 M 587 A widow is allowed to remarry, and to make her own decision about whether or whom to marry. If she consents to remarry, she will exchange girdles with her prospective second husband in token of her willingness. If she wishes to marry one man and is being compelled to marry another, she can notify the first of the time of her departure to the home of the second, and the desired mate may kidnap her on the way. If a widow is kidnapped against her will, however, the matter is taken to the chief and the village elders.

g. Discipline of children

N *563 M 867 Children are trained early in life. They attend the meetings at which crimes are discussed and punishment meeted out, and learn first hand that undesirable behavior brings undesirable consequences. They are never shielded from the realities and miseries of life, and as a result they are more sophisticated in their social knowledge than youngsters in other countries.

h. Etiquette

N *563 M 576 264 603 According to custom, only the oldest generation may be seated during meals. When the family is entertaining, the family head presides at the meal. His wife does not sit down unless the guests invite her to do so. During family meals, both grandparents sit on the k'ang, and the elder son may sit on the edge

N of the k'ang. In the presence of the grandfather, the daughters-
*563 in-law may not sit, even on the floor.

M The Mongours regard it as an insult to the T'u-ssu to open a
576 conversation or keep one's hat on in his presence. It is con-
[264] sidered a mark of respect to remove the hat while visiting with
[603] a person of position or rank.

[554] The Mongours use the same term in addressing members of
[561] the same generation, with a differentiation according to sex. Older persons are addressed as "big," younger ones as "little."

M It is disrespectful to present a cracked bowl to a guest. The
[574] same bowl is used for serving both food and tea, and it must always be filled to the brim. One never presents the bowl with one hand, although when pouring tea, one may hold the pot in the right hand.

One is not allowed to step over a person who is lying down.

Father and daughter must always keep some distance apart. A married woman may remove her hat when visiting in her own mother's home, but she must always have her head decorated and wear a long gown or skirt in the presence of her parents-in-law or their guests.

N i. Celebrations and festivals

*563 Feasting and celebration usually follow the rites of ancestor
M worship. A large tent is pitched on the open ground below the
614 cemetery, and here the T'u-ssu sits among the nobles, elders
796 and other prominent men of the clan to receive pledges of renewed allegiance from his subjects. As a master of ceremonies shouts directions, the chief and elders of each village, garbed in there ceremonial robes, come up in turn to pay homage to
N their T'u-ssu. Then a dinner is spread for the T'u-ssu and the
*563 prominent members of the clan. Some sit in the tent, some out-
M side on felt rugs at small tables. A whole sheep is presented to
614 the T'u-ssu, then divided among all present. Wine is drunk, and
527 the festive spirit mounts. Girls dance and sing; lamas from the
273 monasteries wrestle; youngsters race on unsaddled horses. It is a great day for all, but it seldom ends without quarreling and fighting. Under the rising influence of liquor, clothes are torn, heads banged and bones broken. According to tradition, no damage suits may be brought for loss or injuries incurred on this day.

N Boys are preferred to girls in Mongour society. The festival
*563 at the birth of the first son and the selection of his name is par-
M ticularly important. The Mongours consider the lack of a son as
562 punishment for sins of the parents in some previous incarnation.
[558] The sonless woman lives a miserable life, as she has no status
[852] in the family or in society. A sonless couple will hire lamas to
[782] pray for them, and vow to make long pilgrimages or give alms
[852] lavishly if only they are granted a son. Thus the birth of the

N /The Monguors/
*563 first son is an occasion for great rejoicing. Various rituals are
M performed in connection with the name-giving, and the announcement
562 of the birth to the grandparents on both sides. Everyone
852 in the village is invited to a party, and relatives and friends
[553] bring gifts for the baby.

The birth of daughters and younger sons requires less elaborate
M celebration. Invitations are sent to the child's maternal
[203] uncles to be present at the name-giving ceremony, which is
[604] performed by the grandfather. It is thought that a woman's
[603] brothers have a powerful influence over the family into which
[553] her child is born, and therefore they must be notified properly.

M Poor families also celebrate the birth of the first son, although
[184] the ceremonies are less elaborate. If the family cannot
afford the expense of a feast, rich people of the village often
help them. It is not right to allow the birth of a first son to go
uncelebrated, for he is the new link in the ancestral chain, and
it is he who will grow up to make the sacrifices to the clan ancestor,
an important concern to the Mongours.

N j. Beard-growing

*563 A man may start to grow a beard on the first day of the first
M or second moon of the new year after his thirtieth birthday, but
302 only if his parents are dead. He must not grow a beard while
[593] his parents are alive, as it would remind his parents of their
[888] advanced age and approaching death.

k. Wedding, funeral and grave

N The customs surrounding weddings, funerals and the construction
*563 of graves are almost the same among the Mongours as
M those practiced in traditional China. Their burial, however, is
764 unique. Under the influence of Lama Buddhism, it has become
[171] the general custom of the Mongours to cremate their dead. The
[177] funeral rites are carried out by lamas. In the olden days, however,
the T'u-ssu and the nobles were always buried.

N 4. Popular beliefs

*563 Because of the importance of having a son, the pregnant
M woman is full of hopeful expectation. Everyone in the village
843 knows about the coming event, and is interested in the sex of the
562 child. It is believed that a male child lies on the left side of the
womb, a female child on the right. The pregnant woman is
watched carefully when she enters a doorway. If she steps over
the threshold with her right foot, she is thought to be carrying a
boy; if with her left foot, a girl. The logic behind this notion is
that a boy makes the left side heavier than the right, so the
mother will instinctively raise her right foot to make a step
upward.

N If several children in a family have died in infancy, the head
*563 of a family blessed with many children will be invited to name
M a newborn child, in the hope that some of his good luck may pass
553 on the luckless family.
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000 on the luckless family.

N The Mongours will never sell animals, or allow them to leave
*563 their homes, on the first or fifteenth of the moon, lest luck and
M prosperity also leave the family.

231 Although women do all the heavy work, they are not allowed
[777] to kill animals. Women are meant to produce life, not destroy
M it. When a man reaches approximately fifty years of age, it is
[886] no longer fitting for him to kill animals. As his own time of
[775] death is approaching, he must guard against reincarnation as an
animal.

N Women stress neatness and cleanliness. They always wash
*563 their hands before preparing food or starting any task, and the
M elders in the home often remind the daughters-in-law of the im-
515 portance of cleanliness. If they are not clean, the God of the
[784] Hearth will punish them and deprive them and their children of
blessings.

N 5. Occupations

*563 The historical shift of the Mongours from pastoralism to
M farming does not concern us here. Generally speaking, after the
241 Mongours were alloted a fixed territory at the border of Kansu,
233 during the fourteenth century, they were compelled to resort to
433 farming. During a long period of Mongol and Tibetan disturbance
on the frontier, it was difficult for the Mongours to keep large
herds in the relatively small valleys, so they became more and
more dependent upon the farms adjacent to their fortified villages. They sell grain to the city of Lanchou, but they own much
more livestock than the Chinese farmers. Their transformation
to the agricultural economy is complete, however, and the Mongours have no desire to return to nomadic life.

N The Mongours learned from the Chinese farmers, but their
*563 techniques are inferior. Both men and women work in the fields.
M They raise barley, wheat, rapeseed, hemp, potatoes, colza and
241 peas. Very little millet is grown. The women also grow garlic,
[777] leeks, onions, cabbage, spinach, watermelons and cantaloupes
in small gardens close to their courtyards. These products are
[432] for sale; the farmers themselves can seldom afford to eat fresh
fruits and vegetables.

N Some Mongours depend mainly upon their livestock. They
*563 raise sheep, cows, horses, mules, donkeys and pigs. They keep
M as many cows and sheep as their pastures will support. Horses
231 are the most valuable animals because they enhance the prestige
554 of their owners. Wealthy families keep handsome, fast horses
[556] and fine saddles and trappings. They also hire shepherds to take
care of their livestock. In poor families, the women tend the
[184] livestock, both in their stalls and pens and in the pastures during the summer rainy season.

N Shepherds are the highest paid workers in Mongour society
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N because of the value of the animals entrusted to them. They are
*563 skillful in breeding, and in finding the best pasture. A shepherd
M is treated as a member of his employer's family; he receives
233 the same food, and the daughters-in-law must show him the
463 same respect they accord to the head of the family.

(466) The Mongours hunt foxes, hares, pheasants and musk deer,
N using guns, traps and poison. The fox skins are sold to Chinese
*563 merchants and the best skins, used for lining the winter garments
M of the rich, bring a handsome price. Musk deer are also
224 valuable game. The precious musk glands, used as a special
439 drug or as an essence in perfume, are sold by weight to Chinese
dealers.

N Fishing is important in Koko Nor, where the lake produces
*563 an abundant supply. Mongour expeditions go there as soon as the
M lake has frozen over each winter. They go first to the chief of
226 the Mongol or Tibetan tribe on whose shore they plan to operate,
and present gifts such as wine, tobacco, noodles and the traditional
ceremonial scarf of felicity in exchange for permission to
fish and protection from the tribe. The fishermen usually go to
the same territory every year, and become sworn brothers of
the chief or some important local nomad. The expedition, which
lasts about two months, involves hard work in the bitter cold,
M but the profits are sufficient reward. Preservation of the fish is
(251) no problem; they freeze immediately after they are caught. They
are carried to the market in Hsi-ning, or sold to Moslem merchants
who engage in caravan trade.

N Mongours carry on their trade largely with Chinese and Chinese
*563 Moslem merchants. The Moslems are an energetic and
M enterprising people who drive caravans of pack mules from
438 house to house in the Mongour country, exchanging cloth, needles
439 and thread for wool, skins, eggs and grain. In the autumn
they collect oxen and sheep and drive them in small herds to
Hsi-ning. The Chinese merchants do business on a larger scale.
They send their representatives to pitch tents and display their
wares at lama monastery festivals and at the annual celebrations
and meetings of the Mongour clans. During the fall, when the
Chinese Moslems are buying up sheep and oxen, the Chinese
butchers of the cities send their agents to the Mongour villages
to buy hogs. Chinese merchants also send their buyers into Mongour
country for wool and skins, going from home to home.
There are also peddlers, who deal largely in items needed in the
Mongour home, such as needles, colored thread, cotton cloth,
M cheap jewelry, sugar and pipe tobacco. Business is always by
(437) barter, with the top-ranking woman of the Mongour household
doing the bargaining. As the peddler travels a long distance, it
is customary to provide him with a place to sleep. Before he
leaves he presents the hostess with a small token of apprecia-

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tion for her hospitality. Larger scale selling and buying are done at fairs held two or three times a year.

Occasionally an ambitious young Mongour will go into the business of long-distance caravan trade with the Tibetans. He will deal largely in mules and saddle girths woven with white wool, which can be sold readily in Tibet, and bring back wool serge cloth dyed red or purple, or white with red or blue stripes. A heavy fabric, it sheds water, and is highly valued by the Mongours. He will also bring back Tibetan incense, dates and so forth to sell to the Chinese.

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6. Work and leisure

The traditional life of pastoral nomads is rather free and lazy except at the times of seasonal migration. Descendants of nomads, the Mongours still prefer to enjoy long periods of comparative idleness alternating with short periods of intense activity. In their agricultural economy, however, the Mongour men are unable to be quite so indolent as pastoral nomads.

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In the farming communities, both men and women work in the fields. The men do the heavy preparatory work, plowing and harrowing; the women help with sowing and weeding, as well as with reaping the harvest and carrying the grains to the threshing floor. Women do the threshing. Like their Mongol sisters, they do the housework and care for the animals. Married women work under the supervision of the oldest, usually the mother-in-law.

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Although their status is inferior, the Mongour women accept it without resentment. Their outlook is conditioned by their milieu. They know what is expected of them, and behave accordingly. Though bound by strict rules of etiquette, they are entirely free to associate with men, to sing and dance in public, and to enjoy themselves. They delight in attending the big festivals at the lamaseries and the annual assembly of the clan, where they meet their friends and visit, and also show off their fancy costumes and headdress. They love to shop at the fairs, and bargain over goods. Both men and women love to sing. During the long, tedious hours of weeding the fields, men and women sing in unison.

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G. The Tibetans

1. The people

Hsi-fan is a name applied by the Chinese to the Amdo Tibetans, and to all other non-Chinese tribesmen from Sung-p'an to Hsi-ning. It means Western Barbarians. Some European scholars have maintained that the Hsi-fan are not Tibetans, and suggest that they represent a northern branch of one of the non-Chinese peoples of southwest China, like the Lolo or Moso.

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Granting that there is no such thing as a homogenous Tibetan

/The Tibetans/

*563 race, the Hsi-fans of the country west of T'ao-chao speak the
[197] Tibetan language and are as much Tibetans as the inhabitants of
any other portion of the Tibetan plateau. They come into contact
[177] with the Koko Nor Mongols farther north, whom they bully and
plunder. Unlike the Mongols, who are being pushed back every-
[648] where along the northern borders of China by Chinese agriculturalists, the Tibetans of the Kansu border hold their own
against the Chinese colonists. The northeastern Tibetans are
[181] truculent and independent as compared to the Mongols, and they
take readily and successfully to farming.

There appear to be two physical types in Tibet, the short,
[142] round-faced Mongoloid type, and the tall Aryan type with prominent features. The latter type is common among the Tibetans of
[291] Amdo. The eastern Tibetan, even though he is in Chinese dress,
[177] may be readily recognized by his peculiar habit of standing with
[516] his feet turned out at right angles to his body.

On the whole, these people are hardy, independent, and cau-
[181] tious with strangers, but they are also notably hospitable.

2. Patterns of living

*563 a. Dwelling

342 Like all nomads, the Tibetans have no fixed homes. They live
in rectangular tents usually made of yak hair instead of felt,
with wooden framework. The bottoms of the tents are made fast
with iron pins or animal horns. Mud, stone or dry dung is built
up around the tent to keep off wind and snow.

The interior arrangement varies little from tent to tent. A
*563 mud stove is in the middle, a Buddha image at the left side. On
342 wooden shelves along the walls are chests and boxes where food
352 and clothing are stored. Skin bags of butter, tsamba or flour,
353 and saddles and rifles also hang along the walls. Shelves on the
right side hold pans, water buckets, kettles, bowls, cups, a
stone mill and a few skin bags. Near the door there is usually a
[237] heap of dried ox dung for fuel.

[372] b. Food

*563 Farm products do not grow in the cold climate and high alti-
262 tude, and transportation is difficult. Thus there is little variety
[241] in foodstuffs, and eating and drinking are simple functions. The
[489] daily fare is beef, mutton and other domestic meats, fresh and
sour milk, butter, cheese, noodles, tsamba (parched barley
meal) and tea.

*563 There are no regular meal times in most households. In
264 winter when the days are short, they may eat three meals a day;
in spring and summer, perhaps four or five. During the day they
[262] eat tsamba and sour milk. The evening meal is noodles with
boiled beef or mutton, though the poor can have noodles and beef
less often.

Rich and poor eat with their hands, though the Tu-kung (chief

*563 or leader families) use chopsticks at festivals. Everyone has
264 his own bowl and carries it with him, even when invited to an-
other home for dinner.

*563 Ordinary people do not often have guests for dinner, and a
feast can be afforded only by the family of a T'u-kung. The for-
574 mal dinner, which resembles that of the Chinese, is long and
262 ample. When the guests arrive they are served milk-tea, then
184 given chopsticks and a knife. The courses include rice, sweet
556 cake (made of rice flour and dried fruit) sprinkled with sugar
and butter, patties made of chopped mutton and intestine. There
are small plates of green onions, vinegar and soy sauce for
seasoning. The last course is beef soup or mutton with chopped
potatoes, rice noodles and vegetables. Sour milk may be sub-
stituted for the soup in hot weather.

[252] Among the poor, the main meat dish for entertaining is a
sheep's head boiled in salted water.

*563 c. Clothing

291 Tibetans wear the same sheepskin robe the year around. A
man's robe ends just above his knees; a woman's reaches the
ankles. Wealthy people may have silk or cotton robes lined with
[556] sheepskin. The less wealthy may decorate their robes with red
or blue cotton trim or leopard-skin collars. The poor dispense
with decoration. The robe is often worn with the left arm and
shoulder exposed and the sleeve dangling, and in hot weather,
the wearer may strip to the waist leaving both sleeves dangling.
Women often strip in this manner while they work, and only in
cold weather do they keep both arms in their sleeves. As they
habitually wipe their hands on their robes, they are as a rule
thoroughly dirty.

No one wears stockings. The wealthy have long leather boots
[556] trimmed with black, red or green. Most common people go
barefooted in summer, and wear sheepskin or felt boots in win-
ter. All wear felt hats or caps in winter.

The dress of the lama differs from that of a commoner. The
[793] robe is crimson, reaches to the ankles and has no sleeves. Not
even in the coldest weather is the monk permitted to wear
sleeves.

*563 Most of the men simply shave their heads, but a few leave a
302 round spot of hair on top. Women's hair styles are elaborate.
The farther one goes into the nomadic area, the simpler the way
[184] of life he finds, and so also the feminine hair styles. Women in
Labrang select a small amount of hair on the top of the head to
make a braid which hangs down the back. The rest of the hair is
made into a number of tiny braids which hang all around. A soft
red board reaching to the ankles is attached to the hair, and the
whole is heavily ornamented. This is the Tibetan woman's hair-
dress which is commonly seen.

/The Tibetans/

3. Social values and customs

*563 a. Virtue

181 577 Early social values and customs of the Tibetans were derived from their religious code and legal concepts. Their leading forefathers formulated a set of virtues for the laity, which bound them together as a people, and it is said that these virtues are still the basic moral code of the Tibetans.

The sixteen early Tibetan virtues are: "To have faith in 'The Chief Rare Ones' (Kön-chok); to perform religious observances and to study; to honor one's parents; to respect the virtuous; to honor elders as well as those of high birth; to pay heed to relatives and friends; to be useful to one's country; to be honest; to realize the proper use of food and wealth; to follow the examples of those who are good; to show gratitude to benefactors and to return their kindness; to use correct weights and measures; to be free from jealousy and to be at harmony with all; not to listen to the words of women; to be gentle in speech and acquire skill in conversation; to bear sufferings and distress with patience and meekness." (Bell 1928:11.)

*563 b. Etiquette

576 431 [822] In Tibetan etiquette, the presentation of a katag may not be made except in the presence of others. The katag is a small rectangular scarf, always white, green or blue. The white is considered the most respectful. The katag of thin raw silk is used at common social occasions, or presented to a living Buddha or a Buddha image. Another type is made of silk or satin with designs of a Buddha on it. This type is used solely for an audience with a high living Buddha or a high official, or presented to a Buddha image to show reverence.

[574] [554] When one visits relatives or has an audience with a Living Buddha or high official, the katag is presented first. The recipient will give one in exchange, but perhaps not until the return visit. The manner of presenting the katag varies with rank. For one of higher rank, such as an elder, t'u-kung or Living Buddha, the giver presents the katag with both hands. The receiver may not receive it personally, however, so the giver places it under the dignitary's chair and backs out. Two persons of equal rank simply hand the katags to each other. A person of high rank grants a katag to a less exalted person, he ties it around his neck. If there are other gifts, they may be placed on the top of a katag.

*563 574 576 Strict etiquette surrounds a social visit. When a visitor approaches a tent, he should call loudly to his host (for protection from the dogs). The host appears to greet the guest, and allows the guest to walk before him into the tent. Host or hostess lays a sheepskin or felt on the ground for a seat. The left side of the tent is the honored side. Hostess and women guests occupy the

*563 right side. The honored seat is the one farthest from the door.
574 After the guests are seated the hostess will brew tea, place a
576 wooden box in front of the guests, and serve tsamba and butter.
The guests take their eating bowls out of their robes.

[521] At dinner parties, conversation takes place before the meal.
It is proper and right for the guests to say farewell and leave
immediately after dinner.

c. Position of women

*563 The position of women in Tibetan society is very low. They
562 have no place in matters of religion, and are permitted to participate
796 in few religious rituals. They are permitted to enter the
monastery on the Memorial Day of Sakyamuni, which occurs on the fifteenth day of the fourth month. At sunrise, all women put on their best clothing with all their trimmings and ornaments, and gather outside the monastery. The women of each village form into a group, and the groups take turns going inside the temple and turning the prayer wheel. Men and boys stand by to witness the spectacle. On this day, women fast until sundown.

d. Customs

*563 On the third day of the first month each year, a coming-of-
527 age festival is held for all girls of fifteen or sixteen. Girls do
881 their hair in the adult style, dress in their best, and visit the
[302] households of relatives and friends, who present them with gifts.
[292] After a ceremony, the girls may participate in all mixed social
[574] functions, and they may also have any sort of relationship with
[431] men. After the coming-of-age ceremony, a girl may ask any
man she likes to spend the night in her tent.

*563 Tibetan marriage follows much the same customs as in traditional
584 China. Proposals are made through go-betweens, who
are usually relatives of the families. It is important that the
[787] horoscopes of bride and bridegroom be in harmony. When the
parents and the young couple give consent, gifts of wine and
[615] katags are exchanged and a contract is drawn up giving the
terms on which the alliance is to be made.

*563 The family receiving a bride or a "male bride" (The male
583 bride is a man who marries into the bride's family, leaving his
584 own home and joining hers.) pays the family for the bride in
money or jewels, and also pays a sum to meet the expenses of the engagement party. Katags are exchanged between the relatives of the two families to signify mutual consent and wishes for a happy union. The bride usually has a dowry in cash or in livestock, land and goods, depending upon the means of the family.

*563 Before the wedding day, the families of the bride and bride-
585 groom prepare a feast to entertain relatives and friends, who
bring gifts for the couple. The bride's family builds a tent for the ceremony, decorating it with pillows and comfortable seats

*563 are arranged for guests. Barley is spread on the ground, sweets
585 and fruits on a low table. The bride, fully dressed, is led in to
sit between her parents. The family returns the courtesy of friends and relatives by giving them katags. Then the bride rides a horse or walks to her new home, accompanied by relatives of both families. The newlyweds sit together to go through the formality of a meal with wine and meat, then receive congratulations and katags from the guests. The katags given by elders are worn around the neck; those from persons of equal status are slipped inside the robe.

When the ceremony is complete, the husband entertains with a feast. Guests customarily take home meat or sweets after they have eaten their fill. On the following day, members of both families dress in their best and go for an outing. They visit the monasteries, but do not enter. The celebration usually lasts for three days, with feasting, drinking, singing and dancing.

*563 The birth of a child is celebrated with a small party on the
844 third day. Though girls are not ill-received, boys are generally
852 preferred. The moment a child is born, a very small quantity
[562] of barley flour mixed with butter is put into his mouth to make
him strong and tough. A tiny piece of butter is placed on the vein
[751] of his crown to protect him from the wind, which, according to
Tibetan doctors, is responsible for one-third of all human ail-
[853] ments. A thick solution of butter is given to the mother for the
same purpose. Tibetan women prefer to nurse their own babies.

*563 The child receives a name when it is one month old. The
553 name may be given by the parent, but preferably by a high lama.
With a few exceptions there seems to be no distinction between
852 names for males and females. High lamas always give their
[793] own names to children as a blessing. It is often on the name-
giving day that a baby is taken on its first outing, to a temple to give offerings to Buddha. Birthdays are not ordinarily celebrated.

*563 "Feeding the birds" is a common form of burial in nomadi[illegible]
areas of Tibet. The corpse is taken out for the vultures to eat,
764 the idea being that the deceased then rises to heaven in the
stomachs of the birds.

When a person falls ill, the lamas are summoned to chant
*563 sutras to drive away the evil spirits. If it appears that the pa-
[755] tient has no chance of recovery, the lamas are asked to chant
[793] sutras to assist him to be born again in the "land of purity."
*563 Before the patient draws his last breath, he is bound into a bun-
763 dle, and as soon as he is dead he is placed in a corner of the
tent by the entrance. Butter lamps and offerings are placed be-
764 side him, and lamas keep vigil day and night, chanting incessant
prayers.

*563 Funeral rites are held on the third day after death. Women
764 are not permitted to attend.
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/The Tibetans/

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are not permitted to attend. The body is carried by friends and relatives to the customary spot, and on the way, those in the procession blow whistles to attract the vultures. The clothes are removed from the corpse, and one of the men slits open the chest and belly to attract the birds. After they have eaten these areas, the birds are driven away and a man cuts the flesh from the bones and places the small pieces on the ground. The birds eat it. When only the skeleton is left, the mourners crush the bones with rocks so the birds can eat them. When nothing remains the mourners are satisfied. The deceased has been proved a worthy person.

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4. Popular beliefs

When a person falls ill, a doll of clay is made to resemble him and dressed in similar clothes. The sick person's name is written on the doll, and it is thrown out onto the steppe. It is
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believed that the chiktur (evil spirit) will find the doll (khuner dzolik) and be deceived into thinking the sick person has died. He will then leave the patient in peace.

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Tibetans are great believers in fortune telling. One way to learn one's fortune is to give his date of birth to a fortune teller, usually a lama, who will consult his rosaries and then advise on such matters as the best days for going on a pilgrimage, the possibilities of getting a job, or the advisability of starting a business.

Another way is to whisper one's thoughts to a wooden fire poker, then secretly place it near someone. The fortune can be deduced from the conversation of that person.

A professional fortune teller asks his customer to place his hand in a sleeve, then tells his fortune from the finger joints. The third joint of the index finger means lion, the third joint of the middle finger, wolf. Both these joints may indicate a journey. The first joint of the index finger means mountain, which is interpreted as continuous living in the same place.

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5. Recreation

The Tibetans have no form of organized amusement or recreation, but they love to sing. The young sing mostly love songs, which are composed spontaneously as they are sung. They have religious songs in praise of Buddha. They even express congratulations and good wishes in song.

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H. The Western Mongols or Torguts

Values and customs of the Western Mongols are based on the same traditions as those of the Eastern Mongols (See IMAR Handbook). Some differences exist, however, that are worthy of discussion:

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The Torguts are noted for their courage and warlike character, but they are a friendly, good-humored, helpful people. As

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/Western Mongols or Torguts/

563 As their forefathers had much contact with the Russians and the
177 Chinese, they are more or less influenced by the culture and
civilization of both. The Chinese influence appears to be the
strongest.

563 Largely nomads, the West Mongols live a life similar to that
233 of their nomad brothers of Inner Mongolia. Only as a last resort
[171] do they abandon tent life and take up agriculture.

[241] The nobles who live in cities dwell in houses that are a com-
563 bination of Tibetan and Occidental architectural style, flat-
565 roofed, whitewashed, and with walled-in courtyards. Like the
369 Chinese, they sleep on k'angs. One often finds Russian furniture
342 in the house, Chinese embroideries decorating the walls, and
177 red silk draperies with Mongolian mottoes.

[352] The ordinary people wear long gowns of Chinese cut, but the
[353] customary Mongolian sash and equipment (see clothing section
563 of IMAR Handbook). A young man wears a long gown with a
291 sleeveless velvet waistcoat on top. Formerly, the officials
177 wore silk robes of Chinese cut, and the decorative cap of Im-
perial times with a peacock feather to signify the position of
chieftainship. Nowadays they wear a Chinese style long gown
with a sleeved jacket (ma-kua).

563 Food of the West Mongols is similar to that of other nomadic
262 peoples, but when the rich entertain, the cuisine is a combina-
556 tion of Mongolian, Chinese and Russian styles.
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ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

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ARTISTIC AND INTELLECTUAL EXPRESSION

I. The Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang

563 A. General Introduction

517 The artistic and intellectual expressions of the peoples of
Sinkiang vary greatly from those of the people of China proper.
The culture of the Eastern Turkis is influenced greatly by
Islamic civilization, and constitutes a culturally integral part
of Turkestan as a whole.

563 The artistic and intellectual creative achievements are con-
517 tained in the vast written and oral literature of the Turkic
people, in their extensive folklore, folk music and dance. The
53 arts of painting and sculpture are a tradition of the past, and
545 have scarcely been practiced since the conversion of the Turkic
people to Islam. Turkic theatre, with the exception of shadow
[177] theatre, was virtually unknown in Sinkiang prior to the Com-
[268] munist era. The Communists have introduced dramatic art into
Eastern Turkestan, the modern theatrical productions being on
the Soviet model for drama among national minorities.

563 "Unfortunately, contact with Europe and the natural inter-
course with the neighboring state of Russia are gradually de-
517 stroying these beautiful arts and crafts which have been pre-
53 served here from earlier times" (Le Coq, Albert von, Buried
177 Treasures of Eastern Turkestan, p. 41). Most of the various
forms of art and intellectual expression of the people of Sinkiang
are today in a state of decline. The contact with industrialised
Russia and the intellectual atmosphere created by the Commun-
ist regime have produced unfavorable circumstances for the
further development of the Eastern Turki artistic and intellec-
tual expression. The important works of art are to be found in
the already accumulated artistic creations.

B. Turkic Literature and Oral Art

563 The literary heritage of Eastern Turkestan is not limited
538 alone to the works produced in this geographical area, but en-
compasses also much of the Turkic literature produced in other
parts of Inner Asia as well as much of the Islamic literature.
Little of the Eastern Turki literature is completely original and
particular to this area alone; most of it being the common heri-
tage of the Turks as a whole and some of it common to the
other believers in Islam.

The earliest important literary achievements known to us in
[175] Eastern Turkestan were written in the Uighur language and date
back to pre-Islamic times. These literary documents are re-

563 ligious in character and testify to the strength and popularity of
538 Manichaen doctrines among the Uighurs. The most famous of
175 these religious documents is Khoustuanit, noted in particular
for its linguistic purity.

In the eleventh century, two new religious trends made an
[997] impression upon the Uighurs—Nestorian Christianity and Bud-
[177] dhism. The existence of both these religions and their influence
upon the Uighurs is confirmed by a few religious texts found in the area which date back to that period. These religious texts seem to be mainly translated works rather than original creations.

There were scarcely any secular documents found in Uighur. However, there is one noted secular work which was written toward the end of the eleventh century—the Kudatku Bilik. This work was written by Yusuf from Balasagun, then serving in the court of Boghra Khan. The work is concerned with the secular ruler, the nature of his office and his duties to those governed by him. It gives many historical details about the court life at the time and the political and social life of the Uighurs. Contrary to the religious Uighur documents, which do not show Islamic influence, this work was obviously written under the influence of Islamic and Arabic culture. Greek ideas, which were adopted by the Islamic culture, appear in this work. Thus knowledge and science are put above material gains and glory as the important possessions in life.

[756] Strong remnants of Shamanism are also evident, side by side with the Islamic ideas.

After the eleventh century, we find no more Uighur documents of literary value.

Turkic Chagatai literature is a product mostly of the Timurid age after the Mongol conquest of Turkestan. The main representatives of the Chagatai literature are Mir Ali Shir Nevayi in poetry and the Emperor Babur in prose. Mir Ali Shir Nevayi lived in the fifteenth century and served in the court of Hussein Baikara. He mastered both the Chagatai and Persian languages and wrote in both. He introduced many Persian stylistic devices into the Chagatai verse. Nevayi gained wide recognition for his creativity and leadership in the field of Chagatai poetry. The Emperor Babur, who lived only forty years after Nevayi, wrote:

"Ali Shir Beg was celebrated for the elegance of his manners, and this elegance and polish were ascribed to the conscious pride of high fortune; but this was not the case—they were natural to him, and he had precisely the same manner when he was in misfortune in Samarkand. Indeed, Ali Shir Beg was an incomparable person. From the time that poetry was first written in the Turkish language, no man has written so much and so well. Some of his Persian verses are not bad, but

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

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the greater part are heavy and poor. He has also left excellent pieces of music, excellent both as to the airs themselves and as to the preludes. There is not upon record in history any man who was a greater patron and protector of men of talent than Ali Shir Beg. He had no son, nor daughter, nor wife, nor family. He passed through the world single and unencumbered, and in the end, victim of a sudden stroke, he departed to the mercy of God." (Sir Olaf Caroe, Russian Empire, p. 219.)

The Chagatai language, being mainly the language of the court, was finally replaced by the Persian language, and the use of Chagatai as well as literary production in this language came to an end.

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Both the early Uighur and Chagatai literatures were the product of the sedentary population of Turkestan. The bulk of literature, however, is to be found in the oral literature which originated with the nomadic Turks. Proverbs, ballads, epic narratives, legendary tales and songs, form the body of this oral heritage. These proverbs, songs and stories are transmitted orally from generation to generation and are mostly carried by the beggars, wandering minstrels, story-tellers and professional musicians.

The popular proverbs among the Turkic people relate much about the customs prevailing among them, their beliefs and attitudes. Here are some examples of these proverbs:

[539] "The eagle has his wings, the man his horse."

"The cock tells you the time, the donkey tells you where your halting place is."

"The girl whom her father does not want to give in marriage is priced high."

"When the camel's stomach is empty, he stretches down his neck even to the thorn-bush."

"Those who never even rode a donkey's foal, now ride yearling horses; those who never even drank barley gruel now drink tea."

[177] The influence of the Persian culture is strongly evident in the popular proverb, and one finds many proverbs identical in both languages.

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The art of story-telling is very popular in Eastern Turkestan. Many of the folk tales belong to the general Turkic and some to the Persian story cycles. An example of such tales is the story of Hamra, recorded by the Russian scholar Radlow, the theme of which is taken from a popular Inner Asian written tale by the same name about the love of two supernatural beings for a young man. Many of the romantic tales of the fifteenth century poet, Ali Shir Nevayi, are in the repertoire of the story-tellers. These folk tales are full of fantastic and supernatural elements, and the Persian influence is easily recognised. These

563 538 tales, although predominantly Moslem in character, have many elements of the older beliefs in them too.

Many of the folk tales originated from the old epic tradition of the nomadic Turks. The change from nomadic to settled life, the introduction of elements foreign to the Turks, and most of all, the conversion to Islam, have left a considerable impression on the epic tradition and change the character of what was essentially an expression of a nomadic culture.

563 533 The song is a very important part of the Eastern Turki cultural and social life. It does not, however, play so integral a part of life as with the Turks, among whom the song literally lives with the people and describes every aspect of their lives. [177] Here, again, both the sedentary life and foreign elements, mainly Persian, have exercised their influence. The Eastern Turki songs are considerably more individualistic than those of the nomads. The tone of the songs is lyrical and highly personal, with scarcely any of the strength and enthusiasm of the songs of the nomads. Themes concerning love, individual fortunes and misfortunes, and different moods constitute the subject matter. The following are examples of the Eastern Turki songs (recorded by C.P.Skrine):

[539] "If my father ask you, if my mother ask you,
Say, 'He is distraught.'
Say, 'His heart is sorrowful, his eyes are full of tears.'
Say he weeps for you."

"My horse is gone from before me
My whip is no more at my side.
Even though this may be my native land
Poverty is come upon me."

"So great is my love for my dear one
Even though I planted it, it could grow no taller.
So fair is the river of my tears,
If I watered my horse from it, he would never be satisfied."

Besides these lyrical songs, strongly influenced by the Persian tradition, there is a small group of songs which still carry the influence of the epic tradition and are partly concerned with the past of the people. These songs are called kuchuk by the Eastern Turks; they are ballads or short epics, and they come closest to the epic tradition of the past. Many stylistic devices are reminiscent of the epic tradition, such as repitition of key phrases, and strongly rhythmic verse. The epic themes, however, are usually absent. Some of the ballads are comic in [539] character. C.P. Skrine brings an example of a kuchuk, The Sad Story of Mulla Tokhta and the Farthing's Worth of Tripe

(p. 211):

563 "Brother Mulla Tokhta, head man of our village
533 Swagged into market as if he were the mayor.
539 He hired himself a donkey
And bought a rope for a half penny
And a piece of tripe for a farthing
And hung the tripe from the donkey's neck.
The donkey promptly bolted
And kicked the byjar in the stomach.
Mulla Tokhta walked home with the tripe,
Took his knife without a handle and cut it up,
Took his spoon without a handle and stirred it,
Said, 'Let's have a feed,' and was just sitting down
When in burst six policemen,
Ate up all the tripe and went away."

563 538 The Russians have done considerable study in Taranchi literature and oral tradition because of their access to the area. In addition to the Eastern Turki tradition, the Taranchi texts include the oral art which sprang up in the area since the settling of the Taranchis in the Ili Valley. The most common themes are concerned with the oppression of the Taranchis in the Ili Valley and complaints against the Chinese.

The nomadic tradition is kept in Eastern Turkestan by the Kirghiz and Kazakhs, the majority of whom are still nomads. [101] They belong culturally to the Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Western Turkestan, and have no distinguishing features.

563 533 538 Music, folklore and epic poetry constitute the bulk of the Kazakh and Kirghiz cultural heritage. Because of the way of life and strong clan ties, their folk art is primarily social in character, concerned with problems common to clans and tribes and not so much with the fate of the individual.

Story and music accompany every phase of their life, and all the important occasions in life are expressed in special songs. A Kazakh writer, Abai Kubanco, wrote the following about the [539] importance of the song in the life of the nomadic Turk:

"The song will open the door of the world for you
The song will open the door of death for you
Listen to it, Kazakh, and follow its wisdom
The song travels with you all your life." (from K. Menges' article in Pivot of Asia.)

563 538 Tales and legends also play an important part in the life of the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs. There are many tales of mystery, magic, animal tales and tales about battles and struggles for good pasture land.

The heroic epos is still alive among these nomadic people, and it usually tells of historical events concerning the glory of

563 the Kazakh Khanate, its disintegration, and the struggles
538 against other national groups. The epos is carried from generation to generation orally, mostly by the traveling bards.

The Kirghiz have recently collected many of their epic poems to constitute a huge national epos. The most popular epos in this collection is Manas, which is primarily concerned with the struggle of the Kirghiz against the Kalmuks in the seventeenth century. It has strong Moslem elements, and the struggle for freedom is depicted largely as a religious battle between the believers and the infidels.

563 C. Novel and Drama under the Communists

538 The Western forms of the novel and drama have been intro-
177 duced to Sinkiang since the Communist conquest. The new fic-
668 tion produced and published in the area does not differ much
from that of China proper, except in such minor details as place names or names of persons. The literature at the present time follows the definite "party lines" decided upon in Peking. It attacks all ideas which are foreign to the party ideology, and familiarizes the readers with the new concepts of Communist ideology. The tasks set for the cultural work in Peking are as follows: ". . . to develop positively the struggle against the mistaken thought of the bourgeoisie on the cultural front, to reorganize systematically the ranks of the cultural workers, to strengthen the study of political and art theories, to elevate the ideological and art levels of the cultural workers, to develop creation further. . . to penetrate deep into the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers and to bring about the vigorous, over-all and penetrative implementation of the line of simplicity and economy so that cultural work may be made to give better service to the Socialist construction and transformation of the country." (Jen-min jih-pao, March 27, 1955.)

The content and style of literary works follows definite trends established in Moscow and copied by Peking. It is not what is known as "art for art's sake," but the literary expression and creativity are diverted to definite purposes decided upon by the Party. Writers are not free to express what they feel or believe; their subjects are chosen for them, and they must follow patterns set by the Party. "Books on art and literature, as well as literary works, have been translated into minority languages to guide the creative efforts of the numerous minority artists." (China Monthly Review, February, 1952, p. 193). There is no doubt that literary expression has been reduced to mere propaganda. The literature is far from being the true folk art of the people of Sinkiang; it is being written by expert propagandists, familiar with all the current party lines.

Many of the books designed for reading by the masses are

563 produced in Peking. A report from Peking on January 3, 1955,
538 states that "some 200 books in more than 1.64 million copies
177 were put out in 1954 in Peking in the languages of the minority
668 peoples. They were published by the Nationality Publishing
House for use among the Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh
[214] and Korean peoples. These books include works on revolutionary
theory, novels, and translations of Soviet literature. This total
does not include books published by the many printing houses of
the various minority areas." (Peking, NCNA, January 5, 1955,
1607 GMT-W.)

175 D. Artistic Expression

532 The period prior to the introduction of Islam produced the great works of art in Eastern Turkestan. The Shamanistic, Buddhist and Nestorian civilizations which were dominant in Eastern Turkestan in this period encouraged the religious expression through the mediums of painting and sculpture.

175 532 172 Late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth century, European scholars went to Eastern Turkestan to explore the ruined cities which had long been buried under the sands, and which contained many of the pre-Islamic artistic treasures. It is through the efforts of these scholars that we have most of our present information on the subject. Among the best known of these explorers, who carried out extensive expeditions in Sinkiang, were Sir Aurel Stein, Professor Albert Grünwedel and Albert von le Coq of the National Ethnological Museum in Berlin and Paul Pelliot.

Although the Chinese Government was quite tolerant at first
[648] and allowed these archaeological works and expeditions to take place, it later became concerned with the fact that so many cases full of artistic treasures were being shipped out of the country. From then on, the Chinese Government tried to put as many official difficulties in the way of these explorers as they could, and discouraged further efforts in this direction.

532 172 The important artistic discoveries were made at the following sites: near Khotan, the past capital of an ancient kingdom, at the oasis of Dandan Oilik, and at Rawak where a Buddhist shrine was found, and also in the twin oases of Turfan and Karakhoja, which proved to be extremely rich in artistic remains.

Most of the remaining structures which were fully or partially preserved are of an obviously religious character. They are usually shrines, temples, burial monuments, or various parts of monastic establishments. Most of them are products of Buddhist religious expression. Some buildings display the remains of Nestorian Christian and Manichaean murals. Manu-
[538] scripts were discovered in these sites which confirmed the simultaneous existence of these religions in the area for several centuries.

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centuries.

Most of the religious structures in general followed the Persian and Indian patterns of buildings. Every shrine had a square or circular cell with a large image of Buddha in it, and included a passage where religious processions could take place and go all the way around the Buddha statue. Additional images of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and goddesses decorated the temples. The statues ranged in dimension from over-life sized figures in almost full relief to very small figurines of sitting Buddhas.

The inner walls of these temples and the ceiling were often completely covered with frescoes. Dramatic compositions illustrating scenes and episodes from the life of Buddha, stylized mountain landscapes and illustrations of Buddhist legends were the subject matter of these frescoes.

Several examples of smaller art were also found in these temples. Of particular interest are the wooden panels, which were painted, deposited at the feet of the Buddha statues as votive offerings. Among the other kinds of votive offerings were some paintings on fabric or paper.

Sir Aurel Stein discovered the site of the ruins which belonged to the earliest historical period in Sinkiang: the secular dwellings at Niya sites, and the Buddhist shrines at Miran. Sir Aurel Stein found fairly well preserved wooden brackets and beams which had fallen from the ceilings, and parts of furniture. These objects were carved with many animals, flowers, leaves and other decorative motifs. The decorative motifs are strickingly reminiscent of the style of the Bandhara school of sculpture which flourished in India's northwestern frontier in the first and second centuries A.D. This art is often referred to as Greco-Buddhist, as its content is definitely Buddhist while its style is very strongly affected by the Greek art of the Hellenistic kingdoms of Western Asia.

Further remains of the third and early fourth century were found in the temples at Miran. The interior walls of these shrines were full of murals, containing scenes from the life of Buddha, Buddhistic legends, decorated with young men carrying garlands, and youthful male angels. The Miran wall paintings also strongly resemble the Hellenistic frescoes of the same period discovered in the Middle East, both in the techniques employed and in the general effect. Sir Aurel Stein holds the idea that they had been painted by a "Roman Eurasian." A large number of statues of similar nature were discovered by Stein in the temples at the desert site of Rawak, not far from Khotan.

Paul Pelliot and Albert von le Coq found small statues of clay and wood, and some broken heads of statues, which resembled the Hellenistic ancient art even more closely than the murals of Miran and Rawak. They were found in the Tumshuk

532 172 ruins situated near Kashgar and Yarkand.

Kucha is the site of many ancient works of sculpture and paintings dating back to the middle period of Central Asiatic art, which covers the period from the fifth to the eighth centuries.

Le Coq and Grünwedel uncovered many murals in the cave temples found in the vicinity of Kucha. The frescoes are characterized by the abundance of drama and motion. Buddha is the main subject of the frescoes, and many scenes from his life, in teaching, meditating and other poses, are portrayed. The other figures surrounding Buddha include the Bodhisattvas, worshippers, Brahmans, monks, dancers, musicians, servants and demons. They all display a great variety of features, figure, clothing, expression and pose. Muted browns, rust and flesh tones, accented with bright blue and green, form the basic color scheme of these frescoes.

(177) A blending of Indian, Iranian and late Hellenistic influences are evident in the style of the paintings and the decorative motifs employed.

The final stage of the pre-Islamic Buddhist culture in the area is represented in the collection found in Karashahr, It consists mostly of statues, some of them still preserving their original coat of paint. In these works of art we find the familiar figures of Buddha, Bodhisattvas, and goddesses done in a style which is strongly influenced by the Hellenistic culture. However, here we begin to find dieties of distinctly oriental appearance and some very realistically drawn animals (horses and camels). These wall paintings are ascribed to the seventh, eighth and ninth centuries and strongly illustrate the intermingling of eastern and western civilizations. The features of the figures clearly demonstrate Far Eastern characteristics, and the stylistic devices indicate a strong Chinese influence. (Most of the information on this section comes from Alice Thorner's chapter on Central Asian Art, in Pivot of Asia.)

An important scene of artistic discoveries in Kansu is the Tunhuang oasis, known as the Caves of the Thousand Buddhas, which Sir Aurel Stein visited in 1907. In this oasis hundreds of cave-temples are found, some of them dating to the fourth century A.D. The place was jealously guarded by an illiterate Taoist priest, who allowed Sir Aurel Stein to visit the caves only after a great deal of persuasion. Stein found thousands of paper scrolls, a large number of books in fragments and many paintings on silk and cotton in these caves. Most of the works of art (177) were Buddhist in character, and had a pronounced Chinese influence. A small percentage included Taoist and non-religious documents and works of art.

532 779 797 The conversion of the Turkic people of Sinkiang to Islam had tremendous repercussions on the artistic expression of the

532 region. A new type of art was introduced and adopted by the
779 people, and it dominates to this day. The set patterns of Islamic
[779] decorative arts and articrafts were transmitted to the Eastern
Turki from the Islamic centers of civilization by way of Persia. Sinkiang, however, has not achieved so much in these fields of arts and crafts as did other Moslem countries, such as Persia and Turkey.

531 As statues and mural paintings of religious character are
532 strictly forbidden by the Moslem religion, the artistic expres-
779 sion is to be found mainly in the field of ornamentation. The
decorative art is employed both in religious and secular objects—the walls of mosques as well as those of private houses; books, both secular and religious, and objects of daily use—are all elaborately ornamented in similar patterns. We find the same patterns of ornamental designs in mosque walls, in the beautifully woven rugs, in silk, embroidery works, brocaded caps, books, wood carving, leather and metal works. The most common patterns are geometric and floral ones. The use of human and animal figures is prohibited by the Koran, but the tradition allows their use in secular objects. The prohibition of the Koran is strictly observed in the decoration of mosques, Korans and other religious objects, but the rule is often discarded in other cases.

The most common motif in Islamic decorative art is the arabesque. The arabesque is an ornament composed of gracefully curving scrolls, crossed or interlaced and bearing stylized motifs suggesting a leaf or a flower. Besides the arabesque we find in Islamic art the representation of plants and filated and floral scrolls. The geometrical ornament is widespread in its use also, either by itself or in combination with arabesques or floral scrolls. Circles, lozenges, crosses, triangles, wavy bands and lines, form the simplest motifs of this kind of ornamentation.

531 Of special interest is the use of calligraphy as ornamenta-
212 tion. Arabic writing, in both the Kufic and Naskhi styles, plays
779 a very important role in Islamic ornamentation. The highly
decorative characters are often elaborately intertwined with scrolls and sometimes terminate in palmettes. This art of calligraphy was cultivated from the earliest times of Islam. The formal style, the Kufic, is characterized by the angular letters, while the second style, the Naskhi, is a cursive style with rounded letters. The work of calligraphy is often ably comple-
[213] mented by that of the book binders. The leather used to cover
books is looted or stamped with gold, with the designs as described above, the decoration being on both the inside and the outside of the cover.

000 Khotan is the most famous of the cities in Sinkiang in the

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Khotan is the most famous of the cities in Sinkiang in the
286 production of the famous oriental rugs, in needlework and also
531 in metal works (Kashgar and Yarkand are also important cen-
177 ters of rug weaving). The design of many of the rugs is a most
interesting mixture of Persian and Chinese styles. The whole
treatment is unmistakeably Persian, though many small details
are Chinese. The same blending of the Far with the Near East
is found in the beautiful embroidery of Khotan. The stitch
chiefly used in the embroidery is the Turkish chain stitch,
which is not found in the embroidery in China, but the wave and
cloud patterns, the butterflies and some of the flowers are def-
328 initely of Chinese design. Khotan is also famous for its crafts-
531 manship in brass and copper household utensils decorated with
415 elaborate floral designs in pierced metal work.

Kuch in the north has been famous for generations for the
286 gold and silver embroidery on velvet. Women's indoor caps are
294 the chief article of manufacture. The design as a whole is Per-
531 sian, but the use of circular medallions in embroidery on robes
(177) is a Chinese device.

There has been a tremendous decline in all these works of
53 art and articrafts in the present century, mainly because of the
517 availability of factory-manufactured cheap objects of daily use,
177 from both Russia and China proper. Thus, the carpets of
178 Khotan and the surrounding country are slowly disappearing, and
their quality has gone down. The expensive handmade items are
replaced by the cheap materials provided by modern industry.
The class of artists and artisans has declined, since it is im-
possible for them to compete with new imported products.

The artistic expressions inspired by the new Communist re-
517 gime are totally different from the old indigenous ones. They
532 center around paintings and statues glorifying the present-day
177 leaders, and describing episodes from the life of the newly "li-
668 berated" working class. Nothing could be more foreign to the
spirit and traditions of the Eastern Turkis.

E. Music and Dance

533 The taste for music and dance is highly developed in Sin-
527 kiang, and it constitutes the main means of entertainment for
important social occasions. There are professional musicians
(maghmatchi) organized in bands of three or four individuals,
available for hire. At many public feasts, a band is hired for
entertainment. The musicians chant as they play their instru-
ments. The tunes are simple, composed primarily for accom-
paniment to the dance, or, more often, improvised. To the
Western-trained ear, both tune and rhythm are monotonous.

534 Most of the musical instruments used in these bands are of
[177) Persian origin. Grenard lists the following instruments:

Doutar—a long guitar with two strings.

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534 Sitar—very similar to the doutar, but has nine strings which are played with a bow.

Tambur—consisting of five strings that are plucked with the fingers.

Rbab—longer than the previously mentioned instruments, a sort of mandolin with five strings along the front of the instrument and five others of different lengths along the side.

Hechtar—a guitar with eight strings.

Ney—a pipe with eight holes.

Surney—a copper trumpet.

Sipay—antelope horn with iron rings.

Dop—a drum.

Kalun—a kind of psaltery (ancient stringed instrument) made of a wooden box on which eighteen pairs of brass wires are strung, supported by wooden pads, regulated by fixed keys at the side. (The Chinese have a similar instrument, and it is possible that the kalun was brought from China.)

535 The dance is performed by both men and women. Each usually dances by himself, although a man and woman may dance together. They sing as they dance. The dance is fiery and rhythmic. The body sways continuously and the arms play a very important part in expressing the mood of the dancer. When a number of women perform together, they usually form a circle and exchange places. They sometimes arrange themselves in a double line or in pairs, each person dancing in her own place. Like the Turkic music, the dance steps seem dull and unvaried to the unaccustomed Western observer.

This form of dance is quite unknown in the Moslem parts of Western Asia, and would be highly frowned upon. Le Coq is of
(174) the opinion that these dances were probably inherited from the
(114) old pre-Islamic times.

The arts of folk dance and music have been promoted by the
533 Communists as part of their program of nationality cultural ac-
535 tivities and expressions. The professional teams of dancers and
177 musicians perform often in the different National Festivals in
668 China and also abroad. More than encouraging the performance of the existing folk dances and music, the Communists have been promoting the creation of the new "folk dance" and "folk music," to express the new era of liberation. A sample of the results obtained is to be found in the following excerpts from so-called Uighur folk songs:

(539) "You have made our land a lovely garden, Mao Tse-tung,
You are the inspiration of our life, Mao Tse-tung,
We know you have our welfare at heart, Mao Tse-tung,
You are the saviour of our people, Mao Tse-tung,
Long live Mao Tse-tung!
Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hurrah! H-u-r-r-a-h!"

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533 "Play your dunbra, dance and sing,
535 People of different nationalities are now closely knit,
177 Let's sing the praise of Mao Tse-tung,
668 Ai, let's sing of Mao Tse-tung!
Our beautiful fields and gardens, our dear native land!"
(Songs of New China, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1953.)

II. Artistic and Intellectual Expression among the Tibetans of Northwest China

N A. Introduction

*563 Chinghai is the most heavily Tibetan-populated area in North-
177 west China. Culturally, it is very much a part of Tibet proper,
53 although being a border region, its Tibetan inhabitants have
come often into close contact with the Chinese and have been
greatly influenced by them. The most famous of the Tibetan cul-
N tural centers in the area are the Kumbum and Labrang monasteries,
[792] where much traditional Lamaist literature and art have
been found and are still being produced. The great majority of the Tibetans in the area, however, are members of nomadic tribes, who are largely ignorant of the many cultural treasures of the monasteries. These tribes are the seat of Tibetan folk cultures—song, dance and epic literature. (The distinction between the strictly religious artistic and intellectual expressions and the unwritten folk culture is present through Tibet, and is not peculiar to this area alone.)

N B. Tibetan Literature

*563 Tibetan literature is almost exclusively religious in charac-
538 ter. It centers around the religious Buddhist texts translated
779 from Sanskrit into Tibetan, and attempts to explain them, analyze them, relate the lives of saints, eulogize convents and glorify events which are an expression of religious feelings.
N There are not many secular works, as traditionally the culture
[792] was, and has largely remained, the privilege of the monks. The center of Tibetan culture is to be found in the monasteries, and the scholars are the lamas reared and trained in these institutions.

N The Lamaist scriptures, which are faithful translations
*[175] from Sanskrit texts (Indian, Kashmiri and Nepalese), and a few also from Chinese, were made mostly in the eighth and ninth, eleventh and thirteenth centuries A.D. None of these Tibetan translations, however, seem to have been printed until comparatively recent times.

The Lamaistic scriptures consist of two great collections, the canon and the commentaries (the kah-gyur and the Tangyur). The great code, the Kah-gyur, or "The Translated Com-

*563 538 779 mandment," is so called because it was translated from the ancient Indian language. The code extends to one hundred and eight volumes of about a thousand pages each. The Kah-gyur is divisible into three great sections: the Dul-va (Discipline), the Do (sermons), and the Ch'os-non-pa (metaphysics). These three sections are considered to be the antidotes for the three original sins; thus the discipline cleanses from lust, the sermons from ill will, and the wisdom from stupidity.

The Tibetan commentary or Tan-gyur is a great cyclopedic compilation of all sorts of literary works, written mostly by ancient Indian scholars and some learned Tibetans, in the first few centuries after the introduction of Buddhism into Tibet. There are two hundred and twenty-five volumes. It is divided into two classes, the rGyud and mDo. The rGyud is mostly on rituals and ceremonies and the mDo on science and literature.

The indigenous works composed in Tibet are for the most part devoted to sacred subjects. The secular books exist, as a rule, in manuscript form, as the printing is in the hands of the monks. The sacred books can be divided into (a) apocryphal and (b) authentic and quasi authentic. The apocryphal works are the most numerous and most popular. Chief among them are the fictitious "revelations" or Terma books. Other common apocryphal works are the manuscripts possessed by the monasteries which gave a more or less legendary account of the history of the monastery.

The authentic books include many religious chronologies and records. Most of these biographies and records are legendary, especially those of the earlier Lamas and Indian monks. Some of the later ones dealing with more modern personages are of a somewhat more historical character, but are also overloaded with legends.

The leading ritualistic manuals of the various sects are of a more or less authentic character and small pocket editions of these prayer books and hymns are very numerous.

*563 538 By looking outside the monastic circles, little can be found: on the one hand, the elaboration of chronicles and genealogies of noble families, on the other, sacred plays, arbitrarily adapted to the people's psychology, temperament and understanding, by actors always ready to modify their literary origin. Folk songs and epics also originated by the people outside the monasteries. A collection of proverbs and drinking songs can be found in "The Precious Rosary" (rin-ch'en-p'ren-wa). The folk tales of the people (sgruns) are fabulous. The best known of these is that of Gesar. (Waddell suggests a possibility that the name may be derived from Caesar, or from Czar.)

Among the secular works of Tibetan literature, the most popular is the epos of Gesar, the national epic poem of the

/The Tibetans/

*563 538 Tibetans. There are a few versions of the fabulous history of Gasar, of which the version told in Kham is most frequently recited. There are several manuscripts of the Gasar legend, but none of them is complete. The Gasar saga is mostly recited orally, by the wandering bards, who can recite long passages from memory, and by the people themselves, as every Tibetan can recite a few verses of the Gasar epos. It is particularly popular among the nomadic Tibetans. The legend seems to have had its origin in the Pon time, prior to the conversion of Tibet to Buddhism.

*563 532 [177]

C. Tibetan Art

Tibetan art is divided into two categories, the religious and the secular. The influence of India can be recognized in the first category, while Chinese influence is dominant in the things pertaining to worldly life, as the cultured society in Tibet modeled its manners upon those of the court of Peking, which for centuries occupied the suzerian position.

The religious art is expressed mostly in works of sculpture and painting. The most popular and unusual of the creations of the Tibetan artists have been the tankas. The tankas are scroll paintings, or occasionally embroidered pictures, which first came to use in about the tenth century. Before that time, painting was mostly confined to frescoes on the walls of temples or monasteries or in caves. These tankas are hung in the temples and at family altars in homes. They are also carried by the Lamas in religious processions. They often portray a deity, group of deities, or scenes from the life of Buddha or the saints. Often they depict stories which the Lamas use to illustrate their sermons.

[992] The tankas are usually painted on canvas, sometimes on paper, rarely on silk. The artists are Lamas, who spend many years in training before they attempt to work independently.

Images are also made for religious purposes. They can be of gold, silver, copper or bronze; or sometimes they are of wood, stone, clay or butter. They are often studded with turquoise, coral and pearls. The artists either sculpture them by hand or make them in molds and finish them by hand.

[992] The votive tablets are another category of religious objects which requires the work of special artists for its production. They are made by the Lamas, after a set pattern from which they are not allowed to deviate. These tablets are sometimes sold to the worshippers or pilgrims, or they may be made by order of wealthy donors and presented to a particular temple. The cruder ones are made of clay, with the figure of the deity or group of deities impressed on the face. More elaborate tablets are polychromed and gilded. A few are made of bronze,

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*563 532 copper or silver. The clay votive tablets are made in molds, and finished and colored by hand. The metal tablets are also made in molds and are finished with hand tools.

Other ritual objects are made by the Lama artists, such as the cups for offerings of butter water, incense and perfume; objects for the altar (such as holy water vases), amulets and charms. The technique for making these ritual objects and the materials used are prescribed, the Buddhist canon containing the rules for making these objects.

[792] The Kumbum monastery in Chinghai is particularly noted for its work in copper and other metals.

*563 532 294 Other objects which require skilled artists and craftsmen are the robes and masks used by the Lama dancers in the mystery plays on festival days. Especially embroidered and brocaded robes of bright colors are prepared for the actors. Masks are constructed to fit over the head and rest on the shoulders of [177) the dancers. Some masks are very elaborate and grotesque. The brocaded robes are Chinese in origin, but the masks and headdresses are Tibetan.

*563 531 532 415 352 Objects of daily use employed by the common people, such as interior fittings and furnishings of houses, windowframes, tables, carpets and food vessels, are often made and decorated by skilled artisans. They all bear a strong influence of Chinese motifs. The rugs in Tibetan houses exhibit patterns which are derived from Chinese prototypes. A favorite color scheme of these rugs is a combination of light blue, warm brown and white. The little tea tables found in Tibetan homes are called choqtse. Those which are not plain are either painted gaily with bunches of flowers on flat panels, or, more rarely, carved with dragons and then painted. Most of the eating utensils, such as bowls, pots, jugs, cups and teapots, carry interesting [291) designs. Shoes are usually skillfully decorated, and so are other works of leather like mule trappings.

*563 533 792 D. Music and Dance

Music and dance play an important part in the religious worship, as well as in the lighter amusements of life. The classical music of the temples consists of a solemn though animated style of chanting and of orchestral interludes, played with long copper trumpets, with the rhythm supplemented by a multitude of percussion instruments. The hymns are always sung by memory, but there also exists written forms of them. The notation is in the nature of a graph of the rising and falling voice; large curves convey the basic tunes, while smaller loops represent melodic ornamentation. The words of the songs are articulated with great clarity and are given the right stress while the bodies of the monks sway gently to the rhythm.

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*563 533 Outside the temples, secular music is to be found in the many folk songs of the common people. The Tibetans are very musical, and they sing on every possible occasion. Most of their songs are sung as they go about their everyday life, or during their festivals.

Some songs are sung individually, some collectively. Gral glu (row songs) are sung only in the New Year Festival or the marriage ceremonies, the singers standing in rows. Sgor bzhas (circle songs) are sung by men and women who grasp one another's hands and stand in a circle walking now to the right, now to the left. Lullaby songs are sung by people standing in a long line, one behind another. Each one places his hands over the shoulder of the person immediately in front of him, and they rock to and fro as in a lullaby.

Most of the folk songs are anonymous, and usually they are circulated only within a small region. Only those which gain strong popular approval spread over a larger area, traveling with pilgrims and caravans. There are many kinds of folk songs, some of them peculiar to a special kind of work and therefore sung almost exclusively by those who engage in that kind of work. (There are special songs for harvesting, for parching corn, for making bricks, for building a house, for making the roof of a house, for loading beasts, for shearing sheep, for washing wool, and so forth.) There are many love and courting songs, and songs describing other sentiments (of sorrow, disappointment, et cetera). Some songs are composed for special social occasions, others for high dignitaries.

Following are three examples of folk songs (translated by [539] Tucci):

"From the mountain peaks in the east
The silvery moon has peeped out
And the face of that young maiden
Has gradually appeared in my mind."

"Anger and ill humour combined
Have made the feathers of the vulture dishevelled
Intrigue and worldly cares
Have completely worn me out."

"When the cuckoo comes from the country Mon
Then the seasonable essence of the soil also comes
Since I have met my lover
My body and mind have become relaxed."

*563 535 In dance as in music there is an absolute division between secular and sacred. The former comprises all rustic styles, both the elementary ring dances in the village squares and the

*563 535 far more complex and subtle figures of the troupes of professional dancers.

*563 535 536 796 It is in the sacred mystery plays (commonly known in the West as "devil-dances") that the art of Tibetan dancing reaches its heights. It is part of the regular ceremonial of the church, given at certain seasons of the year. In the large monasteries, hundreds of monks participate in these dances. The smaller monasteries also have their dancing monks and costumes for these mystery plays. The dances usually portray a story, the story always being religious, such as the victory of the heavenly forces over the evil ones. The costumes worn are magnificent, the dresses being made of Chinese silk brocade and embroidery with underskirts banded in red and yellow, the two sacred colors. In addition to the presentation of the heavenly figures, some of the men are dressed as skeletons and demons. At the culmination of the dance, to represent the overthrow of the evil forces, effigies representing them are torn to pieces.

III. Shen-Kan-Ning, the Cradle of Chinese Communist Literature

536 *668 177 The Shen-Kan-Ning border area with its center at Yenan was for a period the leading and most advanced region of all Communist activities. Even though cultural propaganda was not yet stressed to the same degree as in the period after 1949, most of the patterns of future procedure were already worked out there and then. This pertains in particular to the development of propaganda dramas on a popular level, both for the benefit of the peasants and for the army. The effectiveness of presenting to an unsophisticated audience its own problems in an inflammatory way through the medium of drama was not a discovery of the Chinese Communists. In the framework of the Ting-hsien experiment the same thing had been done in the late 1920's and early 1930's to arouse the political awareness of the Ting-hsien population. Hsiung Fu-hsi (see General Handbook) was the principal author of these popular and frequently impressive plays. As in other cases the Communists were swift in beclouding this ancestry of their propaganda plays, and, when questioned about it, made some disdainful remarks about the bourgeois character of Hsiung and the entire Ting-hsien experiment. In this field too, their political media had to be presented as being of their own creation.

*[175] Actually, political dramatics were cultivated in the Kiangsi period, but little emphasis was given to them then and in the earlier Yenan days. It was only with the outbreak of the Japanese war and the influx of experienced Chinese writers from the major cities that the movement gained momentum. Prominent

536 *668 177 among those who promoted this movement during the earlier war years was Ting-ling (see General Handbook), whose dramatic team was particularly active before army audiences. Further impetus was derived from the foundation of the Lu-hsün Academy of Arts, which also had a drama department. Ts'ao Yü and Ma Chien-ling are two of the more frequently produced authors.

The whole movement was streamlined, however, only in 1942 after Mao Tse-tung's famous speech on the "Problems of Art and Literature" (see General Handbook). The directive given therein to link up artistic activities with popular traditions was followed and, at least in name, the yang-ko movement gave contour and direction to the dramatic arts from then on. The yang-ko, literally "rice sprouting song," was a widespread and popular form of dance, songs—frequently antiphonies—and simple thanksgiving plays in the rural areas. Again the discovery of the usefulness of this tradition for contemporary propaganda purposes was not of Communist priority; it had been used in similar ways in the Ting-hsien experiment.

Very little but the name remained of the popular yang-ko tradition under Communist moulding. Most of their propaganda plays for rural and army consumption, whatever their topics and whatever their form, were called yang-ko. The number of so-called yang-ko pieces composed and produced in Yenan is legion. The most famous of them is, of course, "The White-Haired Girl," the libretto for which was written in early 1945 by members of the Lu-hsün Academy of Arts (see General Handbook).

Other playwrights, particularly Ma Chien-ling, developed the regional style of the traditional opera, the so-called ch'in-ch'iang, into an instrument of Communist propaganda. Ma's first play in this tradition is called "Bloody Enmity," and was written in 1943, the enemy being the Kuomintang and not the Japanese. His second play, entitled "Everybody is Happy," was written in early 1944. Its topic is the conversion of an opium smoker and lazybones into a useful and productive member of the rural masses. This was followed in 1946 by the play called "Save the Peace," which is put into the take-over situation after the Japanese surrender, and in which the conversion of Kuomintang soldiers is the main topic; and in 1947 by the play "The Hate of the Poor People," a civil war play in which the objects of hate are, of course, Chiang Kai-shek, the "feudalistic" gentry and American "imperialism." It is worthy of note that at that early date the Communists came out into the open with their anti-American slogans in a context in which they believed themselves to be, and were, unobserved.

The appeal of casting propaganda plays in the opera style was

536 *668 177 strong for several reasons. Not only was the entire population familiar with this style to the point of knowing from memory a large repertory of traditional plays, the splendor of the costumes, falsetto singing and accompanying acrobatics were features in which any audience rejoiced. For that reason not only the local theatre style but also the Peking opera were cannibalized. An Institute of Research on the Peking Opera was founded at Yenan, the function of which was to remould classical operas along Communist propaganda lines. Particularly plays in the tradition of the great novel, Shui-hu (All Men Are Brothers), lend themselves to this type of recasting.

538 *668 177 The story-teller's tale was also adapted to contemporary use. Perhaps the most famous of Communist epics in this style is the story of Wang Kuei and Li Hsiang-hsiang, which was written at Yenan in 1945 by Li Chi. The author is not a poet, but has won himself a name as a Communist theorist since the 1920's. He makes use in this story of the rather freely modulated and crudely rhymed seven-beat line of the popular ballad for a story in which the landlord, who is a bloodhound as well as a lecher, is finally disposed of by Communist soldiers.

Another author who worked in this genre is T'ien Chien. His "Song of the Carter," written in 1946, tells the story of an oppressed, poor peasant who, after having received indoctrination from Eighth Route Army people, succeeds in organizing peasant resistance against landlord oppression, and in the course of this action also gains the allegiance of his sweetheart.

After 1949, the Shen-Kan-Ning region lost its leading place in literature and the arts to the major cities, particularly Peking. The general trend, however, developed during this period and remained influential in all later production (see General Handbook).

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EDUCATION

I. Nationality Education in Pre-Communist Times

+175 A. The Traditional Pattern

+563 During the Manchu period, education in the Northwest was
871 characterized by permissive and non-interfering policies of the
794 government. This meant that the minorities were able to maintain and develop their own educational systems. During this
(858) period schools connected with the mosques, in the case of the Moslems, and the monasteries, in the case of the Buddhists, were the primary educational institutions. The minorities were allowed to formulate their own educational principles. It may be noteworthy that in the Manchu period, eighteen medrese, mosque schools, existed in Kashgar alone. Reading and writing were taught in these schools, and up to two thousand students were enrolled in the schools in any given year. The total number of medrese in the Northwest during the Manchu rule is unknown, but it is safe to say that each Moslem community had at least one educational institution.

872 1. Moslem schools

794 The Mohammedans have two kinds of school. The mekteb, elementary school for children, is administered by the local mosque. These schools provide education for all male children older than six. Since 1923 the Mohammedans have initiated the same educational provisions for girls.

The program of a mekteb comprises, first, the memorizing of a surprisingly high number of suras (chapters of the Koran), then the study of the Arabic alphabet, which is used by the
[896] Uighur. By memorizing various suras the pupils acquire some hundred Arabic words by the end of the first year, though their meanings do not become clear until the fifth year when the teaching of Arabian grammar is begun. Between the fifth and tenth years the curriculum covers advanced Koran exegesis, the history of Islam, geography and basic arithmetic.

873 The medrese, the institutions of higher learning, also teach
794 such familiar subjects as al-mantik (logic), al-arithmāṭīḳī (arithmetic), al-handasa (geometry), al-hai'a (astronomy), al-ṭibb (medicine), al-falāḥa (agriculture); also some subjects which are specifically Islamic in nature, such as al-kalām (theology), al-taṣawwuf (ceremonies or practical theology), 'ilm al-ilāhīyāt (metaphysics), al-'arūḍ (metrics) and al-ḳāfiya (prosody).

[896] As in elementary schools, the method of education consists primarily of learning by rote (talkīn) and dictation. Those

Those
873 students who go through six to ten years of continuous studies
875 may become ahungs, mudarris (teachers) or ustād̲h̲ (honorary
794 title of recognized teachers). Generally, the erudition of these
[554] teachers does not seem to be very high. Hence idioms like
"ahmaq min mu-allim kittāb" (more stupid than a school
teacher).

[779] Islamic laws regulate strictly the position and conduct of a
teacher. He has to be married; he is permitted to teach only in public places (ḥānūt) with big windows, so the community can watch his activities; he is not allowed to use children as servants or engage them otherwise except in school work without the consent of their parents. Occasionally, however, parents have their children serve the teacher instead of paying the regular fees.

Kashgar has a fairly well-known school, the Wanglyq Medrese, whose fame was not confined to Sinkiang alone when Bohā'eddīn Makhdūm taught there, but spread as far as Istanbul and Cairo. Another famous Moslem scholar, Rāmctulla Akhun, the leading jurist ('ilmi fiqh) of his time, taught at Wanglyq. The Kichiq Orda (Little Castle) Medrese in Yarkand was also a well-known seat of higher learning. Also called Yeshil (Green) Medrese, it was founded by Baisi Bēk, the hākim (judge or physician) in 1820. While the quality of the medreses of Kashgar and Yarkand have steadily declined during the last decades, the medrese of Aqsu has maintained its reputation to the present because the core of its faculty are scholars from Afghanistan who received their training at the Al-Khazar University in Cairo.

792 2. Monastic academies of Lamaism
871 The high number of Buddhist monasteries all over Northwest
China and their enormous monk population of course colored the
794 whole educational system of the Northwest. These monasteries
were not only institutions of higher learning, but they also
served as libraries and printing houses.

Kumbum (Tib.: sKu-'bum-Byams-pa-gling; Chinese: T'a-
erh-ssu) was the chief monastery in the Northwest. It was cus-
*[563] tomary in Chinghai for every Tibetan family to send its second
son to this monastery. At the age of eight the boy was admitted
after a strange ceremony, which included questions like the
following: Are you a debtor or a slave? Are you a hermaphro-
dite? Are you a demon or an all-knowing spirit? Did you ever
treat your parents badly? Did you ever rob or steal? Did you
ever belong to a heretic sect? After having answered these
questions satisfactorily he received five objects, which hence-
forth were his only property: an alms-bowl, underwear, a
[875] tunic, a mattress and a water sieve. Then one of the ordained
lamas was presented to him as his future tutor, whom his

792 family were to pay, and the boy's welfare depended largely upon
794 the amount his parents were able to pay. Sons of poor families
871 who could pay perhaps only one yak a year had to do menial
[875] work as water carriers, cow-dung collectors, straw and grass
carriers, housekeepers and so forth, to pay for their lessons.

The years between eight and eighteen, the usual length of the
792 novitiate, were given to attending an elementary school where
794 the pupil learned to read, write and recite prayers. He was to
872 learn forty chapters of the Kanjur from memory. During this
time he was called a bande, or novice. Then he might enter
792 the "Lamaistic college" to become a getsul, a stage between a
794 novice and a fully ordained bLama. Or he might return to his
home village or camp to become a house lama, of whom there
873 are thousands, who are supported by a single family. If he
chose to become a getsul he might continue to study and become
a gelong, a fully ordained lama, entitled to wear the precious
yellow tunic with a black collar.

Kumbum has four colleges: a philosophical college, a college
of church service and occult sciences, a college of canonical
literature and a school of medicine. One must go through the
philosophical college before he may enroll in the college of
church service and occult sciences, and must go through these
two successfully before he may enter the college of canonical
literature. The usual characteristics of those who enter the
[158] school of medicine are a pathological personality, epilepsy or
other abnormality.

792 The philosophical college (Tib.: tsan-nyid) offers the study
794 of the Kanjur. [The Kanjur consists of one hundred volumes sub-
873 divided into one thousand eighty-three chapters. Volumes one to
779 thirteen contain the chapters about conversion and reclaiming
(Tib.: dul-wa), the discipline and moral duties of the monks.
The volumes from fourteen to thirty-four constitute the Prajnâpâramitâ, which deals with the "road to virtue" leading to the "other shore," to Buddhahood and to that subtile and "transcendental wisdom" which is "without any characteristics," through which "all differences, contrasts, antagonisms, contraries, antithesis and contradistinctions" disappear, where all categories of thinking are empty, where heart and mind become silent like "the surface of a tranquil and placid sea." Volumes thirty-five to thirty-eight are called the Club of the Buddhas, volumes thirty-nine to forty-four are called Construction of the Precious Stones, and the volumes forty-five to seventy-six contain narrations on how to gain the nirvana. The volumes seventy-seven to ninety-eight contain the tantrus and dharanis, sentence of anathemas and magic formulas, and the last two volumes are the exegetics and exposition of the tantras and dharanis.]

The philosophical college does not procede according to the

792 arrangement of the Kanjur but starts, strangely enough, with
794 the most difficult chapters, the abhidharma, metaphysics (Tib.:
873 C'os-mnon-pa, clear doctrine), and difficult sutras. Each
[779] student gets an additional private tutor, who explains difficult
passages of the matter under study.

When the weather permits, teaching is conducted in the open in the so-called chŏr-ra. Otherwise instruction takes place in a temple hall.

An important part of instruction is frequent disputations be-
[876] tween the teacher-monks and the students, under the supervision of the abbot, khan-po. These loquatious duels give occasion for the students to show how much they know and how much they have memorized.

In the course of time the students are taught ts'ad (logic), bzo (technique), rtsis (astrology), snan ṅags (rhetoric), sgra (grammar) and adul-ba (monastic rules). After having mastered the whole material the student receives the degree of dka-bcu (a man who has passed the ten examinations).

To complete the work of the philosophical college takes more
than a decade. Then the dka-bcu can either procede to the next
[554] college to gain the title of snags-rams-pa (master of the tantric
sciences) or to another monastery where other famous teachers
are found.

[779] To receive the title of snags-rams-pa, the monk must study
large parts of the Tanjur, a gigantic 225 volume collection of theological, philological, ethical, alchemistic tractates and a tremendous amount of occult tantras.

Another center of monastic studies was Labrang in Kansu, one of the foremost monasteries of the Yellow Sect. This monastery is divided into what might be called six different colleges. In the first, known as Wen-hsi-t'ang, five different sutras are taught. The second college is primarily concerned with the continuation of the studies in the first, but the difficulty of the curriculum increases. In the fifth and sixth colleges the esoteric sutras are taught. There are separate colleges for sciences of medicine. Most monks, however, never
learned more than a few prayers. The Labrang monastery
[177] showed some concern with modern times by introducing courses
in animal husbandry and the manufacture of agricultural byproducts. Like other monastic academies, however, it has remained primarily a center of religious learning.

B. Nationality Education under the Republic

658 The period of the Republic was characterized by the fact that
891 the government attempted to bring the Chinese educational sys-
177 tem as far as possible into the area of the nationalities. Educa-
*563 tion became one factor in the general policy of assimilation.

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658 871 177 *563 The plan was to enforce four years of compulsory education in lower elementary schools, and a great effort was made to establish new schools in all the major centers of the nationalities. In Sinkiang, however, this development had not yet superseded the importance of the mosque schools. Figures (for 1941) on the number of schools and on school attendance are as follows:

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Table 1

No. of Schools and Students in Sinkiang, 1941*

	Schools	Students		
		Male	Female	Total
Chinese Public Schools	236	9,461	1,979	11,430
Mosque Schools	1152	62,198	12,982	75,180
Total	1,388	71,659	14,961	86,610

* (Hsü Ch'ung-hao, Hsin-chiang chih-lüch, 1944, pp. 232-233.)

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563 According to another source, the schools were mostly established and operated by the cultural associations of various nationalities in Sinkiang. These cultural associations maintain offices in most of the cities of Sinkiang, with headquarters in Urumchi. They were supported by the ahungs, the village head men, living buddhas, princes and native chieftains, and they had a greater influence upon the promotion of education in Sinkiang than the provincial bureau of education. The number of schools operated by these cultural associations and the number of students enrolled in the schools in the year 1938 were as follows:

Table 2

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[162] Schools Operated by Cultural Associations in Sinkiang, 1938*

	Schools	Students
Uighur Cultural Associations	1,540	89,804
Kazakh Cultural Associations	275	14,322
Moslem Cultural Associations	1	44
Mongolian Cultural Associations	24	917
Total	1,840	105,087

*(Ch'en Chi-ying, Hsin-chiang Niao-k'an, Changsha, 1941, p. 36f.)

The Uzbeks, Tatars and Kuei-hua (White Russians) also have cultural associations which operate schools. Statistics about them, however, are not available. It is possible that there is a

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certain amount of overlapping of the figures in Tables 1 and 2.

During the war years there was an expansion of schools in Sinkiang. By 1946 the number was as follows:

Table 3

Schools in Sinkiang in 1946*

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1. Schools under the Provincial Bureau of Education
    - a. Higher Education: 2 (the Sinkiang College and the Sinkiang Women's College, both at Urumchi)
    - b. Middle Grade Schools:
        - (1) Middle Schools
            - Senior Grade: 4 (at Urumchi)
            - Junior Grade: 4 (2 at Ining, one at Kashgar, one at Chuguchak)
        - (2) Normal Schools
            - Senior Grade: 2 (at Urumchi)
            - Junior Grade: 5 (2 at Ining, one at Kashgar, one at Chugachak, one at Aksu)
    - c. Vocational Schools
        - Senior Grade: 2 (one at Ining, one at Chuguchak)
        - Primary School Level: 4 (Urumchi, Kashgar, Khotan, Aksu)
    - d. Public Schools, primary level: 580
2. Schools under the Cultural Associations:
    - a. Primary Schools: 1,883.

*(Ministry of Information, "Education in the Border Regions," 1948.)

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Government sponsored education of Mongols and Tibetans was already initiated in 1910, when the comptroller-general of Chinghai founded the Chinghai Mongolian Academy at Hsi-ning. This school was conceived for service to the Mongol Banners exclusively.

A somewhat peculiar situation existed in Chinghai after the revolution of 1911. Chinghai in this period was ruled by Moslem generals, who persued a rather fair policy toward ethnic groups. The activities of one of these Moslem generals, Ma-Ch'i, should be stressed. The goal he set for himself was the introduction of at least one primary school in every community of Chinghai, regardless of the ethnic composition of the particular community. His activities were marked by his insistence that all children should learn Chinese in addition to their own language. Besides, he developed and enlarged the training of the ahung (teacher or lowest priestly rank). His first act upon becoming vice-governor of the province was the establishment of

*563 the first middle school in this area.

873 After the revolution of 1911, the Chinghai Mongolian Academy
658 was renamed Ning-hai Mongolian and Native School, and was
*175 now open to other ethnic groups such as Tibetans, Chinese and
871 Moslems. In 1919 this school added a department for the train-
ing of elementary school teachers. Since the enrollment of Mon-
gol and Tibetan children steadily decreased after 1919, the gov-
ernment ordered the Mongol nobles to send the children under
their jurisdiction to this school. In 1926 the school was again
enlarged, and renamed the Planning School of Frontier Develop-
*563 ment. After the addition of a middle school to this institution, it
873 became the center of secondary education in the area. The cur-
riculum of this school comprised language training in Mongolian,
658 Tibetan and Chinese. Otherwise the school program corres-
*175 ponded to that of other middle schools in China proper. In 1929
the department of vocational education was separated from the
school and became the First Provincial Vocational School. The
Planning School itself was then renamed First Provincial Middle
School. About this time other schools, such as First Provincial
Normal School, First Provincial Girls' Middle School and First
Provincial Agricultural School, were founded.

In 1930 the First Middle School provided a Mongolian and
Tibetan normal division as a course of study; this division be-
came in 1937 an independent Tibetan and Mongolian Normal
School under the supervision of the Chinghai Bureau of Educa-
tion. The authorities of the Chinghai Moslem Association, to
eliminate the differences between the various minorities, estab-
lished also their own middle school.

*563 There were three cultural organizations in Chinghai worthy
871 of note, namely the Tibetan Language Study Association, which
translated the Three Principles of the People into Tibetan, and
*175 provided Tibetan school children with Tibetan reading and gram-
mar books; the Tibetan Culture Promotion Association, which
was founded in 1931 and which was supported by military and
political leaders. Its objectives were to propagate the Three
Principles of the People in a manner that would awaken the
Mongols and Tibetans from their so-called backward cultural
condition. A further goal of this association was to unify Tibetan
and Mongol culture, and to maintain the physical existence of
these minorities. Third, there existed a "Moslem Promotion
Association which was primarily concerned with promotion of
general education among the Moslems of Chinghai and their in-
doctrination with the Three Principles of the People. A further
objective was to overcome certain racial resentments that
existed among various minority groups in the area. Branch
associations were set up in all counties (hsien) where Moslems
live. The headquarters for all branches was located at Hsi-ning,

*563 871 *175 and attached to these headquarters was a primary and a middle school. The Moslem Promotion Association, discussed here, operated a total of eighty-three primary schools, twelve of them senior primary schools. They had a total of 5,300 students and 201 teachers.

*563 658 871 *175 The main purpose of the government during wartime, in bringing educational facilities to the Northwest, was to unify and reconstruct the cultures of the ethnic minorities along Chinese principles with equal emphasis in primary education on citizenship training, language, vocation and hygiene. In secondary education, the Kuomintang government attempted to develop or initiate technical abilities.

During World War II the Kuomintang government showed some interest in the education of the nomadic Tibetans. Chiang Kai-shek induced some tribal leaders to carry a school tent with their tribes. These tents served as primary educational centers. This move was revolutionary, as it was the first type of education, or at least of organized education, to reach the nomadic Tibetans.

Up to 1945 the educational program sponsored by the provincial authorities was as follows:

1. In Chinghai: As of 1943, there were eleven nationality schools operated by the Mongolian-Tibetan Cultural Promotion Association. These eleven schools supplemented the forty-four Mongolian-Tibetan Nationality Schools already in existence. Following the transfer of the Chinghai headquarters of the Mongolian-Tibetan Cultural Promotion Association to Yü-shu in 1943, six more nationality schools were established, of which two were directly under the administration of the association. In addition, the association established two training classes for teachers of Mongolian and Tibetan, one at Ta-t'ung and one at Yü-shu. Hsi-jao-chia-tso, with the financial assistance of the Ministry of Education of the National Government, also established a training class for the teaching of Chinese language to the native teachers.

2. In Ninghsia: The educational program of the local authorities received a boost when the Yün-t'ing Educational-Cultural Fund of one million dollars was appropriated. The money, however, was in depreciated currency of the National Government and did not amount to much, but with it the provincial authorities were able to set up twelve Yun-t'ing Primary Schools which had a total of twenty-five hundred students. In Ninghsia the number of mosque schools was much fewer than in Sinkiang. Here there were, up to 1945, only twelve classes with a total of two hundred and forty students. There were two nationality schools, one at T'ao-yueh and one at T'eng-k'ou, one banner school and a teacher training class in the Alashan Banner.

*563 3. Kansu: The educational program was more advanced than
658 in the other provinces in the Northwest. The number of schools
871 and students as of 1945 was as follows:
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Table 4

563 No. of Schools and Students in Kansu, 1945
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	Teachers	Students
162 1. Middle Schools		
a. Under Provincial Bureau of Education		
(1) Hsia-ho Normal School		112
b. Private		
(1) Northwest Middle School, Lan-chou	25	211
(2) Ch'ing-yun Middle School, Wu-wei	28	314
(3) Yun-t'ing Middle School, Lin-hsia	11	74
(4) K'uei-feng Middle School, Lin-hsia	9	68
2. Primary Schools		
a. Border Region Nationality Schools		
12 schools	85	2,124
b. County (Hsien) Nationality Schools		
129 schools	313	7,198
3. One mobile team of teachers for Mongols in northern Kansu		

*(Ministry of Education, "Education in the Border Regions," 1948.)

II. Chinese Education in Pre-Communist Times

A. Education under the National Government

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184 During recent decades, the education in Northwest China has been backward compared to that in the coastal provinces. The educational standards within Northwest China also differed greatly. Generally speaking, the farther the people lived from the big cities, the less they were educated.

Even though the general Chinese school system was introduced also to the Northwest, in remote places the so-called schools were scarcely different from the old-fashioned tutor system.

658 The provincial authorities were handicapped by the shortage
871 of funds as they struggled to set up schools with what little was
appropriated to them by the Central Government. In 1935, the
*175 Central Government appropriated half a million dollars for border education, and within two years the following schools were established:

In Kansu: A training class for village teachers and fifty-five primary schools.

In Chinghai: A normal school for the teaching of Mongolian and Tibetan at Hsining, two middle schools, 143 primary

658 871 *175 schools.

In Ninghsia: Two training classes for Mongolian and Tibetan teachers and fourteen primary schools.

563 658 792 871 Special attention was paid to the education of the lamas in the great monastery of Labrang, at Hsia-ho in Kansu. The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission organized a Tibetan People's Cultural Association which helped to set up a vocational school and a political training class for young lamas. In the field of political instruction, the Central Political Institute also established a Mongolian-Tibetan School at Sining, in Chinghai, with a branch at Suchou, in Kansu.

*175 166 871 [648] [658] During the war against Japan, with the migration of the coastal population inland, universities and middle schools from Peking and other places moved to the Northwest. When the war front was more or less stabilized after 1938, the Northwest enjoyed a comparatively stable peace. These "immigrants" built up cultural centers such as Ch'eng-ku, Ku-lu-pa in Shensi; and with the mass education movement promoted by the National Government, education in the northwest was greatly improved both in quantity and in quality.

658 872 Under the school system of the National Government, children started school when they were a full six years old. Before that age they might go to kindergarten if there were such facilities and if the parents could afford it. But at six the government required every child to attend the first grade. The free and compulsory education covered the first four grades, which were called junior primary school. The fifth and sixth grades were classified as senior primary school. A school with all six grades was called a complete or central primary school. In the Northwest, the National Government made a real effort during the war to push toward the goal of one junior primary school in every pao (approximately one hundred families) and one central primary school in every town or hsiang (administrative village). By the end of the war, all children with the exception of those in really remote areas had a chance to attend a junior primary school, even though some of these schools were of low caliber. As the central primary schools were limited in number, only the luckier ones who either lived close by or were financially better
658 873 off could enter the fifth and sixth grades. After graduation from the sixth grade, there was quite a hurdle to clear before one could enter the secondary schools. Entrance examinations were difficult because the facilities were so limited that only selected children could be admitted. The secondary schools included three types: the middle schools; the vocational schools, and the normal schools. The middle schools were meant for a selected
[874] group, as preparation for more advanced studies. The vocational schools offered training in agriculture, industry, commerce

658 873 [874] or other professions to those who would enter a profession immediately after graduation. The normal schools offered training for grade school teachers. Each of these three types of schools was divided into two periods of three years each, the junior and the senior. In the Northwest, the government pushed toward the goal of having at least one junior secondary school in each county, and a senior secondary school at every center of each of the provinces. Not only were the normal schools free of tuition, but the government supplied board, room, books and even pocket money against the obligation to teach for a certain number of years.

873 Of institutions of higher education before the war, there was a National Northwest Junior Agricultural College in Wu-kung, Shensi, with modern buildings, equipment and vast experimental farms. In Sian, Shensi, there was the National Northeast University which had moved from Mukden to Sian after the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. In Lanchou, Kansu, there was a college with very low standards. In Urumchi, Sinkiang, there was the Sinkiang College.

After the war broke out in 1937, the Northeast University moved from Sian into Szechwan. But three other important institutions moved into Shensi, the National Peking University (Peiping), the National Peiping Normal University and the National Peiyang University of Tientsin. These three were combined to form the Northwest United University (later called Northwest University) and stayed in Ch'eng-ku, Shensi. Later the engineering school was separated to form the Northwest Engineering College, with its campus at Ku-lu-pa, Shensi.

873 874 At the time the Communists took over, there were more institutions of higher education in the Northwest than ever before. The following list shows the increase of these schools during the war and post-war years:

1. Northwest University, Sian, Shensi
2. Lanchou University, Lanchou, Kansu
3. Northwest Normal College, Lanchou, Kansu
4. Northwest Engineering College, Hsien-yang, Shensi
5. Northwest Agricultural College, Wu-kung, Shensi
6. Sinkiang Provincial College, Urumchi, Sinkiang
7. Northwest Agricultural Junior College, Lanchou, Kansu
8. Shensi Provincial Junior Commercial College, Sian, Shensi
9. Shensi Provincial Junior Normal College, Sian, Shensi
10. Shensi Provincial Junior Medical College, Sian, Shensi
11. Private Northwest Pharmaceutic Junior College, Sian, Shensi

(Ministry of Education: Second Educational Year Book, 1948.)

In addition, in 1946, were the following institutions not of

873 college level:
874 Hsining Normal College, Hsining, Chinghai
Northwest Normal College, Lin-hsia, Kansu
Su-chou Normal College, Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu
Sui-ning Normal College, Huang-ch'ü-ch'iao, Ninghsia
A T'ien-shan Normal College was being planned for Sinkiang.

874 The vocational schools that existed in 1946 were:
Ning-hsia Vocational School, Ninghsia City, Ninghsia
Chinghai Vocational School, Nieh-yuan, Chinghai
Labrang Young Lama Vocational School, Hsia-ho, Kansu
Yü-shu Vocational School, Yü-shu, Chinghai

[872] [563] The Mongols in Ninghsia had two primary schools which served the purpose of vocational schools, both at Ting-yuan-ying for the Edsingol Banner. (Ministry of Information, Border Education, 1948).

871 B. Education in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Area

*668 177 The Communists in the Shen-Kan-Ning border area had their own educational system. This is described by Edgar Snow as follows:

"It should be explained that under the emergency Soviet educational system there were three sections: institutional, military and social. The first was run more or less by the Soviets, the second by the Red Army, the third by Communist organizations. Emphasis in all of them was primarily political—even the littlest children learning their first characters in the shape of simple revolutionary slogans, and then working forward into stories of conflict between the Reds and the Kuomintang, landlords and peasants, capitalists and workers, and so on, with plenty of heroics about the Young Communists and the Red Army, and promises of an earthly paradise of the Soviet future.

"Under institutional education the Reds already claimed to have established about two hundred primary schools, and they had one normal school for primary teachers, one agricultural school, a textile school, a trade-union school of five grades, and a Party school, with some four hundred students. Courses in all these lasted only about six months.

"Greatest emphasis naturally was on military education, and here very much had been achieved in two years, despite all the handicaps of the little beleaguered State. There were the Red Army Academy, and the cavalry and infantry schools, already described. There was a radio school, and a medical school, which was really for training nurses. There was an engineering school, where the students actually got the rudimentary training of apprentices. Like the whole Soviet organization itself, everything was very provisional and designed primarily as a kind of

871 *668 177 rear-line activity to strengthen the Red Army and provide it with new cadres. Many of the teachers were not even middle-school graduates. What was interesting was the collective use of whatever knowledge they had. These schools were really Communist not only in ideology, but in the utilization of every scrap of technical experience they could mobilize, to 'raise the cultural level.'

"Even in social education the Soviet aims were primarily political. There was no time or occasion to be teaching farmers literature or flower arrangement. The Reds were practical people. To the Lenin Clubs, the Young Communist Leagues, the Partisans, and the village Soviets they sent simple, crudely illustrated Shih-tsu, or 'Know Characters,' texts, and helped mass organizations form self-study groups of their own, with some Communist or literate among them as a leader. When the youths, or sometimes even aged peasants, began droning off the short sentences, they found themselves absorbing ideas along with their ideographs. Thus, entering one of these little 'social education centres' in the mountains, you might hear these people catechizing themselves aloud:

"'What is this?'

"'This is the Red Flag.'

"'What is this?'

"'This is a poor man.'

"'What is the Red Flag?'

"'The Red Flag is the flag of the Red Army.'

"'What is the Red Army?'

"'The Red Army is the army of the poor men!'

"And so on, right up to the point where, if he knew the whole five hundred or six hundred characters before anyone else, the youth could collect the red tassel or pencil or whatever was promised." (Edgar Snow: Red Star Over China, 1938, pp. 254-257.)

(212) Early attempts to promote education by making it compulsory and by replacing the Chinese script with a system of phonetic Latinization had to be abandoned again.

873 *668 177 In later years the Anti-Japanese University and the Lu-hsün Art College were their major institutions of higher learning. During the war several colleges were merged into Yenan University, which then was composed of a College of Administration, a College of Natural Sciences and a College of Art and Literature. The courses in the first two colleges took three years and the Art and Literature course, two years. Earlier attempts to duplicate the more formal curricula of Nationalist universities had been given up and education was "brought into harmony with the actual conditions of the people under the New Democracy." In the 1940's, Yenan University was one of the

873 strongholds of the movement for the remolding of ideology with-
*668 in the party (Cheng-feng Movement). Training of cadres was its
177 main purpose. (G. Stein, The Challenge of Red China, 1945, 260-67)

Attached to the Anti-Japanese University at Yenan was the College of Nationalities to train youths of racial minorities from Inner Mongolia and the Northwest to be Communist cadres.

871 III. The Communist Period

*668 A. Chinese Education in the Northwest

177 1. The general trend of changes

After the Communist take-over the educational system was initially left more or less untouched. Teachers and students, however, were constantly mobilized to participate in the movements led by the government and the party. This additional political activity meant not only an interruption of the regular educational program, but also an amount of overwork detrimental to the health of the students. [Hsüeh-hsi, Vol. 4, No. 11, (1951, September 16), p. 37, and 1952 Jen-min Shou-ts'e, p. 449. The latter quoted the resolution of the State Council on July 13, 1951, concerning the health condition of the students.]

Even after it was realized that this state of affairs conflicted with the purposes of education, it was never entirely remedied. As late as 1956, complaints were heard about the constant political interference in academic work.

By a resolution at the ninety-seventh meeting of the State Council on August 10, 1951, the old system of education was remolded (See General Handbook, Education). Within the new system much emphasis was given to Leisure Time and Short Course Schools on the primary and secondary levels for older students and adults. This program, however, has in the meantime come under heavy criticism, as it did not achieve its aims and absorbed the time of workers and peasants needed in production.

One significant aspect of the new system is that graduates of higher educational institutions do not have a free choice of professions, but are placed by the government wherever it deems fit. In fact, it is one part of the gigantic program of slave labor.
877 The tendency of students, condoned and incited by the Commun-
577 ists in pre-Communist times, to behave in a "revolutionary"
way has recently been curbed by a set of strict disciplinary
*668 rules, which have been called "New Confucianism" by one
177 writer:

Basic Rules for the Middle School Student. (Promulgated by the Ministry of Education on May 13, 1955.)

1. Study diligently to make yourself strong in health, in class work and in character. Be ready to serve the fatherland

877 and the people.
577 2. Honor the national flag. Love warmly your fatherland and
*668 the people's leader.
177 3. Obey the school rules, follow the instruction and guidance of the principal and the teachers.

4. Arrive at school on time. Attend classes on time. Never be tardy, nor leave early, nor be absent without a good reason.

5. Bring all necessary books and supplies to school every day. Have ready all necessary articles for each class.

6. Sit straight and square at classes, concentrate on listening to the lecture. Never talk freely or do anything on your own. Never enter or leave the classroom without permission of the teacher.

7. To answer the teacher's question you must stand up. Only when you have the teacher's permission may you sit down. To ask the teacher a question you must first raise your hand.

8. Review diligently, and finish on time all home work.

9. Respect the principal and teacher. When the class starts you must stand up to show your respect to the teacher. Do the same thing when the class is dismissed. When you meet the principal or the teacher outside the school you must salute him.

10. Love your schoolmates earnestly. Help one another and be united.

11. Respect and love your parents. Love and protect your brothers and sisters. Help your folks in housework.

12. Respect the older generation, and old people: Love children and care for the weak and the sick. Yield your seat on a train and your right of way on the street.

13. Be earnest, humble and polite. Do not lie, do not curse, do not fight. Do not disturb other people's work, study or sleep.

14. Do not smoke, do not drink liquor, do not gamble, do not take other people's articles without their permission. Do not do things harmful to yourself and others.

15. Positively drill and strengthen your body. Keep your body, clothes, room and the public places clean.

16. Obey public orders. Love and protect public property.

17. Love and defend the honor of your class and school.

18. Carry your student card with you all the time and take care not to lose it.

876 Discipline in schools had tended to become harsh before the
*668 promulgation of these rules. For instance, in Tso-shui, Shensi,
177 a grade school teacher ordered tardy students to kneel on the floor and to carry bowls of water on their heads. In Ling-t'an, Kansu, a grade school principal ordered all the children of his school to line up and spit in the face of a child he wished to punish. In some schools, the teachers organized "accusation meetings" to punish the children. In some, "courts" were estab-

876 lished to pass out judgments. Cases of suicide among students
*668 thus treated have been reported.

177 Another factor which influenced education was the austerity
[762] movement, which cut deeply into the already meager equipment,
facilities and supplies of the schools. For instance, in Shensi
871 some schools had provided some teachers with single rooms
*668 with twenty square meters of floor space, or about thirteen by
177 fifteen and one-half feet, to serve both as bedroom and office.
[875] This was criticized as luxurious and wasteful, and the size of a teacher's room was reduced to three and one-half square meters or less than six feet square. The size of campuses was also cut down mercilessly. A well-known educator, Feng Yu-lan, recently complained: "When a professor finds enough space to lay down his body, he would find no more room to lay down his books." (Jen-min Jih-pao, Peking, January 15, 1956.)

Claims that school attendance has greatly increased are numerous in the Communist press. The figures given, however, are either meaningless or contradictory, so no attempt has been made here to trace this increase.

877 Extra-curricular activities included a summer camp for the
students in the Northwest, which took place at Mei-hsien, Shen-
*668 si, from August 1 to 31, 1952. The participants were selected
177 from students of different places, including 150 from Shensi,
110 from Kansu, 100 from Sian, 20 from Ninghsia, 20 from Chinghai, an indefinite number from Sinkiang and 80 from the colleges and universities. To be selected, a student had to be: progressive in thought; good in school work; active in all kinds of social activities inside and outside the school; healthy, with-
[562] out contagious diseases. Girl students and students of the minor-
*[563] ity groups had priority. The whole program of the camp was
sponsored by the New Democratic Youth League.

[526] Athletic competitions are also sponsored. From August 10 to 17, 1953, there was a Northwest China track and field meeting at Sian. Gathered for the competition were 351 athletes from 12 nationalities, representing 5 provinces and a municipality.

873 2. Higher education

*668 Institutions of higher education in the Northwest under the
Communists can be divided roughly into three groups. The first
177 group includes universities and colleges in the normal sense.
874 The second includes political training institutes. The third in-
*[563] cludes the institutions for the minority nationalities.

The following institutions were listed in 1952:

Northwest University, Sian, Shensi
Lanchou University, Lanchou, Kansu
Northwest Engineering College, Hsien-yang, Shensi
Northwest Agricultural College, Wu-kung, Shensi
Northwest Normal College, Lanchou, Kansu

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873 Northwest Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Medicine Col-
874 lege, Lanchou, Kansu
*668 Northwest Art College, Sian, Shensi
177 Northwest Medical College, Sian, Shensi
Northwest Russian Language Junior College
Tihua Russian Language School, Urumchi, Sinkiang
Kansu Industrial Junior College, Lanchou, Kansu

In July, 1952, these institutions held united entrance examinations at Sian and Nan-cheng, in Shensi; Lanchou and T'ien-shui in Kansu; Hsi-ning in Chinghai; Yin-ch'uan (Ninghsia); and Urumchi in Sinkiang. According to regulations, besides graduates from regular middle schools, candidates claiming to have "equivalent educational standards" were also admitted. Cadres were given special priority.

Subjects in the examinations were: Chinese, mathematics, chemistry, Chinese and foreign history and geography, physics, political common sense, biology and a foreign language (Russian or English). Cadres were exempted from the foreign language examination.

In 1952, the Communist government started a system of scholarships for every student in the institutions of higher education. This system was changed in October, 1955, and scholarships are now issued only selectively; children of party cadres and of the minority groups have priority.

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In April, 1955, the Communists announced the establishment of Sinkiang Medical College at Urumchi. The professors were transferred there from the First Medical School in Shanghai. A New China News Agency report from Urumchi, dated April 19, 1955, reads:

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"Sinkiang's new medical college has announced it is ready to enroll 250 students of various nationalities for the coming autumn term. A teaching staff of 100 including professors, lecturers and practicing physicians will arrive here from other parts of the country in June to take up their posts. The medical college is part of a scheme for building a medical center in this provincial capital of Sinkiang, where the inhabitants belong mostly to national minorities. The project includes a 600-bed hospital and a clinic able to treat 800 patients daily. Construction of this 240,000 square meters medical center was started in July last year. The college authorities have arranged for studies to begin this year while building continues."

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The second group of schools includes the Yenan University in Yenan, Shensi, which became the Northwest People's Revolutionary University in 1949, and the Northwest School of Political and Legal Sciences in 1953. This kind of school is essentially a training center for cadres. The August First Agricultural College, the establishment of which was reported by Burkhan in

873 September, 1955, is a place where cadres and students trans-
874 ferred into Sinkiang from other provinces receive their agri-
*668 cultural training. It is more of a training camp than a regular
177 college.

B. Nationality Education

1. The general trend

871 Under the Communist regime, educational activities among
*668 the ethnic minorities of the Northwest are reported to have in-
177 creased sharply. The Communists recognized early that by emphasizing the issue of education among the some thirteen nationalities in the Northwest, they could further consolidate their hold over these minorities. In line with their policy of placating the Moslems (See Religion), educational developments in Sinkiang have been widely publicized. It is not easy to make sense of the different sets of figures given. The most meaningful are tabulated in Table 7.[1]

In this table, the figures of Burkhan's report of January 1, 1953, are so inconsistent with the rest that they probably have to be discarded; otherwise the figures appear mutually compatible. According to the percentages given, the number of schools in the years before 1949 should have been about two hundred, and the number of students slightly more than two hundred thousand.
[114] These figures do not coincide with pre-Communist statistics. One fact emerges clearly from the figures of Table 3 All the mosque schools and their students must be included in them. In view of the shortage of educational personnel it is highly questionable whether staff and curriculum of these schools can be adjusted within a reasonable amount of time to the exigencies of Communist education. That this problem is realized is shown by reports that more than 130 middle and primary school teachers of all nationalities were inducted for special political training in the Sinkiang College, the Northwest People's Revolutionary University, and the Northwest Normal College in 1955 alone. In 1954, 126 teachers of all nationalities were given political indoctrination courses in so-called "spare-time improvement classes" in Urumchi, Kashgar, Sha-che and Khotan. Such classes were also operated in other areas, with particular emphasis upon the training of primary teachers. Schools of all levels are adopting advanced teaching methods and experiences and the teachers have reached the stage "of carrying out their work with preparation and planning" (Current Background, Oct.
[875] 25, 1955). The number of politically reliable teachers might have increased somewhat through these measures. In view of the prevailing need, the figures given are still pitifully low. The basic question of whether the ahung can be entrusted with Communist education remains unsolved.

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[1] [See p. 323--Analyst]

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871 The Communists are, however, careful in giving the appear-
*668 ance of promoting the special characteristics of the different
177 nationalities, and of using national forms in teaching. Where the
*563 nationalities have written languages, they are used in textbooks.
In the last few years there have been compiled, translated, published and supplied more than four million copies of middle and primary school textbooks in Uighur, Kazakh, Russian, Mongolian, Uzbek, Tatar and Kirghiz. The new teaching material used has been as far as possible adapted to the actual living conditions of the different nationalities, and teaching methods have been adopted which are familiar to the different nationalities and suitable to their mentalities.

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2. Higher education
873 Efforts to build up institutions of higher education for the
*563 nationalities have been particularly publicized. The Sinkiang
*668 Medical College and the August First Agricultural College have
177 been mentioned earlier. Of particular importance, however,
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(873) were the institutions for the training of nationality cadres. The
(874) foremost school in the country which serves this purpose is the
Nationalities School in Peking (See IMAR Handbook, Education).
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The Northwest, however, has two institutions of its own, the
(563) Sinkiang Nationality College at Urumchi, Sinkiang, and the
(873) Northwest Nationality College at Lanchou, Kansu.

The Northwest Nationality College was reorganized in 1950 from the so-called Study Class on Problems of the Tibetans. Up to 1953, it had graduated more than 1,800 students and in 1953 it was attended by more than 1,300 students from 13 different nationalities. The school includes three sections:

(1) The training class of administrative cadres:

(2) The College, with four departments, namely, languages, political science, law, and animal husbandry and veterinary medicine. The students majoring in law or political science graduate in two years; those majoring in languages or animal husbandry and veterinary medicine graduate in three years.

(3) The sub-freshman.

On February 18, 1954, Jen-min jih-pao reported that up to then the Northwest Nationality College in Lanchou graduated 2,573 students; and that there were 786 students in attendance. These students came from thirteen nationalities, namely, Mongol, Tibetan, Uighur, Chinese Moslems, T'u-sin (Mongours), Tung-hsiang, Salar, Pao-an, Yü-ku, Kazakh, Uzbek, Manchu and Chinese. Teaching was offered in all these languages.

On January 10, 1955, the New China News Agency reported that the Northwest Nationality College graduated another 465 students of the various nationalities. Most of these were "positive elements" in the pastoral areas and minority cadres serving in the government above the ch'ü level in Kansu, Chinghai

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873 and Shensi. Of them 342 had attended the college to learn the
*563 spoken and written languages of the Mongols, Tibetans and
*668 Uighurs.

177 Sinkiang Nationality College has a different background. Before
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873 1949 it had been a regular college, with about two hundred
563 students, three-fourths of whom were Chinese and the rest
668 minority nationalities. On October 1, 1950, the college was renamed
177 as Sinkiang Nationality College and reorganized into five
departments, namely, agriculture and forestry, animal husbandry, education, law and medicine. The number of students doubled, 89.3 per cent being of the minorities. Because of the shortage of faculty and equipment, the two classes of the department of medicine were transferred to Lanchou University and to the Physicians' School of the Provincial Public Health Bureau in 1951. Furthermore, because of the shortage of cadres in every field in Sinkiang, the students still in college were also called out to serve in the various branches of the government.

S In 1952, the college authorities proposed to add a two-year
[874] curriculum, with the aim of preparing teachers in the secondary schools in Sinkiang. The college was then divided into two parts, the college and the junior college. The college took in students at the level of a regular senior middle school and graduated them in two years. The junior college took in students at the level of a regular junior middle school and graduated them in one year. This included the re-education of middle school teachers already teaching.

This College of Education was organized into five departments, so together with the three original departments, agriculture and forestry, animal husbandry and law, and the newly added art and physical education department, there were now nine departments and thirty-two classes. The number of students increased to 878, including Uighur, Kazakh, Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tartar, Sibo, Solon, Mongol, Chinese, Manchu and Chinese Moslems. Nationality students outnumbered Chinese ten to one.

S The college library had about fifty thousand volumes. The
873 shortage of faculty was serious. To solve the problem, the college
219 depended upon students to teach students. Textbooks were
563 also a problem, which was partially solved by using textbooks
668 in Uzbek and Kazakh from the Soviet Union, and by re-editing
177 and combining material from old Chinese textbooks and Soviet
books. Up to August 1953, this college had graduated more than 250 cadres. In 1955 the college had eight departments and thirteen hundred students. Ninety-six per cent of the students were from the minority nationalities. Among the faculty were 350 Soviet Russians. (NCNA, November 1, 1955.)

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Table 5
Primary Education in the Northwest in 1945

Province	Complete primary schools	Proportion to Hsiang and Chen	Junior primary schools	Proportion to pao	Total schools	Students Children	 Adult
Shensi	1,137	1.2 school to 1 Hsiang or Chen	12,591	1.77 school to 1 pao	13,979*	852,237	512,519
Kansu	821		6,551	2 schools for 3 pao	7,372	398,260	173,133
Ninghsia	86	3 schools for 5 Hsiang or Chen	357	2 schools for 5 pao	443	36,509	16,754
Chinghai	195	.83 school for 1 Hsiang or Chen	752	.78 school for 1 pao	947	51,535	33,112
Sinkiang	201	1 school for 6 Hsiang or Chen**	677	1 school for 4 pao**	2,694**	298,600	45,500

* Including provincial, private and other schools.

** Including 1,515 private schools.

(Ministry of Education: The Second Educational Year Book, 1948.)

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Table 6

Secondary Education in the Northwest in 1946

Province	Schools: Middle	Normal	Vocational	Total
Shensi	143	65	29	237
Kansu	160	25	14	199
Chinghai	4	10	2	16
Ninghsia	5	6	2	13
Sinkiang	8	11	4	23

(Ministry of Education: The Second Educational Year Book, 1948.)

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Table 7

Development of Nationality Education in Sinkiang, 1952-1957

	Secondary Schools		Elementary Schools	
	No. of Schools	No. of Students	No. of Schools	No. of Students
1952 (Report by Saifuddin in Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao 1955, No. 8, p. 118)	41*	14,874	1,800	331,870
January 1953 (Report by Burkhan, Sinkiang jih-pao, Jan. 1, 1953)	63	63.5% more than pre-1949	1,700=41% more than pre-1949	58% more than pre-1949
July 1953 (JMJP, July 3, 1953)	51	20,000=100% more than pre-1949		
1953 (JMJP, May 22, 1954)	60	23,000		
1st half 1955 (Report by Burkhan, Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao 1955, No. 11, p. 33)		28,353=almost 200% more than pre-1949		366,637=76% more than pre-1949
1957 (Plan)	77**	48,196	2,198	428,180

* Including one professional school with 557 students.

** Including three professional schools and eight normal schools.

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RELIGION

000 I. Historical Background of the Religions of Inner Asia
    A. Shamanism
    B. Buddhism
    C. The Lamaism of Chinghai
    D. Manichaeism
    E. Christianity
    F. Islam
II. The Position of Islam in Northwest China
    A. The Sources of Islam
    B. The Principles of Islam
    C. The Rituals of Islam
    D. The Sects of Islam
    E. The Turkic Moslems of Sinkiang
    F. The Chinese Moslems
    G. Chinese Moslem Sects
    H. The Salars
III. Religious Life of the Chinese in the Northwest
    A. Sites of Religious Traditions
    B. Religious Attitudes in the Northwest
IV. Religion under the Communists
    A. Islam
    B. Lamaism
    C. The Fate of Christianity
Additional Readings

RELIGION

I. Historical Background of the Religions of Inner Asia

771 Various religions have been strong in the Northwest, among
795 them Shamanism, Buddhism, Nestorianism, Manichaeism, Confucianism, Taoism and Islam. The latter is the predominant religion among the Turks and the Dungans. Buddhism is the religion of the Mongols, Mongours, Shira Yögür and Tibetans. Nestorianism and Manichaeism have become extinct, but Confucianism and Taoism are still alive in Chinese communities (see China Handbook).

771 A. Shamanism
756 Shamanism is a pagan faith based upon concepts of demons
and spirits, with whom the Shaman, or priest, attempts to
maintain contact by either sending his soul to them or receiving
[787] them into his own soul. The Shaman usually functions in a self-
[273] induced trance, produced by taking alcoholic beverages, toad-
[276] stool powder, et cetera. A high percentage of Shamans suffer
[158] from various neuroses, severe forms of hysteria, or epilepsy,
and the selection of a new Shaman may be based upon such mani-
festations of a deviant personality. Sometimes, however, the
[428] position of Shaman is hereditary.

756 The Shaman is regarded as a mediator between man and the
supernatural. He exercises his magic powers for such purposes
as healing, rain-making, success in hunting, prevention of
accidents, and divination. In central Asia, the common methods
[787] of divination are by the flight of birds and by scapulimancy, or
interpretation of cracks on the shoulderblade of a sheep which
[292] has been treated over a fire. While functioning in his super-
natural capacity, the Shaman wears a distinctive dress, usually
a long robe decorated with metal discs, small bells and the
claws of the totem birds.

The training of a Shaman is long and involved, and he usually does not reach full professional status until the age of forty or fifty. Shamanists have no ecclesiastical organization, but rank Shamans on the basis of their success in dealing with the supernatural.

756 Besides the various ghosts, ancestral and animal spirits and
77 other lesser supernatural beings, the Shamanists recognize a
supreme being, the Tengri, who is the universe personified,
God and heaven. He is the fountain of life, as he gives man his
171 soul, and the fate of all peoples depends upon him. The Altaic
776 people believe that the Tengri observes all and everything, no

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776 one can hide from his all-seeing eyes, nor flee his judgment.

171 This was the autochthonous religion of the Central Asiatic
175 steppe regions. It has been proved that Shamanism appeared
77 among the Hsiung-nu of the third century B.C., as a cult idol-
[156] izing heaven and certain holy mountains. The T'u-ch'üeh of the
sixth century A.D. worshipped the originator of heaven and
earth as their highest god, and sacrificed horses, cattle and
sheep to him. This ancient so-called Tengri cult looks upon the
world as a construction of layers. The upper seventeen layers
form the realm of heaven, the world of light, and in the upper-
most layer resides the Supreme Being, whom heaven and earth
must obey. The lower seventh to ninth layers constitute the
world of darkness, the place of damnation for sinners. Virtuous
souls, on the other hand, are received into the world of light.
Between these upper and lower realms is the world of the living.

776 Turkic mythology tells of a child-protecting diety, Umai, and
good genii who populate the soil and water (yer-sub), especially
171 fountains and mountains, holy places (idug). This cult became
771 legalized and later was regulated by the Jassa (code) of Chingis
Khan. The veneration and adoration of air and water played an
important role, and was a distinctive phenomenon. For this
reason, the Jassa forbade the Islamic ritual washings of body
and clothes except in certain cases. Priests prophesied the
future. The Kül Tegin inscriptions (one of the oldest Turkic
runic written monuments) reflect the Turco-Mongolian cosmo-
geny and the concept of morality: The order of heaven is the
subjecting and peaceful ordering of the peoples of the "four cor-
ners of the earth."

771 This same Tengri cult was carried to Europe by the Chazars
756 and Avars. The Shamanism of the latter is evident in the prac-
171 tices handed down to posterity by Theophylaktos Simokatta, a
Byzantinian historiographer of the seventh century. In China,
which was conquered by the Ju-chen in the twelfth century A.D.,
a large part of the influence of the Ju-chen statesman, Wan-yen
Wu-shih, was due to his Shamanistic "brotherhood."

771 More precise information about the Mongols' religious con-
cepts prior to the thirteenth century is not available. Even in
175 later times, Mongol Shamanism remained essentially unchanged
171 and the major religions had only a negiigible influence upon it.
756 Mongols hide from thunder, they are careful to avoid muddy
streams and springs, which are believed to be inhabited by
spirits, and they take refuge on holy mountains. According to
Islamic writers and Nestorian missionaries, the object of such
ascents is to come nearer to Tengri. Doffing the cap and belt is
a sign of humility before the omnipotence of Tengri. Thus, when
he was pursued by the Merkits, the young Chingis Khan fled to
Burkhan Khaldun, an especially holy mountain today called

771 Ken-tai, on the headwaters of the Onon River, and there im-
175 plored Tengri for grace and mercy. According to Vladimirzov,
171 the name "Chingis Khan" should be traced back to Chinggiz, the
756 god of light. His elevation and promotion to the position of Great Khan (Khagan) of all the Turko-Mongol peoples of Central Asia was confirmed by religious omens, circumstances and conditions. For example, there was Mu-kua-li's prediction that a revenging hero would be chosen (Chingis Khan) in the same place (Kharaqorum) in which the last Mongol received the title of Khan, i.e., "receiver (recipient) of the mandate of the blue heaven." The superstitiously feared Shaman, Kökču, could ride his dapple-gray horse into the heavens and converse with the spirits. It was he who announced to the assembly (Qurultai) empowered with making the decision that the "eternal blue heavens" had ordained Chingis Khan as Khagan of the world, and that, henceforth, he would be known as "Khagan through the eternal heavens." Even the Mongol banner of the nine yak tails, which is the symbol of the house of the spirit of the "golden chains" (altan uruq), expressed the religious mission of conquering the world. Later Chingis Khan had Kökču, as well as his own blood brother, Jamuga, murdered. The deed was accomplished, however, without the spilling of blood, because, according to Shamanism, the soul resides in the blood. Before starting out on the decisive campaign against North China, Chingis Khan remained in his tent for three days with his belt loosened. When he emerged on the fourth day, he proclaimed to the worshipping people that Tengri had accorded victory to him.

Chingis Khan and all his successors were Tengri's representatives on earth; their command was his command; rebellion against them was rebellion against him. When Güyük prepared to invite the Pope through his emissary, John of Plano Carpini, he called upon heaven (as highest representation of divinity and as the arbitrator among all religions) to bear witness to his divine power.

The worship of Tengri did not rule out attempts by the Mongols to placate other representations of the godhead. This wish for double insurance led to the lenient and favorable treatment accorded to the priests of foreign religions and to the famous
756 Mongol tolerance. After a thousand-year process of penetration,
171 Shamanism was finally overcome by the major religions of the bordering states. It is, however, still alive among the Tungus tribes of Manchuria and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, among the Alashan Mongols, among the Tibetans of South Chinghai and finally, among those Turks who live in the mountainous regions of Sinkiang. It is noteworthy that, to a certain degree, Shamanism is compatible with Islam and Buddhism.

B. Buddhism

795 171 175 The steppe people's first contact with Buddhism came by means of the famous "silk road." Buddhist missionaries from India traveled over this road to China. Translations of Buddhist works into Chinese (223-253) were made by the Parthian, An Shih-kao, in 170; by Indoscythian Yüeh-chih Chih-ch'an, founder of the monastery at Lo-yang; and by Chih-ch'ien, son of a Yüeh-chih envoy. A Chinese military leader brought Kumārajīva of Kucha (344-413) to Lo-yang (382-383). Eventually the Turfan region was converted to Buddhism. Śurvarnatep of Kucha (Suvarna: Sanskrit "Gold") was host to the Chinese Mahāyāna pilgrim, Hsüan-tsang, in 630. Kucha's Iranian characteristics were eradicated by the Chinese punitive expedition of 647. Buddhism remained the predominant religion of Inner Asia until the times of Islamic conquest.

The first steppe people to come into close contact with Buddhism were the Hsiung-nu and the Toba. Shih Hu (334-349), king of the Hsiung-nu, combined Buddhism and perversion and his son ordered the most beautiful concubine cooked and served. On the other hand, T'ai-wu-ti, the Toba emperor, opposed Buddhism (438-446), but his grandson, Wen-ch'êng-ti (452-465), put a halt to the persecution. In 471, Hsien-wên-ti went to the extent of abdicating and becoming a monk. His son, Hsiao-wen-ti, humanized the law. During the latter's reign the conquering tribe, the Toba, became completely sinified and concurrently lost its warlike characteristics. Buddhism exercised its strongest influence upon the Mongols who were the first steppe people to conquer the whole of China. Khagan Möngke was the first ruler who showed a pro-Buddhist attitude. Qubilai, after him, actively approved the advancement of Buddhism among his people. He promoted the Tibetan, 'P'ags-pa, to be his personal advisor and promulgated anti-Taoist edicts. As conquerors and rulers over Iran, Ilkhan's Hülägü, Abaga and Argun brought Buddhism to the western countries.

For a time, Buddhist influence on the Mongols was weakened in the face of the Chinese nationalist reaction of the fourteenth century, when the Mongols had to retreat from China proper. Their intellectual impoverishment contributed to a further disintegration of Buddhist influence. Soon, however, following their contact with Tibet, their complete conversion to Tibetan Buddhism, or Lamaism, took place. In 1566, after the Yellow Sect, founded by Tson-k'a-pa, had vanquished the Red Sect, it succeeded in converting the Ordos Mongols. Altan Khan and his nephew, Khutuqtai Setsen, invited Tibet's highest church dignitary, bSod-nams-gya-mtso, to visit them. In 1577, the "Mongolian Church" was established. Altan Khan was ordained as the incarnation of Qubilai and the prelate as the incarnation of

795 'P'ags-pa. After his conversion, the Great Khan, Tümen Sasaq-
171 tu (1557-1593), of the Chahar area, promulgated a Buddhist code
175 of law. His second successor, Legdan, built a Buddhist temple and had the Buddhist compilation of the Tanjur translated. The "Living Buddha" settled at Urga in 1602 and was succeeded by a chafn of reincarnations until 1924. In 1620, the Khoshuts, inhabitants of present-day Dzungaria, broke away from Shamanism. Buighabu Bātur also adhered to Yellow Sect Lamaism. As a reward for leading the "holy league" of Oirats who defeated a Red Sect prince's attack on Lhasa, the Dalai Lama ordained Gushi-Khan, the Buighabu's brother, as "vicar" of the Yellow Church. After the Ordos and the Chahar, the Tümet and Khalkha, having adopted Buddhism, also lost their warlike characteristics. In contrast to the "secret history" of 1240, the history of the Ordos prince, Sanang Setsen (1662) dealt not with the conquest of the world but with the conquest of souls.

175 C. The Lamaism of Chinghai

795 The province of Chinghai, or Amdo as the Tibetans refer to
792 it, has played a very significant role throughout the history of Lamaism. From Chinghai came the first new stirrings of Buddhism after the religious persecution by the apostate king, Langdarma. The great reformer, founder of the ruling (Yellow) sect, the Gelugpa, came from this border area. The immediate excuses for China's marching into Lhasa usually have been supplied by events here. Both the present and the late Penchen Lamas had spent considerable periods of exile or semi-exile in one of the most famous monasteries of the area, Kumbum. Cen-
[648] turies ago the Chinese system of Ambans at Lhasa was insti-
[775] tuted after a Chinese army had marched as escort for a disputed reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. This Dalai had been born south of Amdo, but had spent his years at Kumbum. As a meeting place of Mongols, Tibetans and Chinese, the area has also played a vital role, religiously and politically, in matters concerning Mongolia and China.

795 Lamaism has played a role in Chinghai equal to the role that
792 the province has played in the religion. According to Ekvall (1939), one out of every three males in the area is a monk. Lhasa has never succeeded in achieving the secular rule of this region; as a result, all sects of Lamaism including the various unreformed sects and the non-Buddhist Bonist sects have continued to flourish. However, the two largest monasteries, Kum-
792 bum and Labrang, adhere to the Yellow Church. Kumbum had held the pride of place as the site where the great reformer
[669] Tsong-kha-pa was born. After the Moslem rebellions in the last century, however, the population of Kumbum dropped. Until recently it had to bow to Labrang in respect to numbers. Between

792 the two monasteries there has been a total of five to seven thousand
monks. These monks came not only from the immediate
area, but were attracted by the prestige or teachings of the
monasteries from Mongolia and other areas on the Chinese border.

792 Labrang prides itself on being one of the six major academic
monasteries in all Tibet. Ma Ho-t'ien even claims for it more
871 complete systems of education and organization than are to be
found at the central Tibetan centers of Ganden, Sera and Tashihlumpo.
But this pride is modified by the fact that an academic
degree of Geshe from Labrang is not actually recognized in
Tibet proper. The Labrang incarnations, Chia-mu-yang, have
generally gone to Depung in Lhasa to receive instructions.

792 Kumbum can rest on its laurels as a place of holy pilgrimage.
(778) Within its grounds is the rock associated with Tsong-kha-pa's
birth; so too is there the famed tree that supposedly sprang
from the shorn locks of the Great Reformer. Both monasteries
[423] own much land and represent great wealth. Some has come in
the form of the accumulated gifts and donations of the pious.
[651] Still more is representative of taxes imposed over the years on
their local subjects, for, like many of the smaller monasteries,
these two are the seats of secular rule as well as religious
reverence.

792 In return for the gifts and other revenue, however, the monasteries
perform many functions for their subjects and believers.
701 In the turbulent conflicts between Moslems, Chinese and
Tibetans, the monasteries have represented the effective military
force of the area. Rijnhart, Ekvall, Ma and others who
have been present in crises have all reported the efficacy of the
fighting monks. Their strongholds serve as banks for the wealth
of all in danger from looting; their armed force stands for the
safety of Chinese, Tibetans and foreigners who seek refuge. Nor
is there any perceptible hesitancy about the prospects of taking
life when the lama war cry, "Sha-sa, sha-sa" (Eat meat, eat
meat!), summons the monks to arms. Sometimes these armies
[669] were aroused by major crises, such as those of the Moslem rebellions
in the late 1800's. They have also done battle against
the Communists in the 1930's. And when no greater danger
threatens, they are apt to do battle among themselves on an
inter-sect or local rivalry basis.

792 But the hold of the monasteries cannot be measured solely
795 in terms of the social and political roles they fulfill. The religion
of Lamaism is a very tenacious one. The complete conversion
of Tibetans to another faith, be it Christianity or Islam,
remains on a very small scale. Within the Lamaist structure,
the hold of the older sects is the strongest, especially in areas
that have remained outside the control of Lhasa. And underneath

792 795 all the forms of Lamaism, especially in Chinghai, the strong strain of Bon, the pre-Buddhist religion, continues in a modified but still openly non-Buddhist form.

795 175 D. Manichaeism

Manichaeism reached the steppe people by way of Persia and China. Mo-yen-cho (759-780), the Uigur Khagan, accompanied by Manichaean missionaries, returned from the conquered Lo-yang. He was converted and on the inscription of Khara Balasaghun he was referred to as "Mani's emanation." After the Kirghiz forced the Uigurs to flee from the Orkhon region to the Turfan area, Manichaeism waned among the latter and they soon adopted the Buddhism found in their new domain. Rudiments of Manichaeism were to be found up to the time of Chingis Khan.

795 175 171 E. Christianity

From time to time, Christianity has played a significant role in Inner Asia. Due to Methodius and Kyrillus (759-780), it exerted powerful force among the former inhabitants of today's southern Russia. The empire of Khara-Khitai in Eastern Turkestan furthered both Buddhism and Nestorianism. Among the Turkic Naimans, Nestorianism came into existence but not in sufficient strength to overshadow Shamanism. The Turkic tribe of the Kereits (almost as influential as the Naimans) is said to have become Christian about 1,000 A.D. Their Khan contacted the metropolit of Merv, Ebejesü. When the Khan of the Naimans, Küčlük, had been driven away to Kashgaria (1214), his Nestorian education became obvious when he permitted the Moslems to become either Buddhists (considering the faith of his wife, who was the daughter of Gur-Khan) or Nestorians.

The Mongols were considerably influenced by Christian traditions because of the Kereits' and the Naimans' intense interest in their faith. The Great Khan Güyük (1246-1248) was in favor of Nestorianism. His chief advisor, Khadag, and his chancellor, Chin-Kai, were Nestorians. The Great Khan Möngke (1251-1259) was educated by his Nestorian mother, who was the Kereit princess, Surgaqtani, and had Bulghai, a Kereit Nestorian, as his advisor. Even at the beginning of the Iranian Mongolian Empire of the Ilkhans, Christian traces were considerable.

Hülägüs' wife, a niece of the last king of the Kereit, was a Nestorian. The military leader, Kitbugha, who was defeated at Ain Jalūt (in Palestine), was another early adherent to this religion. In many respects the conquest of Persia resembled an anti-Islamic crusade. The indigenous Christians' aid proved effective whereas that of the occidental Christians was requested in vain. As in the case of the empire of the "Golden Horde" (Batus' son, Sartaq, was a Nestorian), these Christian outposts

795 were annihilated by the victory of Islam.

171 When the government of the now sinified Mongols became a
175 Chinese empire, Qubilai permitted the Nestorian patriarch of Bagdad to establish an archbishopric in Peking in 1275. In 1289, a government bureau was established in Peking to deal with Christian affairs throughout the empire. A strong occidental Christian influence was also present. John of Montecorvine, sent by the Pope in 1289, built two churches in Peking and became archbishop of that city in 1307. Other Franciscan monks who played an important role were Thomas, Hieronymus, Petrus of Florence (1313) and Andreas of Perusa. The most famous missionary from the west was Odorick of Poderone (1265-1313). As the fall of the Uigur Empire in 840 resulted in the destruction of the Christian outposts, so the downfall of the Mongol rulers brought the collapse of Chinese Christianity which was pursued and prohibited by Chinese nationalist reaction.

F. Islam

Islam was relatively late in reaching the steppe people. Its first adherents were the Turks (Qarakhanides, Ghaznawids and Selchuks) who settled in Transoxania, Afghanistan and Iran in the tenth century. They soon took the lead in overthrowing the heretofore dominant Arabian culture and tradition. Islam's deeper penetration into the culture of the steppes occurred under Mongol rule. After the first massacres, Chingis Khan adopted a more positive attitude toward Islam. However, he prohibited ritual washings and ritual slaughtering of animals because they contradicted Mongolian traditions. In conquered Bukhara, then the cultural center of Turkestan, he accepted the doctrines of Islam (1222) except for the "unnecessary" pilgrimage to Mecca ("all the world is Tengri's house"). His tolerant successors gave Moslems the opportunity to participate in religious discussions or debates. In 1254 they were tactically allied with Rubruk against the Buddhists. During this time, some insignificant conversions of members of the ruling family were made. Among these unsuccessful converts were Mubarek-Shih in Chaghatai (1266); the Ilkhan Takhudar (1282-1284), and the Khan of the Golden Horde, Berke (1257-1260). In 1377 the grandson of Qubilai, Ananda, who despite his Buddhist name was an ardent Moslem, made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the throne of China. He was vanquished and murdered by his cousin, Khaišan.

In the fourteenth century, the official conversion of the Mongol successor states began under Ghazan (1295-1304 in the empires of the Jakhans). To indicate their new faith the Mongols even adopted the wearing of turbans. The wave of iconoclasm initiated by the Emir Nauruz resulted in the destruction of churches, synagogues, and the pagodas decorated with Buddhist

795 sculpture by Arghun. Under Özbek Khan (1312-1340) and Jani Bek
171 (1340-1357) Islam conquered the "realm (empire) of the Golden
175 Horde" of southern Russia. Later there followed the Inner Asian Khanac Chaghatai which stuck longest to the Jassa Laws of Chingis Khan.

As far as Central Asia was concerned, the conversion of the masses occurred under Tughluq (1347-1363) and Chingis Khan's greatest successor, Timur (Tamerlan), who wanted to recreate the Great Mongolian Empire and who founded his empire completely on Islam. However, his plans for the invasion of China never materialized.

II. The Position of Islam in Northwest China

A. The Sources of Islam

779 The original source from which all principles and ordinances of Islam are drawn is the Koran, the Holy Book which, according to Moslem belief, was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by God through his Angel Gabriel. Although the Koran does not contain a systematic exposition of Moslem beliefs or rituals, yet taken as a whole, there emerges from it a consistent body of doctrine and of practical obligations. Through the ages these have remained the core and inspiration of Moslem religious life.

The Koran is not the only source of the Islamic religion. The sunna (custom) of the Prophet and the interpretation of his different ways of behavior also constitute an extremely important source for the religion. At first the sunna of the Prophet was handed down in the form of a short narrative, called a hadith (story), told by his Companions. The whole corps of sunna collected and handed down soon received the general name of hadith. The hadith was first transmitted orally. Later it was collected and written down. The tradition was invaded on a vast scale by forgeries. However, the serious students of the hadith became aware of the danger of incorporating many of these tales which contained elements foreign to Islam. They established different methods of control by which to attempt to sift out the genuine traditions from the mass of forgeries.

779 The Shari'a is the third important source of Islam. It em-
671 bodies Islamic juristic studies and doctrines, which evolved into a rather coherent body of laws and regulations. The law contained in the Shari'a is not restricted to religious regulations, but envelops all phases of life. Yet it is considered a part of the religious doctrine, for one of the characteristics of Islam is that law is considered part of the religion, and there is no clear distinction between the two. In the Koran, both legal and religious aspects were interwoven. The connection between law and religion established by Muhammad and adopted by his followers

779 has persisted to this day. The Koran and Hadith were the basic
671 foundations on which the Shari'a evolved. The law was developed by Moslem jurists who, by different rational devices (e.g. analogy, consensus), adapted the principles of the Koran to fit many new situations, and supplemented the law when the Koran could not suffice.

779 B. The Principles of Islam

The whole of the religion of Islam is briefly summed up in the shahada, or the profession of faith (which is considered the primary duty of every Moslem)—La illaha illallah, i.e., there is but one God; Muhammadun rasulu-llah, i.e., Muhammad is the Apostle of God. The shahada is not found in this composite form anywhere in the Koran, but its two halves occur separately and are its constant theme. "O you who believe, believe in God and His Apostle and the Book which He has sent down formerly. Whoever denies God and His Angels and His Books and His Apostle and the Last Day has strayed far from Truth." (Sura iv, v. 135).

779 One of the essential elements of Islam is an uncompromising
776 monotheism. The true belief demands ikhlas, the giving of one's whole and unmixed allegiance to God. Its opposite, which is considered the gravest sin that Moslems can commit, is shirk, the ascribing of partners to God and the worship of any other than him. Of the different forms of shirk, idolatry is denounced as the gravest.

Islam conceives of God as existing at all times and to eternity. "Call not any other God but Allah; there is no God but He. Everything shall perish except His Being. To Him belongs the rule and to Him you shall be brought back for judgment." (Sura XXVIII, v.88.) Along with the terrible and majestic aspects of God as Creator, Supreme Power, Judge and Avenger, the Koran also stresses His bounty and loving kindness.

The doctrine of angels also exists in the Koran. In the imagery of the Koran, the angels are represented generally as God's messengers. They are, like men, His creatures and servants and worship Him constantly; they bear up His Throne, descend with His decrees on the Night of Power, record men's actions, receive their souls when they die, and witness for or against them at the Last Judgment, and guard the gates of Hell.

With the doctrine of angels there is also the doctrine of devils although the devils are represented as rebellious Jinn rather than fallen angels. The Jinns, like men, are created out of fire instead of earth; there are believers and infidels among them, and the unbelievers will be judged with men and condemned to Hell. The rebellious Jinns are called shaitans; they lead men astray, oppose the Prophets and try to overhear what is dis-

779 cussed in Heaven. They teach men sorcery and will serve men
776 who can rule them by these devices. The leader of these evil
spirits is called "The Shaitan" or Iblis. His fall from a place among the angels was due to his refusal to worship Adam on God's command; for this he was accursed till the Day of Resurrection and given authority over those of mankind whom he seduced.

779 Next to the unity of God, the doctrine of the Apostles, as the
shahada indicates, is the central doctrine of the Koran. Mos-
776 lems are required to believe in the Apostles without distinction
792 The last of the Prophets is Muhammad, who is God's Apostle to
all mankind. The doctrine preached by all the Prophets is essentially one and the same, although in matters of detail there has been a gradual evolution in their messages toward the final and perfect revelation.

As for Muhammad himself, the Koran repeatedly disclaims on his behalf anything that is superhuman. He was but a mortal man, commissioned with the sole duty of conveying God's warning and message of salvation. He had no knowledge beyond what was revealed to him, and he had been granted no miraculous powers.

779 Faith in life after death is the last of the basic principles of
775 Islam. The word usually used to indicate it in the Koran is al-
akhira. The Koran does not speak only of a life after death, but impresses on believers the importance of life on earth as a basis for the future life. The Last Day, the Day of Resurrection and Judgment, will be the time when men's future fate will be decided by God. This day will come suddenly at a time known only to God. On that day the graves will open and men will be called to account for their deeds. Each man's angel shall bear witness to his record, his deeds will be weighed in the balance, and his book will be placed in his hand, the right hand of the blessed and the left hand of the damned.

Then the blessed, the God-fearing men and women, the humble and the charitable, the forgiving, those who have suffered and been persecuted for God's sake, those who have fought in the way of God, shall be summoned to enter the Garden of Paradise, where they shall dwell forever by flowing rivers, praising God, reclining on silken couches, enjoying heavenly food and drink and the company of dark-eyed maidens. Those who have sinned against God and men are condemned to eternal punishment in the flames of Hell.

779 C. The Rituals of Islam
a. Prayer (Salat). The observance of the ritual prayers is re-
788 peatedly emphasised as one of the essential religious duties.
782 Although neither the ceremonies nor the five set times of prayer

779 are precisely stated in the Koran, it is certain that they were
788 well established before Muhammad's death. Each consists of a
782 fixed number of bowings (rak'ah), the bowing itself consisting of
seven movements with their appropriate recitations: (1) the recitation of the phrase "Allahu akbar" (God is most Great) with the hands open on each side of the face; (2) the recitation of the Fatihah or opening sura of the Koran followed by another passage or passages, while standing upright; (3) bowing from the hips; (4) straightening up; (5) gliding to the knees and a first prostration with the face to the ground; (6) sitting back on the haunches; (7) a second prostration.

The set times are at daybreak, fajr (two rak'ahs); noon, zuhr (four rak'ahs); midafternoon, asr (four rak'ahs); after sunset, maghrib (three rak'ahs), and in the early part of the night, isha (four rak'ahs). At these times, prayers should be said and the ritual observed by every believer wherever he may be. By preference they should be performed congregationally in a masjid (mosque) under the leadership of an imam. The imam and the worshippers face toward the qibla, the prescribed direction, which is toward Mecca.

The Koran also mentions the noon prayer on Friday as the principal congregational prayer of the week, and enjoins the suspension of work during its performance. At this time a special ceremony (kutba) is delivered, usually by the imam. (The deliverer of this ceremony is called the khatib. He is not necessarily the imam, but may be one of the leaders in the community.)

779 Tahara, the ablution before prayer, is strictly enjoined and
782 the ritual is defined in Sura v, v. 9: "When you rise up to
783 prayer, wash your face, and your hands to the elbows and wipe
your heads and your feet to the ankles." This is the lesser ablution, to be performed before every prayer. The greater ablution is a complete washing of the body, which should be done before the Friday service or special holiday service, and after becoming unclean (incidents of uncleanliness are defined specifically).

779 b. Alms (Zakat). With the observance of prayer the Koran
735 regularly enjoins the giving of alms (zakat) as the outward sign
431 of piety and as a means of salvation. A distinction is made between sadaqat, which is a freewill offering, and zakat, the obligatory contribution, presumably at the rate of one-fortieth of the annual revenue in money or kind. The zakat is to be exacted form all who enter into the brotherhood of Islam; but it is not a tax. The objectives on which the revenue from zakat is to be spent are defined (in Sura ix, v. 60) as being: the poor, the needy; those employed in its collection, debtors, wayfarers, and the "Way of God."

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785 c. Fasting (Saum). Fasting, according to Islam, is primarily a spiritual discipline. Satisfying one's thirst and hunger are considered great temptations, and a chance is given to man to overcome his temptation.

[796] Moslems are required to fast for twenty-nine or thirty days of the month of Ramadan, the ninth month of the lunar year. Fasting begins at the appearance of the moon of Ramadan and ends on the appearance of the new moon of Shawwal (the tenth month). Fasting is to be observed with complete abstinence from food and drink during the hours of daylight. The fast is broken after sunset and during the hours of the night. The last meal should be taken before sunrise. The Koran and the Hadith make special mention of people who are exempted from fasting. The Koran mentions those who are sick and those on a journey. This is not an absolute exemption, as the sick man and the traveler are required to fast later, when the sickness has gone or the journey has ended. Hadith also gives extension or exemption to certain classes of people who, because of some physical disability or the performance of heavy labor, are not able to fast. In addition, fasting is included among the expiations for various offenses.

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788 d. Pilgrimage (Hajj). As an institution the hajj existed from a very remote antiquity, before the advent of Islam. The sacredness of Mecca was established in the Koran by Muhammad and given strong connection with the names of Abraham and Ishmael. [175] In the first and second years of the Hejira (Muhammad's exodus from Mecca to Medina, 622-23 A.D.) full directions relating to the hajj were given by the Prophet. The traditional days in Dhu'l Hijja (the twelfth month) and the traditional ceremonies: going in circuit round the Kaaba; running between the two small eminences of Safa and Marwa in the vicinity; assembling on the ninth day of the month at the hill of Ararat; offering sacrifices of sheep and camels at Mina on the way back to Mecca—all were retained and prescribed in the Koran. Other traditional usages, including the kissing of the Black Stone set in the walls of the Kaaba, and the stoning of the pillars representing the Devil in the vicinity of Mina, though not mentioned explicitly, were observed by Muhammad in his pilgrimages and so were incorporated into the Moslem rite.

[783] As before prayer the worshipper must be ritually clean, so also before making the pilgrimage the worshipper must be in a state of ritual consecration (ihram). This involves shaving the [302] head and discarding ordinary clothing before entering the terri- [292] tory of Mecca, putting on instead two plain sheets and leaving the face and the head uncovered.

Although the pilgrimage constitutes a religious obligation for every Moslem, the obligation is explicitly limited by possession

779 [788] of the necessary means and the physical possibility of getting to Mecca.

e. The Way of God (Jihad). In addition to the obligations mentioned, in many passages the Koran further enjoins believers to "strive in the Way of God." The duty is formulated in general terms in Sura ii, v. 186., between the regulations of the fast and pilgrimage: "Fight in the Way of God against those who fight against you, but do not commit aggression. . . Slay them wherever you find them, and expel them from whence they have expelled you, for sedition is more grievous than slaying. . . Fight against them until sedition is no more and allegiance is rendered to God alone; but if they make an end, then commit no aggression save against the evil-doers."

A distinction is drawn between warfare against the pagans, on the one hand, and against the Jews and Christians on the other:

"When the sacred months are over, kill those who ascribe partners to God wherever you find them; seize them, encompass them, and ambush them; then if they repent and observe prayer and pay alms, let them go their way." [Sura ix, v. 5]

779 721 798 "Fight against those who believe not in God nor in the last day, who prohibit not what God and His Apostle have prohibited and who refuse allegiance to the True Faith from among those who have received the Book, until they humbly pay tribute out of hand." [Sura ix, v. 29]

"As for those who are slain in the Way of God, they are not dead but living in the presence of their Lord their needs supplied, rejoicing in the bounty which God has given them." [Sura iii, vv. 163-4]

779 Besides these major issues of doctrine, ritual and obligations, the Koran contains a large body of religious and ethical teachings and legal injunctions. For example, wine, pork, gam- [262] bling and usury are forbidden along with the making of images or representations and a number of the practices of pagan Arabs. Marriage, dowry, divorce, the guardianship of orphans, [681] and inheritance are all regulated in detail. Penalties are laid down for certain crimes such as stealing, homicide and murder [567] as well as for a few minor offenses. Slavery is accepted as an institution, but certain limitations are placed upon the rights of owners over slaves and good treatment of slaves is enjoined. [681] Fraud, perjury and slander are repeatedly and severely condemned, and rules of social behavior are laid down in several [671] passages. All these and other regulations explicitly detailed in the Koran served as foundations for a more elaborate set of rules and regulations upon which the structure of the Shari'a, the Islamic law, was erected by later generations.

N D. The Sects of Islam

795 The two major sects of Islam are the Sunna and the Shi'a. Both of these camps are divided internally into numerous subsects, a discussion of which will not be included in this chapter.

N 795 798 The schism between the Sunna and Shi'a occurred first on the political question of the legitimate succession to Muhammad's leadership in the Islamic world. The Sunnis claimed that the Caliphs were the legitimate heads of the Islamic community. The Shi'a followers repudiated the first three Caliphs, Abu Bakr, Omar and Uthman, as usurpers, and declared Ali, Muhammad's son-in-law, to be the true successor, and his house to be the only source for the selection of future Caliphs.

The Shi'a sect seceded on a purely political basis, but it also began to develop its own characteristics in matters relating to religious doctrine. It spread widely in Persia and Iraq and assimilated a great amount of the esoteric non-Moslem doctrines which prevailed among the newly converted Moslems.

N 779 795 798 In particular, a special doctrine concerning the nature of political leadership of Islam divides the Sunnis and the Shi'is. The Shi'is attribute to the Imam (the political leader) a spiritual function which the orthodox Sunni theologians never granted to their Caliphs. This doctrine of the Imamate gradually crystallized into definite theological form. The Imams acquired a superhuman character and their decisions on both political and theological questions are not to be contested.

N 795 The mystical movement in Islam, Sufism, found followers in both camps, and is popular mainly among the masses of the people.

S E. The Turkic Moslems of Sinkiang

563 795 The majority of the population of Sinkiang is Moslem by religion. The Moslems include the Eastern Turkis, the Kirghiz and Kazakh nomadic tribes, a small number of Chinese Moslems and a few Afghans, Indians and Tajiks, most of whom reside only temporarily in Sinkiang.

The Turks of Sinkiang are Sunnis of the Hanefite School. Unlike the Chinese Moslems, they have maintained close ties with the rest of the Moslem world. The idea of the cohesiveness of all believers is very strong in Islam. The Turks of Sinkiang not only feel strong national ties with their Turkic brothers in Western Turkestan, but they also consider themselves an integral part of the Moslem world community. In the past they recognized as the chief of all believers (emir el mu'minin) the Khan of Bukhara, and they looked to the Sultan of Constantinople as the political leader of Islam.

S 779 Sinkiang can be called a Moslem country, but it has features which are peculiar to it, and which have greatly changed the

/Turkic Moslems of Sinkiang/

779 character of Islam. In Sinkiang, Islam has been affected by two major factors. The first one is that Islam has been superimposed over a civilization which contained Shamanist, Buddhist, Manichaeanist and Nestorian elements. Many Buddhist traditions have not been erased completely by Islamic beliefs. These traditions have been incorporated into Islam, although totally foreign to it, and they have acquired a superficial Moslem character.

779 177 The second fact that had considerable influence upon the development of Islam in Sinkiang is that the country is under Chinese administration. As already explained, Islam is not merely a religious faith, but it encompasses many aspects of the entire way of life of the Moslems. As a result of Chinese administration, all those functions of Islam that are not concerned with the articles of faith and strictly religious rites, have been taken [671 692] over by the Chinese. The law of the country is the Chinese secular law, and not the Moslem religious one. The courts of law are administered by Chinese civil servants rather than by the Moslem Qazis (judges).

779 794 563 The Turkic Moslems in Sinkiang are not very strict in their observance of religious practices. There is only a small number of people (mainly Kirghiz) who perform the ablutions and say the prayers regularly, pay the Zakat to the mosque, medresses (mosque schools) and the poor, wear a turban and abstain from smoking and drinking. The majority of the people (this applies to the East Turki as a whole) do not perform the ablutions nor prayers. Except on holidays there are very few people in the mosque during the services. The people do not give the required Zakat, and they smoke tobacco and even opium. Though they are quite strict about not eating pork, they do not abstain from drinking wine and other alcoholic beverages. Few of the women veil themselves in public, and they go unsupervised in the market places. The Sunni Turki in Sinkiang have no scruples about letting their daughters marry the Balti Shi'is (most other Sunni Moslems consider it a great offense). The people as a whole are very poorly instructed in the matters of religion. Most know the fatihat sura (the opening chapter of the Koran), but few know more. Holidays are more strictly observed than are other rites. [796] Though Ramadan imposes rigid restrictions during the daytime, at night the Moslems of Sinkiang compensate festively for their daily sacrifices. Id-el-Fitr, the Moslem New Year celebration in the tenth month, is one of the most joyful and colorful holidays in Sinkiang. The people attire themselves in new clothes, attend the special services in the mosques, greet each other, visit friends and attend feasts.

795 776 778 As Grenard points out, the cult of Imams and other Moslem saints which is an integral part of Islam in Sinkiang, goes back

795 to religions other and older than Islam. The Moslem priests,
776 powerless to destroy the popular worship of certain shrines,
778 adopted those shrines and named them after Islamic personages.

The Turki is a great believer in the efficacy of local saints, and there are innumerable shrines all over the country dedicated not only to the "imams," but to later saints and heroes. These sanctuaries usually have some beliefs and observances attached to them, connected either with the curing of diseases or with the bearing of children. At shrines of the latter type, the majority of pilgrims are women. The mullas have therefore been obliged, for the sake of propriety, in each case to invent a female saint, complete with legend, to bring the cult in line with Islam. The
[778] popular names of the shrines reveal that most of these cults
[769] have been derived from the ancient practices of ancestor worship.

771 Paganism, as well as ancestor worship, is still prevalent in
796 this land despite a thousand years of Islam. Many of the religious festivals, especially those which are seasonal and therefore not connected with the Moslem calendar, are more pagan than Moslem. They are merely popular gatherings for the purpose of feasting and enjoyment, and are probably older than Islam.

793 The clergy in Sinkiang is divided into two categories: the
794 judges and the priests in one, and the simple clerks in the other (the mullas). The latter class includes all males who can read and write and wear a turban. Above these mullas, there is a class of mosque officials with specific functions: the Muazzin, who calls the believers to attend the daily prayers, the Imam, who leads the services, the Mutakib, in charge of seeing that the laws of the Koran are observed, the Reis, prefect of discipline, the Khatib, who delivers the Friday sermon, and the mulla a'lam, doctor of law who is also in charge of the circumcision ceremony.

793 The resources of the clergy consisted mostly of waqf, land
[423] property which had been donated to them or confiscated by them. In spite of the Chinese confiscations of clergy landed property, until recent times this constituted an important source of income for the clergy. Other clergy sources are the Zakat, donations from richer believers, casual fees, judicial fees, and fees paid for marriages, funerals and so forth. The Zakat is not a very substantial source of income, as the Sinkiang Moslems are lax in adhering to this obligation. At present it is almost impossible for the clergy to subsist without resorting to some secular occupation.

793 The judicial power and the police functions of the clergy in
692 the past have diminished greatly during the Chinese administra-
[177] tion. The Qazis judge cases which are brought voluntarily to

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
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S
793 them. Nowadays these are more cases of private feuds than law
[692] suits. Even when a Qazi exercises his judicial powers, he has
S no authority to enforce the verdict. The position of the reis is
[794] purely symbolic, and that of the Mutaki merely one of consultative powers.

F. The Chinese Moslems

S
N The Chinese Moslems are a different sect of Islam than the
795 Turkic Moslems in Sinkiang. They constitute a religious and, to
563 an extent, a racial minority in China proper. The same is not
true of the Turkic Moslems, who form a major section of the
population in Sinkiang, and who in reality are not a national and
religious minority. However, in Northwest China, the number
of Chinese Moslems is much greater than in other parts of
China, with the possible exceptions of Yunnan and Peking. Many
differences between the Chinese Moslems and the Turkic Moslems
S
N stem from this factor alone. The Chinese Moslems are
795 much influenced by an environment which is foreign to Islam.
They have accepted many of the local customs and have integrated
them into their own rites. This process has been both
voluntary and forced. The Chinese Moslems, through the process
of intermarriage and living within a majority of non-Moslems,
have absorbed some of their customs, perhaps without
realizing it. To avoid persecution and suspicion from the rest of
the people, they have been forced to adopt others.

S
N Another important factor in the shaping of Islam in China is
[361] the virtual isolation of the Chinese Moslem communities from
other centers of Islam, an isolation which has existed for many
centuries. Islam in China has been deprived of many of the contributions
made later to the religious doctrine and practice by
various philosophic and juristic scholars in Western Asia.
Islam in China, consequently, developed its own peculiar characteristics
(mainly in ritual). The Chinese Moslems have not
contributed anything of major importance to the fields of Islam's
philosophy and theological thought.

S
N The Chinese Moslems are commonly called Dungans. They
795 themselves do not use the name, but term themselves Hui-hui
or Hui tzu. This appellation is applied by the Chinese to all
101 Moslems, whether residents of China proper or Turkestan.
Islam is commonly designated Hui-Hui Chiao (the religion of the
Hui Hui). It is also known as Ch'ing-chen Chiao (The Pure and
True Religion), or the Hsiao-chiao (minor religion) as contrasted
with Confucianism, the "Great Religion." The Communists
refer to them as Hui. The meaning and origin of the name
Hui-hui are not known. There are many varying opinions on the
subject. Some say Hui-hui is a corruption of the name Uighur;
others, that it is equivalent to the Arabic term Islam, the character
hui signifying "to return".

/Chinese Moslems/

000 acter Hui signifying "to return."

S N 795 361 The Chinese Moslems live in small, closely knit communities, organized around the mosques. The Moslem community is usually set apart from the general Chinese community. The Moslems may form a whole village, or a certain suburb or section of town. The communities are organized on a local basis and there is no higher religious authority that unites all the communities. The mosques, the religious and social centers of the Moslem communities, are maintained independently.

S N 795 182 At least ostensibly, the religious attitude of the Chinese Moslims is characterized by moderation. They make concessions to the ruling power, hoping thus to gain security for person and property. The more capable and resolute of those who enter into government service take part in the ceremonial of the national cult.

S N 795 794 [346] The Moslems in the Northwest do not publicly practice their religion, nor do they advertise it. In some cases their mosques are dissimulated, so that they cannot be distinguished easily from other houses in the village. They are quite lax in their observances of the different rituals connected with Islam. The Chinese Moslems do not regularly attend religious services in the mosque. S N [793] [782] Aside from the ahung (the religious leader of the Chinese Moslem community) and the extremely orthodox people they do not pray five times a day, but once or twice at most. The noon service is the most popular one, and the place of worship is limited to the mosque. The manner of calling for prayer differs in China from that in Western Asia. The Muazzin does not chant the call to prayer. He stands on the roof of the mosque and shouts the invitation to prayer and may strike a special wooden instrument called ta-p'an-tzu. Most Moslems will ignore the worship time if it interferes with their daily business. Except for some minor differences, the prayer ceremony is conducted in a manner similar to that in Western Asia.

S N [562] Women are not allowed to attend the mosques where the men pray. In some of the larger communities, the women may have a mosque of their own, but in most places they worship individually.

The Friday service draws the best attendance, although certainly not all nor even the majority of believers. On this day the sermon is delivered by the Khatib, a special person, not necessarily a religious leader, elected for the purpose. It is usually in Arabic, and few of those present can understand it.

S N 795 785 796 203 [184] The Fast of Ramadan is one of the rituals which is observed with a degree of strictness in Moslem communities throughout China. In many places there are special messengers who go about the Moslem quarters calling out the times for observing and breaking the fast. Messengers also go around at night lest

/Chinese Moslems/

S N 795 785 796 203 any should oversleep and fail to eat the necessary food before daybreak.

The regular practice of Zakat is practically unknown to the Chinese Moslem community. Only during the month of Ramadan, S N 795 735 431 when charity is extended to the poor and donations are given to the ahung are alms given in a form resembling Zakat. There is no fixed amount given and the act itself is purely voluntary. The only form of sadaqa (voluntary alms) given is the sadaqa el-fitr given in the three days of Id el Fitr (the Moslem New Year). These offerings can be made in cash or in goods.

S N 795 788 Particularly among the Chinese Moslems of the Northwest the practice of pilgrimage to Mecca was observed. The Hajjis, or those who completed their pilgrimage to Mecca, were highly respected in their communities. Pilgrimage has decreased considerably in the last years. The Hajj organized by the China Islamic Society in 1952 did not reach Mecca; they went as far as Pakistan and returned to Peking, for reasons that were not specified.

S N 795 796 Id el-Fitr, the New Year, is the best observed of the different Moslem holidays. It occurs during the first three days of the tenth month. Special services are held in the different Moslem communities, and great feasts are given to celebrate the occasion.

S N 795 262 In general the Chinese Moslems do abstain from pork and wine as their religion commands. They will not eat meat that has not been killed in the approved Moslem fashion. Many of the merchants, carters and others who travel carry their own utensils, and often, where there are no Moslem communities, carry their own food so as to avoid food that is prohibited by their religion.

S N 795 769 177 The influence of the general Chinese beliefs on the Moslems has been noted by many, particularly by D'Ollone. Ancestor worship is the core of the non-Moslem Chinese belief. It is not restricted to domestic worship but extends to religious devotion to the graves of the ancestors, which are designed to assure the peace of the deceased and are a scene of devotion every anniversary. The Moslems of the Northwest have been so influenced by these traditions that, in the secrecy of their homes, most of them burn incense in front of the ancestors' tablets. In evidence of this custom, D'Ollone brought back two vases which served the purpose of ancestor worship. Both of these vases belonged to Chinese Moslems, and had Moslem religious inscriptions in Arabic. N 795 788 778 The practice of pilgrimage to the well kept tombs of the ancestors is also found among the Chinese Moslems of Kansu. Some of the bigger tombs are quite elaborate and include, besides the monuments, a mosque, school halls and lodging places.

S N 795 621 793

/Chinese Moslems/

The Chinese Moslem community differs from the Turkic Moslem community mainly in the organization of the community around the mosque and in the peculiar position the ahung holds in the community. The ahung holds the central position in both the religious and the social life. In principle, the Islamic community has no professional priests, but in China the ahung has actually taken the place of one. The Imam, whose office is important in Western Asia and Eastern Turkestan, where he has leadership in religious life, has lost his pre-eminent position in China. So has the Muazzin (the one who calls people for prayer) and the Mufti (the teacher of law). At present these positions have been practically abolished. Those who hold the title have no particular importance in the community. These titles are inherited and are not conferred by virtue of any knowledge of Islamic affairs. The ahung is the only real Moslem scholar
S N [554] in the Chinese Moslem community. He is nominated to this position by virtue of his knowledge of the details and philosophy of the religion. He trains students, the **Khalifa**, to become the future ahungs and to continue to maintain Islamic life in China.

S N 795 185 [175]

G. Chinese Moslem Sects

After the pilgrims had established some contact with the rest of the Moslem world, there were attempts, many of them springing in the Northwest, to reform Islam in China. The first well-known attempt of this sort was made by Muhammad Amin, known in China as Ma Ning-hsia, who in 1781 appeared among the Salars and introduced some reforms concerning the rituals of Islam, correcting some of the practices which seemed not to be in accordance with those he had observed in Mecca.

However, of all the most notoriously successful is the sect of Ma Hua-lung, the hsin-chiao or the new doctrine, as contrasted with the traditional religion practiced by the Chinese Moslems, Lao-chiao or the old doctrine.

S N 795 792 185 The new sect is to be set apart from the rest of Islam in China. In spite of the Islamic Chinese tradition regarding religious leaders, their being chosen by the community to serve it, and known only to their adherents, Ma Hua-lung's name was known far beyond his immediate followers. To some he was a prophet, and others detested him as an impostor.

The nature of Ma Hua-lung's teachings still remains somewhat of a mystery. There is a tendency to regard them as endorsements of Shi'ism, or perhaps as an unusually bold representation of Sufism (mysticism in Islam). However, the notices of D'Ollone show that actually they are genuinely Sunni in character and not a variety of the mystical philosophy widely diffused throughout Central Asia. Ma Hua-lung was regarded as an incarnation of the Spirit—a sheng jen (holy man, prophet)

S N 795 792 185 equal to or even higher than Muhammad himself. Most of his followers were uneducated. They believed that he had divine revelations since, without instruction, he had answers to all questions and appeared to know many things. As the founder of a new sect, he had to prescribe certain external forms by which his adherents might be distinguished from others. The differences he ordered are best described by W. T. Chan in the following passage:

"The New Sect insists that a certain chapter of the Koran should be recited once only instead of three times as held by the Old Sect, that at prayer clasped hands should be raised once instead of twice, that after a meal there is no need to raise clasped hands in greeting, and that in singing the praise of Allah the voice should be low instead of high. With reference to religious service, the New Sect does not allow any substituting for an ahung in preaching, whereas the Old Sect permits such an arrangement. The two sects also disagree on the basis for calculating the period of fasting, with the New Sect adhering strictly to the Arabic method and the Old Sect following the Chinese lunar Calendar. The New Sect believes that at funerals the mourners should take off their shoes, and stand on a mat while praying for the dead, whereas the Old Sect holds fast to the tradition of standing on the ground with the shoes on. The New Sect also directs that the corpse be laid on the ground, whereas the Old Sect insists on its being on a platform. There is also a disagreement as to whether there should be an honoraria for preachers. In short, the New Sect insists on returning to Islamic traditions, but the Old Sect prefers to keep the customs that have developed in China through the centuries." (Religious Trends in Moslem China, p. 193.)

S N 795 792 [669] Being partly dedicated to ideas of forming a Moslem state in the Northwest, independent of China proper, Ma Hua-lung played a very important role in the Moslem rebellion during the nineteenth century.

S N [578] After the death of Ma Hua-lung, friction developed in his sect. His son-in-law, Ma Ta-hsi, and his grandson, Ma Hi-hsi, fought each other for the sacred inheritance. Ma Ta-hsi had the advantage of numbers and his place of residence, Cha-ku, became an important religious center.

S N 795 Chang distinguished another sect existing in the Northwest, which he identifies as the New New Sect. Unfortunately there is not much evidence as to its nature. He also mentions a Sufi order in the Northwest called Che-ho-yeh (corruption of Jahrivah). The latter is described as "having an abbot, like the Buddhist lama. It is heavily superstitious and is generally despised by other schools." D'Ollone and Hartmann, however, identify this sect as that of Ma Hua-lung, the name Jahriva

S N 795 referring to "those who pray openly," contrasted with Khafira (identified as the Old Sect) or "those who pray secretly."

All the sects described above belong to the Sunni order; there are extremely few Shi'is among the Chinese Moslems. These sects have retained continuous hostility, which has manifested itself in violence, at times even resulting in bloodshed.

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H. The Salars

795 563 [197] [142] The Salars are another group of Moslems, distinct from the Dungans, who live in China. They differ considerably from the Chinese Moslems in appearance, and they speak a form of corrupt Turkish.

N 795 [361] The Salars live in Hsün-hua-t'ing on the right bank of the Huang-ho, and in the surrounding villages. They are also found on the road from Sining to Ho-chou. In religion they are Sunnis of the Hanefite School. They are not very strict in their observance of the different Moslem rites, and are known to be heavy drinkers. Although they do not observe the rites of Islam in a strict manner, they feel very strongly about their belonging to the world Moslem community and are quite fanatic in this respect. N [669] [793] They have participated in many of the rebellions against the Han Chinese in the Northwest. Their clergy, who are greatly respected, are leaders of the Salar community.

N [177] [212] Unlike the Chinese Moslems, the Salars have not assimilated many of the customs and beliefs of the Chinese. They do not burn incense nor pay special reverence to their ancestors. They have a much better knowledge of the Arabic language than have the Dungans, and even the lowest classes are acquainted with the Arabic alphabet. They are said to have received their present form of religion from Ma Ming-hsin (Muhammad Amin).

III. Religious Life of the Chinese in the Northwest

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A. Sites of Religious Traditions

346 778 The Northwest includes what was once the economic and administrative center of the Chinese Empire. In the city of Sian and its surroundings, some of the older relics of religious institutions can still be seen. The memory of the great culture heroes of the past is particularly strong here and many of them are still worshipped in temples and shrines. Foremost among them is the Great Yü, tamer of the flood, who, according to legend, made life in this region possible by draining the excess water off through the narrows of T'ung-kuan. Among the famous Buddhist temples of Sian is the Wo-lung-ssu (The Temple of the Sleeping Dragon) which was built in Han times and has been a place of continuous reverence by emperors and peasants ever since. It contained a famous mural of the Kuanyin by Wu Tao-zu

346 (eighth century A.D.) and a Sung edition of the Tripitaka. It 778 gained its name through the Buddhist monk Wei-ko (Sung times) who used to stay there overnight and was called the Sleeping Dragon.

Another one is the K'ai-yüan-ssu, built in 713 A.D., which is adorned with many famous inscriptions and also was once famed for its library. Few religious relics are left now at this place, which has become a center of high-class girl entertainers instead.

One of the landmarks of Sian is the Glazed Tile Pagoda, Hua-t'a, built during the times of the Five Dynasties. Other famous pagodas in the neighborhood are the Great Swallow Pagoda, Ta-yen-t'a, belonging to the temple Ta Tz'u-en-ssu, in which the pilgrim Hsüan-tsang was active, and the Small Swallow Pagoda, Hsiao-yen-t'a, built in the beginning of the eighth century.

The best-known Taoist temple was the Ying-hsiang-kuan, which was made the main center of Taoist devotion by Emperor Jui of T'ang in 708 A.D. at a period when the Imperial house of T'ang showed pride in its alleged descendence from Lao-tzu, the great patriarch of Taoist religion. ~~In~~ Kuomintang times the temple was converted into a school.

778 The plain around Sian is dotted with many tombs of past [764] emperors. These artificial hills are held in great reverence by the local population and many myths have taken their origin here even though it is not known whose august remains these hills cover.

778 Shensi is also the site of one of the Five Sacred Mountains of 823 China, which formed part of the Imperial cult and to which regularly Imperial sacrifices were offered. The worship of these mountains belongs to the oldest religious traditions of China. All through historic times down to and including the last dynasty, the Emperors went there in person for regular services or at least had themselves represented by topmost officialdom. At least since T'ang times large temples were erected to the spirit of these mountains. They were, however, not only [788] depositories of memories of this official cult, but as pilgrimage centers of organized groups and individuals, they have accumulated religious traditions and historical relics devoted to all sections of the population.

Even though the Western Peak, Hua-shan, has to cede priority to the Eastern, T'ai-shan, it always was, and still is, one of the most important centers of pious activities. Numerous temples, shrines, caves and pavillions testify to this fact. Most [346] of them are outside institutionalized Imperial ritual, but are maintained by local religious groups or sects and by the donations of visiting pilgrims in search of delivery from some bodily or spiritual troubles.

778 According to official tradition, the Spirit of Hua-shan is
776 Shan-sheng, one of the descendants of P'an-ku, the mythical
823 creator of the world. Many other genii have, however, been con-
nected with this mountain. According to the oldest legendary
[782] records, it was a female spirit, the Holy Mother, Sheng-mu,
who was propitiated here to bring forth the all-important rain;
but she also received sacrifices and prayers to accord victory
in battle. More recent and still prevalent legendary traditions
make the Hua-shan one of the centers of the cult of the Jade
Maiden (Yü-nü) whose blessings are sought for the propagation
of male offspring.

823 It might be added that the Hua-shan with its rugged peaks and
valleys, adorned with rare forests and intimate expressions of
the pious sense of centuries, belongs to the most scenic spots
of all China.

346 The great temple at the foot of the mountain, one of the most
712 magnificent products of Chinese architecture, has been trans-
178 formed into an arsenal in Kuomintang times.

B. Religious Attitudes in the Northwest

771 In general the Chinese in the Northwest adhere to the so-
called "Three Great Religions." Confucianism, Buddhism and
Taoism all play important parts in their religious system. In
specific regions, Christianity, particularly the Catholic Church,
has strong footholds among the local Chinese people. Where the
people belong to the tradition of Chinese history and culture,
scholarship and tradition have strengthened the cult of ancestor
worship and the ideals and practices of Confucianism. There the
blending of Confucian teachings, Buddhist ethics and Taoist
principles predominates in the religious complex of the local
[777] inhabitants. In the border communities, strongly influenced by
the nearby Tibetans, the Chinese include a large amount of Bud-
dhistic observance and practice in their religious activities.
They persist in styling themselves Confucianist in religious
matters, but they devote their time and money to the perform-
ance of Buddhist ritual. It is reported that the Chinese of these
areas are appreciably more religious than those of the more
typically Chinese communities. Taoism is sandwiched into this
all-embracing system of magical practices, necromancy and
aberrant forms of philosophy.

797 Christianity first came to China through the Northwest and
established its headquarters in Ch'ang-an (present Sian), the
national capital during the Tang Dynasty. Missionaries of the
Nestorian Church first brought Christianity to the trade routes
in the present Northwest. The decisive, historically dated
[211] record in Chinese and in Syriac called the Nestorian monument,

797 or Ching-chiao pei in Chinese, which stands at Sian, varifies
[211] the fact that this church had been established among the Chinese
people of Shensi Province. This early Christian movement in
[798] Northwest China suffered persecution and died out. In modern
times both the Catholic and Protestant Churches came to the
Northwest. Most of their converts have been Chinese. Until the
Communist period the Catholic Church had been very strong in
one place in Ninghsia Province. It rendered many kinds of
service to its members and had a much stronger control over
them than did the local government. To a great extent it had
trespassed the jurisdiction of the government, which had cre-
ated considerable resentment and suspicion among the authori-
ties and the general populace. (See Social Structure.)

771 Though subscribing to all important religions in varying pro-
portions, the Chinese in the Northwest, like those in other
provinces, seem rather materialistic. Nowhere among them is
there found a religious fervor and devotion which characterize
both the Moslems and the Tibetans of this part of Asia. How-
ever, the religious atmosphere is very strong in all aspects of
communal life, which are always cloaked with some religious
771 rite. For example, the village or community theatrical has a
536 great deal of religious implication. Although unlike the miracle
545 plays and so-called devil dances of the Tibetans, the plays are
usually straight drama, frequently historical, the primary sig-
nificance of the presentation is a religious one. They give the
gods pleasure and thus dispose them favorably toward the people
of the community. Even the mask and the animal plays of the
New Year's celebration have a definite religious significance.

771 Chinese home life is also mixed with religious or semi-
769 religious feelings. Regardless of its wealth or locale, a Chinese
[353] home will have its ancestral tablets in the place of honor. The
tablets represent those who have gone and keeps them and their
memory always present. Those living now are only the present
custodians of the family name.

"This belief. . . holds the members of one household togeth-
[592] er with strands which are not so much woven by affection as by
[614] a sense of mutual responsibility within a clan. . .

771 "At New Year the shack living room, miserable though it be,
796 is the scene of the most exact rituals when, in absolutely cor-
rect order, each member of the family makes obeisance to the
592 elders; the feasts fixed by the Chinese calendar are scrupulous-
782 ly observed, and I have known a man to carry a watermelon for
days across the desert in order that at the Feast of the Moon,
in the most desolate of wayside stages, he might put an old
rickety table in the courtyard and offer the melon, cut in slices,
to the Queen of Heaven.

N 771 182 N [769] "The traditions, the rituals, the basic and essential relationships which govern men's intercourse, control the small circle living in such far-away places as rigidly as they control the family which dwells in one of China's great cities. Both act according to principles laid down by ancestors, whose control is so subtle and so little questioned as to leave no room for the spontaneous and the unusual." (Cable and French, The Gobi Desert, 165-166.)

S 771 795 [575] Chinese settlers in Sinkiang of course reflect the religious characteristics of their origin. Among the old settlers, who came into the country with Tso Tsung-t'ang, the secret society tradition is still strong. Merchants, mostly from Tientsin, almost universally belong to the Tsai-li sect which forbids its adherents indulgence in drinking and smoking.

IV. Religion under the Communists

N 795 *668 177

A. Islam

When they were fighting for the supremacy of China in the years following World War II and when they first came to power in 1949, the Chinese Communists promised religious freedom to the national minorities in an effort to gain their support. Article 53 of the Common Program of the CPPCC, promulgated in September, 1949, stated that "the national minorities shall have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs." Mosques were promised exemption from taxes and Article 3 of the Agrarian Reform Law, published in June 1950, which decreed the confiscation of the land belonging to ancestral shrines, Buddhist temples and Christian churches and schools, provided for the retention of land by the mosques, subject to the wishes of local Moslem residents. As a further effort to win over the Moslem population of the Northwest, the Government Administration Council issued in December, 1950, a directive permitting the observance of the festivals of Id-el-Fitr, Corban and Molid Nabawi. It abolished tax on the slaughter of cattle for celebration of these festivals and permitted holidays for cadres, soldiers, workers and students of Moslem faith. State trading companies were instructed to sell daily necessities to the Moslems, during these festivals, at reduced prices.

N [798] These pronouncements made up the sum total of what the propaganda of the Chinese Communists called the "policy of benevolence" toward the national minorities. They were given tremendous publicity which served to overshadow the grimmer and more gory record of persecution of the Moslem peoples in the Northwest. The reasons for the ostensible policy of toler-

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795 ance toward the Moslems may be as follows:
*668 1. The strong cohesiveness of the Moslems in China. Unlike
177 the followers of other faiths, such as Buddhism and Taoism,
who were scattered and disorganized, the Moslems in China and in the border regions are strongly organized and, at times, have presented a united front toward their enemies. This was one of the first lessons learned by the Chinese Communists. For example, early in 1949 when the People's Liberation Army, on entering Peking, wanted to occupy one of the mosques, a crowd of Moslems immediately gathered at the entrance of the mosque, voicing belligerently their determination to defend it. It was only upon the intervention of the Commission of Nationality Affairs that the PLA agreed to drop its demands.

In view of the predominance of the Moslem population in the
N Northwest, especially in Sinkiang which is far from the locus of
795 Chinese Communist power and where Soviet influence was
*668 strong, the Chinese Communists were obliged to adopt a concil-
177 iatory, go-slow policy in order to bring the Moslems in line.

S 2. Instead of outright persecution, the Chinese Communists,
795 recognizing the traditional deference of the Moslems to their
668 leaders and their attachment to organizations, sought to control
177 them by winning over their leaders and dominating them indirectly through the agency of mass organizations. Of these mass organizations, two were especially designed for the control of the Moslem peoples as a religious faction: the China Islamic Association and the China Hui Cultural Association, both established in May 1953, and both predominantly staffed by Chinese Moslems (Hui or Dungans) instead of Moslems of other races.
S The chairman of the China Islamic Association is Burkhan,
[635] governor of Sinkiang (now chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur
Autonomous Region), who is apparently a figurehead. In the executive committee of the China Islamic Association, thirty-one of the forty members are Chinese Moslems and only four including Burkhan are Uighur. The China Hui Cultural Association, headed by Liu Ko-p'ing, is almost exclusively a Chinese Moslem organization.

The purpose of the China Islamic Association, stated Burkhan in a speech in October, 1952, was to assist the government to implement the policy of religious freedom and to include the representative figures of Moslem faith throughout the country. The vice chairmen of the association, Liu Ko-p'ing, Shaikh Nur Mohammad Ta Pu-sheng, Yussuf Ma Yü-huai, Ma Chien and Saifuddin, are all loyal Communist followers. In their speeches at the preparatory meeting of the association, July 27-31, 1952, Chang Hsi-jo, vice chairman of the Financial-Economic Commission of the GAC, and Ulanfu, vice chairman of the National-

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ity Affairs Commission, both stressed that the aim of the association was to imbue its members with the love for the fatherland.

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In Sinkiang and other concentrations of Moslem population in China, branches of the China Islamic Association and the cultural associations established by the Communists, have supplemented the Islamic church, and the function of the Moslem dignitaries.

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3. A more important reason for the apparently tolerant attitude of the Chinese Communists toward Islam is the utilization of the Moslem leaders for the purpose of propaganda, both domestic and foreign. In a speech at the third session of the First National Committee of the CPPCC, October, 1951, Ma Chien declared: "I have received numerous letters from the ahungs in the Northwest and the Southwest regions expressing their desire to study and to reform themselves. In order to assist them to study the revolutionary ideas of Mao Tse-tung as well as to enable these theories to be universally made known to the people of the Middle East and North Africa, we have translated the following documents of the CPPCC: 'On New Democracy,' 'The Chinese Revolution and the CCP,' and the 'Important Documents of the CPPCC.'" (JMJP Nov. 2, 1951.)

The fact that the Chinese Communists intend to use the Moslem leaders to extend Chinese Communist propaganda to their co-religionists in the Middle East may be seen in the statement in the Jen-min jih-pao (June 6, 1952) that the religious leaders of the Northwest were aroused "to boundless sympathy and concern for the people of the Arab countries of the Middle East—Egypt and Iran—in their fight for national liberation and struggle against the United States and British imperialism and to adopt concerted action to support their struggle."

The first act of the preparatory committee of the Chinese Islamic Association was to assist the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Communist government in publicity work in the Arab countries. In August 1952, it organized a Chinese Hajji Mission to visit Mecca, which, for reasons unexplained, turned back upon reaching Pakistan without going on to its destination. However, two months later, many Moslem leaders from Asiatic countries were invited to attend the Peace Conference of Asian and Pacific Regions, held in Peking, during which Burkhan, chairman of the Association, at a reception to the Moslem delegates, told them that "our religion as well as our customs and habits are fully respected" by the Communist regime. His speech dwelt, however, more on the material benefits than on religious well-being of the people in the Northwest except to say that they were permitted to observe their festivals.

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Deprived of their civil and judicial duties, the Moslem clergy

795 in the Northwest was utilized primarily as propagandists. In
648 April, 1951, three thousand Moslem ahungs and mullahs from
*668 forty-five mosques in Urumchi held a mass meeting to denounce
177 the United States and, later in meetings of their congretations,
793 they made speeches to persuade the Moslem people to sign the
Stockholm Peace Appeal, the Appeal for the Five-Power Peace Pact, and to protest the rearmament of Japan. On May 2, 3,500 people, led by ahungs and mullahs of 46 Urumchi mosques offered prayers for world peace. The mass rally initiated a drive for funds for the purchase of planes, tanks and heavy artillery for the Chinese troops in Korea. The minority peoples of Sinkiang donated funds sufficient, it was reported, for the purchase of thirty planes and seven artillery pieces. The religious leaders of Yin-chuan in Ninghsia donated funds for a fighter which they named "Mohammedan."

795 In a way, the acquiescence of the Moslem leaders to assist
778 the Chinese Communists in the promotion of propaganda has
*668 been a reason for the comparative moderation of the Communist
177 regime toward Islam in China. The attitude of the Chinese Com-
munists toward the teachings of Muhammad has followed very much the line adopted in Soviet Russia. The evolution of the Soviet authorities toward Islam has undergone the following stages: (1) the attack on the teachings of Muhammad as the deification of big capitalistic merchants exploiting the unhappy poor, (2) the argument that Islam was originally the ideology of the peasantry but was later corrupted by the aristocratic class. This view was rejected as being too favorable to Islam. (3) The anti-religious propaganda lines that Muhammad was a myth or that Muhammad was the leader of a feudal revolution. (4) The argument that finally prevailed was that of S.P. Tolstov, that Islam emerged from a social-religious movement which evolved from the feudalism following the disintegration of Arab tribal systems. (Essays in the History of Research into Islam in the USSR, published by the History Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, cited in Missionary Bulletin, September, 1955.)

In China, the argument for and against the teachings of Muhammad also raged in Communist publications early in 1951. Lu Hung-chi, in an article in Kuang-ming jih-pao (January 10, 1951) charged that Muhammad, figuratively speaking, held a gun in one hand while he reached into the pockets of the people for money with his other hand, and that his teachings were an excuse for robbing the people. This article aroused a storm of protest from the Moslem residents of Peking and prompted Ma Chien to write a rebuttle entitled "The Sword of Muhammad," published in the Hsin-hua Monthly (February, 1951 issue), stating that the sword of Muhammad was for self-defense, aimed only

795 at the counter-revolutionaries and not to coerce the people to
778 become converts. In this article, Ma Chien skillfully diverted
*668 the attention of the people from Islam to the United States as the
177 enemy of the nation, saying that it was American imperialism,
795 not Islam, which aimed at the conquest of Asia and the enslavement
641 of the Asians. This line was immediately adopted. On May
*668 16, 1951, the Jen-min jih-pao carried an article entitled, "The
177 American Imperialists are the Deadly Enemies of the Moslems
of the World." On April 16, 1951, another article appeared in the Jen-min jih-pao, signed by forty-nine prominent Moslem leaders in Peking, entitled "Moslem Brethren of the World, Rise up to Halt the Crimes of the American Imperialists." The cry was re-echoed by Moslem leaders in the Northwest. Ma Liang-chün, imam of the Chinese Moslems in Sinkiang, issued a proclamation under the title "Moslem Believers, Take Positive Action and Struggle to Crush the Germ Warfare of the United States." (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 13, 1952.)

Thus, by joining the Resist United States and Aid Korea Movement, which was raging at a frensied pitch in 1950-52, the Moslem leaders in China were able to deflect attacks on Islam launched by some of the Communist publicists. But with the conclusion of hostilities in Korea, the Chinese Communists began to re-evaluate and to revise their policy toward the Moslems in
795 the Northwest. Moreover, by 1954, when Communist China had
*668 gained ascendency in Chinese Turkestan and political domination
177 over the Moslem population in that region, there was less need
to pacify them by promises. The year 1954 also marked the end of the period of New Democracy, which called for a United Front of all the peoples, and the commencement of socialism, in which the CCP would emerge paramount.

795 The change of Communist policy toward the Moslem peoples
641 of the Northwest as in other parts of China is seen in the official
*668 documents of the Chinese Communists. In contrast to the Common
177 Program of the CPPCC, the blue print for the period of
New Democracy, in which, in Article 53, the national minorities were promised freedom to develop their languages and to preserve or reform their cultures and religions, the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (adopted in September, 1954,) pointedly omits the freedom of religion for the national minorities. Article 3, which discusses the rights of the national minorities, states that "all the nationalities have freedom to use and foster the growth of their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their own customs and ways." Only in Article 88 was there the provision that the "citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief," and, according to Mao Tse-tung's definition (in his People's

795 Democratic Dictatorship, 1949), the term "citizen" is restricted
641 to certain select classes of people, not all the people.

*668 Moreover, as the Communist officials have frankly stated,
177 toleration would be granted to only religious faiths which (1)
795 have been purified of foreign influences and "feudal superstitions,"
798 (2) contribute toward the increase of production, and
*668 (3) do not conflict with the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao
177 Tse-tung. In other words, the Chinese Communists sanction
only religions that have been tamed, domesticated, and cleansed
of political coloration.

In the implementation of this policy of the Central People's Government, Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, announced in February, 1955, that only "legal religious activities would be permitted by the people's government," because, he said, "individual counter-revolutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam and, under the cloak of religion, are carrying on counter-revolutionary activities." (Sinkiang jih-pao, February 25, 1955.)

The stiffening of Chinese Communist policy toward the adherents of Islam represented, actually, no radical change but rather the shedding of the pretense of benevolence toward the nationality minorities whose attachment to their religion was stronger than their allegiance to the state. It represented, too, a recognition by the Chinese Communists of the fundamental differences between Islam and Communism and of the impossibility of rationalizing these differences. Islam, with its strong social principles for the regulation of state and homelife, conflicts with the totalitarianism of Communism. As Moslem
795 leaders of Asian countries have pointed out, Communism advocates
*668 the use of force against those who would not readily
177 accede to it; Islam teaches men to bring others to follow the
way of God by peaceful means. Communism does not respect
the sanctity of human life, but teaches violence and favors the
organization of society based upon atheism and anti-religion;
Islam provides for individual rights and freedom, and encourages
humanitarian services, compassionate feeling toward all
living beings, apart from devotion to God.

795 Besides being a religion, Islam in Chinese Turkestan has
also been a strong political force welding the multi-racial
182 groups together in their struggle for self-rule and their resistance
[669] to oppression. The insurrections of the Moslems against
the Chinese in the beginning of the nineteenth century have been
led by religious leaders, the Khojas; the widespread uprisings
of the Moslems in the 1860's were led by Ma Hua-lung, the
leader of the New Sect, in Kansu, and by Yakub Beg, who bore
the title of Commander of the Faithful, in Kashgaria.

000 The demands of the natives of Sinkiang for independence were

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The demands of the natives of Sinkiang for independence were
795 accentuated in the 1930's by the introduction of pan-Islamic
668 ideals from India. These ideals for a union of Moslem peoples
which transcends national boundaries, fired the imagination of
the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang and bolstered their nationalistic
aspirations. As they served to mobilize Turkestanian nationalists
to oppose Nationalist rule in the 1940's, so they have inspired
Turkestanian resistance against the Communists since
795 1949. In speeches and in publications, the Communist leaders
668 have vehemently denounced pan-Islam as a major obstacle to the
policy of bringing the native peoples of Turkestan into the "great
177 family of nationalities" of Communist China.

Perhaps, because pan-Islam is still an incohate movement,
having attractive and high-sounding goals but not the organization
and strength to achieve these goals, the Chinese Communists,
despite their denunciation of it, have not regarded it as a
great threat in comparison to that of other religions, like, for
example, the Roman Catholic Church, which have external ties.
Consequently, in the first years of Communist rule,, they proclaimed
a policy of benevolence toward the Moslems largely
for the propaganda value of such a policy.

A number of Moslem fellow-travelers readily responded, and
other Moslem leaders, out of self-interest, also acquiesced to
the Communists. Still others hoped to carry on even under the
narrow restrictions imposed upon them by the Communist government.
The majority of the Moslem peoples of the Northwest,
learning from the experience of their co-religionists in Soviet
Central Asia, have evolved a way of life which is to live in the
Communist world without becoming a part of it. Privately, they
still regard themselves as belonging to the Moslem world.

795 A large number of the Moslems in Chinese Turkestan, following
798 the militant tradition of their forefathers, chose to resist
the Communists, and the Communists treated them, not as Moslems,
668 but as counter-revolutionaries. Consequently, while proclaiming
177 their policy of benevolence toward the Moslems, a
policy reserved for only those who submit, the Communists also
carried out a violent program of persecution. As soon as they
entered Sinkiang in 1949, the first act of the Chinese Communists
was to undermine the influence of the Moslem clergy. A
number of religious institutions were closed, and the landed
property of the clergy—the waqf—were confiscated. Chinese
892 Communist judges took over the judicial functions of the qadi and
the people's courts took over the handling of criminal and civil
cases, while the so-claimed cultural cadres assumed the guidance
of the daily life of the people. The local branches of the
China Islamic Association and other mass organizations supplanted
the leadership of the Moslem clergy. With institution of

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civil marriage, marriage and divorce ceased to be an important function administered by the qadi.

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Thousands of religious scholars and intellectuals, denounced as counter-revolutionaries, were arrested. The people's court tried some thirty thousand Moslems, sentencing some to death and others to life imprisonment. Soviet forces were reported to have joined the Chinese Communist troops in suppressing the anti-Communist uprisings, in which it is estimated that 130,000 Moslems were slaughtered, 260,000 sentenced to forced labor and 150,000 fled from Sinkiang. [Figures based on Hikmah (Indonesian weekly), July 23, 1955, in Missionary Bulletin, January 1954, and report of Mochtar Gazali, member of the Executive Council of the Federation of Indonesian Moslem Labor, in Missionary Bulletin, July 1953.]

But the persecutions have failed to wipe out opposition from large segments of the Moslem population. As late as the spring of 1956, it was still charged that "counter-revolutionaries" were hiding in religious circles and "under the cloak of religion they carried out various kinds of destructive activities." (Report of Su Chen-yung, vice director of the Bureau of Public Security, Kansu People's Government, in Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956.)

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B. Lamaism

As was the case with Islam, the present regime has also tried to placate Lamaism as a device to attract the loyalties of the Lamaistic peoples, the Mongols and the Tibetans. Famous Lama temples were kept in a good state of repair. Lamaist priests and dignitaries received subvention and a certain restraint was shown toward interfering with strictly religious practices (for details see IMAR Handbook, Religion). More particularly, the two highest priests of Tibetan Lamaism, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, both 'teen-agers, by the way, were kept at Peking for long periods of time and shown around at international gatherings.

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Attitudes toward Lamaism as a religion and an institution differ somewhat in the Mongolian and the Tibetan contexts. Generally speaking, it can be said that among the Mongols the influence of Lamaism was on the wane. Even among those Mongols who stuck to their traditions and maintained loyalty to their princes, there was a tendency to break loose gradually from the leading-strings of the Lamaseries. Already in pre-Communist times, progressive Mongols supported this movement. The Regent of the Alashan Mongols, for instance, had made it a rule to submit Lama novices to compulsory secular education and military training in order to educate them out of Lamaism. No reports are available on how Mongolian Lamas have reacted to

795 the Communist soft-glove treatment. It is known, however, that
792 they are used widely as Communist propaganda agents.

*563 In Tibet, on the other hand, and that includes the Tibetan
*668 parts of Chinghai, the position of Lamaism is infinitely stronger.
177 There was no sign of weakening in the adherence to the old faith,
795 and militant Lamas were always in a position to incite the lay
792 population to concerted action. This has again been shown in the
171 recent rebellious outburst in Tibet, which seems to be partic-
*668 ularly strong in Southern Chinghai. Occurring at a time when
177 the Dalai Lama was back in Lasa and the first steps had been
taken to grant Tibet "autonomy" status (Reuters, April 26, 1956), this outburst is all the more surprising as it sets off the leading Lamaist clergy not only from the Peking regime but also from their spiritual head. Ruthless suppression measures which included the bombing of Lamaseries have thus far apparently not succeeded in quelching the rebellion. Mention is made of a Tibetan Resistance Party (Mim ang, literally, People's Organization) led by Lamaist clergy and joined by officials, traders and other laymen (Himalayan Times, Kalimpong, May 13, 1956; New York Times, June 30, 1956; AP, July 7, 1956).

795 C. The Fate of Christianity

Christian missionary activities and Christian establishments
798 in the Northwest have been predominantly Catholic. The Com-
*668 munists had some dealings with Catholic priests and Catholic
177 communities in the Yenan period. The staunchly anti-Commun-
(797) ist stand of the Catholic Church had at that time given rise to
friction and incidents, even though the Communists still wanted at that time to avoid drastic action. In Mongol Catholic communities, they had attempted to undercut the prestige of the priest in case he was a foreigner, but they learned from experience that they did not fare better when a Mongol Catholic priest was put in charge. The strong cohesion between the community and the priests forced the Communists repeatedly into making concessions. A perusal of the records, however, creates the impression that dealings with the Catholic Church were handled locally and incidentally only, and that no plans were yet devised for how to take care of the Catholic Church.

795 After the general conquest, however, a pattern emerged
*668 which shows that an over-all policy was applied to the region.
177 This policy was apparently inspired by Lenin's doctrine that
798 Bismarck's head-on collision with the Catholic Church, the
Kultur-kampf, was a folly. A propaganda front of "religious freedom" was therefore maintained all through the years. There was apparently, particularly in the beginning, a certain amount of local lattitude in the interpretation of this principle. In a

795 number of parishes, religious life went on without major inter-
*668 ference up until about 1951. For the strategy of interferences the
177 Communists drew on earlier experiences in Manchuria and
798 Inner Mongolia, where "spontaneous action" had frequently led
to situations that were deemed undesirable by the regime (see Northeast Handbook, Religion). From the pattern of events the following strategic rules can be derived:

1. Do not attack the Catholic Church as such.
2. Attack certain Church institutions which are either most dear to the hearts of the communities or most efficient in maintaining an active community spirit.
3. Avoid making martyrs.
4. Attack individual functionaries of the Church on non-religious charges.
5. Draw the utmost propaganda advantages out of every case.
6. Separate foreign leadership from indigenous communities.
7. Substitute a malleable "Catholic" organization for the existing Catholic Church.

Not even the first of these principles was generally applied. Even though the "freedom of religion" line was never officially abrogated, repeated anti-religious propaganda campaigns were entertained to create an atmosphere in which individual believers would sever their connections with their Church. In the case of Catholics these campaigns proved essentially a failure. It was furthermore made perfectly clear in interrogation of Church officials that there was no room for religion in a Communist state.

Catholic institutions most heavily attacked were the orphanages and the Legion of Mary. The Communists did not tolerate the possibility that an institution of such incisive charitable effect as an orphanage should remain in the hands of the Church. The public trials of the Sisters who were in charge of these orphanages are among the most vicious on record; incredible charges such as child murder and selling into prostitution were preferred against them. The Communists even risked considerable opposition and resentment to eradicate institutions which would so obviously ingratiate the Church to the communities.

The campaign against the Legion of Mary started early. It reached its pitch in 1951, but has not subsided.

The treatment dealt out to Catholic priests, sisters, brothers and laymen showed some local variations. There are instances in which torture and indignities were only sparingly applied. In most cases, however, it was attempted to go all the way to the point of martyring—an attempt, by the way, that was not always successful. Insufficient food, shackling, beatings by fellow prisoners used as stooges, constant disturbance of sleep,

795 continuous interrogations and then trials before People's tri-
798 bunals and confrontations with hysterical crowds, parading
177 through the city, were the methods most frequently used.
*668 In the second half of 1951 and all during 1952 and 1953, the campaign against the Catholic hierarchy went on. Most of the bishops and priests were charged with collaboration with imperialistic countries, spying, and membership in the Legion of Mary. Many of them were thrown into jail or kept under house detention, and then one by one they were expelled. It is strange to note that, particularly in the beginning, the Communists wanted it to seem that they left voluntarily; and all kinds of torture were applied to make them sign petitions for an exit permit. Among those expelled were: Archbishop Theodore Buddenbroek of Lanchou, Kansu; Bishop Melckebeke of Ninghsia; Prefect Apostalic Jerome Haberstroh of Hsining; Bishop Larranga-Lana of Ping-liang, Kansu; Prefect Apostalic Pierre Maleddu of Hsing-an, Shensi; Bishop Peter Grimm of Ch'in-chou, Kansu; Bishop Joseph Maggi of Han-chung, Shensi; Bishop Pierre Moretti of T'ung-chou, Shensi, and Bishop Fulgence Pasini of San-yüan Shensi. Priests and Sisters were also forced to leave, so that by January 1, 1956, no foreign church official was left in the Northwest. However, as in most of the dioceses concerned, the indigenous priesthood, Chinese or Mongol, was well developed, this loss of foreign leadership did not hurt the Catholic Church in the Northwest so much as the Communists had hoped. Chinese priests were not spared the persecution that their foreign brethren had experienced. They were pilloried and jailed in great numbers, but they stood up to the test remarkably well. Even under the most restricted of circumstances they maintained church services and contact with their communities. It is reported, for instance, that an unnamed Chinese bishop carried on in Lanchow after Archbishop Buddenbroek had left, and even went on ordaining new priests.

The attempt by the Communists to substitute an "Independent" or "Reformed" Catholic Church for the original structure failed dismally in the Northwest. Also in other parts of China this movement has found only negligable response among the Catholic clergy, with the exception of a few show pieces which, of course, are always produced when foreign visitors are at hand. When the movement started, a few among the clergy in the Northwest might have believed that the Holy See would condone such a compromise. Excommunication of the collaborators soon dispelled this belief, however, and in no known case does a priest in the Northwest support the movement. The Communists tried for a time to bring in some "progressive" priests from outside, but apparently none could gain a foothold in Northwest communities.

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000 communities.

795 The Russian Orthodox Church in Sinkiang had quite a differ-
668 ent fate.[1] By 1938 the Vicariate of Urumchi comprised eight
199 parishes and counted fifteen thousand faithful. It was headed by Mgr. Juvenal Kilm, who in the meantime has been promoted to the Archbishopric of Omsk. Archpriest Dimitry Mlodzyanovky is now active in Urumchi, and it is reported that the number of believers is increasing.

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1. [In contrast to the Roman Catholic church in Northwest China, see pp. 359-361--Analyst]

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SUBCONTRACTOR'S MONOGRAPH

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ON
NORTHWEST CHINA

Volume II

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Additional Readings

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PUBLIC INFORMATION

000 I. Newspapers

II. Periodicals

III. Publishers and Distributors

IV. Books and Pamphlets

V. Radio

VI. Movies and Lantern Slides

VII. Organization

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PUBLIC INFORMATION

N 1. Newspapers

,175 During the past decades, Northwest China was lagging in cul-
204 tural development. There were very few newspapers before 1937.
167 After the war started, numerous people migrated from the coastal
N provinces into the Northwest. Among these there were a great
(873) number of intelligentsia. Several universities moved from Peking into the Northwest and thousands of students poured into the area. With the coming of these people, the average of cultural standard
N was greatly raised and the demand for more and better newspapers
204 increased. A number of papers emerged and some stayed. Among these, some were supported by the Nationalist Party, such as the Hsi-ching jih-pao or the Western Capital Daily in Sian. Some were supported by the San-min-chu-i Youth Corps, such as Ch'ing-nien jih-pao or the Youth Daily, in the same city. Some were supported by churches, such as the I-shih-pao (Sian edition) in Sian, a Catholic paper. Some were supported by local influences, such as Ch'ing-feng jih-pao in Sian. After the war, there were even anti-government papers, such as Kung-shang jih-pao in Sian, organ of the Democratic League.

Some of these papers achieved an admirable standard of quality. In appearance, these papers were unattractive. Usually printed on the native newsprint, which was thin, dark and rough, the print
N was often unclear. Bad as it was, this kind of newsprint was ex-
(656) pensive and could be bought in quantity only through government rationing. In fact, the government did occasionally use this authority of rationing newsprint to practice a kind of indirect censorship on the papers. Papers were occasionally cut off their rations and found it necessary to buy on the black market at forbidding prices. The dailies usually had no more than four pages, with half of the space occupied by advertisements. About a page and a half would carry the national and world news, editorials, and articles, leaving about half of a page for local news and miscellaneous subjects. The news were mainly supplied by the Central News Agency, a Nationalist Party organ. Within these limitations, little could be done to give profile to a paper. This monotonous pattern was later broken by the anti-government papers, which carried a lot of the Communist news and views. The circulation of all the papers was limited among the intelligentsia, officials and merchants. Few, if any, of the papers exceeded a daily
S circulation of 10,000 copies. In Sinkiang, during the administra-
204 tion of Sheng Shih-tsai, there were editions of the Sinkiang jih-pao published in seven languages. (Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 73.)

N After the Communists conquered the Northwest, they took over
204 all the former government papers. The private papers were dis-
*668 couraged to continue. According to the limited information avail-
177 able, the following papers have been or are being edited in the

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Northwest(discounting wall newspapers and blackboard newspapers):

1. Ch'ün-chung jih-pao (Mass Daily) Sian, Shensi. This was the most important Communist Party paper in the Northwest during the period when the Northwest Greater Administrative Area was in existence. With the abolition of the Greater Administrative Area System in 1954, this paper merged with the provincial paper, Shensi jih-pao (Shensi Daily). Apparently the Ch'ün-chung jih-pao was built upon the material foundation of the former Hsi-ching jih-pao, the Nationalist Party paper. It delivered the official Party line to the party members as well as to the public of the Northwest.

2. Shensi jih-pao (Shensi Daily) Sian, Shensi. The Party daily in Shensi with a section on literature. After 1954, it absorbed the original Ch'ün-chung jih-pao.

3. Kuan-chung jih-pao (Kuan-chung Daily), Sian, Shensi. Apparently this is the paper of the local Communist Party in the area of central Shensi.

4. Nung-min pao (Farmers' News), Shensi. A local Party paper published for the peasants in Shensi.

5. Ching-chi k'uai-pao (Economic Express), Sian, Shensi. A paper with emphasis on economics but it has a section for literary work.

6. Ye-nan pao (Yenan News), Yenan, Shensi. A local Party paper in the former Red capital Yenan.

7. Lan-chou Kung-jen pao (Lanchow Workers' News), Lanchow, Kansu. First published on February 7, 1952, apparently by the local trade union, it is a four-page tabloid paper published once every three days.

8. Kansu jih-pao (Kansu Daily), Lan-chou, Kansu. The Party paper in Kansu. Published in Lanchou but its distribution is province-wide.

9. Kansu ch'ing-nien pao (Kansu Youth), Lan-chou, Kansu. An official organ paper of the Kansu provincial committee of the New Democratic Youth League. Published once a week since January 28, 1955.

10. Hsia-ho pao (Hsia-ho News), Hsia-ho, Kansu. The Party paper published by the Communist Party Working Committee in Hsia-ho county of Kansu. First published on April 10, 1952, it is a weekly four-page paper in Tibetan and Chinese.

11. Mu-min pao (Herder's News), the Mongol Autonomous chou, Kansu. A local paper in Mongolian for the Mongols in Kansu, a four-page paper published three times each month since January, 1955. According to the Communist reports, "in the past issues, much space has been devoted to reflect the pastoral people's production, life, and demand in the autonomous area. The newspaper devotes special columns to the study of Mongolian, to cultural and recreational life, and to favorite songs and tales."

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12. Chinghai jih-pao (Chinghai Daily), Hsi-ning, Chinghai. The Party paper in the province of Chinghai.

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13. Sinkiang jih-pao (Sinkiang Daily), Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang. An old paper taken over by the Communist Party after their conquest of Urumchi (Tihua). Now it is the leading Party paper in Sinkiang with a daily circulation of 330,000 copies. It is in Chinese.

14. Sinkiang Ch'ing-nien pao (Sinkiang Youth) Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang, organ paper of the Sinkiang New Democratic Youth League in Uighur.

15. T'ien Nan jih-pao (Southern Tien-Shan Daily), Kashgar, Sinkiang. A Party paper in the local area of southern Sinkiang.

16. Ili jih-pao, (Ili Daily) Ili, Sinkiang. First published on October 1, 1955, in Kazakh for the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou.

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Other papers, not presently identifiable must exist or have existed. In 1950, it was claimed that "except for Taiwan and Tibet, each of the 28 provinces of China has its own state-owned newspapers." (NCNA December 17, 1950). It might thus be assumed that there was also an official paper in Ninghsia.

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Yolbars Khan wrote in 1954: "according to Communist official reports there were at the end of 1953, sixteen different newspapers in Sinkiang printed from lead types. Among these, eight were in Uighur, four in Kazakh, two in Chinese, one in Mongolian, and one in Manchu. (Chung-hua nien-pao, February, 1954, p. 54). A later report states that "In Sinkiang, there are now (September 20, 1955) thirteen newspapers published in five different languages, Uighur, Chinese, Kazakh, Mongolian and Sibo. (Sibo is an extinct Tungusic language.) (Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao, November, 1955, p. 33).

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Besides these local papers, some of the leading nationwide papers are specially shipped into the Northwest by air mail. Starting from August 1, 1952, the Communist postal administration has arranged the air mail delivery to Sinkiang and other northwestern areas of Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), the Kung-jen jih-pao (Daily Worker), Kuang-ming jih-pao (Kuang-ming Daily), and the Chung-kuo Ch'ing-nien pao (China Youth), all published in Peking. The papers could in this way reach their destinations in two to nine days. Air mail charges for newspapers were 700 (3¢ U.S.) per copy in addition to the ordinary postage. (see China General, Public Information)

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The contents of these national and local papers are monotonously similar. Especially in the local papers, the very limited space averaging four pages a day is crowded with Party documents, editorials, reports, and articles, leaving very little room for news. Most of the material is supplied by the New China News Agency, which is the Communist Party outlet, guaranteeing successfully strict news control. (The denunciation of Stalin at the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956, was not mentioned in the review of this congress in the official

204 *668 177 Hsin-hua pan Yüeh-k'an (New China Semi-monthly) of March 21st.

One of the unconventional features of these papers is their special use of letters to the editors. These letters are not only published as a safety valve or to reveal public opinion, but are carefully planted "to consolidate the ties between the newspaper and the people." Another way to achieve this aim is the direct appointment of a large number of correspondents from among workers, peasants, students, PLA units and government branches. (Liu Tsun-ch'i, NCNA December 17, 1950.) Liu also hinted at the usefulness of keeping acquainted with constant shifts in the party line, a hint that was well understood and boosted the circulation of the papers.

In appearance these papers are generally very pleasing. Regular newsprint is used again and a clear print. Misprints are few. Starting from January 1, 1956, Shensi jih-pao has changed the setting of types from the traditional vertical lines into horizontal lines. The Sinkiang jih-pao and the Kansu jih-pao are also making preparations for this change.

II. Periodicals

Up to June, 1955, there were 305 different kinds of periodicals in Red China. Among these, 166 were nationwide. In the Northwest, the following magazines were most popular:

1. Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien (Chinese Youth)
2. Hsüeh-hsi (Study)
3. Shih-shih shou-ts'e (Handbook on Current Events)
4. Hsin-chung-kuo fu-nü (New China Women)
5. Kung-jen (Worker)
6. Hsin kuan-ch'a (New Observer)
7. Shih-chieh chih-shih (World Knowledge)
8. Wen-i-pao (Literature)
9. Jen-min wen-i (People's Literature)
10. Hsin chien-she (New Construction)
11. Jen-min hua-pao (People's Pictorial)
12. Hsin-hua yüeh-pao (New China Monthly), starting from January, 1956, it has been changed into Hsin-hua Pan-yüeh-k'an (New China Semi-monthly).
13. Lien-huan hua-pao (Pictoral Stories)
14. Min-tsu hua-pao (Nationalities Pictorial)

(See China General, Public Information)

According to the advertisements in the local papers, these periodicals are available in the Northwest through the book stores.

Identifiable periodicals edited and published in the Northwest include the following titles:

1. Ch'ün-chung yin-yüeh or The Music for the Masses, edited and published by the Northwest People's Publishing House in Sian.
2. Hsi-pei wen-i or Northwest Literature.

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204 3. Kung-jen wen-i or Laborer's Literature.
*668 4. Shensi wen-i or Shensi Literature.
177 (The above three are literary magazines published in Sian.)
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204 5. The Sinkiang Propagandists, a semi-monthly published by
668 Sinkiang People's Publishing House in Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang,
177 with 2,665 regular subscribers, among which 1,719 subscribed to the Uighur language edition and 946 to the Chinese edition. It is a directory for propaganda workers in Sinkiang.

6. Sinkiang Education, a monthly edited and published by Sinkiang Education Corporation and distributed by the Urumchi (Tihua) post office. It has editions in Chinese and Uighur.

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214 III. Publishers and Distributors

Before the Communists took over the mainland, most important publishing houses and distributors throughout the country were private. Some semi-official publishing houses, such as the Cheng-chung Book Stores were gaining some ground but did not dominate the field. In Northwest China, there were branch stores of nationwide publishers such as the Commercial Press, the Chung-hua Book Company, mostly acting as distributors of books published in Shanghai or Chungking. Local publishing houses were few and small in scale. They were short of capital and inefficiently managed, therefore often ephemeral.

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214 After the Communists took over, the official and semi-official publishing houses were taken over and the private ones put under
*668 control. Previously, Communist controlled publishing houses,
177 the Sheng-huo Book Store, the Tu-shu sheng-huo Book Store and the Hsin-chih Book Store, were consolidated into the San-lien Book Company. This company was then used as a nucleus to control the leading private publishers: "Four of the leading privately operated book companies in China, the Commercial Press, the Chung-hua Book Company, the K'ai-ming Book Company, and the Lien-yin Book Company and one private and public jointly operated, the San-lien Book Company, will form a joint house to be known as the China Book Distributors Corporation to coordinate with the state-owned Hsin-hua Book Store in establishing a network of distribution centers throughout the whole country. This is a decision reached on September 15 in the First National Publication Conference held under the auspices of the Publication Administration." (Shanghai News November 19, 1950)

The integration of the private publishing business into the interests of the party was the necessary reorganization and division of labor that changed the blind and anarchial situation of the past." (Wang Po-kung in Shih-shih shou-ts'e pan-yüeh-k'an, September 20, 1951, p. 22.) From that time on publishing business soared (see China General, Public Information).

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As the major distributor of books, the state-owned Hsin-hua Book Store has established 1,086 branches all over the country. The state-owned International Book Store became the special distributor of the books and periodicals imported and exported. In the main cities all over the country the Party has established 12 state-owned printing presses with modern equipment. Among these twelve, one is in Sian, Shensi, and one is in Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang. Private publishers, printers and distributors have mostly been forced out of business or have become a part of private state joint enterprises. For Northwest China, the most significant publishing house is the Nationality Publishing House in Peking which has been assigned to publish books in minority languages.

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In Northwest China itself, there are two leading publishing houses, one is the Northwest People's Publishing House in Sian, Shensi. The other is the Sinkiang Provincial (later regional) People's Publishing House in Urumchi (Tihua), Sinkiang. Both are state-owned but apparently the former is under the direct control of the Party, while the latter is under the control of the Provincial Government. The Northwest People's Publishing House uses the printing facilities of the Hsin-hua Printing Press in Sian. The Sinkiang Provincial People's Publishing House apparently has its own printing press since it has put special emphasis on publishing books in languages of the minority groups.

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The distribution of books and magazines in the Northwest is mainly dependent on the branches of the state-owned Hsin-hua Book Store. The short history of the Hsin-hua Book Store in Sinkiang illustrates this fact.

On January 10, 1950, the Sinkiang branch of the Hsin-hua Book Store was founded in Urumchi (Tihua). On March 19, April 19, and July 1 of the same year, the sales departments at South Main Street, North Main Street and Nan-liang in Urumchi (Tihua) opened for business respectively. In April, 1950, the Qomul (Hami) Branch opened. In June the Kashgar branch opened. In August, the branch stores in Sha-ch'e, Ili, Altai (A-shan), Chuguchak (T'a-ch'eng), Khotan (Ho-t'ien), Kharashar (Yen-ch'i), Aksu, and Manass (Sui-lai) opened as a part of the provincial government's project. In September, 1952, two branch stores were established in the industrial and mining districts Fu-wen and Tu-shan-tzu. In October, 1952, four branch stores started business in Karghalik (Yeh-ch'eng), Kucha (K'u-ch'e), Yangihissar (Ying-chi-sha) and Maralbashi (Pa-ch'u). Up to the end of 1952, there were 16 branch stores which, in turn, had established 48 sub-stations in counties where no branch store was in existence. At the end of 1950, "with the help of Soviet friends" the Hsin-hua Book Store took over the five International Book Stores at Urumchi (Tihua), Ili, Kashgar, Chuguchak (T'a-ch'eng) and Altai (A-shan).

549 668 177 443 On November 2, 1952, the Qomul (Hami) branch of the Hsin-hua Book Store established the first "self-service" sales station. In November, 1952, in Urumchi (Tihua), the store organized 116 special individual distributors in the various units of government offices, schools and military forces. At the same time, four more sales stations were established.

[489] [705] To ship the bulky and heavy books to the whole province, the Hsin-hua Book Store utilized the army transportation facilities. With the help of the army, 1,280,000 copies of elementary and middle school textbooks were delivered.

[205] In August, 1952, Hsin-hua Book Store organized a moving supply section to go deep into the nomadic counties Barkul (Cheng-hsi), Ch'ang-chi, Hu-t'u-pi (Ching-hua) together with the Visiting Group of Sinkiang Provincial Government. It also established a mail order department, accepting also orders for books published in other places in the country and the Soviet Union (Sinkiang jih-pao, January 11, 1953).

Distribution of Communist books has been pushed tremendously by the organized force of the Party. The distribution of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung in Uighur and Kazakh started with the organization of a distributing committee at every level of the Party organization above the county. Every member of the Party and the Youth League was required to join in the selling of the book, to his friends and acquaintances as well as in the bazaars. Every branch of the committees had a selling quota to meet. Dancing teams, drum teams performed and marched on the streets to promote the sale. Salesmen were carrying books to every door.

With this kind of high-pressured salesmanship, Hsin-hua Book Company sold in three years (1950-1952): 2,491,531 copies of books; 733,348 periodicals; 1,848,555 textbooks; 2,973,762 international editions of books and periodicals (This included Chinese, Uighur, Kazakh, Russian, etc., among which 1,200,000 copies were textbooks.) This is a total of 8,037,196 copies. Broken down by languages, the figures were:

Uighur	4,018,595	or 50%
Chinese	2,813,019	or 35%
Kazakh	482,232	or 6%
Mongolian	160,744	or 2%
Russian, Uzbek, etc.	562,603	or 7%

Compared with the past, these figures are impressive. The impression is modified, however, when the distributed titles are examined. Many of these publications were documents, handbooks, or propaganda pamphlets.

Among these, the periodical The Sinkiang Propagandist was distributed in 7[illegible]2,902 copies in three years. Another best seller was the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, translated into Uighur, S 549 443 668 177

Kazakh and Mongolian by the Propaganda Department of the Sinkiang Sub-Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which sold 243,395 copies. In 1951 alone, Mao's books, On the New Democracy and On Practice, and the People's Democratic Dictionary sold 131,000 copies.

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IV. Books and Pamphlets

Because the Northwest has been culturally backward for years, most of the books there have been imported from outside. The cultural development of China has thus directly affected the situation in the Northwest. If there are more books published in the country as a whole, the Northwest will proportionally benefit by this fact.

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After the Communists took over, achievements in the publishing business were boosted. In 1951 it was reported that from January to July 6,754 different titles were published, an increase of 158% over the same period of 1950. Among these, 2,540 titles were popular reading. This raised the proportion of popular books to 40.9% of the total.

In an article published in 1952, Hu Yü-chih, the Director of the Publication Administration of the Central People's Government of China, made the following statements: "On October 12, 1951, vol. I of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung was published. So far 3,020,000 copies of the first two volumes of this series have been printed and distributed.... During the past three years, the state-owned People's Publishing Houses alone...have published 48 titles and 3,686,000 copies of the classical works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin...."

According to his statistics, books and periodicals published before and after the Communists' conquest compare as follows:

Year	No. Copies Published	No. Periodicals
1936 (Pre-Communist record year)	178,000,000	32,300,000
After:		
1950	274,632,630	35,301,679
1951	669,639,911	176,774,253
1952 (estimation)	882,000,000	180,000,000

He further stated that before the Communists took over, the average number of copies for each title besides textbooks was 2,000. In 1951, the number was 9,782, an increase of about five times. He named the four best sellers in 1951 as follows:

1. The Popular Edition of the Illustrated Explanation of the Marriage Law - 11,500,000 copies.
2. The Popular Edition of the Illustrated Explanation of the Regulations for Punishment of the Counter-Revolutionists in People's Republic of China - 10,680,000 copies.

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3. The Thirty Years of Chinese Communist Party - 2,800,000 copies.
4. The Pictoral Story of the Thirty Years of Chinese Communist Party - 2,500,000 copies.

He also revealed that since 1951 textbooks used in the junior middle schools all over the country have been unified. They were uniformly edited and printed by the state-owned People's Educational Publishing House, marked with uniform prices and uniformly distributed by the state-owned Hsin-hua Book Store. In other words, the profitable textbook business was taken out of the hands of the private publishers and monopolized by the state. Together with the already monopolized grade school textbook business, the total number increased from 153,849,314 copies in 1950 to 306,230,000 copies in 1952, an increase of 90% in two years. These figures did not include those of textbooks used outside the regular schools. In the second half of 1952 alone, the textbooks used by the winter schools and beginners blasses for adults sold 270,320,000 copies.

Besides books for peasants and workers and books for the youngsters, publications for the minority groups were especially emphasized. The New China News Agency reported that in 1951 176 titles of books (including textbooks) were printed in minority languages with a total of 2,200,000 copies; in 1952, the total increased to 376 titles and more than 4,300,000 copies. It is also reported that during the three years from 1950 to 1952 the Committee of the Nationality Affairs alone had published more than one million copies of books and periodicals translated into Mongolian, Tibetan, and Uighur.

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Up to the end of 1953, the Sinkiang People's Publishing House had published 189 titles of books with a total of 2,114,000 copies. Among these, 56 titles were translations of Mao Tse-tung's writings in Uighur and twelve titles were Mao's writings in Kazakh. In other words, more than one-third of these were Mao's pamphlets.

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The figures on books published in 1954 for the minority groups in Red China were given as follows:

Books Published in Minority Languages (including Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, and Kazakh)

	Titles	Copies
Local Publishing Houses	835	8,730,000
Nationality Publishing House in Peking	201	1,967,000
Total	1,036	10,697,000

This emphasis on the publishing of books in minority languages is further illustrated in the fact that during the eight months from January to August, 1955, Red China published 112 titles of books in Mongolian with a total of more than 432,200 copies.

To assure a wide circulation of books, the Ministry of Culture in Peking issued new regulations about the prices of books in

S N 214 171 March, 1955. Through these regulations, the prices of some books were lowered from 4% to 21%.

S 214 668 177 The above reported figures are impressive. The narrow choice of titles, however, has given constant cause for complaint. Readers in Aksu, Sinkiang reflected, according to a Sinkiang jih-pao report of January 11, 1953: "Why do you people in the Hsin-Hua Book Store sell only this kind of book?" And the editorialising explanation: "...to spread Marxism-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" will have hardly sounded convincing to the questioner. The China Youth Journal, 1955, No. 10, writes: "For a long time, young people have not found satisfaction in the published books. They are mentally half-starved. Some youths are so eager to read that they have fallen prey to feudal, superstitious, mysterious and sexy books."

S N 214 668 177 (656) Similar complaints can be found in the press and the journals all over the country. Apparently, the policy of the Communists to swamp the "simple-minded" minority groups with Party doctrine did not pay off. Thus recourse was had to censorship. On July 20, 1955, the State Council promulgated the Temporary Regulations on Controlling the Book Renting Business, according to which the books which are lewd, supernatural and full of reactionary ideas are excluded from circulation.

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V. Radio

Radio broadcasting of the Chinese Communist Party had a humble start. On September 5, 1945, the Hsin-Hua Broadcasting Station in Yenan made its first official broadcast. It had a power of 300 watts only. When the Nationalists attacked, the station fled with the Party headquarters but never ceased to broadcast.

From September 5, 1945, to September 4, 1946, it broadcast for two hours a day. The programs included news, comments, introduction to the liberated areas, etc. From September 5, 1946, the time increased to two and a half hours daily. The program included speeches, and voices of the people. Later a broadcast to the Nationalist Army was added. Starting from September 5, 1947, the broadcast increased to three hours. News summaries were added, and later programs in English.

In March, 1949, the station moved to Peking and took over the Nationalists' station there. On October 1, 1949, the name was changed into the Central People's Broadcasting Station. It became the leading broadcast center.

In April, 1950, the Communists began to establish monitoring stations throughout the country. The Central People's Broadcasting Station has since broadcast the main programs for the monitoring stations all over Red China, including the Northwest. In 1950, there was only one program lasting 7 1/2 hours per day. From 1954 on, it increased to two programs with a total broadcasting

207 time of 19 1/2 hours per day. Now there are also programs in
*668 Uighur, Mongolian and Tibetan. The political program takes up
177 about 30% of the time; music, literature and drama take up about
60%; other items take up about 10%.

In 1951, the Communists claimed to have 73 People's Broadcasting Stations and the "monitoring net" had covered the whole country. There were 15,200 monitoring stations and monitoring cells, besides 14,260 independent monitoring units manned by one individual. How many of these were in the Northwest, was not reported.

Besides the broadcasts sent out from Peking, the main broadcasting stations in the Northwest are:

Name	Wave Length (kc.)
Northwest People's Broadcasting Station in Sian	8007
Sian People's Broadcasting Station	1280
Lanchou People's Broadcasting Station	7313, 1400
Hsi-ning People's Broadcasting Station	9900
Urumchi (Tihua) People's Broadcasting Station	7050

(Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1952, p. 436)

These stations were not used to their full capacity. In 1952, Sian People's Broadcasting Station broadcast only three times a day, from 6:20 to 7:20, from 10:50 to 13:30 and from 17:20 to 22:00. On some days the morning broadcast was omitted. The following are sample programs:

July 2, 1952:

Noon: 12:00 - 12:30	Workers' period: Recorded speeches delivered at the rally of the representatives of the workers of Sian celebrating the 31st anniversary of the Party. Speeches by Chang Yen-po, Deputy-Director of the Department of Organization of the Sian Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and Feng Li-shen, the Secretary of the Enterprise Committee.
12:43 - 13:15	Songs
Evening:	
17:45 - 18:00	Youth Period: Introduction to the movie "Sverdlov".
19:00 - 19:30	Local opera of Mei-hsien and Hu-hsien, "Chao Hsiao-lan".
19:45 - 20:20	Recorded speeches delivered at the rally of the Sian Committee of the Chinese Communist Party celebrating the 31st anniversary of the Party. Speeches by Deputy Mayor Ch'en Shih-yü of the People's Government of Sian; Vice-Chairman K'ang Hsin-tsai of the Consultative Committee of the All City All Circle People's

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Representative Meeting
20:00 - 21:00 Shensi Opera, "The White Rabbit Trick". (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, July 2, 1952, advertisement)

July 6, 1952:
Noon:
12:00 - 12:30 Workers' Period: Correspondence, An introduction of comrade Chang Chen-ts'ai, a municipal worker who is positive in production and diligent in study.
12:45 - 13:15 Single String: "the excellent labor model Chang Shu-yün" (musical program)
Evening:
19:00 - 19:30 Honan Opera: Hua Mu-lan, K'ao-kung
Shensi Opera: The little Son-in-law
19:45 - 20:05 Commentary: The government offices and schools must promote wholeheartedly the patriotic, healthy, anti-epidemic movement.
20:05 - 20:20 Answers to questions from the audience about common sense to prevent contagious diseases.
20:20 - 21:00 Shensi Opera: "The White Rabbit Trick".

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These programs are re-broadcast by loudspeakers through monitoring stations all over the Northwest. In Sinkiang, the main broadcasting station is the one in Urumchi (Tihua). In every county, there are one or more monitoring stations. According to a 1954 report, there were 140 monitoring stations in Sinkiang. On February 15, 1955, Sinkiang Broadcasting Station started a Kazakh language program, 35 minutes daily except Sunday.

In March, 1955, the State Council in Peking ordered the supply of 1,500 receiving sets for the establishment of monitoring stations in nine provinces and autonomous regions. Kansu, Chinghai and Sinkiang were among these nine. Two months later, 350 monitoring sets were delivered by air mail to Sinkiang. This trebled the monitoring stations in Sinkiang. (NCNA May 27, 1955). Thus there should have been 525 monitoring stations in Sinkiang by summer of 1955. According to the report of Burkhan, however, by September, 1955, there were only 360 monitoring stations (Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao, 1955, p. 33).

One of the first acts of the people's government of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, established in October, 1955, was to expand the radio-receiving facilities in the region, especially for the nomadic peoples living in the more remote parts. In addition to the radio monitoring centers already established in the agricultural areas, 113 centers were set up for the pastoral districts. The plans for 1956 call for the establishment of 479 new monitoring stations in the SUAR. The cost of providing sets will be borne entirely by the people's government and the aim is to have

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207 at least one monitoring station in each pastoral and agricultural
668 district in Sinkiang.
177 These sets are designed to monitor local stations but are not
S powerful enough to receive foreign broadcasts. Reconditioning
[674] a radio set to suit "illegal" purposes is one of the major crimes (Hsin-Hua Yüeh-pao, 1955, 8, 258-9).

Extension of broadcasting and diffusion services is being con-
N stantly stepped up. By 1962, it is planned to have every village
[207] and cooperative listen to Peking. But even these plans exclude
*[668] the "remote areas" which means that the border areas of Chinghai,
[177] Sinkiang and Kansu will not be reached.

N VI. Movies and Lantern Slides

546 In 1950, the Communists trained more than 1,800 people in
+668 Peking to operate movie projectors. At that time they planned
177 to establish 700 mobile movie teams. The Communists also reported that by 1951 there were at least 9,943 lantern slide projectors in the country, serving 8,000,000 in 1950 and about 200,000,000 in 1951. Simultaneously the production of lantern slide projectors and slides was expanded. In 1952, there were sixteen factories specializing in manufacturing lantern slide projectors and fifteen organizations to produce slides.

In Sian, Shensi, a city of about 600,000 people, there were four movie theaters. Before the Communists took over, the public usually would have a choice of four different pictures. A recent advertisement of these theaters shows the following monotonous pattern:

Liberation Theater	Northwest Theater	A-fang Palace Theater
3:15, 6:45, 9:15	2:45, 6:15, 8:45	2:15, 5:45, 8:15

People's Light Theater
2:00, 5:30, 8:00

We solemnly dedicate our show to
a translated Soviet Feature, the
Glorious winner of the Stalin Prize

SVERDLOV

This picture concretely illustrated the firmness, courage, and wisdom of Sverdlov. In the dark years under the Czar, he organized the progressive workers to struggle for the establishment of Lenin's Party, and lit up the revolutionary fire which destroyed all.

Released by the Northwest Branch of the China Movie Managing Co.

(Sian, Ch'ün-chung Jih-pao, 1952, July 2, advertisement.)

Sverdlov, Yakov Mikhailovich, 1885-1919, an outstanding revolutionary and one of the major organizers and leaders of the Bolshevik Party, a close friend of Stalin and Lenin, with whom he worked in early revolutionary movements. He spent several years in exile with Stalin. Lenin called him chief organizer of Party and Soviet power.

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546 668 177 According to an advertisement in Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 5, 4953, two of the four cinemas in Tihua showed the Chinese feature: "Defend the Fruits of Victory" and the other two showed Soviet Russian films of the heroic type.

Shen Yen-ping, the Minister of Culture, recommended the following films as good features: "The Steel Fighter," "The White-Haired Girl," "The New Young Heroes and Heroines," "The People's Fighters," "The Victory of the Inner Mongolian People," "Chao I-man," "The Red Flag on the Green Hill," "The Concentration Camp in Shang-jao".

He mentioned the following pictures as good documentaries: "The Great Army Marches across the Yangtze," "The Victory Song of the Great Southwest," "The Red Flag Flaps in the West Wind," "The Great Union of the Chinese Nationalities," "Happy Sinkiang," "The March of the Army Liberating Tibet," "Resist America, Aid Korea," "We Must Control the Huai River," "The Victory of the Chinese People," "The Liberated China."

According to Burkhan, the governor of Sinkiang, at the end of 1952 there were more than 40 movie theaters, six rural mobile movie teams in government and army units, sixteen 16 mm. projector movie teams and 91 other movie projecting units in Sinkiang. In 1951, these theaters and teams performed before an audience of more than 4,214,800 (Sinkiang jih-pao, January 1, 1953). In 1952, films and slides were shown to over 5,700,000 people in Sinkiang (NCNA, May 4, 1953). The lantern slides have captions in Uighur, Kazakh, Mongolian and Chinese which were added to them on their arrival in Sinkiang. In 1952, there were only 600 of these sets, but 3,400 sets were being prepared for 1953 (NCNA, May 5, 1953).

In 1954, fourteen Chinese films were dubbed in Mongolian, Tibetan and Uighur (NCNA, December 31, 1954). The first movie showing the life of the Kazakh people, named "Hassan and Karmila" was released. A musical film recording ancient Uighur music was also made for the Uighur inhabitants. In September, 1955, there were 45 movie theaters, 35 educational mobile movie teams, three nationality cultural teams, six theatrical troupes, and 39 cultural halls in Sinkiang.

563 595 872 The institution of cultural halls is not new to Sinkiang. In the past, each of the nationalities residing in Sinkiang has had its own cultural association. These were usually headed by Moslem priests, village elders, living buddhas, or the princes and begs, and it was these cultural associations, not the provincial Commissioner of Education, which had control over the primary schools in Sinkiang. In 1938, they controlled 1,840 primary schools with a total of 105,087 students, and the Uighur Cultural Association, the largest, controlled 1,540 schools with 89,804 students. There were sub-associations in all the cities and towns of Sinkiang, all under the direction of the headquarters of the joint cultural associations located at Urumchi.

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575 ciations located at Urumchi. With the advent of the Chinese Com-
668 munists, the nationalities cultural associations were taken over
177 and in their place, cultural halls and cultural teams managed and
operated by Communist cultural cadres were established in the
cities and towns of Sinkiang.

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217 It is strange that in the pronouncements of Communist leaders
668 and the reports of cultural and educational achievements in Sin-
177 kiang in the Communist press, no mention can be found on libraries. One can only speculate that with the expansion of publication enterprises under the Communists, the number of libraries must also have increased, as well as the number of books. In the library of the Sinkiang College of Nationalities, the number of books increased 700 per cent of the pre-1949 figure, and the number of books in the languages of the minority peoples increased by 1,400 per cent.

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VII. Organization

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105 The organizational system of public information in the North-
+668 west appears simple but is complicated. Government offices in
177 charge of information services are Bureaus or Committees of
[647] Cultural and Educational Affairs on the provincial level, which
[648] receive instructions from Peking and control the various information services. Some of these, however, are directly controlled from Peking, and among the newspapers and journals are many which are in the hands of the party rather than of the Government.

LABOR

000 I. "Free" Labor

II. Army Labor

III. Conscript Labor

I: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang A11

LABOR

I. "Free Labor

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464 Information on labor conditions in the Northwest is very
scanty. However, there are indications that the Communists
have faced a very serious problem of labor shortage in that
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[162] area. To begin with, the Northwest is a very sparsely
populated area. It embraces about one third of China's terri-
tory, but its population is only about six percent of the national
total. If any large scale reconstruction works are to be effected,
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it seems to be necessary to use outside labor supplies. More-
[871] over, educational standards in the Northwest have been relatively
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low. Consequently, the quality of native labor is also a problem.

464 To overcome these difficulties, the Communists have adopted
*668 several methods. One is to encourage or force skilled and
177 semi-skilled labor in other parts of the country to work in the
167 Northwest. For instance, the communication department of
[466] Sinkiang in May, 1955, absorbed some 409 automobile drivers
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and mechanics from among the demobilized servicemen in
[464] Shantung and Honan for reconstruction work in the border
[066] regions. In March, 1955, 200 cadres of Hui nationality of the
People's Liberation Army Railway Corps have been transfered
to work in the Hui-nationality areas in Kansu and Chinghai.
Most of these cadres have passed through the Anti-Japanese
"War of Liberation," land reform and Anti-U.S. and Aid-Korea
campaigns. Of these ninety percent are party members or
members of the Communist Youth League.

In late 1954, four thousand skilled building workers and technicians from other cities have signed up for work in Sian. They began to arrive from Shanghai, Wuhan, Canton and other places in early 1955, and they were warmly welcomed by the local authorities. All this shows that outside labor has played a very important part in the economic reconstruction in the Northwest (See also section Population).

II. Army Labor

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464 Another method is to use the army as a labor force. This
701 has been particularly important in Sinkiang, in which the
708 People's Liberation Army have participated in many reconstruction
668 projects. To take 1955 as an example, they were engaged in
177 the following tasks:

A March 24, 1955, despatch reports: "The People's Liberation Army farming units in Sinkiang have started their afforestation program in the south of this province. This year they plan to plant trees on 1,200 hectares, mostly shelter belts to protect reclaimed farmland."

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang A11

464 An April 18, 1955, despatch reports: "The People's Liber-
701 ation Army in Sinkiang has started spring sowing on the plains
708 north and south of the T'ien-shan Mountains. Crops already
668 sown include spring wheat, oil-bearing plants and long
177 staple cotton. The army men are experimenting with the
241 cultivation of long staple cotton in the Turfan Basin, where
favorable conditions exist. This year the PLA farming units
will cultivate over 66,000 hectares, or thirteen percent
more than last year. More than half of the land will be ploughed
by tractors. Adequate supplies of chemical fertilizer and
insecticides are on hand."

708 A June 3, 1955, despatch reports: "The largest reservoir
653 in Sinkiang is being enlarged this month by engineering units
312 of the People's Liberation Army stationed in Sinkiang. When
668 completed, the Men-chin reservoir, north of Urumchi, will
177 have a storage capacity of sixty million cubic meters of water
503 which can be used for irrigation."

464 An October 31, 1955 despatch reports: "A leading part has been played by the People's Liberation Army in irrigation works in Sinkiang. With their help, the peasants have constructed nine reservoirs, repaired irrigation canals and ditches, totalling 30,000 kilometers in length, built hundreds of new canals and added more subterranean waterways, a form of irrigation traditionally used in the region. In addition, the People's Liberation Army units have built and expanded works capable of irrigating 200,000 hectares, mostly farmed by local peasants. The army men also reclaimed over 73,000 hectares of wasteland and set up twenty-nine mechanized state farms."

708 A November 3, 1955, despatch reports: "Manass Basin
241 Agricultural Production Construction Troops of Sinkiang Military
668 District of the People's Liberation Army plan to grow cotton in
177 an area of 202,000 mou next year, one hundred forty-six percent
464 larger than this year. These troops are now actively undertaking
(248) the preparatory works."

A December 24, 1955, despatch reports: "A new mechanized farm has been built in the Manass Basin by PLA. It has some 10,000 hectares of well irrigated farmland, part of which has already been sown in winter wheat. They plan to supply the state with nine thousand tons of grain and twenty-eight hundred tons of cotton next year."

701 The constitution of the so-called People's Liberation Army
708 in Sinkiang has not been disclosed. But to use the regular army
944 as a labor force in peace time is, to say the least, forced labor
462 in disguise. (See section Forced Labor of General Handbook).
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177 III. Conscript Labor
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Forced labor in the strict sense, or "corrective" labor, has however also been amply used. Conscript labor solved several of the problems connected with the labor situation in the Northwest. "Free" or induced labor had to be given certain incentives, such as higher wages and better living conditions in order to overcome non-economic barriers to labor mibility, such as language barriers, differences of customs and living standards, differences of climate, etc. For skilled and semi-skilled labor these incentives might prove a worthwhile investment; for unskilled labor, however, a cheaper labor supply was desirable. Conscript labor would also overcome the problem of labor discipline, which is prone to be particularly serious among laborers working far from home. Specifically conscript labor could be employed at a level of subsistence far below the minimum to be paid to a recruited or induced labor force; it could be employed in dangerous work without the necessity of using costly safeguards against accidents; and it had the advantage of perfect mobility and could be moved around without regard to family and other social ties. In the following, some reports, mostly collected in summer 1955 among Turkestani refugees are given to throw some light on the extent of conscript labor used in the Northwest.

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From a refugee in a colony in Yugoslavia, called Yengi Khotan "New Khotan":

In 1950 at an open People's court session in Cherchen, former Kuomintang officials, influential merchants and landowners were tried, sentenced and dispossessed of their property. They were transported to Charklik (Chin.: Cho-chiang) from where they proceeded in a southeastern direction where a new auto highway was being constructed. The prisoners were formed into working units which were led by Soviet soldiers of the Seventh Regiment. Halim estimates that at least six to ten thousand prisoners were working between Charklik and Timurlik. Each three hundred men was headed by a Russian corporal or sergeant. He said that the real masters of the area were the Russians, and he repeatedly emphasized that the latter treated even the Chinese Communist officials with no respect. Furthermore, he saw several mining projects in this area, especially gold mines. When he was transferred to the area of Tash-Kurghan (Turk.: Stone tomb) in 1953, he managed to flee to the Wakhan area of Afghanistan.

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Reports, published in Turk-i-stan, Arabian edition, March 1955, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, give a limited account of the railway construction between Turfan and Hami. It states that since May, 1953, about 80,000 prisoners have worked there. The main body of prisoners consisted of Chinese, but there were also thousands of New-Uighurs, Kazakhs, Mongols and

464 Tibetans. The prisoners were organized in military fashion,
466 i.e., squads, platoons, companies, battalions and regiments,
697 led by Chinese of the so-called Transport Army Corps. The
499 prisoners had to work twelve hours a day. They were
668 rigidly guarded by means of machine gun towers. Due to
177 undernourishment, overwork and rough weather conditions
the death ratio was about thirty to fifty men a day. The
equipment was of Russian origin and handled by Russian
"specialists."

According to the same source about 180,000 were employed
in levelling the terrain and building the embankment for
the railway tracks on the route between Kulja-Wusu-Urumchi
and Turfan. The prisoners were mainly Chinese but heavily
intermingled with minority groups, either condemned in-
surgents, court-martialled soldiers or people who were
tried by People's Courts for being "kulaks," saboteurs,
"capitalistic spies" or former independent tribal leaders.
Entire Tibetan tribes of the Sinkiang-Tibetan border area,
who repeatedly revolted between 1950 and 1953 were finally
captured and brought to the Bogda-Ula (mountain range with
elevation up to 17,000 feet) where the passes and tunnels for
a railway were constructed. The Communists first used
Chinese prisoners but the death rate was extremely high
because the Chinese, who were sent mainly from China
proper, could not become accustomed to the rough climate
of the T'ien-shan mountain range. The construction took
[648] place under the supervision of the 18th cavalry regiment of the
9th Soviet Cavalry division. Technicians and "specialists"
are mainly Soviets. Administrators are Chinese Communists.
At the same time Chinese military units are trained by Russians
in regard to embankment constructions.

In the coal and petroleum area of Wusu, Urumchi and Kurla about 35,000 prisoners worked, reinforced by Soviet and Chinese engineers and technicians. Dozens of mountain roads were built by pioneer units of the People's Transport Army Corps which do all the dynamiting and bridge building, while prisoners do routine work.

464 Two Turkic refugees, now living in Germany, reported that
466 they were working for an irrigation building co-op in Mazartagh
697 on the Khotan River. Those co-ops usually receive fifty to a
668 hundred prisoners as handymen, who are guarded by a few
177 Chinese soldiers, who are stationed at the co-op.

464 Another Turkic refugee who was sentenced to ten years
466 (1950) for underpaying his employees in his fur trade enterprise
315 was sent to the oil field near Yü-men in Kansu. His sentence
697 was reduced to two years when he saved a bulldozer at the risk
668 of his life when an oil shaft blew up. He said about 18,000
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466 prisoners work on the oil fields. When he returned to his home town
315 Keriya in 1953 he had to go through Soviet control posts at the
697 Sinkiang-Kansu border towns of Hsinhsingsia and Kushui.
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199 After his flight, the former Aksakal of Kizilbulak (northeast
[648] of Aksu) Abdul Azizi Hajji wrote an article in the Turkish
newspaper Ulus, July 15, 1955, relating how all cities along
the line Kashgar, Aksu, Karashahr, Urumchi, Turfan, Hami,
Kulja, Ili, Chuguchak, including the Tarbagatai region, are
occupied by at least four Soviet dividions, two of which
definitely have been identified as tank dividions, equipped
with T34 models.

466 A copy of the well-informed newspaper Al-Mizir (Cairo)
464 of May 19, 1955, says that the total number of prisoners who
697 are used as forced labor amounts to 380,000 in Sinkiang
alone.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

000 I. Introduction

II. The Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang

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- B. Turkic Concepts of Disease
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IV. The Chinese

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- D. Medical Personnel
- E. Efforts of the Government

V. Health and Sanitation Under the Communists

HEALTH AND SANITATION

S N

I. Introduction

128 For the purposes of this section the region has been divided into three groups: (1) the Turkic people of Sinkiang (including the Eastern Turks, Kirghiz and Kazakhs), (2) the Tibetans of Chinghai and (3) the Chinese of the Northwest (including both Hans and Moslems).
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751 164 Measured by Western standards, the area as a whole lacks most modern facilities for maintaining high standards of health and sanitation. The shortage of trained personnel in the fields of medicine, dentistry and nursing is quite acute. These conditions may be due partly to the geographical location of the area, being in the deep hinterland, away from the center of China, and generally lacking a sufficient water supply. The common man's ignorance of the basic facts of health and sanitation contributes greatly to the spread of disease and to the lack of precautionary measures against the occurrence of certain diseases.

However, the local population, while living under what we consider unsanitary conditions, has built immunities to many diseases, to which a Westerner, living under the same conditions, would easily succumb. Some habits that we consider dangerous in spreading disease may actually be without any harmful consequences to the local people.

II. The Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang

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262 A. The Diet of the Turkic People

563 The daily diet of the sedentary Eastern Turkis consists mostly of mutton and rice, with vegetables, both boiled and fried, including onions, potatoes, turnips, carrots and spinach, many forms of soups, and pilaus. Tea is the staple beverage, served with sugar and without milk. Bread, in the shape of circular rolls indented at the top, constitutes an important item in the diet. A variety of fruits, including melons, apples, pears, apricots, peaches, nectarines, pomegranates, plums, cherries, and mulberries, grow in profusion in Turkestan and are abundant during the summer.
S [272] [263]

S 264 262 184 565 563 [539] The common people eat only twice during the day; in the morning and in the evening. The wealthy people frequently have feasts and eat a great abundance and variety of foods. Many of them suffer from abnormal obesity as a result of overeating and lack of exercise. A common proverb in Sinkiang warning against the folly of this type of behavior is the following, "He who eats sparingly eats ten times, but he who eats too much eats but once."

S 563 262 [272] The diet of the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs, the nomadic Turks, differs somewhat from that of the sedentary Eastern Turks. Their diet is composed mainly of milk and mutton. From flour and

563 mutton fat they bake a type of bread resembling a doughnut. The
262 best-liked meat is horsemeat, but it is a dish only for the well-to-do. The daily menu comprises boiled and roasted mutton, with rice, if any is available, milk, cheese made from yaks' and sheep's cream, and small fried pieces of mutton. The main drink
[273] is kumis. It is prepared from mares' milk by shaking it in a leather bottle and then leaving it to ferment.

563 Both the sedentary and nomadic Turks of Sinkiang are bound
262 by Moslem dietary laws, which generally are strictly observed.
779 The Koran expressly prohibits eating four things: (1) the animal which dies of itself, including "the strangled animal, and that beaten to death and that killed by a fall and that killed by being smitten with the horn and that which the beasts have eaten", (2) the blood of slaughtered animals, (3) the flesh of a swine, and (4) an animal which has not been slaughtered by a Moslem according to the prescribed rules in the Koran and over which the name of Allah has not been invoked. The drinking of alcohol, except
[273] for medicinal purposes, is also prohibited by the Koran. However,
[369] the Moslems of Sinkiang, particularly the city-dwellers, drink frequently.

Moderation in eating is recommended by the Koran in the following passage: "...Eat and drink and be not immoderate!" (7:31). But abstention from foods allowed by the Koran is discouraged: "O people! Eat the lawful and good things of what is in the earth!" (2: 168) Moslems are warned both against undereating and overeating as, for example, can be seen in the following directive: "O you who believe! Forbid not yourselves the good things which Allah has made lawful for you and exceed not the limits." (5:87)

Except for things prohibited in the Koran, the Eastern Turks enjoy most food. They eat a fairly well-balanced diet containing some meat, vegetables, fruits, and starches. Starches, however, far exceed the other food items. The most noticeable deficiency in diet is the lack of food containing iodine. They do not have access to much sea food, being so far inland.

B. Turkic Concepts of Disease

753 In Eastern Turkestan the cause of disease is attributed both
779 to God and to the evil spirits, called "jins". According to Moslem
[784] belief, disease is often a result of disobeying God's laws and directives. God's penalties for disobedience and his way of testing the True Believers take the forms of inflicting epidemics on the population. Man can avoid misfortune by being obedient and by putting his trust completely in God. The Headith (Moslem Tradition) reports that when the Prophet was asked about the Plague, he said that it was an infliction which Allah imposed upon anyone, but that he made it an occasion for the exercise of his compassion towards

753 Moslems. No servant of Allah who was in a plague stricken city
779 ought to depart from it. He must remain steadfast, counting upon
God and knowing that nothing will happen except what Allah has ascribed for him. If anything should befall him, he would earn the reward of martyrdom in the future world. The Prophet declared that contagious diseases, such as cholera and the plague, had no reality independently of Allah.

753 Older pre-Islamic beliefs prevalent among the people of Eastern
776 Turkestan attribute the source and cause of diseases and death
to evil spirits, which they call "jins", and which inhabit the body
754 after the evil eye has been cast upon a person. Belief in the evil eye is extremely strong among the women. Skrine recorded some of the superstitions about the cause of disease and death: "If a woman feels liverish, she at once concludes that she has been bewitched, and goes to the du'a-khwan (witch-doctor).... There
754 are several death-spells in use. If a woman wishes her husband to die, she washes her head on seven successive Wednesday mornings; another method is to wear two caps, one on top of the other, for seven weeks. Similarly, a man puts a death-spell on his wife by combing his beard with two combs. In most countries where sitchcraft and the evil-eye are believed in, the victim's hairs, nail-parings, etc., are peculiarly valuable to the enemy who wished to cast a spell upon him. In Chinese Turkestan, by a curious extension of this idea, this potency attaches also to the kafsh-massi or slippers which are worn over the long boots when outside and are removed on entering a house. If an enemy's slippers are found lying neatly together outside the room in which he sits, they are turned upside down or placed one on top of the other. If an enemy's death is desired the slippers are taken up and thrown down haphazardly.... A widely prevalent idea is that the death of a person affects the health of his or her surviving relatives." (Skrine, C.P., Chinese Central Asia, pp. 187-88).

Aside from these beliefs, the common people are unaware of
753 the modern, scientific explanations of the causes of disease and death. Only those who attend government schools (as opposed to the Moslem religious schools) are likely to learn some facts about human physiology and the existence of disease-carrying germs.

1. Sanitary measures included in the Moslem religion

779 The Moslem religious code, however, provides its own sani-
515 tary measures that are closely observed by the population. Most of these rules concern the cleanliness of the body, both for the purification of the soul, and for the sake of health. A Moslem is required to take a partial ablution before each of the five daily prayers. The partial ablution (wudzu) consists first of washing the hands up to the wrists, cleaning the mouth with water, washing the whole face from the forehead to the chin and from one ear to the other, wiping the head with wet hands and washing the feet

779 up to the ankles. A special provision is made for those to whom
515 water is not available because of their being on a journey or being
sick, etc... "and if you are sick or on a journey or one of you
came from the privy, or you have touched the women, and you
cannot find water, betake yourselves to pure earth and wipe your
faces and hands therewith." (5:6) A complete ablution of the body
is required when the body has been soiled to a greater extent.
Though not always strictly observed, these religious habits are
followed quite closely by the majority of the population.

2. The predominant diseases in Sinkiang

The predominant diseases in Eastern Turkestan which were
164 recorded by Grenard and Pevtsov are the following: goiters,
syphillis, gonorrhea, smallpox, scabies, tuberculosis, the Baghdad
boil (a disease brought over from the Middle East), rheumatism,
often connected with the effects of venereal diseases,
trachoma and other eye illnesses, dental troubles, inflammation
of the joints, malaria and some cases of leprosy. Skin diseases
are very common among the population. The Eastern Turks
[515] seldom change their clothing, including their underclothes, and
their fur hats are hardly ever taken off. This often results in the
growth of parasitic vermin. The excessive dust and dirt are very
conducive to the spread of skin diseases. Unfortunately, no
figures are avilable on the incidence of different diseases. Most
feared are the epidemic diseases which spread rapidly and the
incurable diseases, like leprosy. There is a popular proverb in
[539] Eastern Turkestan that says the following: "Flee from the leprous
as you would from a lion."

3. The local doctors

The two most popular types of doctors in Eastern Turkestan
759 are those who practice Arabic medicine, and those who practice
756 witchcraft. Arabic medical science is fairly well developed and
includes some knowledge of human physiology, methods of curing
certain diseases and even some surgical techniques. Most of the
mosques have hospitals attached to them for the care of the ill
and the injured. However, the knowledge of those doctors practicing
Arabic medicine in Eastern Turkestan is quite limited.
There has been no great progress in their methods since the 11th
and 12th centuries. According to C.P. Skrine, the witch doctors
are much more popular than the Islamic doctors. The witch doctors
are called bakhshis in Yarkand and du'a-khwans or jadugars
in Kashgar. The fees of the witch doctors are relatively high,
and the more famous of them are very well-off. In return for their
fees they compose spells and perform incantations to drive away
the demons which possess the patient.

/Turkic Peoples of Sinkiang/

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759 C. Efforts of the Government in the Field of Health and
Sanitation

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[197] Only a few doctors in Eastern Turkestan have a Western
scientific training. Most of them are either Chinese or Euro-
peans (White Russians). Lately, however, young Turkic people
possessing a formal education have been sent to Western Turkes-
S tan and to China Proper to study in medical colleges. Awareness
759 of the lack of proper medical personnel and equipment in Sinkiang
743 first inspired the Nationalists to try to open clinics and hospitals
S in Sinkiang. The Communists have followed in their steps with a
743 somewhat more extensive program, according to their reports.
744 Clinics were opened in various parts of the Sinkiang Autonomous
668 Region, with the aim of combating the most common diseases in
197 the area. They have facilities for innoculation against certain
diseases, and place particular emphasis on curing and preventing
venereal diseases.

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874 In April, 1955, a new medical college was opened in Sinkiang
to meet the problem of lack of medical personnel. The Commun-
ists announced that "Sinkiang's new medical college... is ready
to enroll 250 students of various nationalities for the coming
autumn term. A teaching staff of 100 including professors, lec-
turers and practicing physicians will arrive here in June from
S other parts of the country to take up their posts. The medical
874 college is part of a scheme for building a medical center in this
743 provincial capital of Sinkiang, where the inhabitants belong mostly
to national minorities. The project includes a 600-bed hospital
and a clinic able to treat 800 patients daily." (NCNA, Urumchi,
April 19, 1955).

III. Health and Sanitation among the Tibetans of Chinghai

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*563 A. The Diet of the Tibetan People

262 Regardless of whether he be rich or poor, farmer or nomad, the diet of the Tibetan consists primarily of four staples, grain (primarily parched and roasted barley), meat, cheese and butter. However, the questions of wealth and mode of life determines the relative proportions of each of the staples. The parched barley, or tsamba is generally added to the buttered tea and the consequent mush is eaten. The sedentary Tibetans resort most frequently to pork or small game animals, such as marmots, for their meat supply. Very few of the farmers can afford beef or mutton as a staple. Yak cheese and the curds of soured yak and sheep milk are favorite items, the latter often counting as a sort of dessert. The nomadic diet uses much less of the grain and is preponderantly meat, including yak-beef and mutton, butter and other dairy products. The Tibetans eat almost every part of the animal except its hooves and hide. The wealthy Tibetans, and the poorer ones

*563 on special occasions, enjoy many Chinese dishes, or Tibetan
262 adaptations of them. One of the most popular dishes is a sort
of steamed dumpling stuffed with meat. Another is whole mutton,
[273] semi-raw or roasted and eaten off the bone. A favorite beverage
is a mildly fermented beer of barley or other grain. A more
spirituous liquor is also widely appreciated.

Vegetables are scarce and usually are purchased from the Chinese or Chinese Moslems on the Sino-Tibetan border. At that they are limited mostly to potatoes and onions. The nomadic Tibetans have little fondness for green vegetables and accept them to a lesser extent than do the sedentary groups.

*563 B. The Predominant Diseases Among the Tibetans

The most common diseases include the venereal diseases,
164 stomach and intestinal disorders, rheumatism, eye and skin
diseases and tuberculosis. Perhaps because of the cold climate,
the high altitude and the consequent absence of flies, and the use
of animal manure instead of night-soil for fertilizing the fields,
cholera, typhoid and similar excrement-borne diseases are rare.

The incidence of some diseases seems correlated to whether the people are nomadic or sedentary. For example, Ekvall (1939) reports a higher incidence of syphillis among the agricultural Tibetans, and a somewhat higher gonorrhea rate among the nomads. Leprosy is practically unknown among the nomads but is very common among the farmers. One can infer that rheumatism would be more frequent among the nomads than among the farmers because of the former's greater exposure to chills and dampness. In common with other Tibetans and peoples of the inland areas whose supply of salt is from Tibet's salt lakes, goiters are prevalent. The digestive ailments may be attributed to the frequent inclusion of foreign matter, such as sheep wool or yak hair, in the food, and also to some of the methods used in food preparation. The eye ailments, can be traced in part to the venereal disease rates, in part to the hazards of wind, dust, smoke, and snow-glare on the high plateaus. The skin troubles may be traceable to the customs of rarely washing more than the hands and face, of never completely removing one's clothes, and the numerous population that shares the sheepskin garment with its human host.

Other health hazards among the Tibetans include infections of
accidental and non-accidental wounds (many a child has suffered
severe burns) incurred in raids. The Tibetans seem to have an
extremely low resistance to epidemic diseases such as smallpox,
scarlet fever and influenza. Ekvall reports that the Tibetans even
[751] suffered violent reactions to vaccination, quite out of proportion
to their neighbors, the Chinese and Chinese Moslems. However,
[758] this low resistance is accompanied by a high fear of these infec-
tions. The tradition of strict quarantine, even to the point of

*563 abandonment of the sick, is very strong, and to some extent helps
164 limit the spread of contagious disease. (Cf. also Rijnhart, 1902).

[758] The Tibetans are apt to attribute diseases to spirits, such as
*563 the sa-ndre, (earth-spirits), demons and wrongdoing in this or
164 previous lives. The sa-ndre are especially feared, because they
753 afflict those who disturb the ground with leprosy; hence, the high
776 incidence of that dread disease among the farmers and its absence
among the nomads. Demons or devils are the sources of the epidemic diseases and the reason for the imposition of the strict quarantine of their victims. Like their diseases the devils are highly contagious. But, except for these ailments that have known
[759] causes, the Tibetan will consult a doctor or someone whose home remedies have proved successful. Under the latter category would be included the various Christian missionaries and explorers, traders, etc., who frequented Chinghai.

759 C. The Local Doctors

"...the treatment given by the native doctors generally means
757 an increase of agony to the sufferer. For headaches large sticking
*563 plaster are applied to the patient's head and forehead; for rheumatics often a needle is buried in the arm or shoulder; a tooth is extracted by tying a rope to it and jerking it out...; a sufferer with stomach-ache may be subjected to a good pounding, or to the application of a piece of wick soaked in burning butter grease; or if medicine is to be taken internally it will consist probably of a piece of paper on which a prayer is written, rolled up into the form of a pellet, and if this fails to produce the desired effect another pellet is administered, composed of the bones of some pious priest." (Rijnhart, 1902, p. 34).

Actually, Tibetan medical science is one of the ten major
75 subjects that, according to Buddhist classification, constitute the
*563 whole of human knowledge. One of the nation's main medical schools is located near Lhasa. Some of the major academic monasteries also have medical schools and the person with the title of manpa (sman-pa, doctor) is respected as highly learned. The medical lore that is studied is that of ancient India. It is primarily scientific, in that it is based on rational explanations of physiology and pathology. The religious aspects are superficial additions that do not affect too seriously the basically scientific approach. There are different categories of disease apportioned according to whether the sickness is the result of something wrong in this life, in the previous life, or a combination of previous lives and the present; whether the patient is male, female, child or desexed. Then there are afflictions common to all regardless of sex or age. These number 404 categories, 101 being attributed to each of the four major elements, organs or vices, depending upon the interpretation. (The original Brahmanical medicine had only 101 cate-

/Tibetans of Chingahi/

N /775 *563 gories and the apportionment of the traditional Buddhist 404 is not standardized.) There are further breakdowns of what might go wrong with what aspects of the human body and the human mind or spirit, to the point where each infinitesimal ailment has its own specific cause and cure, or impossibility of curing. The medicinal treatments involve acupuncture, plasters, herbs, roots, crushed bone, excreta, potions, incantations and numerous other elements. It is a very complex system. When a Tibetan needs N [787] medical aid, he must first seek out a lama, present him with a scarf and a gift, and have this lama (who is not a doctor) cast the dice. The dice reveal the portion of the canon that contains reference to the manpa who is needed. The manpa, or specialist, may turn out to be a Christian medical missionary who has been successful in effecting cures (cf. Rijnhart, pp. 163-64). Sometimes there may be some suspicion of fee-splitting. Generally the prescription and treatment bear little relation to our own medical knowledge. However, the Tibetans are pragmatists and will seek their cures from those who have established a reputation for success, N [177] be they Westerners, Tibetan Buddhist or Bon doctors, or any others. Wherever Western medical science has filtered through, few Tibetans hesitate to make use of it, often simultaneously with their own. Mongol medical science is derived from the Tibetan Buddhist sources. However, more particular Mongol data on health and sanitation can be found in the IMAR Handbook.

III. The Chinese

N *563 262 [272]

A. The Diet of the Chinese

The Chinese diet does not contain milk or any milk products. The usual beverage is tea. The principal animals raised for food are pigs, chickens and ducks. In the Northwest, however, mutton S 563 262 [272] has become a very common dish. The Moslems substitute beef for pork. In the Northwest the main grain products are wheat and millet. Rice is also eaten in abundance, being brought generally from southern and central China. Most proteins are derived from soybeans, peanuts and sweet potatoes. The food prepared for special feasts, and the kind eaten by the upper classes, differs S N 7 [252] considerably from the average Chinese meal, consisting of at least four-fifths meat, fish or fowl. The Chinese method of cooking preserves the vitamins contained in the vegetables, since they are never permitted to linger over the fire or in water.

N *563

B. Chinese Concepts of Disease

S 563 [146] Most of the people do not know the different values of the various food products. Although many might wish to improve their daily diet with more meats and fish, they cannot afford to do so. S N [751] The people in general, and particularly in the Northwest, have no

N knowledge of sanitation and elementary health regulations. Their
*563 concepts of health and disease rest mainly on the traditional beliefs.
751 The concept that dominates most of their thinking about the human
[772] body and its health is that of the Two Principles of yang and yin.
S These are philosophical concepts of the origin of all things. The
563 yang principle represents the male and the yin represents the
751 female. They stand for opposite poles - heaven and earth, sun
[772] and moon, day and night, heat and cold, life and death, positive
and negative, strong and weak.

N In medicine, everything is classified as yang or yin. The
*563 exterior of the body - the skin - is yang, while the interior is
753 yin. The back is yang, while the abdomen is yin. The heart and
772 826 liver are yang while the spleen, lungs and kidneys are yin. A
S disease, accordingly, is yang when due to external causes and yin
563 when due to internal causes. Respiratory diseases, fever, and
753 diseases affecting the upper part of the body are yang diseases.
772 826 Chills and afflictions of the lower body, and circulatory diseases
are yin diseases. When the yin predominates, one suffers from
S yang disease; when the yang is in excess yin results. These two
N principles must be kept in mind when treating the disease, since
[278] the drugs and herbs are also divided into these two classes.

N Another Chinese concept concerning health is that of the exis-
*563 tence of the Five Elements - metal, wood, water, fire and earth.
751 According to this belief, the human body is composed of a mixture
753 of the five elements. So long as the proportions of these five
772 elements remain in order, health results. If the balance is dis-
S 563 turbed, disease follows.

751 These beliefs are common mainly among the uneducated popu-
753 lation, the rural and the lower classes of the urban population.
772 In most cases, the higher classes have a Western knowledge of
N [184] the basic elements of health and sanitation and know the basic
facts of human physiology and the causes of transmission of diseases.
S N Illiteracy and ignorance is much greater in the Northwest region
[212] than along the Pacific Coast. Thus, in the Northwest, the beliefs
are widespread and most Western ideas have not penetrated into
the larger part of the population.

S N Unfortunately, we do not have figures on the birth and death
114 rate in Northwest China. The figures for all of China are given
163 in the chapter on "Health and Sanitation" of the General China
165 Handbook.

N C. Predominant Diseases Among the Chinese

*563 The most common diseases are the fecal-borne ones. They are
164 spread through the use of human waste as fertilizer. Andre Migot,
364 who travelled through Northwest China in 1946, dwells on this
S 563 problem in his description of a typical middle-sized town in this
164 area (Tibetan Marches, p. 51): "Then there is the problem of sani-
364 tation. The total volume of human excrement produced every day

/The Chinese/

N
*563 by half a million people - even if they live mainly on rice - is
164 bound to be formidable. No sewage system of any kind exists; its
364 place is taken by an old established guild of public servants who
S
563 can be seen every morning in large numbers making their way
164 through the streets. The casks or buckets which dangle from
364 the bamboo poles across their shoulders smell no better than
you would expect them to. They are always full to the brim and
their contents, which are eventually sold to truck gardens on the
S outskirts of the city, are a constant threat to the legs of the
N passers-by.... The buckets in which they carry their night
[415] soil down the hill are used, after being briskly rinsed, to carry
[312] their water up."

Besides producing a very unpleasant picture, this description brings out the very serious problems connected with the lack of a proper sewage system. It also points out the many possibilities for spreading contagious diseases and infections.

N
*563 Tuberculosis is quite prevalent in China. Epidemic diseases
164 are common also, such as typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, cholera
[165] and smallpox. Malaria and the two kinds of dysenteries, amoebic
(844) and bacillary also are present. Death at childbirth, both of infants
S
563 and mothers, is quite high, because of the lack of adequate sani-
164 tary precautions during childbirth and the practices of the mid-
[165] wives, who do nothing to prevent infection of both mother and
(844) child.

S Winfield in his book states that "seventy-five per cent of all
N deaths in China are due to preventable diseases that are under
[165) control in the West; there are about 15 million deaths each year
in China, of which 11,750,000 are due to preventable diseases."
(China: The Land and the People, p. 111).

D. Medical Personnel

N The lack of Western-trained doctors, nurses, pharmacists
759 and dentists in the Northwest is an extremely serious problem.
*563 Most people, because of the shortage of medical personnel, still
S go to the local herb-doctors. (A full description of the traditional
759 Chinese science of medicine is given in the General Handbook).
563 In many less acute cases, people either neglect to do anything or
attempt to treat themselves by unscientific methods.

S
E. Efforts of the Government

N The Nationalist Government was aware of the serious shortage
744 of medical personnel and equipment in all of China, including the
Northwest. Two national organizations were established in the
1930's to deal with these problems: The Department of Public
Health under the Ministry of the Interior, which had a Northwest-
ern Office for the Prevention of Epidemics, and the National Health
Department under the National Economic Council, which also had
an office in the Northwest.

744 The first department devoted most of its time to preventing
epidemics, innoculating people against possible epidemics (such
as typhoid, typhus, smallpox, cholera) and preventing animal
diseases. The National Department of Health was concerned with
the promotion of regional health and sanitation institutes. Experi-
mental stations for public health were opened in Kansu. In the
744 Northwest the health programs of the Nationalist Government were
743 launched in the last part of the 1930's. The numbers of hospitals
recorded in the Northwest during 1936 are as follows:

	Hospitals	Beds
Shensi	7	263
Kansu	10	124
Chinghai	3	22

648 The Sino-Japanese war interfered with the progress of the
874 health programs in the Northwest. However, some of the war
results proved beneficial. During the war two medical schools
were transferred to the Northwest. Sian has had a medical school
since 1940 when the famous Medical School of National Peiping
University was transferred there. It was not retransferred to
Peiping after the war. A medical school was started in Lanchow
743 after the war as part of the National Lanchow University. In 1942
the Northwest Hospital was established at Lanchow, where, in
1944, over 30,000 outpatients and over a thousand inpatients were
treated. Much medical field work was done during the war and
a few army hospitals were opened in the Northwest. Hsi-ning
also started a school hospital and a city-hospital during the war.
A special health center was opened at Ting-yüan-ying for the
Alashan Mongols.

744 V. Health and Sanitation Under the Communists
The necessity to extend the work done in the medical field in
+668 the Northwest was clearly recognized by the Communist Govern-
177 ment. According to the Chinese Communist reports from Peking,
Northwest China, included in the overall program adopted by the
Party to improve health and sanitation, has made relative progress
in the field of public health.

The overall health policies of the Communist Government were adopted in 1950 by the First All-China Health Conference. This Conference stressed the following three principles as the guiding lines: (1) concentration on the health of the workers, farmers and soldiers; (2) emphasis on the means of prevention rather than cure of disease; and (3) uniting the modern and old-style doctors. The latter measure was decided upon because of the tremendous shortage of qualified doctors trained in modern methods to meet the needs of the huge population of China, the problem being more acute in remote regions.

A special conference entitled "The All-China Conference on the

N 744 *668 177 Health of the Various Nationalities in the Country," was convened by representatives of the Tibetan, Moslem, Yi, Uighur, Mongol, and Han nationalities, representatives of the health administrative organs of the Central People's Government and the various administrative regions, the representatives of the nationalities affairs, authorities of the various administrative regions, leaders of the medical preventive service corps to the national minority areas, and specially invited delegates of all nationalities.

"The Conference will undertake special studies in the diseases which most seriously endanger the health of the people in the national minority areas, such as venereal diseases, malaria, women's and infants' ailments (colds, measles, smallpox, puerperal fever), and thus to proceed to the decision on a definite policy for the work of promoting the health of the national minorities.

The Conference is expected to reach decisions also on various necessary measures for building up a public health system in the minority areas, such as the organization of health machineries, the fostering of health cadres, and the propaganda on health matters among the population." (NCNA Peking, August 24, 1951).

N [759] The need for professional medical help in the Northwest was one of the most urgent problems facing the Communist Government in the implementation of its health program. Young students from Central China with some medical knowledge were encouraged to go to the aid of the national minorities in the Northwest. "Go West" is the slogan of the day, and is considered to be a true pioneering act.

N 743 *668 177 The primary attention is given to the workers, particularly those working on big governmental projects. "In the mountainous region of Szechwan, Shensi and Kansu Provinces, workers on reconstruction receive medical care. For each billeting camp of 1,000 of more a clinic staffed with 5 to 8 doctors and nurses is operating. Four regular hospitals have been opened in Chengtu and other cities along the line especially for road workers." (FBIS, No. 61, March 29, 1955).

S 743 744 668 177 In April, 1955, a new medical college was opened in Sinkiang to meet some of the problems of lack of medical personnel. Clinics were opened in various parts of the Sinkiang Autonomous Region to combat the most common diseases in the area. Particular emphasis was placed on curing and preventing venereal diseases.

"From June to October, four health service teams dispatched by the venereal disease prophylactic and therapeutic clinic of Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region gave free treatment to some 3,000 peasants and nomads of var ous nationalities. In addition to the prophylactic and therapeutic stations already established in the various counties, another well-equipped outpatient department has been added in Urumchi. The clinic has enrolled 60

S
743 students from the nationalities to learn prophylactic and therapeu-
744 tic work." (FBIS, November 30, 1955).

668 Particular attention has also been paid to the Tibetan region
177 as a whole and to Chinghai Province. About health programs
N developed in Tibet we have the following information: "Over
657 5 million yüan have been allocated by the Central People's Gov-
743 ernment to develop health work in the Tibet region during the past
744 four years. During this time hospitals have been built in Lhasa
171 and Chamdo; in addition, clinics and mobile medical teams have
*668 given service to patients in small towns and remote areas.
177 Incomplete statistics show that free medical treatment and innocu-
lation reached 963,000 people. In the same period, 170 Tibetans
have been trained as medical workers. The Central People's
Government has sent more than 400 doctors and nurses from
other parts of the country to the region.

Plans were drawn up at a regional health conference of leading members of Tibet's health organizations and representatives of the Ministry of Public Health to establish more clinics and mobile medical teams and to train 50 to 80 Tibetan medical workers in the coming two years." (FBIS 181, September 16, 1955).

N In Chinghai province itself, the Provincial Health Office ad-
744 ministers the health program. Health clinics have been estab-
743 lished in different parts of the province. The work here is more
*668 difficult because of the many nomadic tribes in the steppes. The
177 Communists have aimed to train people among the nomads to take
the position of medical personnel in their tribe. Progress in this
area is slower. Some of the bigger already established clinics
have been converted to hospitals.

According to their reports, on the whole, the progress made by the Communist Government in the field of health and sanitation is quite impressive. The first positive steps toward improving the health and sanitation conditions have been taken, but there is still much to be done in the future.

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PUBLIC WELFARE

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   B The Concept of Charity in Islamic Writings

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PUBLIC WELFARE

I. Introduction

657 Welfare work in China's Northwest has to be conducted for the benefit of two distinct categories of people in need. The poor are composed of those whose problems arose out of inadequate standards of living. They include the aged and disabled, the orphans and other destitute or handicapped people. Marginal cases of this category are the underprivileged groups of society, who might maintain themselves, even though precariously, in years of abundance but who become relief cases as soon as their balance of life is disturbed. Chinese concepts of charity and charity organizations normally available to this category are discussed in the Public Welfare Section of the General Handbook.

657 731 The second category however, the victims of natural disasters, poses a special problem in the Northwest. As has been demonstrated in other Sections of this Handbook, the maintainence of agriculture in the Northwest is more dependent upon conservancy and irrigation projects than in other regions of China. During the last period of the Imperial era, many of these projects have fallen into disrepair, thus exposing the area to more critical inundations and droughts. Reports from the Imperial period reveal that there were fourteen severe inundations in the province of Shensi during the hundred years 1800-1900 and seven in Kansu. The same century brought sixteen severe droughts to Shensi and nine to Kansu. The droughts of 1877 which encompassed both provinces, of 1900/01 in Shensi, and of 1908/09 in Kansu were catastrophes of a national extent.

The frequency and severity of earthquakes in the Northwest adds to the problems of the region, particularly since in many areas of the region people live in loess caves. The great earthquake of 1879 which hit both Shensi and Kansu, the one of 1881 in Kansu and the ones of 1892 in the Kucha district of Sinkiang and the Hsi-ning district of Chinghai are still in everybody's memory, even though the twenties of our century have again brought two devastating earthquakes.

[669] Nor is this all. During the last hundred years the Northwest has been ravaged by rebellions and civil wars almost without interruption. Several of these events left in their wake a vast number of displaced and needy people, who added to the problems of emergency and disaster relief.

794 735 779

II. Welfare Among the Moslems

A. The Distribution of Welfare Responsibilities

Most of the efforts in the field of public welfare among the

794 735 779 Moslems of the Northwest were done by the Moslems themselves and not by the Chinese administration. The law of Islām provieds for a rather extensive system of, and general concepts on the administration of public welfare. It is not so much through a system of government institutions that the needy were taken care of, but by the religious regulations of Islam. The concept of public welfare is found in the Koran and was transmitted to the people through the laws and obligations specified in the religious writings of Islam. In the Islamic law there is no clear conception of the separation of state and religious institutions. The functions in both political and religious realms are merged and interwoven. The provisions for public welfare are an outstanding example for such a merging of state and church functions. Charity and donations to the needy are regarded as a religious duty and the financial resources necessary to sustain those in need are in the form of an obligatory religious donation, the collection of which is administered by officials, which in an Islamic state constitute a part of the administration. A department of public welfare is specified in the Islamic religious laws to be one of the departments of the Islamic State. However, since the majority of the Moslem peoples, including the Moslems of Sinkiang, do not live in an Islamic State, the functions of the state became the responsibility of the local religious community.

B. The Concept of Charity in Islamic Writings

779 Charity towards man, in its widest sense, is laid down in the Koran as the second great pillar on which the structure of Islam stands (the first obligation being that of regular prayers). Benevolence to other people is stressed constantly throughout the Koran, the most frequently recurring words designating charity being infaq (meaning spending benevolently), ishan (doing good), zakat (purification), and sadaqah (derived from the root sidq which means truth and has come to signify a charitable deed). Benevolence to other men includes the feeding of the poor, the emancipation of slaves, the care of orphans who have no kinsmen. Small good deeds such as helping a man load his animal or saying a good word are considered also as charitable.

779 431 Charity is of two kinds: it can be voluntary or obligatory. Voluntary charity is usually known as sadaqah, while the obligatory charity is mentioned in the Koran as zakat.

794 735 Voluntary charity is to be administered so that no idea of the superiority of the giver or the inferiority of the receiver is conveyed: "As for those who spend their wealth in the way of Allah, then do not follow up what they have spent with reproach or injury, they shall have their reward from their Lord." Or, "Kind speech and forgiveness is better than charity followed by injury." Love of God should be the motivation for those who do

779 charitable deeds, and only the well-earned wealth should be
431 given as charity. Those who give secretly are praised more
135 highly than those who publicize their gifts.

794 Obligatory charity is collected by officials who are appointed by the community to carry out this task. The individual donator is not at liberty to calculate and spend his zakat in any way he wants, but it is collected by the officials and spent by the community.

Zakat is a charge on accumulated wealth, and particially in this manner redistributes a portion of the accumulated wealth of the few to those who have none in the community. A part of the amassed wealth of every individual is taken away annually and distributed among the poor and the needy. Zakat is payable on all cash hoardings, or hoardings in gold and silvers as well as on any form of capital, whether in the shape of cash or kind.

The items of expenditure of zakat are stated by the Koran to be the following: "Alms are only for the poor and the needy, and the officials appointed over them, and those whose hearts are made to incline to truth, and captives, and those in debt, and in the way of Allah, and the wayfarer; it is an ordinance from Allah, and Allah is the knowing and the Wise" (9;60).

The recipients of the benefits of zakat can be divided into three main categories: (1) those who need help; (2) the officials appointed for the collection and disbursement of the fund; and (3) a part is required to be spent in the way of Allah.

Six kinds of people fall under the first heading: the poor who, on account of some physical and mental defect, are unable to earn their bread because of their deficiencies; the poor who have no resources but when given some help can earn their livelihood; new converts to Islam who are deprived of means of subsistence; those who are captives and are deprived of freedom; debtors who are unable to pay their debts; and lastly, the travellers who are stranded in a foreign country or in a distant place and who are unable to reach their homes.

The second kind of expenditure involves the maintenance of an establishment and office for the collection of zakat, and includes the salaries of those who collect the money and distribute it.

The third heading includes those in the way of Allah, which means usually those who fight a Holy War in the name of Allah against the enemies of Islam.

Besides the institution of zakat, there are two others of similar nature designed to collect obligatory charity. Both of these are connected with Moslem festivals. The idea is that whenever the Moslem is in his happiest mood, he must never forget the distress of his poorer brethren. The first of these institutions is the sadaqat-al Fitr, a charity connected with Id el-Fitr, the Moslem New Year. Every Moslem on this occasion is required to give away in charity a certain amount of food, the value of

779 which varies according to one's wealth. This food must be
431 donated by every Moslem in the community who is not poor,
735 and distributed among those who need it. The second institution
794 is that connected with Id al-Adsha, on which occasion the poorer
members of the community are fed with the meat of the sacrificed animals, and the skins of those animals are sold, and the sum thus realized spent on the propagation of Islam.

These then are the concepts applied to welfare work among the Moslems of the Northwest. As has been seen: the impetus toward welfare activities is entirely religious. This religious basis of welfare work was somewhat modified among the Chinese Moslems (Hui) particularly in those provinces, such as Ninghsia and Chinghai, where the secular power was in the hands of Moslem leaders. In these cases welfare activities would be supported strongly and with a certain efficiency by the worldly arm, but would pertain in most cases to the Moslem population only.

With regard to the handling of welfare cases among non-Moslem Chinese, reference is made in the section on Public Welfare of the General Handbook.

III. Welfare Among Lamaists

The concept of charity is alien to original Buddhism; it has no part in its ancient teachings. Almsgiving (dâna) is the only charitable activity that is occasionally mentioned in earlier writings. It is there termed as one of the "lucky things," with which to promote one's own self-perfection and salvation, even though it has no place in the eightfold path. Later on, rules concerning the attitude in which alms should be given were worked out, the theory being that the merit of the gift grows with the merit of the donee. The best gift of all, however, was the gift of Dharma (truth). The only entity who practided charity in anything like our sense of the word was the Bodhisatva, for whom, and for whom only, compassion was the cardinal principle. Every consideration is laid aside and even meditation neglected for its sake.

These basic doctrines have not prevented later schools of Buddhism in China from developing charitable and welfare work both through the temples themselves and through Buddhist sponsored or co-sponsored laymen's associations (see China General, Public Welfare). The Lamaist church, however, has stuck closer to the original concepts and hardly a trace of charitable or welfare work emanating from or sponsored by the lamaseries can be detected.

574 There exists, though, one concept common to both Lamaist
794 peoples, through which the situation is mitigated. This is the
485 concept of hospitality. Under this concept many charitable and
792 welfare functions are carried out by the lamaseries as well as

574 by the laymen. Temples frequently maintain free hostels for
794 travellers, and one can count on any layman to provide food,
485 shelter, road guidance, and any kind of help to needy passers-
792 by. It is even customary for a Mongol to leave food in front of his tent during the time he is on an outing. This hospitality is extended to destitutes and refugees also, by Mongols as well as Tibetans, irrespective of the creed of the receiver.

IV. Welfare Efforts Under the Republic, Particularly Under the National Government

657 With the coming of the Chinese Republic, the realization grew
731 that welfare was a public matter. Although it took time until the rudiments of an organization were set up to implement this realization, the government at best acted to the limits of its possibilities to bring relief in the case of natural catastrophes. During the great famine in the Northwest, caused by protracted droughts and earthquakes in 1928/29, the government organized a special commission to handle relief. The relief work of this commission was financed partly by fixed government grants, special loans and by solicited special contributions from Chinese cities, provinces and private organizations and individuals as well as by organizing a rather successful drive for funds abroad. The role played by the China Famine Relief Commission in this as well as in similar instances is discussed in the Social Welfare Section of the General Handbook.

653 The realization grew however that with regard to natural
312 disasters, prevention work might be of greater importance than
185 relief. One of the projects that grew out of this realization might be mentioned here, the Wei-pei irrigation project in Shensi. This project was conceived jointly by the Shensi provincial authorities and the China International Famine Relief Commission in the twenties. Actual work commenced in December 1930 and was completed in June 1932. Ninety thousand acres of land have been reclaimed b this combined conservancy and irrigation project. The maintenance of the system was later taken over by the National Economic Council.

In the late thirties this Council was particularly active in irrigation and reclamation schemes in the Northwest. It was responsible for the sponsoring or subsidizing of several large-scale projects in Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia Provinces.

114 Unfortunately, there is very little information available on
657 the efforts on the part of the Chinese administration in the field of public welfare in the Northwest, both under the National Government and under the present Communist regime. From the
[794] little material we have the general impression is that the local efforts of the Moslem community encompass most of the work done in public welfare.

114 done in public welfare. The information about the situation in
657 the Northwest has to be inferred mostly from what is available
to us about China proper, keeping in mind that Chinese policies
in Sinkiang have never achieved a fulfillment comparable with
the fulfillment they have achieved in China proper.

It was only during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) that
635 the Nationalist Government established a Ministry of Social
645 Affairs. This Ministry organized in each province, including
641 Sinkiang, a Bureau of Social Affairs for relief and welfare
657 works. Institutions were set up to take care of the aged, orphans, the disabled, disabled veterans and beggars.

The relief organs in the Northwest sponsored by the Ministry
645 of Social Affairs were restricted to free medical service centers;
657 organs maintained by provincial governments were mainly experimental relief stations, which were responsible for a variety of relief work. Municipal and district governments maintained, in addition to general relief organs (90 for the entire Northwest; 57 of these were located in the provinces Chinghai and Ninghsia, which had Moslem governors), children's relief centers (37) and a sprinkling of other institutions. There were several dozens of private Chinese Charity Associations active in the Northwest during the war.

657
Furthermore, the National Government joined efforts with
747 some religious and humanitarian bodies and organized the
731 National Relief Commission. During the war, this Commission
was particularly active in disaster relief. Large appropriations were earmarked for the famine in Shensi in the years 1943 and 1944. Contributions to this province as well as to the provinces of Kansu and Ninghsia were largely used for the resettlement of and the starting of reclamation projects by disaster victims of Shensi as well as of Honan province.

657
The activities of the National Relief Commission included
747 care for war orphans and refugee children. Five hundred of them
were sent to Sinkiang and one thousand were resettled in Ching-
[722] hai. Furthermore, a Juvenile Northwest War Area Service
[727] Corps was organized to accommodate graduates from War Refugee Children's Schools.

The National Child Welfare Association, founded by H. H. Kung, also maintained a Child Welfare Camp at Hei-hsien, Shensi.

Among the service corps operated by the Friends of the Wounded Society, organized under the New Life Movement Association; one had a base in Shensi. These corps worked in hospitals and convalescent camps. They provided delousing, laundry and sewing services etc. and special dieting.

747
The welfare work of Christian missions contributed to alleviate
797 much distress. There were few large Protestant missionary

747 establishments in the Northwest prior to the war. (See Section
797 on Religion). During the war, however, religiously sponsored
welfare work also spread to the Northwest. Among the more
active organizations, the Friends' Ambulance Unit (FAU) which
came to China in 1941 has to be mentioned; Catholic missionary
organs also did much welfare work in the Northwest. The out-
747 standing welfare contribution of the Catholics is their mainten-
797 ance of orphanages, particularly for girls. In 1933 there existed
736 three Catholic orphanages in Sian (Shensi), six in Lanchou (Kan-
su) and one in Ch'in-chou (Kansu) in which altogether 480 orphans
were cared for. During the war, the number of orphanages grew
to eleven in Shensi, twenty in Kansu (including Ninghsia) and one
each in Chinghai and Sinkiang. In these institutions altogether
2,758 orphans found shelter and relief. Under the Communists
these Catholic orphanages attracted particularly vicious attacks.
No data are available from the Northwest; if, however, events
in other parts of China can be generalized, it has to be assumed
that none of these institutions survives. In addition eleven homes
for the old were maintained by Catholic missionaries in the
Northwest with over two hundred inmates. Also the Catholic
refugee camps at Feng-hsiang, Shensi must be mentioned.

747 As the provinces of the Northwest were not occupied by the
648 Japanese during World War II, UNRRA activities did not extend
to this region.

V. Chinese Communist Welfare Projects

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*668 From the information that we get from the Communist press
177 and propaganda, the Chinese Communist Government has launched
an extensive program of public welfare, dedicated in particular
to the raising of standards and security of the working class. It
is no wonder that the Communist regime emphasizes the working
classes to such an extent, since it claims that its ideological
bases rest on this class. Life and medical insurance programs,
better working conditions in factories and construction jobs,
and welfare facilities for the working people are included in the
745 Communist program. According to the Labor Insurance Law
*668 of 1951 (revised in 1953) workers were guaranteed from sixty to
177 one hundred percent of their wages in case of injury or illness
(including non-occupational ones) for their first six months of
absence; after six months, they were to receive from forty to
sixty percent of their wages from the labor insurance fund. Their
jobs are secured for them upon recovery. Women had special provision for childbirth, upon which they received eight weeks of paid
vacation and the expenses of the birth were taken on by the management. Provisions for the workers' future at old age, and the
future of their families in case of accident was guaranteed as well.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

745 If this law is fully implemented, it provides security for the
*668 workers and *their families. However, we have no knowledge of*
177 how close to the letter of the law the practice of the government
is. Nor do we know what percentage of the workers enjoy the
benefit of this law.

855 Child-welfare is highly valued in China, whose future rests
*668 on the health and upbringing of its children. Therefore, extensive child-welfare programs have been adopted. Since the Com-
177 munist society demands that women participate in industrial
and construction works and contributed to the economic development of the country, provisions had to be made to take adequate
care of their children. For this purpose many nurseries were
established which provide a place for the children during the day
[736] time. Government orphanages were established as well, sup-
737 plementing the already existing institutions. The aged, however,
*668 do not receive as much attention in the Communist society since
177 they are viewed as being of no productive value to the society.

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ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

I. The Turks of Sinkiang

186 A. The Concept of the Unity of the Moslem World

795 The Moslems of Sinkiang (Turkic: Türk-e-stan 'Land of the Turks') identify themselves strongly with the rest of the Moslem World. In spite of the many divergencies in national cultures of the various elements which constitute the Moslem world, there is a supernational religious civilization which unifies them all. The feeling and firm conviction of unity of all believers finds ex- [208] pression in the Koran as well as in the traditions and the extensive Islamic literature, and in propaganda slogans which became current since the turning of the century, such as: ittihad ve terakki 'u 'unity and progress', or Muslimlerin hakki birles "Moslim people unite'. The rest of the world is looked at as being apart from the Moslem World - being the domain of war, whereas the area under Moslem jurisdiction is considered the domain of peace.

186 This feeling may have its roots in the history of the propaga- 208 tion of Islam where political institutions and allegiance went hand 795 in hand with religious institutions and allegiance. The acceptance of the religion of Islam, Din-al-Islam, meant also the acceptance of the Moslem political state. The allegiance with a definite political tinge of many Moslems who do not live today under Moslem control remains with the leaders of the Moslem World. They may feel an even stronger attachment to the Moslem leaders than they do to their own non-Moslem political rulers, as has been the case in Sinkiang under Chinese domination. The allegiance and recognition of the Turks of Sinkiang went to the Ottoman Turkish Empire and later to the leaders of Western Turkestan rather than to their Chinese rulers. It is reasonable to assume that the Moslems of Sinkiang today identify themselves much more strongly with the world of Islam than they do with the Communist block. They think of themselves in terms of being Moslems and not in terms of being Communists. No matter how much indoctrination has gone into uprooting this allegiance to the Islamic world, it will take a whole new thoroughly indoctrinated generation to forget the strong sentiments and attachments to the rest of the Moslem world.

668 B. Turkic Nationalism

Besides having supernational allegiance and sentiments of attachment to the Moslem world, there is also a strong nationalistic movement among the Turks of Sinkiang (called milli tahrik). They consider themselves as being a part of Turkestan as a whole and not as belonging to China. They view themselves as Turks, and not as Chinese nationals. They do not regard their position as a national minority in China as the answer to their national

/Turks of Sinkiang/

668 aspirations, but dream of an independent country, some of them visualizing a unified state consisting of Eastern and Western Turkestan, while others think in more local terms. Eastern Turks have strong cultural, linguistic, and religious ties with the other Turkic peoples of Central Asia. The Chinese culture and way of life is totally foreign to them. The history of Chinese and Turkic relations has always been a history of conflicts and rebellions. There has never been an identification with the Chinese nor has there been a feeling for friendship toward the Chinese people. The efforts of the Chinese administrators in Sinkiang to bring the Turkic people close to the Chinese culture and way of life have mostly failed. The Turks have consistently refused to learn the Chinese language and many of them have refused to take advantage of the offered Chinese educational facilities.

The National Turkestanian Unity Committee, established in exile (in Germany) in recent years, represents a strong nationalistic movement for the unity of the Turks in Central Asia. The following statement was made by the National Turkestanian Unity Committee: "Turkestan, a country situated in the center of Asia, is Turki-Muhammedan and must be considered one single nation as regards language, faith, culture, economy, geography, and history. Up to the time of her subjugation by the Russians and Chinese, the country enjoyed freedom and independence for centuries."

"We are firmly convinced that the people of Turkestan, if fair elections (i.e. without any interference from the side of Russia of China) were granted, would unanimously lay claim to a free and independent Turkestan." (Memorandum presented to the United Nations by the National Turkestanian Unity Committee).

Others, while acknowledging the cultural unity of the Turks do not aspire to create a larger Turkic political unity. Togan, a Turkic nationalist and scholar, says the following on the subject: "The movement for Turkish unity, is not a fancy that all the Turks will ever create a political structure. When we talk of a Turkish world we think of a civilization of Turkish complexion and Turkish spirit." (Togan, Turkistan Today, quoted by Sir O. Caroe in "Soviet Empire, The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism").

There is no reason why we should think that the basic sentiments of the Turkic people have changed within the last seven years, since the Communist "liberation" of Sinkiang. Turkic and Pan-Turkic national aspirations, of course, do not find an open expression under a totalitarian regime, nor do we hear about the desire for independence and free election by the Turkic people of Sinkiang. The Chinese Communist propaganda describes the Moslem national minorities as being extremely happy with their new fate under Communism, but it is difficult to believe that strong national emotions could be forgotten in such a short period.

/Turks of Sinkiang/

668 Suppression of external expression of nationalism appears to be
an acceptance of the present regime, but it certainly is not to be
regarded as constituting the fulfillment of the national dreams of
the Turkic people in Sinkiang. The great number of Eastern
[167] Turki refugees from Sinkiang testify to the fact that they consider
the new regime as much more oppressive than the former Nationalist administration. During the former Chinese Imperial and
Republican rule of Sinkiang, no similar mass flight of Turks
occurred. The number of refugees alone indicates deep discontent.

563 C. The Traditional Animosity between the Turks and Chinese
578 The animosity of the Turks to the Chinese is one of the tradi-
669 tional attitudes which became evident in the many Moslem rebel-
186 lions against the Chinese administration in Sinkiang. The Turks
regard the Chinese not only as their oppressors (Turk: gaddar)
but also as infidels (Turk: kafir), who have not received the true
knowledge about God. While being politically and militarily stronger
and superior to the Turks, the Chinese are regarded as inferior by
the Turks in culture and faith. Loyalty to the Chinese regime is
not strong and is maintained by force and political pressure. We
have seen the Moslem reaction to Chinese rule in the past - during
the 1860's and the 1930's when large-scale rebellions took place
[648] against the existing regime. One may even take into consideration
the events that took place in Western Turkestan during World War II.
Many of the Western Turkestanian battalions which constituted a
part of the Red Army defected to the German Army. They later
were organized into special units and joined the fighting against
Soviet Russia. At the present, the occurrence of such an event
seems unlikely in Sinkiang, and there has been no indication of an
organized large-scale rebellion, or any spirited attempts to oppose
the existing regime. It is likely, however, that it would be extremely difficult to trust the Turks fully as Chinese patriots. They
could not be used effectively as soldiers, since their true loyalty
lies with Turkic nationalism in an Islamic framework.

121 D. The Conflict of Islamic and Communist Ideologies
779 Before considering Islam in relation to other ideologies it is
necessary to remember that Islam is not to be regarded as a
religion only, but also as a social and political philosophy, forming a set pattern for the religious, social and political living of all
Moslems. Any political ideology which attempts to enter the
domain os Islam has not only to cope with a religious doctrine,
but to compete with the ideas of Islam in the realm of politics.

Another important basic conception to keep in mind is the division of the world in Islam into two domains, the first of which is
constituted of the believers, who have submitted to Islam - Dar

121 al-Islam (The Realm of Islam), and the second constituted of those
779 who have not received the word of Allah and Muhammed and fall
in the non-believers category Dar al-Harb (The Realm of War).
It is expressed duty for all Moslems to try and extend the domain
of Islam (by means including the holy war), until it encompasses
all of the domain of war. A new ideology would not be considered
only as competing with Islamic ideology but also considered as
being totally unacceptable, since it is a product of the domain of
war. These basic concepts, which have often proved to be
[668] barriers in the progress of Islamic civilization, also set strong
obstacles in the way of the spread of Communist ideology, or its
acceptance.

779 There are other barriers in the way of Communism which are
668 set forth in the principles of the Koran and Sunna, forming the
177 foundations of the Moslem religion. The first of these is the principle of the unity of God "There is no God but Allah." This article of faith has been the rallying point of all Moslems. Communism strongly rejects not only the concept of the unity of God, but the whole concept of God itself, leaving no place for such a supernatural entity. The second important principle of Islam is that of recognition of Muhammed as the Prophet of God (Turk: Peygamber al-Allah), the last and the greatest of God's messengers, which, of course, finds no equivalent in Communism. Nor does the third principle of the acceptance of the Koran as the revealed word of Allah transmitted by his prophet receive acknowledgement in Communist doctrine. Other principles of Islam, including life after death, divine justice with rewards for the righteous and punishment for the sinners, are strongly rejected by Communist ideology as having no valid basis. Communism does have its creeds and beliefs, but there is no correspondence between them and those of the Islamic religion (see section Religion).

While the ideologies of Communism and Islam could never be reconciled, the Communist practice has been that of allowing a place for some religion in its midst. Particularly interested in gaining the favors of the Moslem World, the Communist official policy toward the adherents of Islam both in China and in the Soviet Union has been one of tolerance. Eventually, however, if the Communists aspire to win the complete allegiance of their Moslem citizens, they will, by force or through indoctrination, have to substitute Communist principles for those of Islam. The two doctrines cover too much of the same ground, and because of their incompatibility could not possibly survive together.

648 E. Attitude toward Foreigners

177 The foreigners in Sinkiang are not as varied an international crowd as those inhabiting the coastal cities of China. Because of

648 177 the geographic location of Sinkiang, the lack of adequate transportation facilities, and recently because of the added political complications, foreigners are limited to Chinese, Russians, Turkic and Iranian peoples from Soviet Central Asia, Mongols, Afghans, and Indians. Only a few Europeans (Türk: Frenkler) have visited Sinkiang (with the exception of Russians in recent times), and even fewer of them have remained there for any length of time. [799] A few European missionaries (most noted among them were the Swedish missionaries in Kashgar), British consular officers, Russian Communist diplomatic representatives and White Russian emigrees constituted the foreign colony in Kashgar, prior to the Communist regime. Today the missionaries and British consular staff members are no longer in Sinkiang.

The attitude of the Turkic people to the Western foreigners has, in general, been quite hospitable and friendly, since they did not constitute a sizable minority and had no apparent intentions which threatened the freedom and way of life of the inhabitants (with the exception of the Soviet Consulate members who engaged in espionage and intrigue in the province). People like C.P.Skrine (who served as the British consul in Kashgar) and Owen Lattimore, give the impression that the people, and particularly the nomadic ones, were hospitable and friendly and regarded the Europeans with a great deal of curiosity and interest. Misafirperverlik 'hospitality' is generously observed by all Turks, by nomadic Turks more so than by the sedentary.

The attitude toward the better-known neighbors is somewhat different. The Chinese, who both do and do not fall under the category of foreigners in Sinkiang, are regarded with great animosity, as mentioned above. The opposition of the native to both the Chinese colonizers and the administration has been extremely strong. The Russian Communists are not regarded with much more love, since the Eastern Turkis feel deeply involved in the fate of their Turkic brothers in Western Turkestan. The great [167] waves of West Turkic refugees [mostly Kirghiz and Kazakh] to East Turkestan in 1917 and 1944 have kept the Eastern Turks informed on the situation.

[439] Friendly trade relations are usually the basis for the relationships with the Mongols, Indians and Afghans. Although they do not mix quite freely with the Eastern Turks, they are in general accepted and not regarded with animosity by the Turks.

181 F. The Concept of 'Individualism' (Turk: ferdiyetcilik)

The sedentary Turks of Sinkiang are in general highly independent and individualistic people. This individualism finds its expression in the daily ways and habits of the Turkic people. The [626] pressure to conform to a set of ideas and a set pattern of behavior is slight. The laxity in observance of the religious customs, in

/Turks of Sinkiang/

181 spite of the strong feeling of identification with Islam, the looseness of the family ties, the absence of any clan ties among the sedentary population, and the tremendous amount of individual economic independence, are indicative of this trend of individualism in the Turkic sedentary society.

The traditional economic structure of the urban society, which is based on the small individual merchants, shopkeepers and artisans, is probably the main contributor to the individualistic nature which developed in this society.

Individualism in the Turkic society is not a conscious intellectual movement (although it is reflected in much of the Turkic literature), but is a product of spontaneous historical evolution of the
181 society. The establishment of a strong Communist regime with
668 its exceedingly numerous social controls on the life of the individ-
179 ual is an unnatural imposition on this society. The stress on conformity to set a pattern of thought and behavior, the encroachment on the individual liberties, and above all the destruction of the individual economic basis, will probably destroy much of the individualistic traditions of the Turkic society.

181 The situation differs in some respects in the nomadic tribal
184 society, where the individual depends so strongly on the society for his economic and cultural needs as well. Here the individual's freedom of action and expression is curtailed to fit the pressing needs of the society as a whole. The family and clan ties are much stronger and more important.

181 G. The Concept of Freedom

183 While the Chinese, living in the same environment as the Turks,
192 even lack a proper term for 'freedom', the Turks feel so strongly and emotional about 'freedom', that they have an abundant number of different words for it, just as the Mongols have hundreds of words for military and tactical matters.

Words for freedom are, besides istiklal (of Arabian origin and most used), hürrüyet (e.g. söz hürriyeti 'freedom of speech'), serbestlik (the Eastern Turks often refer to their struggle for freedom as to serbestlik harbi 'the war or campaign for independence'), muafiyet, azadelik, etc.

181 The concept of freedom goes back to the nomadic tribes of
183 Central Asia. The freedom enjoyed by the nomad is one of the most highly valued of his treasures. The sedentary Turks still look up to the nomads, whose way of life they have given up centuries ago. Their literary and cultural traditions have come down from their nomadic forefathers, and with them the concept of the unlimited freedom of the steppe people.

The traditional concept of freedom was not of Turkic origin alone; the Arabic influence on the Turkic civilization has left its
[192] marks here also. The word that designates freedom in Turkish

181 is "istiklal" which is actually an Arabic loan word. Istiklal means
183 both freedom and independence. Along with the nomadic concep-
(192) tion of the freedom of movement in the vast steppes, there is also
a reflection of the concept of political independence and being one's
own master. The 19th and 20th centuries brought additional asso-
ciations to the word freedom. Along with the rise of nationalistic
181 aspirations, which resulted indirectly from the similar movements
183 in Europe, some Western ideas and notions have reached Turkes-
668 tan indirectly also. Though the Western full concept of freedom
177 and democracy is not comprehended among the majority of the
people of Eastern Turkestan, it has added more depth and breadth
to the concept of freedom. The awareness of the need for political
freedom has grown in Sinkiang in the last century. Sinkiang's
history in this period indicates the strong desires and wishes of
its people to be free of Chinese rule, or any other foreign domin-
ation. The Turkic people strongly resent and resist the encroach-
ment on their freedom of action and political decision. This feel-
ing of resentment is not only experienced by the more sophisticated
sedentary population, aspiring for political independence, but is
also shared by the nomadic people. The Communists have made
attempts to either encroach on their freedom of movement in
their searches for pasture land, or have completely attempted to
sedentarize them. Thus, not only the economic existence of the
nomads is threatened, but the freedom characteristic of their way
of life is in danger also. The Communists have not only arrested
the political freedom of the Turks and their desires for independ-
ence, but have also touched on their traditional values associated
with their nomadic past, and threatening the existence of the nomads
today.

H. Attitude toward Change

177 There are elements of both resistance and of desire for change
178 among the Eastern Turkis. The dominating social and economic
565 classes - consisting of the wealthy merchants (the Türks call them
'pek mühim ve zengin tüccar' , verbatim: "the very important and
rich merchants'), landowners (Türk: Emlak sahibi), and clergy
(Türk: Rahibler) - opposed change which threatened to undermine
their social and material status. The general population aspired
to raise their social position and standards of living, but at the
same time did not wish to lose their leaders to whom they have
always looked for direction and guidance. There is no question
that no section of the society aspired to a forced, radical type of
change for which they were not prepared. This type of change in
the social structure, the complete leveling off of the social classes,
with only the party hierarchy in a superior position, which was
forced down on the population by the Communists, is an artificial
product for which the Turkic society was not ready, nor willing to
inflict upon itself.

177 inflict upon itself.

178 The desire for political change is, on the other hand, quite
[668] unanimous and finds expression in the nationalist movement, which aspires to throw the Chinese out of Sinkiang and set up a Turkic government. The only ones who welcome the existing rule are the Turks with positions in the party who have a vested interest in the present regime.

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668 The wish for economic and technological change, while in general looked upon with favor, is opposed by those who have vested interests in the present system. The small artisans (Turk: zanaatkar ve el iscisiler) and handicraftsmen are likely to lose their livelihood with the coming of such changes. The social changes imposed on the population by the Communist regime, pave the way for the introduction of economic and technological changes. While industries threaten the existence of the small artisans, handicraftsmen, and merchants, the collective state farms, using new agricultural machinery and techniques, would threaten the existence of the small farmer, who could never afford such renovations, and is not encouraged by the present regime to own his land and equipment.

181 I. War and Peace Concepts

The Moslems are known in China for their courage in battles and their rebellious spirit. They are known to make good soldiers, when fighting for a cause they believe in. Their skill and talent in way enjoys a reputation as being superior to that of the Chinese.

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779 The Turks have inherited their tradition of war and their fighting spirit from their nomadic ancestors, descendants of the great Turkic empires in Central Asia. War is not only a Turkic tradition, but a strong conception of war is also included in the Moslem religion. One of the five primary duties of a Moslem is to go on a Holy War (Jihad) and to fight in the name of Allah against the non-believers. This tradition stems from the early days of Islam during Mohammed's attempts to overcome his opponents, and it was particularly stressed during the days of the Moslem political and religious expansion. A Holy War today still is an important tool for rallying the believers of Islam to war, although its effectiveness cannot be compared with the times of the past.

While the duty of war is impressed on the believer against the domain of war, peace is the order in the domain of Islam among all the believers. 'Peace, in Turkic 'baris', has the connotation of giving each other shelter. It is important to keep in mind that while the Turks in Sinkiang could quite easily be rallied to war under an Islamic flag, fighting side by side with the Chinese is a totally different matter. The emotional cause and motivation, and the feeling of loyalty which constitute the important elements of the morale of any army, would be completely lacking there,

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721 and the Turkis are likely to make untrustworthy soldiers.

779 J. Material Concepts

556 One of the most important standards according to which an
183 individual's place in society was measured in Sinkiang was the extent of his wealth (Türk: zenginlik). The wealthy merchants
[565] and landowners for centuries occupied the leading positions in society, while those who lacked property, the poor and the beggars, were at the bottom of the social ladder. Wealth was considered as a sign of God's blessings (Türk: Allahin nimetleri) and of the individual's earthly wisdom. A man of property commanded political power as well as an important position in society, while a man who had been reduced to poverty lost all his prestige. Poverty was considered a disaster, as the following folk song
[735] indicates:

[539] "My horse is gone from before me,
My whip is no more at my side.
Even though this be my native land
Poverty is come upon me."

(C.P. Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, p. 208)

From the Communist propaganda, it seems their intention is
556 to eliminate the wealthy classes. It is difficult to tell how many
668 of the leading property owners have become influential under the
177 present regime as "Communist" leaders, and how many have been
[565] truly eliminated. If Communist doctrines are truly pursued, a new attitude in regard to property, will have to be developed. The association of property with the individual will cease, since the property will be transferred to the ownership of the state. We have indications that such a transformation has not fully occurred. The leadership of the Moslem community, however, has been transferred from its wealthy members to the party officials. An individual cannot aspire any more for advancement in terms of gathering more property, but only in terms of becoming an important party member.

815 As regards science (Türk : bilgi, verb. 'knowledge', the term
668 is as old as recorded Türkic history) there was not much of it p
177 prior to the Communist revolution. The only type of knowledge prevalent among the population was the knowledge of religion, of Islam, and the scholars of the Turkic community were its Islamic scholars, and not those versed in secular education. However, with the dependence of the new regime on the new regime of science and scientific achievements (sometimes the term science corresponds to what we mean by it, and often it is used to embrace much more), a new emphasis has been put on the sciences. There are very few among the Turkic people in Sinkiang who are familiar with any of the sciences, and therefore there still is no basic attitude or reaction to the world of science. It is regarded with mixed curiosity, admiration and fear. The term "science"

815 is not quite clear in the minds of the people - they are acquainted
668 with the science of medicine, for which they have great respect,
177 they are bombarded by propaganda telling them of the evil uses
of scientific discoveries, mainly the "germ warfare" supposedly
launched against China by the United States, and they are encouraged
to adopt a "scientific" attitude toward the ideology of Communism,
the science of revolution.

Industrialization is, for the most part, a thing of the future
829 as far as Sinkiang is concerned. The Turks do not even have a
668 word for industry. They use now the term caliskanlik, meaning
177 industriousness. Not much has been done in this field, and the
[439] products of industry have been brought to Sinkiang from China
Proper and Soviet Russia. Since the process of industrialization
will so strongly affect a large part of the urban population consisting of independent small artisans, shopkeepers and merchants, it is very likely that these groups will not look with favor at this process.

423 With the strong emphasis that the Turkic people put on ownership of property, particularly landed property, it is only natural
668 that great resistance is encountered from both the small farmers
177 and the big landowners to the process of collectivization. The
incentive to work will, in many cases of collectivization, be taken away from the farmers, when they are not allowed to anjoy the products of their labor. Collectivization is forced on the Turkic people, and involves a basic change in their economic outlook and ideas. Collectivization may not affect the tenants as strongly, since they have never tilled their own land, and the loss to them is not as great, economically or psychologically, as it is to those who owned their land, no matter how small their property was.

K. Attitude toward the Present Political Regime

829 Communist sources describe the reaction of the national
668 minorities to the new regime and its leaders as follows: "Political
177 consciousness is rising; the people's love for Chairman Mao Tse-
tung and their homeland is heightened by all that is happening day by day (Ulanfu, Vice-Chairman of the Commission of Nationalities Affairs, Report of the General Program for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Nationalities), or, "The growth of the movement to resist United States aggression and aid Korea has further added to the education in patriotism among our national minorities whose overwhelming majority deeply love and warmly support Chairman Mao Tse-tung and the Central People's Government."

In spite of these statements, it is difficult to conceive how the Turks so "deeply love and warmly support" a Chinese leader who has not brought about the fulfillment of their national aspirations, but those of Chinese nationalism, and who has united them not with the world of Islam but with the Communist block. The glori-

S /Turks of Sinkiang/

829 668 177 fication of a non-Moslem is not likely to be a very spontaneous movement on the part of the Turkic people, nor is it conceivable that they "deeply love and warmly support the Central People's Government." To most of them it is a remote government in a foreign country - China - to which most of them have never been, and it is very difficult for them to visualize it as the government to whom they owe supreme allegiance.

S 631 554 668 177 829 Direct authority is represented by the local government bodies. Although composed of many Chinese officials, the representatives of the local population fill prominent positions in the local government also. There is a certain amount of pride felt by the local people owing to the fact that some of the important leaders are Turkic Moslems, who have achieved a position of importance in the government. It is quite likely that leaders like Burkhan and Saifuddin are quite popular among the Turks of Sinkiang. The Turkic refugees abroad and the strongly nationalistic-minded ones who still are in Sinkiang, look at these leaders participating in the Chinese Communist regime as traitors cooperating with the oppressive powers, rather than national heroes.

II. The Mongols of the Northwest

A. Introductory Remarks

N *563 [361] [162] S 563 [361] [162] Northwest China is the arena for some 150,000 Mongolian herdsmen. Although uniform in respect to their Buddhistic-nomadic culture and language (with the exception of the Monguors who speak a Mongolian-Tibetan mixed dialect) they do not constitute a political or areal unit, living as they do thousands of miles apart, in the northeastern area of Sinkiang, around the Tsaidam swamps area, in the Edzingol area, in the northern part of Kansu and even in some enclaves in Shensi. Since Chingis Khan, they have never constituted a political unit, although Legdan Khan united the major parts of them into a short-lived empire (see Historical Setting).

The reason for this lack of unity is first and above all, the fact that the Mongols of the Northwest area are outnumbered by Chinese (30 million) and Turks (4 million). The second reason is the treatment by the Manchus who shifted the Mongol banners from place to place in connection with the Manchu, Sibo, and Solon banners, who constituted the main and more reliable garrisons in the frontier area. The reliability of the Mongolian garrisons was partly due to the policy toward the banner and tribal leaders who were made wang (king) or nobles of various ranks.

B. Views of the People with Respect to their own Country

N *563 829 S 563 829 The average Mongol of the Northwest is fully aware of the fact that he belongs to a minority and that all he possesses are his

N
829 pastures, but not a country. Nationalistic movements of recent
*563 times hardly reached the Mongols of the Northwest (see Political
*[668] Dynamics) and serious attempts to join a greater Mongolian unit
S (Outer Mongolia) have never been made by the Mongols of Sinkiang.
829 For most of the other Mongolian splinter groups of Chinghai,
563 Kansu and Shensi, such an ambition would have been still more
[668] unrealistic due to their geographical separation from Inner and
Outer Mongolia and due to their more progressed sinification,
which is especially true for the Chinghai and Shensi Mongols.
(Two heretofore isolated groups in Kansu, the Mongols of Alashan
and Edzingol have recently been incorporated into the Inner
Mongolian Autonomous Region.)

For the Mongols of the Northwest their country is China and
their supreme representative, the court of the government in
Peking. Their immediate superiors and chiefs were the banner
leaders who observed a rather strict loyalty to China's court or
government as they received a yearly apanage and, after having
performed special, mostly military, services for the court in
Peking, were promoted to higher ranks which in turn meant an
increase in their yearly presents received from Peking. This
fact did not encourage them to make any attempts toward independence,
self-determination or autonomy. The Mongols of the Northwest
thus did not think of their country but of their domain. An
important aspect of this view is also the cultural basis of the
Northwest Mongols, Lamaism, whose realm is everywhere where
Buddhists live and whose center is Lhasa (Tibetan: 'the city of
S gods') rather than Peking. For the religious world is the real
N and essential world to them, the Dalai Lama, the supreme spiri-
[792] tual leader of all Lama Buddhists, became more real and essential
to them than the supreme political leader in Peking.

C. Traditional Attitudes of the Northwest Mongols

No matter where Mongols live, some trends are common to
all of them: the pride of being a Mongol; the pride of speaking
Mongolian, which is considered by them as melodious, sonorous,
and full-toned in comparison with the 'chirping and cackling' of
S Chinese; and finally, the pride of being a free nomad, herding
N wherever he wants and riding wherever he wishes. Whenever
(197) Mongols meet each other they can communicate with each other
as their dialects differ only slightly. They realize, too, that
they have even more in common than only external appearance
and language, something which is of utmost importance to all of
them - their Lamaistic religion. In these respects they certainly
feel that they constitute at least an ethnic unit, very different
from the Chinese for whom they do not want to be mistaken.

/Mongols of the Northwest/

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829 These feelings and emotional attitudes were hardly sufficient to
*563 arouse animosity or hatred toward the Chinese but rather an unjustified and unwarranted feeling of superiority. The progressive
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829 advancement of Chinese settlers, however, who gradually took
563 over lot after lot of their pasture land led not only to hatred but resulted in petty uprisings, so that even the Manchu government several times issued laws against Chinese advancements, which were hardly ever observed. Complaints of the Mongol leaders did not help and they were numerically too weak for military action.

Only in the case of the sedentary Mongols of the Northwest, the Monguors, such problems never arose, as they had become so strongly sinified that their tribal leaders were considered by the Chinese themselves as Chinese officials with a reputation of absolute loyalty.

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D. Attitudes toward the Communist Regime

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Throughout the history of the Mongols, their pattern of living,
(178) internal and external, changed very little. Their families con-
[596] stituted auls, the auls, clans and the clans, tribes. Besides this
(614) structural organization, there existed the military institutions of
(619) banners and leagues. The internal order was always strict and
(601) the laws and regulations hard. A leader who was not strict and
(622) hard would hardly be considered as a leader and the history of
(554) the Mongols shows that a strong leader always evoked their respect and found them to be submissive followers.

In view of this fact there is little doubt that the Mongols of the
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Northwest will respect the iron hand of Peking, even though probably
829 with mixed emotions. The creation of autonomous chous (districts)
*563 populated only or overwhelmingly by Mongols might give them a
*668 certain feeling of self-determination and cultural autonomy. The
177 organization of veterinarian stations which take care of their live-
[634] stock will certainly be welcome to the nomads; the organization of
[242] a widespread educational system might be another asset for the
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Communists as it fosters Mongolian language and promotes litera-
829 ture written in Mongolian. The establishment of permanent
563 winter sites, on the other hand, which is contradictory to Mongol
668 customs and above all the threatening collectivization of their
177 [634] livestock, which is the Mongols' highest and greatest treasure,
[242] are negative aspects. This, of course, refers to the present
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generation only. The younger and youngest generation, subject to
(361) a very vivid and propagandistic education will undoubtedly change their attitude toward the present regime, a process for which the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia are a classic example. (see also IMAR Handbook, same section).

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III. The Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans

An attempt at a cohesive description of popular attitudes among

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N *563 829 /Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/
S 563 829 the Chinese in the Northwest meets with several obstacles. The
one most difficult to overcome is the lack of attitudinal uniformity
due to a multitude of historical, environmental and social factors
which have molded the people's behavior in the Northwest. There
N *563 369 829 is, to begin with, the difference between the urban and the rural
situation, which even though prevalent all over China, has made
for a specially pronounced diversity in the Northwest. Generally
speaking, in centers like Sian or Lanchou attitudes are met with
S 563 369 829 which do not differ too much from those prevalent in other cities
of China. It has to be taken into account, though, that Sian has
been the capital of the Chinese Empire for centuries up to about
one thousand years ago, and this fact still shapes certain attitudes
of the citizens of Sian today. Lanchou, on the other hand, is most
definitely a frontier city, the last major outpost of Chinese civilization with an ostentatious pride in local traditions and relics of
a cultural or esthetic nature, but open, on the other hand, to a
colorful mixture of influences coming from a variety of peoples
beyond the pale. The urban attitudes prevalent in Sian and Lanchou
thus differ perceptively and both cities differ in certain respects
from other Chinese metropolises. Their peculiarities influence
in turn urban-rural and social tensions in a specific way.

The Chinese rural scene, on the other hand, displays a variety of factors accounting for attitudinal diversity. There are the differences of the loess-cave dwellers and the mud-hut dwellers, those of the irrigational farmer and the one on hills or mountain slopes; there are regions of compact minorities or dominant majorities of Moslems and finally, regions along the few great thoroughfares and regions of remote seclusion.

The picture gains in complexity in the real frontier areas, Western Kansu, Chinghai and Sinkiang, where the Chinese constitute a minority. Here the diversity of peoples with whom the Chinese have contact, the geographical differences, the professional differences, differences of the duration of stay, of the home province of the settlers account for attitudinal patterns which change from settlement to settlement.

What is attempted in the following pages is, in view of the
S N [128] [129] difficulties, and furthermore, in view of the pitifully scanty coverage
of the area in the literature, to present a few samples of pertinent
observations, which might add up to some general notions. In
the selection, stress has been laid on the frontier regions, as the
regions within the pale, reference still can be made to the General
Handbook.

N 712 361 [129] In their book, The Gobi Desert (New York, 1944), Mildred
Cable and Francesca French describe the Chinese people's life
in the fortress of Chia-yu-kuan in Western Kansu, which they
visited in the thirties: "Inside of the fortress, life was divided
into three distinct sections, each of which had an existence quite

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

712 different from the others. All the inns and shops were in the
361 suburb. The people who owned them were descendants of a long
line of old residents who took pride in the very exclusiveness which
was imposed by their isolation. Few of them ever left the place,
and many had never even seen the neighboring town of Suchow.
An inner gate led to the military section of the fortress, where
life was entirely different. The yamen, built in traditional Chinese
712 style, was the center of garrison life, and here the general and
701 his family lived, guarded day and night by sentries! Officers
marched in and out, and much official business was done, for
this was an important military center and the officer in command
held a high rank. Unlike the old residents, the military hated the
place and seized every chance of being away from it, bitterly
resenting the appointment to such a lonely outpost, and longing to
be transferred elsewhere. Nothing would have induced them to
walk outside the Northwest Gate where that fateful Gobi Desert
stretched, and their eyes always turned longingly to the city where,
twenty miles away, there was solace, gaiety and life.

712 If the men disliked Kiayukwan (Chia-yu-kuan), the women hated
512 it. There is nothing to do here all day but sit and listen to that
517 howling wind, they would say frequently.

The ladies of the yamen would gather in each other's rooms,
[525] play ma-jong for small stakes, sip tea and gossip. Often the
[521] game was prolonged until midnight, with interludes for drawing
[276] on the opium pipe, but the next morning's reaction brought a
fierce hatred of this place where desert demons hid themselves
in dust-clouds and whistled through every crevice of the crazy
[567] buildings. The little slave girls learnt to dread the days of blizzard
when their mistresses' nerves were tensed and blows were
dealt out irritably for the slightest offense.

[796] Each festival of the year was the occasion for a welcome social
function, and during the summer months life was made brighter by
[574] the frequent exchange of visits with the officials from Suchow.
[545] Twice a year a theatrical troupe visited the fortress, and for the
three days of its performance all the inhabitants enjoyed themselves
and made merry. But it was soon over, and when the
properties were packed and carts carried both actors and their
belongings elsewhere, life in the fortress relapsed into desolating
stagnation.

712 The third category of human beings to be met in Kiayukwan
485 were the travellers who came, lodged for a night or two at the
484 inns, and forthwith went their ways. Every sunset and every sunrise
they arrived, some taking night stages and some travelling
by day, but all were travel worn and weary....

484 These formed the stream of living men and women who moved
712 up and down the great road, acquainted with life and full of knowledge
about distant places. They were familiar with the large

484 cities and the great waterways of China, and had traversed her
712 wide plains by the iron track at speed which seemed fabulous to
the owners of these little shops. The static inhabitants saw them
come, heard them talk, watched them go, but failed to understand
the matters of which they spoke, for, to them everything which
they had never seen was unreal, vague, remote and seemed to
bear no relation to daily life. Enough for them that today they
[432] had sold three boxes of matches, two packets of cigarettes and
handful of salt. They cared little for travellers' tales and probably
believed none of them....

712 The restless soldiers of the garrison rushed to and from the
512 large town, but the old inhabitants cared for none of these things,
[701] and when the fortress gates were closed each night they put up
[352] the shutters of the little shops and crept under miserable coverlets
to lie on the mud kangs, fill their opium pipes and escape into
[276] the land of illusion and dreams, which was the only wider horizon
that they knew." (pp. 17-20).

361 While she was visiting in Tun-huang Miss Cable observed:
443 "The people of Tunwhang (Tun-huang) viewed themselves as the
(186) elite of Gobi land, and were abnormally proud of their oasis.
They had plenty of money to spend and opened their markets freely
to goods from other places, but prided themselves on being a self-supporting
community, not only in respect of food, but also in
regard to brides and bridegrooms, and they did not approve of
marriages arranged between their own children and those of other
181 towns." (ibid.) The people in this district were very conservative.
436 "One sign of its deep-seated conservatism," observed Miss Cable,
"was the backward system of money exchange which it retained.
441 Long after the silver dollar had become the common basis of coinage
on the main road, Tunhwang businessmen looked askance at
it, and preferred the shoe of silver which was chipped down,
weighed up and exchanged for copper coinage. Here again Tunhwang
set its standard by allowing one hundred worn and valueless
cash to be introduced into each string of a thousand. It became
therefore worthwhile to collect these useless copers in other
towns, cart them to Tunhwang and dispose of them there. When
the reluctance to admit the silver dollar was finally overcome,
merchants still discriminated between different issues and refused
one or the other according to fancy. The coin stamped with the
dragon was depreciated in favor of one designated as the 'standing
man' which was Hongkong currency. The dollar bearing the head
of Yuan Shih-kai found favor, and for some reason the third-year
issue was more highly valued than any other, but when a new coin
stamped with the head of Sun Yat-sen appeared, this Gobi town
absolutely refused to recognize it because the new president's
effigy was small and unimpressive. No other explanation was
offered than the words 'The head seems small', but no one would
use it.

181 use it. In this little backwater town large business deals were
436 effected, but each roll of dollars received for payment was
opened, the contents carefully examined, and the individual coins
valued a little higher or a little lower according to the Tunhwang
standard." (pp. 69-70).

423 The landowners in the Tunhwang district are mainly Chinese
whose ancestors were established here very long ago. The Chi-
181 nese farmers are more conservative than the town folks. The rural
369 rural pattern here is different from that of other parts of the North-
241 west. Here the farmsteads are dotted over the area, each stands
in the center of its own land and each at a considerable distance
361 from the other. The larger farms are surrounded by a high wall
[351] which is a small fortification, and inside the wall is a substantial
[342] house made of sun-dried bricks and excellent timber. Most of
[621] the farmsteads are spacious and built to accommodate large num-
[614] bers of people, for it is customary that all the members of a clan
live together in their generations.

The author of The Gobi Desert recorded another interesting
631 feature of the Tunhwang oasis. The record says that Tunhwang
is divided into as many sections as there are prefectures in the
whole of the province of Kansu. Its colonization brought men
from all areas, who were anxious to honor the cities which they
represented, by erecting temple buildings. The result is that the
traveller wanders through the oasis as through a replica of the
whole province of Kansu, stepping from the section called after
the town of Chingchow to that called Liangchow, from Kaotai to
Pingfan, or from Pingliang to Titao, in the course of an afternoon
[532] stroll. Near one of these temples was a very old carved stone
[172] figure of a man, which was not an idol but was said to represent
a historic personage.

Of the Chinese people of the wayside in the Gobi Desert
157 Miss Cable writes: "The intense isolation of the inhabitant of a
485 small oasis, and the extraordinarily low standard of life imposed
[511] upon him, produce a strange mentality. His normal condition is
torpor. He sits or lies on his mud bed and thinks of nothing. Only when a traveler arrives does he experience the discomfort of rousing himself, but then though it may be cold or windy, he must leave the pleasant stuffiness of his bed-living-room, throw off the greasy coverlet which he has drawn over his crossed legs, come into the open and give the service, which is demanded of him as innkeeper. The life of the innkeeper's wife is more bare and poor. Clothing, which has some place in the thought of nearly every woman, is, to her, absolutely nothing but a protection from cold and a covering for her nakedness. The other incidents of her life are concerned with food and the birth of her children. She knows that her husband has some money, but she has never thought of money as a means of securing comforts

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/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

157 because there is nothing for which to exchange it. Once a week
485 a caravan carrying Government supplies deposits a bag of flour
[434] at the door. This is the subsidy granted to them, in exchange of
[654] which her husband is bound to be at his post all through the year, and keep the well from being choked by sand. She has never thought in terms which refer to anything except meals, births and occasionally deaths. Her boys may go farther afield, and if they do, she knows that they will never return, but after a time she will become accustomed to their absence and it will not trouble her again."

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157 With spiritual senses dormant, mental powers arrested and physical demands reduced to the minimum, wherein shall a human being show that he differs from the beasts whose conditions he shares? There is hardly anything which can be called attitudes or reactions.

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485 About the Chinese-speaking Moslems Miss Cable reports that
795 Chinese travelers avoid any inn operated by Moslems because of the rudeness to which they may be subjected when using it. This
798 is a very particular observation, as in other places in the Northwest, non-Moslem Chinese prefer to go to Mohammedan restaurants, which are famed for their cleanliness and tasty food. In many places Moslems have monopolized the innkeeper business, so that they cannot possibly be avoided. Even the Chinese guests abstain from eating pork during their stay, every pot and pan which they possess is considered unclean and will not be allowed inside the kitchen. This is not conducive to good feeling between host and guest, and may at any time lead to high words and even to blows. Toward known westerners the Moslems' attitude is

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485 somewhat different, and more tolerant. Cable records the experi-
795 ence of her party in staying in an inn with the sign of "Pure and True Religion" by saying, "The attitude toward our party was
114 different because, though we were styled kaper (infidel) we were
798 known to keep a 'clean' kitchen, which is to say that pork, lard, and every produce of the pig was rigidly excluded from our menu. We were 'infidels of the book' for the Bible and not the Koran was our guide, but we were not 'infidels of the pig' which was an insult reserved for eaters of unclean food. The closest watch was kept upon us as we journeyed, and any lapse or laxity would have been reported to every mosque on our route, so that 'pure religion' inns would have been closed to us. Moslems acknowledged that we were as free from idolatry as themselves, but openly stigmatized us as blasphemers, for we called the prophet Jesus 'Son of God', and the innkeeper turned aside to spit whenever he

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795 heard the word." (pp. 72-73). The Moslems who are of means
554 like to make others understand that they are wealthy people.
485 "Like other Tungan landlords to whose houses we had the entree,
114 he left us with a sense that he was very wealthy and that his

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795 **/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/**
559 apparent trade of innkeeping was simply a cover for another and
485 more lucrative business." (p. 73).
114 Like the Chinese, the sinicized Moslems are very much con-
S cerned with the problem of offspring. To them continuity of life
N is bound up with that prolongation of existence which a son secures,
842 one who carries on the life which he owes to his parents. This
775 is a completely Chinese concept. The Chinese-speaking Moslems
771 cannot understand and would certainly not accept the Christian
177 faith that life after death is God's gift, that one does not depend
N upon a son and his worship, and that immortality means the soul
*563 or spirit living eternally in Heaven. Miss Cable records in her
S 563 book: "We talked often of these things, but it was hard for them to
understand what I told them, and they would turn it off with one
excuse or another. 'She is different from us', they said, 'her
life is given up to God's work and her merit will secure her an
entrance to Paradise'. Some envied, some pitied, some just
stared and made no effort to understand, others summed it up in
these words: 'Eastern ways are for the East, Western ways are
for the West.'" (p. 75).

The Chinese-speaking Moslems in the Northwest, in spite of
N their having taken up a considerable amount of the Chinese way
*563 of life, are deeply conscious of racial and religious inadaptability
177 to Chinese rules. Most of them are always rebellious. They
181 alwasy think that they are oppressed or unfairly treated by the
[669] Chinese authorities. For this reason, Moslem revolts occur in
S the Northwest frequently. For example, the immediate cause of the
563 the 1930 revolt was, according to Miss Cable's account, the sus-
177 picion of the Moslems that the Chinese Government was to change
181 their age-old social and political system and that the Chinese
[669 population in the area goat many advantages at the expense of the
S Moslems. Up to 1930 the Moslems in the Hami district of Sinkiang
563 were always governed by a ruler of their own race, religion and
642 speech. The last one of their rulers was Khan Maksud Shah.
This ruler died during the year 1930. The Chinese Sinkiang Gov-
643 ernment took this opportunity to end the Moslem system and the
177 succession of the Khan was not allowed to continue. Maksud's
son, Nazir, heir to the throne was summoned to report at Urum-
chi, then capital of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, and
Yolbars, the Tiger Prince, was ordered to appear with him.
This was bad news for the Moslem inhabitants. Later, a word
came from the capital that the young prince had been made a
prisoner in his own lodging, and that there were to be many
changes in the standing of the Turki people. When Yolbars re-
turned to Hami he left Nazir in Urumchi, and arrived in company
with a band of Chinese officials who at once sat down to business
and drew up a list of changes which were to be introduced in the
administration of the Moslem community. The old administration

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S The old administration
563 of the Khan was not always liked by the Moslems, but he and his
642 people were one, and they understood each other well. His
643 Oriental style of court life was appreciated by the Turkis, and
177 the Khan, by virtue of his hereditary title, was unquestionably
829 accepted by them. There was immediate resentment among the
populace at the suggested changes, and the resentment became
the more bitter when a great display of highly organized official-
S dom was made.
563 At the same time, the whole area of Hami was carefully sur-
177 veyed and the land redistributed. Three large administrative
631 districts were arranged and given names which dated back to the
Han dynasty. The new government was to be wholly in Chinese
642 hands, and the old Khanate system was to vanish. Chinese magis-
829 trates were appointed to hear the law cases and Chinese tax-col-
[423] lectors were to levy the dues and convey them to the capital,
where they would be allocated to the respective departments.
These propositions all seem legitimate to the Chinese authority
and they were presented to the people as improved measures of
justice; but the Moslems did not like them and had a great deal
of suspicion towardsthem. There was also the rumor that some
unappropriated land which the Turki farmers would have liked to
use was given to the Chinese and that arrears of taxes from which
S the Chinese were exempt were demanded from Moslem landowners.
[669] Suddenly that dangerous thing so well known to the Oriental as a
"breath of fury" rose fiercely among men who had hitherto dealt
only with their own Khan, and they unanimously determined on
revolt.
N Fan Ch'ang-chiang, a well-known journalist connected with the
829 most influential Chinese daily Ta Kung Pao in the prewar period
565 and now editor of the People's Daily in Peking, reported, after a
trip to the Northwest in 1936 through Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and
Ninghsia, that the common people, especially the peasants in
N Kansu, all had a very bad impression of the government. Because
[651] there were so many kinds of taxes, the people thought that the
government had nothing to do but to collect taxes from the common
N people. The people did not trust the government. In regard to
565 social customs Fan says that the Chinese in Kansu are very con-
181 servative in matters which have anything to do with their women.
562 Even middle-aged women of respectable families can hardly have
829 anhy opportunity to be seen by or to be spoken to by any man who
is not a relative or a neighbor. Young ladies must absolutely not
be seen by strangers. Soldiers who have come from the coastal
provinces and who are accustomed to more liberal relations
between the two sexes were resented by the local people because
N they acted rather freely toward their women folk. Notwithstanding
565 their bad impression of the government and their resentment
829 toward the "outside" soldiers, the common Chinese in Kansu are
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565 extremely obedient and timid toward the government officials.
829 Anyone who has some connection with the government can command
181 the service and materials of the small people. One who has
just a sword may act as a lord in the Chinese rural community.
The common people in these communities are too meek and ignorant
to resist. The rural people in general are primarily concerned
with their food problem. Their attitude toward anything
565 is affected by this problem. Their attitude toward the coming of
829 the Communists, for example, was quite interesting. They were
668 anxious to know how far the Communists were and how great the
177 possibility was of their coming. When they were asked how they
felt about the coming of the Communists, the answer was that what they feared mostly about the Communists was that the Communists might eat up all the food they had and then they would be left to starvation. They seemed to believe that the Communists would not persecute them because they were just poor people. They had heard that the people in Szechwan called the Communists the misfortune bringers. It meant that wherever the Communists appeared they would bring misfortune. The Kansu people would not care how sweet the Communist promises might be, if the Communists had to live off the province's scanty food supply, they were not wanted. This shows that the economic conditions in the Northwest, as in other places, had great influence on the people's political attitude.

However, this does not mean that the Chinese peasants in the Northwest care only about their stomach and overlook all else. They also resent the fact that the government officials and the local gentry looked down upon them and treated them as people of little value. It is reported that bad administration of the local government at that time was the reason that the local Communists, led by a man named Liu Tzu-tan, were able to make considerable progress among the peasants in a big territory between the provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia. The Communists gave the people many kinds of little or temporary advantages and made all sorts of big promises. At the moment they looked much better than the local government officials and therefore they won the people's confidence and support. It is reported that when the government tried to call the people in the villages to a meeting so they might be enlightened about the government's policy, very few came. But whenever Liu Tzu-tan wanted a mass meeting, the peasants swarmed into wherever the gathering was held. Liu Tzu-tan knew the common people's psychology and their dire needs, and he skillfully played these factors for his purpose. Consequently, his movement was very successful among the rural masses.

423 According to Fan Ch'ang-chiang's report, the Chinese farmers in the areas between Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia were by and large landowners, not tenants. The areas were very thinly populated

423 and therefore land was abundant. Among the landowners there were quite a few with extremely large holdings. It is reported that the amount of farm and grazing land owned by a family was so big that it was not measured by acre or by any other unit but was simply estimated as reading from this mountain to that mountain, or from this river to that river. Thus these people's attitude toward land must have been different from that of the people in the coastal provinces. They certainly would not treasure their land so much as farmers of other places. This assumption is verified by the fact that the peasants in these areas would easily abandon their farms and migrate to other places whenever the farming business failed to produce an adequate livelihood. [556] Also, merely large landholdings would not necessarily make a person wealthy. It depends very much on whether or not there are irrigation facilities. Without such facilities, the land might mean nothing.

*563 578 Racial relations in the Northwest are very complicated. This complication influenced not only political and social affairs but also people's attitudes toward each other. Fan reports that in the province of Chinghai the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems all considered themselves civilized and thought of the Tibetans and Mongols as primitive tribes. Both the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems claimed that they were people from China Proper, chung-yüan. Between the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems in that province there was also much discrimination. The Chinese-speaking Moslems held all the key political, economic, and military positions and they were the predominant group while the Chinese either had no such positions or had only the secondary or insignificant ones. This discrimination had undoubtedly fostered a great deal of bitterness in the Chinese toward the Moslems.

*563 181 183 829 [674] About the Chinese-speaking Moslems in the district of Ho-chou, Kansu, Fan has this to say: The Chinese-speaking Moslems in Ho-chou are brave and disposed to fight or to make war. They praise warriors but look down upon literature. They have the characteristics of the ancient Spartan people. In their communities stealing and robbery are not things to be frowned upon, as long as they are not done to their own people. If a person left his community empty-handed and came back after a year or so with a big horse and many precious things he would certainly be lavishly praised by his relatives and neighbors as a hero or a worthy man. Nobody would care to ask how the man acquired his wealth. But if such a man came back without any gain and bore the mark of having been captured and punished for stealing or *563 181 526 robbery, he would be exposed to humiliation. In order to express their warlike spirit and to train their people for fighting and bravery, the Chinese-speaking Moslems in Ho-chou have numerous

*563 hunting and racing games. In playing such games all the partici-
181 pants think and act as equal competitors. All social and kinship
526 distinctions disappear. The competition between father and son,
[593] if they all participate in the same game, could be just as fierce
as that between two other persons.

*563 In regard to relations between the Chinese and the Chinese-speaking Moslems, the attitude of the people in Ninghsia was quite
[184] different from that of people elsewhere. In Ninghsia, the Chinese-speaking Moslem leaders held that the Moslems are not a race different from the Chinese but that they are only a religious group. Because of this attitude the Ninghsia Moslem leaders advised their co-religionists not to undertake any political movement on the basis of race. This attitude eliminated or at least lessened the racial antagonism between the Moslems and the Chinese. Another
[178] significant trend to be mentioned here is that the traditional barriers between the Moslems and the Chinese have been melting
*563 away in recent years. Fan reports that the Moslems in the north-
177 ern parts of Ninghsia went voluntarily to Chinese schools and learned the Chinese language. Some of their religious leaders were alarmed and tried to stop this. But the people answered them by saying: "After our children have gone to Chinese schools and learned the Chinese language they immediately become useful in helping their families to make a living. What is the use of learning the Koran?"

797 Robert B. Ekvall is a Christian missionary who lived in the southeastern parts of the Northwest for many years. He and his wife did evangelistic work mostly among the sedentary Tibetans in the district of the Kansu-Chinghai border. He made numerous observations on the sedentary Tibetans and the Tibetan-influenced
798 Chinese. About the latter, Ekvall says: "In contrast to the violent
*563 incompatibility existing between the Chinese and the Moslems, we have Chinese and Tibetans displaying a mutual tolerance in mat-
795 ters of religious belief and practice... the Chinese of the border differ from those already described in that they place a greater emphasis upon Buddhism to the neglect of some aspects of Confucianism. In particular do the more uneducated tend to become almost entirely Buddhistic in observance; the scholars, of course, give greater place to the doctrines of the Sacred Books of Confucian teaching and always refer to themselves as members of the Confucian sect. Also, the Chinese of the border country - possibly influenced by the religious fervor of the Tibetans - appear more religious-minded than their fellow countrymen of the Titao district." (Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border, p.33)

*563 In speaking of the differences between the Chinese and the seden-
621 tary Tibetans, Ekvall observes that the Chinese village organization permits a considerable degree of individualism, whereas in
184 the Tibetan village, communal activity completely overshadows

/Chinese, Chinese Moslems and Sedentary Tibetans/

*563 individual activity. In all matters relating to the village-owned
621 woodlands and pasturelands, as well as in all matters regulating
184 the time of planting, harvesting, etc., the Tibetan village acts
with a solidarity and unanimity that is comparatively lacking in a
Chinese village community, although that community also owns
communal wood lots and pastures.

*563 The sedentary Tibetans in the Northwest, according to Ekvall,
722 were quite friendly toward the Chinese. The Tibetan country with
727 which Ekvall is familiar "has again and again been a most effective
refuge for those fleeing from the three great Mohammedan
rebellions" and from other local troubles. The Tibetans, like
many unsophisticated peoples, are rather soft-hearted toward
refugees, especially if they be destitute. By Tibetan custom the
right of refuge has become one of the basic rights, and when it
is reinforced by the claims of acquaintance and the functioning of
the "guest-host" system this right of refuge can open a path into
the most exclusive of Tibetan communities.

*563 The sedentary Tibetans are short of males. For this reason,
162 in every instance intermarriage is between a Chinese man and a
Tibetan woman - never between a Tibetan man and a Chinese
woman. This means that the Tibetans put more value on their
[562] men than on their women. They can afford to give up a woman,
but not a man.

829 Attitudes of the Chinese in the Northwest toward the present
regime again differ widely. The so-called Shen-Kan-Ning Border
*668 Area was the core area of the Yenan regime. Communist policies
177 and maneuvers were experienced here for almost a decade and a
half before they were applied to other parts of China. It will be
remembered that the strategy of the Yenan period differed considerably
from later usages. An initially sceptically favorable
attitude of the rural population seemed at that time justified.
Those who joined the party or the army did so with enthusiasm and
a sense of mission. (Compare, however, section Political
Dynamics on their later fate). Regions outside the Border Areas
did not enjoy this "privilege". To the pronounced conservatism
of the rural population in other parts of Shensi and Kansu, Communist
innovations which were in contrast to their traditions and
interests came as a heavily felt shock. Their passivity and submissiveness
[157] on the other hand kept them from voicing open discontent.
Apathy would probably be the right term to represent the
rural people's attitude toward the new regime.

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

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THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

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I. The Historical Background

When the Communists conquered Northwest China, they created a Northwestern administrative area, which included the five provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. In 1954, the Communist Government abolished Ninghsia Province and put it under the jurisdiction of Kansu. In 1955 it changed Sinkiang Province into the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. So now, Northwest China includes three provinces, namely, Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and one autonomous region, Sinkiang.

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Historically speaking, Shensi and Kansu were under one governor-general during the Manchu Dynasty. For many purposes, such as provincial examinations, the two provinces were handled as a unit. At that time, part of Chinghai and Ninghsia were considered to belong to Kansu. While most of Sinkiang was administered under a special military government system, its eastern strip, from Tihua (Urumchi) to Hami, was under the jurisdiction of the governor-general of Shen-Kan. When Sinkiang later was made a province, it absorbed all the territory west of Hami.

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Under the Nationalist Government, the Kokonor area was separated from Kansu. It became the nucleus of the Province of Chinghai, which was established in 1928. During the same year the Nationalist Government also established Ninghsia Province by uniting the northern counties of Kansu along the Yellow River with the two Mongolian Banners, Alashan and Edsin. Thus, when the Communist Government abolished Ninghsia as a province by combining it with Kansu, it merely reestablished part of the old border line.

S 175 631 635 [642]

During most of the Manchu Dynasty, Sinkiang was a special area. The local people retained a high degree of self-government. Even after the area was established as a province, the Chinese government let the local leaders handle most of the business of their own people. Thus, the establishment of an autonomous region in Sinkiang also had a historical basis.

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II. The Constitutional Systems

A. Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic

In October of 1927, Mao Tse-tung retreated to the border area of Hunan and Kiangsi. There he established the "Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region Worker-Peasant Government". This was the beginning of the Chinese Soviet Government. After the Communists had consolidated their position, they established a "Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic". This was a Communist constitution for a Communist government. After suffering severe losses from Nationalist attacks, the Chinese Communists were no longer able

175 to defend the Soviet Republic in Kiangsi. On October 16, 1934,
642 the main forces of the Red Army started to evacuate. This was
668 the beginning of a long and bitter journey. In October, 1935, a
669 remnant of a little more than twenty thousand people reached
northern Shensi. By the timely help of some native Communists,
notably Kao Kang, Mao Tse-tung finally had a breathing spell and
settled down at Yenan. His opportunity came when Chang Hsüeh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng captured Chiang Kai-shek on December
12, 1936 in the well-known Sian coup d'etat. Soviet Russia's
175 necessity of avoiding a two-front war in the impending World War II,
642 produced a compromise. To forestall this danger, Stalin wanted
648 Japan to be occupied with a war against China. He realized that
668 Chiang Kai-shek was the only one who could unify China to resist
669 Japan. Thus the Communists won a good bargaining position, and
a compromise was reached. Chiang was released and the Nationalists' military campaign against the Communists was halted.
175 Later in 1937 the Chinese Communists declared that they would
642 give up their independent state, follow Sun Yat-sen's doctrine of
628 the Three Principles of the People, stop the policy of confiscating
668 land, reorganize the Red Army into a part of the Nationalist army,
669 abolish the red flag and red star which were the symbols of the
Communist revolution and adopt instead the Nationalists' flag and emblem. With this virtual surrender, the Communists gave up their own constitution and accepted the constitutional system of the Nationalists.

Mao Tse-tung had difficulties in persuading his comrades to accept this virtual surrender. Many incidents indicated the true feelings of the Communist rank and file at the time. The following excerpt from an autobiography of a Communist war hero is a good example:

"In 1937...the Red Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route Army. Our flag, our uniform, our cap, our emblem were all changed. When I reported these facts to my mother...she wrote back and demanded an explanation: 'You are the Red Army! Why do you use "the Blue Sky White Sun" flag now?'.... She repeatedly reminded me: 'Remember, your heart is red!'" [Ch'eng Yüeh-ch'ang, "Forever a loyal warrior of Chairman Mao" in Sian Ch'ün-chung Jih-pao, 1952, July 1]

Ch'eng was a division commander in the People's Liberation Army when he wrote this article. Later he was promoted to army commander in Sinkiang. The editor of the newspaper described him as a leading model warrior in the People's Liberation Army.

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B. Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China for the Tutelage Period.

At that time the constitution was the "Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China for the Tutelage Period," adopted by the

175 National Conference in May, 1931 and promulgated by the Nation-
642 alist Government on June 1. Under this constitutional system of
668 the Nationalist Government the Communists participated in political and military activities in the war against Japan.

After discarding the old Soviet Constitution, the Communists found it advantageous to adopt certain democratic practices which soon attracted the sympathy of western observers. These observers, who were eager to see democracy in China, happily praised the Chinese Communists and unconsciously fell in with the Communist party propaganda. But the Chinese Communists themselves frankly considered all their practices merely as means to achieve other aims. They said as follows: "The change seems to be a backward step in historical and social development. Well, we are making a concession. But this concession is necessary. Our population is only a fraction of one per cent of China. China as a whole does not have any kind of democratic government. If we recede to a lower stage of democracy but do it well, we will stimulate the whole country towards democratic government. A nation-wide democracy will more than compensate whatever may be regarded as our temporary loss." (Ch'u Yun, Factual Account of a Shensi Trip, or Shen-hsing Chi-shih, Hankow, 1938, pp. 16-17 as quoted in Hsü Yung-ying: A Survey of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, Part I, Geography and Politics, International Secretariat Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1945, p. 43.)

175 The Nationalists, who bore the brunt, were greatly weakened
668 by the Japanese invasion. Taking advantage of the situation, the
669 Communists made every effort to build up their party and their
648 army. In proportion to their successes in building their own strength and in weakening that of the Nationalists during the war, the Communists dissented more and more from the Nationalists.

In September, 1944, when the Nationalists were hard-pressed by the last desperate drive of the Japanese into the Chinese interior, the Communists openly challenged the Nationalist Constitutional system. In Chungking, the wartime capital, at the People's Political Consultative Council, the Communists requested the replacement of the Nationalist Government with a coalition government. On April 24, 1945, when the Communists could claim to have an organized army of 910,000 men and irregular troops of 2,200,000, Mao made his speech "On Coalition Government" before the seventh National Congress of the Communist Party at Yenan. He restated his aim of abolishing both the Nationalist Government, and its constitution. In August, when the Japanese surrendered, the Communists openly rebelled against the Nationalist Government. They destroyed the railways and attacked the Nationalist troops. These actions led to continuous warfare, sandwiched between peace talks.

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C. The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

In the talks, an arrangement of truce and political settlements was once reached, but was immediately violated. Then the Nationalists called the National Assembly to establish the 1947 constitution without the help of the Communists. The Communists went ahead on their own program and intensified their efforts to fight the civil war. In 1949, the Communists had almost completed their conquest of the mainland. In September they handpicked 662 persons to represent the people of China. This group met in Peking as the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. They passed a Common Program as a temporary constitution. Based on this Program, they established the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and elected Mao Tse-tung as its chairman.

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D. The Constitution of the People's Republic of China

On March 1, 1953, the government promulgated the "Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China for the All-China People's Congress and Local People's Congresses of All Levels." Elections soon were held and the All-China People's Congress met on September 15, 1954. On September 20, it adopted the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.

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E. Comparison of the Four Systems

A comparison of the four stages of the Chinese Communists' constitutional system reveals many interesting points.

The Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic represented the Communists' ideas in strong words: "Our goal is the establishment of...dictatorship throughout China. It is the aim of this dictatorship to destroy all feudal survivals, to annihilate the might of the warlords of China, to unite China, systematically to limit the development of capitalism, to build up the economy of the state, ...to effect the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat." (point 1, in Fundamental Laws...pp. 17-18.)

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By this constitution, "capitalists, landlords, the gentry, militarists, reactionary officials, t'u-hao (local bullies), monks" were deprived of the rights of election and of political freedom. (point 2, Ibid. p. 18.) On the other hand, all qualified "Soviet citizens" sixteen years of age could vote, (later the age was raised to 18), and special advantages were granted to the proletariat in the elections... by allowing it a greater number of deputies." (point 4, Ibid. pp. 18-19.)

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To the minority groups, it promised: "All Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans and others living on the territory of China, shall enjoy the full right to self-determination, i.e., they may either join the Chinese Soviet state or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer." (point 14, Ibid. p.22.)

000 state as they may prefer." (point 14, Ibid. p. 22.)

C Coming to the second state, the Yenan period, the Communists
642 retreated to an almost amiable position. The differences were
668 summarized by a friendly observer as follows: "The basic struc-
666 tural change which distinguishes the Border Region from its pre-
177 decessor lies in the broadening of the electorate. As contrasted with the Soviet election system which was restricted, indirect and unequal, the present system is characterized as universal, direct and equal, and to insure this change the secret ballot is substituted for the hitherto open ballot hand-raising. This means that whereas under the Soviets franchise was limited to workers, farmers and a section of the 'petty bourgeoisie', the new system extends the right to vote to all men or women over eighteen years of age, including landlords and capitalists, except when a person is insane or his political rights have been specifically suspended by court action. The Soviet election was also pyramidal. This means that a voter under the Soviets voted only for delegates to a local soviet, while delegates to an upper Soviet were chosen by the lower Soviets but not by the voter. The new system allows the voter to vote as many times as there are local, county or regional elections for members to the representative body of each grade of geographical division. The segregation of farmer and worker voters and their disproportionate representation under the Soviets are abolished under the new regime and secret or unsigned ballots of citizens of all walks of life in the same territorial unit are counted together without discrimination." (Ch'u Yun, Factual Account of a Shensi Trip, or Shen-hsing Chi-shih, Hankow, 1938, pp. 11-12 as quoted in Hsü Yung-ying: A Survey of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, Part I, p. 43.)

Judging by western standards, this was progress toward democracy. But from the Communists' point of view, it was a temporary necessity.

C When the Communists conquered the Northwest in 1949, they
642 found themselves in a much more favorable position than during the
668 war. Hence their "common program" of this stage brought back a
648 lot of the characteristics of the old Soviet Constitution. The Com-
N munists made the following points very clear:

642 1) The People's Republic of China is a country led by the Com-
*668 munists. Those who refuse to follow this leadership will be
648 crushed and denied all rights (Articles 1 and 7).

2) The Communists are ready to continue the war to the last, at least until Formosa is occupied (Article 2).

3) The Communists will protect the private property only of qualified people, and at any time they can disqualify anybody (Article 3).

4) China must be tied to the U.S.S.R. now and in the future (Article 11).

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With these basic premises, one may understand the real meaning of the "struggle for the independence, democracy, peace, unification and prosperity of China" (Article 1). They also help one to understand the following analysis.

In the constitution of 1954, the same premise presented in the Common Program is restated. Under this general premise, the study of the constitutional system in northwest China can be carried out under four sub-headings, namely, the general civil rights, the economic rights, the political rights, and the rights of the minority groups.

The Communists always make a great effort to promote their programs. Before and after the establishment of their Constitution, they mobilized all people available to study the Constitution. To do this, study groups were organized everywhere. Discussions were insisted upon. Millions of copies of the draft constitution were distributed.

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In Northwest China, the Communists' effort to publicize the constitution can be seen in their publications. To reach the minority groups, the Constitution was translated into various languages. It is available in Kazakh, Tibetan, Mongolian and Uighur. So are the organic laws of the National People's Congress, the State Council and the Local People's Congresses and Councils.

III. Practices Regarding General Civil Rights

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A. Pledges and Exclusions

According to the Common Program of 1949, "the people of the People's Republic of China shall have freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, correspondence, person, domicile, change of domicile, religious belief and the freedom of holding processions and demonstrations." (Article 5). This, however, does not mean that all will have these rights. The Communist Party may disqualify anyone. Moreover, since the standard of selection changes according to the ebb and flow of political tides inside the Communist Party, it is hard to guarantee that anybody, including Mao Tse-tung himself, always will enjoy these rights.

In the Constitution of 1954, this fact is even more clear. In Article 19 it is stated: "The People's Republic of China safeguards the people's democratic system, suppresses all treasonable and counter-revolutionary activities and punishes all traitors and counter-revolutionaries.

"The state deprives feudal landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists of political rights for a specific period of time according to law; at the same time it provides them with a way to earn a living, in order to enable them to perform thorough work and become citizens who earn their livelihood by their own labour."

In this article the first part refers to traitors and counter-

641 revolutionary," however, are very vague. It could be a Nationa-
642 list soldier resisting the Communist conquest or the Number Two
668 Communist Party leader, Kao Kang, who lost the political battle
inside the Party. By extending the definition of the terms traitors and counter-revolutionaries, there is no real guarantee of civil rights in the constitution.

The last part of Article 19 refers to feudal landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists. These two terms also are not too clear. In the Resolution Concerning the Classification of Rural Elements adopted by the Government Administration Council on August 4, 1950, a landlord is defined as follows: "One who occupies land but does not labor, or who does subordinate labor, not for the purpose of making a living but for exploitation, is a landlord. His main method of exploitation is in the form of land rent, even though he may also exploit people through making loans, or hiring helpers, or doing business...

"Managing the properties of various social organizations and schools is also a form of exploitation through rent.

"Any bankrupt landlord who is not using his labor ability to labor is still classified as landlord if his standard of living is better than that of common middle-farmers.

"Warlords, bureaucrats, land-despots, bad-gentry are the political representatives of the landlord class. They are the worst of all the landlords. Landlords' managers who depend mainly on the exploitation of the farmers for a living and live better than the common middle-farmers shall be treated equally as landlords." (Hsüeh-hsi, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1950, October 1, p. 27.)

By this definition, a person is a landlord when:

1) he owns land and charges a rent for the land he owns; or
2) he owns land and charges people interest for the money he loans; or 3) he owns land and hires helpers; or
4) he owns land and operates business; or
5) he does not own land but manages the properties of social organizations or schools; or
6) he lost his own land and has no work but lives better than the common middle-farmers; or
7) he is a landlord's manager and lives better than the common middle-farmers.

By this definition, numerous people are deprived of their civil rights. "Warlords," "bureaucrats," "land despots," and "bad gentry" are all loose terms which the Communists have used freely against all those of whom they do not approve (as well-illustrated in the slogan "Yu-t'u chieh hao, wu-sheng pu-lieh!" Whosoever owns land is a despot; whosoever is a member of the gentry is a bad one!). Apart from the landlord, the following were prosecuted:
1) those who had links with the non-Communist army in the past;

641 2) those who had been officials in the government in the past;
642 3) those who had been local leaders and
668 4) those who belonged to the class of gentry.

The term "bureaucratic-capitalist" is even more vague than the term "feudal landlord." It has been a weapon used to harass all businessmen, large and small. Whenever the Communists want to take over a private business, a hint of that term sufficed to wrest the property from the owner. Should anyone ignore this hint, he would be designated a "bureaucrat-capitalist" and would lose not only his property but his "political rights" as well.

Article 85 says, "citizens of the People's Republic of China are equal before the law." But citizens who incur governmental displeasure can be classified summarily as "traitors," etc. and denied this equality.

Article 87 says, "citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of procession and freedom of demonstration. The state guarantees to citizens enjoyment of these freedoms by providing the necessary material facilities." There is no "freedom to strike" clause such as the Communists, during their negotiations with the Nationalists in Chungking, had insisted upon inserting in the Nationalist Constitution. The Communist government does not tolerate any strike within its jurisdiction. The "freedom of thought", promised in Article 5 of the Common Program of 1949, has been omitted. Moreover, the state now must provide "the necessary material facilities" for the citizens to enjoy these freedoms because if has taken control of all "the necessary material facilities" such as newspapers, radio broadcast stations, buildings, land, railroads, roads, ships, trucks, and other means for exercising these freedoms.

B. Freedom of the Reason

Article 89 says, "Freedom of the person of citizens of the People's Republic of China is inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except by decision of a people's court or with the sanction of a people's procuratorate." A people's court, however, is not an independent agency as is a court in the American system. Like the people's procuratorate, it is another tool at the command of the Chinese Communist Party.

C. Freedom of Residence

Article 90 says: "The homes of citizens of the People's Republic of China are inviolable, and privacy of correspondence is protected by law. Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of residence and freedom to change their residence," but ownership of citizen's homes is subject to the sanction of the state. (below), and a citizen can lose his home at any time.

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[486] "The freedom of residence" and "the freedom to change their residence" again involve the problem of whether the citizens would have a place to reside and whether they would have facilities to change residence. Strict rulings against free migration, such as "lu-t'iao" (road passes) are practices curtailing these freedoms. Even a guest who stays over-night without the knowledge and approval of the local police station is subject to arrest.

D. Freedom of Religion

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771 Article 88 says, "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief." Since Communist doctrine condemns religion as an "opiate for the people," it is not easy for a non-Communist to understand why article 88 is there. The Party rank and file is not convinced that a Communist Constitution needs such an article. There are numerous indications of such difficulties. A long article written by a certain "Wen Ch'ing," published in China Youth, the magazine of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps, on February 1, 1955, refers to a letter to the editor, which says, "as science keeps on developing in our present day world, there is no place for things unscientific. Religion has still a legitimate status in China... to indoctrinate the people with passive, pessimistic, and superstitious concepts about the universe. Is this not in conflict with the Communist world outlook?" The author admitted that "many questions of a similar nature have been raised."

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771 To answer these questions, this Party spokesman first said that religion "reflects in an incorrect way the relationship of man with nature and the relationship of man with man." His analysis was that "religion was born when primitive society developed to a certain higher plane. At that time, man was at the mercy of nature and was helpless against the spontaneous forces of nature....He thought that all things had souls...that there was some peculiar supernatural force existing outside the natural world...when the primitive man met with difficulty in life or encountered danger, he turned to the 'man of the other world,' or God, for help...

"When man entered into a class society, with his productive activity broadened and his productivity developed, he was in a better position to exploit and control the natural forces. But at the same time, there developed a form of social force. This force was opposed to man and had the latter under its rule. Before this force, man was as helpless as was the primitive man before the natural forces. The domination of this force over man resulted in the birth ...of the religious concept that the destiny of man was under the rule of some supernatural forces. Lenin said: 'When the oppressed class had no way to resist the oppressors, they staked their hope on a good life in the coming life....'

"Religious worship took shape when man found that he was in no

641 position to resist nature and the social law. God was created by
668 the psychology of fear....On the other hand, when man is capable
771 of dominating the natural forces and eliminating the society of
class oppression, religion will be deprived of its foundation...
The obliteration of religion is possible only when man has obliterated classes and greatly developed his ability to dominate nature and the social forces." (Survey of China Mainland Press, March 9, 1955, pp. 23-24).

With this kind of analysis, the writer found it necessary to
641 answer another question which obviously was puzzling the young
668 Communists, namely, "Since the Soviet Union has been built into
771 a Socialist society, why is it that there are still religious followers
829 and religion in that country?" He repeated the standard statement:
"It is true that the Soviet Union has eliminated the exploiting class and the phenomenon of man exploiting man. Because of the prominent and effective development of advanced sciences in the Soviet Union and the elevation of the cultural standards of the people throughout the country, the Socialist man in the Soviet Union is no longer powerless before the natural and social phenomena. The Soviet Union has destroyed the social root of religion. The Socialist system has liberated the Soviet people from religious belief." (Ibid., p. 24).

Apparently this Party spokesman believed that repetition had convinced the young people that the Soviet Union was still a paradise; he went ahead to admit the undeniable fact: "But in the Soviet society, there are still believers in religions."

He continued; "There is nothing strange in the matter. Though the building of the Socialist society in the Soviet Union was possible because of the overthrow of the capitalist society, yet...the capitalist ideology cannot be eliminated at one stroke....although the Soviet Union is far more capable than the capitalist countries in the domination of nature, it is still in no position to shake itself entirely free from the ravages of natural calamities.... To those who have not shaken themselves free from religion, these calamities help to deter them from giving up their religious beliefs. The Soviet Union is still encircled by capitalism.... During the time when the Great Patriotic War i.e. the Russo-German War from 1941- 1945, fought for the defense of the country was on, religious faith of part of the Soviet people became somewhat revived. This is because war is always inseparable from sacrifices, hardships and worries about the fate of friends and relatives. Religion frequently thrives best where there are great hardships which come in the wake of great disaster." (Ibid., p. 25).

In any event, the Party spokesman reasoned, since religion had been an unavoidable fact in the Soviet Union, it was necessary and advisable to tolerate it. Because the Soviet Union, especially Stalin, had tolerated religion, it was justifiable to have article 88

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in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. There are many followers of religions in China. It would be unwise, the spokesman argued, to offend them all. He repeatedly emphasized, however, that the world outlook of the Marxists is in every way contradictory to that of religious believers. The solution is , "the religious believers must abide by the Constitution and the law. The policy of freedom of worship must not be allowed to be used as a pretext for carrying out counter-revolutionary activities,... We must publicize among the masses of the Youth the materialistic world outlook... The youths should thus be given an ideological founcation... to make them into...atheists and the heroic fighters of the Socialist construction undertaking." (Ibid., p. 28).

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The Communists believe that by turning the young people against religion, all religion will eventually be eliminated when the present believers die. However, the Communists will tolerate or even participate in religious activities for reasons of expediency.

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In Northwest China where the influence of Islam and Lamaism is great, the Communists have gone all out to woo the Moslems and the lamas. For instance, when the Communist army marched into Ninghsia and Kansu, the commander of their First Field Army, P'eng Te-huai, issued a special order to the whole field army to honor the Moslem religious habits. Not only were the Mosques not to be damaged, but the order even demanded that every soldier wash his hands before he drew water from a well. In numerous cases, the Communists spent much money to repair the mosques and the lama temples. In the Soviet China stage the Communists had disqualified every monk as a citizen. (see above).

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Obviously, the general civil rights promise in the Communist Constitution are restricted. Mao Tes-tung's statements in his "On People's Democratic Dictatorship" leave no doubt about this point.

E. Practices

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Some instances of infractions of these rights may serve as examples. In 1951 some faculty members of the Provincial First Middle School at Sian, Shensi, grumbled in private talks about the "land reform." They said, "In the country, if you have two bowls of rice to eat, you will not have peace." Because of this, Vice-Commissioner Lu Ch'in-liang of the Bureau of Culture and Education of Shensi Province wrote a special article and published it in the local newspaper. He severely criticized the tolerance of the administrators and accused the school of being a hiding place for counter-revolutionary ideas and opinions. Special groups were organized by the Northwest People's Supervisory Committee and the Northwest Department of Education to investigate the school. A special criticism was published in the nation-wide Party magazine, Hsüeh-hsi. As usual, this would indicate that a serious purge took place.

000 purge took place.

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In order to control Christians, the Communists sponsored a
*668 movement to reorganize the churches. Following the principles
798 of Communism all the churches were supposed to be combined under the leadership of the Communist government. The movement started with a government-sponsored statement entitled, "Road for Chinese Christian Churches in Reconstructing New China." All Christians were asked to sign their names to this statement. To most Christians, this movement was a rebellion against God. To the Communists, any Christian who refused to sign was a potential "counter-revolutionary". According to the Communist report, 1,527 Christians signed the statement in August and 1,741 signed in September of 1950. Among these, 44 were in Shensi and 1 in Kansu. (Peking Jen-min Jih-pao, December 5, 1950). No detailed figures of the later years are on hand but it was the start of a continuous persecution of Christians loyal to their faith.

An editorial of the Jen-min jih-pao of July 7, 1955 complained about sabotage activities of "reactionary" religious groups in Shensi and Kansu during 1954 and recommends: "We must take effective actions and resolutely beat the sinful activities of all the reactionary religious groups.... We must severely suppress these religious leaders. As to the common believers... we must order them to register in the government and force them to sign a pledge to withdraw from their religious organizations."

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The Sinkiang jih-pao of June 18, 1953 discussed the activities
668 of people's courts in the district of Urumchi: "When the land re-
423 form began, the personnel of the courts cooperated with the land
692 reform teams to penetrate into the villages. They called various meetings and publicized the policy, function and missions of the people's court... They encouraged the mass to accuse the landlords,.... Generally they would arrest the landlords... confiscate their property and publicly liquidate them. When a case could be used to educate the people they would convict the man in public trial before a mass meeting. For instance, after the arrest of the unlawful landlord Je-he-p'u (most likely an Uighur) of T'o-k'e-sun, the team and the court organized a small scale liquidating meeting against him in his village. Then they organized a large scale liquidating meeting in the hsiang with deputies from every district of the county presented.... In less important cases, the landlords were warned before the public... and forced to admit their sin and publicly accuse themselves... The important point is to use the local people as the judge and the jury. ... For instance, when the 3rd hsiang of the 3rd district of Shanshan publicly accused the local despot and landlord P'ai-tsu-nan (probably an Uighur), the judge and the jury were all minority cadres. The mass was very much pleased, saying, "Now... it

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is our own people who are judging and sentencing people." But... we must give the minority cadres concrete help and guidance."

The Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, 1955, no. 7, reported: "On March 14, 1955, the People's Court of Hsien-yang County in Shensi called a public accusation rally to punish Chao Chu-shih. It reclassified him as a landlord, and confiscated all his land, drafting animals, farming tools and houses, except the part his family deserves to have."

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IV. The Pledges and Practices Regarding Economic Rights

In view of this lack of personal security very few people dared to defend their property rights. In the Common Program of 1949, Article 3 stated: "The People's Republic of China must abolish all the prerogatives of imperialist countries in China. It must confiscate bureaucratic capital and put it into the possession of the people's state. It must systematically transform the feudal and semi-feudal land ownership system into a system of peasant land ownership; it must protect the public property of the state and of the cooperatives and must protect the economic interests and private property of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. It must develop the people's economy of New Democracy and steadily transform the country from an agricultural into an industrial one." A number of terms in this article are vague; they are presumably to be kept this way to allow for a flexible interpretation.

It is hard to draw a definite line between the "bureaucratic capital" and "economic interests and private property of workers, farmers, the petty bourgeoisie class and the national bourgeoisie." Only after the loss of one's property, he would realize that he was a bureaucratic capitalist or feudal, or semi-feudal landowner. Those who kept their property would have to regard it as a favor rather than a right.

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The present Communist Constitution is more explicit. It has quite a number of articles relating to economic system and rights. These are articles four to fourteen. Besides, there are several more articles to protect the citizens, namely 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, etc.

In these articles the constitution clearly states that the economic system in a socialist nation shall be built on state ownership, supplemented by cooperative ownership, (articles 6 and 7), while they are definitely going to eliminate "rich-peasant economy" (article 8) and "capitalist ownership" (article 10). The protection of the rights of ownership and inheritance (article 12), the property of the individual farmers (article 8) and workers (article 9) is subject to the regulations of law which will be adjusted from time to time to encourage the individual owners to organize cooperatives voluntarily. Protection of private income, savings, housing, and

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668 other living materials is limited to those which are "legitimate."
642 Thus landlords cannot legitimately collect rent on land and
421 interest on loans. The legal status of house rent and banks'
C payment of interest on deposit are not yet clarified. The duty of
[651] paying taxes (article 102), the privilege of working hard (article
[461] 91), and the responsibility of offering contributions in labor,
money and kind, furnish more means for the Communist government
to ensure "the gradual abolition of systems of exploitation and the
building of a socialist society." (article 4)

C Late in 1950, the agrarian reform movement began to spread.
668 The movement did not concern itself only with the redistribution
423 of land, but also included the confiscation and redistribution of
422 draft animals, farm implements, grain supplies, and so forth,
which was later to be followed by a program of cooperativization.
Some excerpts from the Chinese press will illustrate how the
agrarian reform was handled in the Northwest.

S The New China News Agency, November 16, 1950, reported:
[668] "The farmers in Sinkiang, including the various minorities, deeply
felt the warmth of the People's Government and the People's Army
[421] and requested to pay more taxes (in grain).... At the same time,
[651] the peasants in various places universally started class struggle
against the... criminal landlords."

The same agency, December 7, 1950, reported the start of a
S "Rent Reduction and Down with Local Despots" campaign in the
668 Northwest as a prelude to full scale land reform. From the win-
423 ter of 1950 through the spring of 1951, it was reported that 3017
N hsiang (administrative villages) confiscated more than 1,000,000
*668 mou of land (each mou is ca. 1/6 acre), 30,000 heads of draft
423 animals and more than 200,000 pieces of farm implements in
Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. By May, 1952,
4364 hsiang in the Northwest had completed 72.6% of the original
quota. (NCNA, May 28, 1951). In total, during the winter and
spring seasons of 1951 and 1952 more than 20,000,000 mou of land
were confiscated in the Northwest. The population who received
land and other productive material was from 10,000,000 to
12,000,000 people. (Sian Ch'ūn-chung Jih-pao, May 5, 1952.)

S Thus Burhan, the Governor of Sinkiang, could report to the
668 Sinkiang Provincial People's Congress on September 20, 1955:
"From September, 1952 to the end of 1953, in the agricultural
423 district of Sinkiang we completed the whole program of land reform.
We destroyed the landlord class. We abolished feudal land owner-
ship. We confiscated and condemned more than 7,300,000 mou
land and other properties to be distributed to 2,100,000 poor
farmers with little or no land."

S A report by the Vice Secretary-general of the Communist
[578] party at Aksu, Sinkiang, P'eng I-min, in Sinkiang jih-pao, April
3, 1953, reveals, however, some of the difficulties which the land
reform movement encountered in Sinkiang.

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668 reform movement encountered in Sinkiang. The attempts at forced
423 cooperation resulted in many hard feelings and in violations of the
578 principles set forth by the government. Examples were cited of
474 "middle farmers" supplying carts or other tools, but not participating in the actual labor. Village cadres were unwilling to work on the cooperative farms lest their private interests suffer. Considerable difficulties were experienced in finding people who would accept responsibility. A partial solution was sought in sending more professional party workers to aid the cadres.

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Similar reports are available from other parts of the North-
*668 west. From these reports the following trends can be gathered:
423 (1) In the program of cooperativization the policy was to exclude
474 not only the landlords but also the rich farmers. Since those who
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were not in the cooperatives would suffer social and economic os-
668 tracisim, the threat to all individual farmers kept out of the co-
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474 operatives was great.

(2) The experience of those who did join the cooperative groups, however, was not happy. Their hard work often was not properly rewarded. It was difficult to keep the record of credits straight. This was the reason why many cooperatives collapsed.

(3) However, the average farmer, including the party cadre, dreamed of becoming a rich farmer and private businessman.

Against this background one can understand the significance of Mao Tse-tung's drive for one million cooperatives in 1955. According to Mao's plan, by the spring of 1958 half of the agricultural population must be organized into cooperatives. In other words, by that time, half of the farmers in Northwest China would no longer be working on their own farms.

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In the field of commerce and industry, the 3-anti and 5-anti
*668 movements were the prelude to the program which calls for the
472 total elimination of private enterprise.

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668 As described above, the political rights in the Chinese Soviet
472 days followed the conventional Communist Party line. But during
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*668 the Second World War, the Chinese Communists had advocated
their democratic government and democratic elections in the
666 border regions. Their procedure of a secret ballot included the following practices: "Each of the candidates' names is written on a bowl. The voter drops a bean or pea in the bowl bearing the name of his choice. If his election "unit" is entitled to more than one representative, he is given the proper number of beans. If a considerable number of the voters cannot read, the candidates are lined up, each carrying a well-calanced bowl or basket on his back. The voter drops his bean or beans into the bowl or bowls of his favorite candidate or candidates. The bowl is carried on the back to insure secrecy, so that no candidate knows who elects whom." (Hsu Yung Ying: A Survey of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, Part I, p. 59.)

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666 Communists, it was claimed, would occupy only one-third of the total membership of any administrative organ of the government of any popular organization elected in this way. One-third of the members would go to the Nationalists while the other third would be reserved for non-party people. They called this the 3-3 system. (Hsu Yung Ying: A Survey of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, Part I, p. 74). The system worked beautifully. The Communists activists together with their "non-party" following were always assured of a comfortable majority.

V. Pledges and Practices Regarding Political Rights

A. Elections

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642 After the take-over, the Common Program of 1949 declared: "The state power of the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The people's congresses and people's governments of all levels are the organs for the exercise of state power by the people. The people's congresses of all levels shall be popularly elected by universal franchise. The people's congresses of all levels shall elect the people's governments of their respective levels..."

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666 But before a general election was held, the People's Political Consultative Conference, which was an appointed body, acted as the All-China People's Congress. (Article 13). In the local districts, the appointed All-Circles Representative Conferences acted as the local People's Congress. (Article 14).

On February 28, 1951, Liu Shao-ch'i reported on the way in which the People's Congress of Peking was elected. He said: "The manner of electing the representatives differed according to the situation. In State Enterprises and schools of higher education the voters gathered in their productive or school units to have a direct election. For the farmers in the countryside, the workers, the businessmen, the youth, the women and the districts, the representatives were elected by 'the representatives of the voters.' With the only exception of the schools where people were experienced and literate, all the units elected representatives on a candidate list produced in the meeting by raising their hands. In schools, the elected with secret ballot. I think this is absolutely accurate and necessary... I think not only the People's Congress of Peking...but all the other places... shall follow the experience of Peking to elect their congresses in the similar way ...

"Whenever we mention election, people often think of 'universal, equal, direct and secret ballot.' This old slogan undoubtedly served its propaganda purpose under the reactionary, dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek's regime... But if we request to realize this slogan under today's New Democratic regime, it is not yet very suitable to the reality. Therefore we cannot wholly adopt it." (Liu Shao-ch'i:

668 "A speech on the third session of the People's Congress of Peking,
666 February 28, 1951," in Hsüeh-hsi, Vol. Iv, No. 1, p. 6.)
Liu's words revealed that with very few exceptions, the elections under the Communists were not supposed to be universal, equal, direct, or secret. Most of the people voted by raising their hands in an open meeting. These meetings were firmly controlled by the Communist Party. Any list of candidates passed by these meetings had been decided on beforehand.

B. Electoral Laws

668 671 666 The electoral law promulgated on March 1, 1953, reflects Liu Shao-ch'i's directives. Among its 66 articles, the following are of interest:

"Article 3: Deputies to the All-China People's Congress and deputies to the people's congress of a province, county, or municipality divided into districts, shall be elected by the people's congress of the next lower level. Deputies to the people's congress of a hsiang, town, municipal district or a municipality not divided into districts, shall be elected directly by the electors.

Article 4: All citizens of the People's Republic of China who have reached the age of eighteen shall have the right to elect and to be elected irrespective of nationality or race, sex, occupation, social origin, religion, education, property status, or residence. Women shall have the right to elect and to be elected on equal terms with men.

Article 5: None of the following shall have the right to elect or to be elected:

(1) Elements of the landlord class whose status has not yet been changed according to law;

(2) Counter-revolutionaries who have been deprived of political rights according to law;

(3) Others who have been deprived of political rights according to law;

(4) Insane persons.

Article 8: Election expenses for the All-China People's Congress and the local people's congresses of all levels shall be dispersed by the national treasury...

Article 55: The election of deputies to the people's congress of a hsiang, town, municipal district or municipality not divided into districts, and the election of hsiang or town deputies to a county people's congress, may be conducted by a show of hands or by secret ballot. Election to a people's congress of and above the county level shall be conducted by secret ballot.

An elector who is unable to write because of illiteracy or infirmity may ask any other elector to record his vote for him.
(The Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China for the All-China People's Congress and Local People's Congresses on All Levels.)

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668 By this law, the key elections are those below the county level.
671 These elections were generally open elections by raising of hands
666 in public. Only under special conditions were secret ballots allowed.

Furthermore, in spite of article 4, which promised equal rights of election to different groups of people, article 5 disqualified everyone who might vote in opposition.

The control of elections was tightened by article 8. As all campaign expenses are dispersed by the State Treasury, the Communists can easily make or break any candidate.

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668 In the new Constitution of 1954, there are at least ten articles,
642 i.e., 23, 24, 27, 38, 39, 44, 56, 61, 86, referring to the right to
666 vote or right to stand for election. There is no basic change from
the situation analyzed above.

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C. Political Rights in Practice
631 The following news items trace the practice of political rights
in the Northwest: "On the basis of the universal convocation of
*668 People's Representatives' Conferences of all circles in municipalities and counties throughout the country, 20 provinces have successfully convened their first Provincial People's Representatives' Conference of all circles. These provinces and districts are...Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai...

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"Of these, the People's Representatives' Conferences of all
631 circles of the first 16 provinces in the above list have successfully
*668 elected their respective Provincial People's Government Commit-
666 tees. The People's Representatives' Conferences of various provinces and administrative districts have further elected and set up consultative committees to assist the government in carrying out the resolutions of the conference after it adjourns." (NCNA, Peking, December 20, 1950).

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"Since last year, the provincial and municipal People's Gov-
631 ernments in the Northwest region have attached importance to
*668 People's Representative Conferences. Except for some pastoral districts of Chinghai, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang which still do not possess conditions for holding People's Representative Conferences, all counties and municipalities in the Northwest have held People's Representative Conferences while those of over 80 counties and municipalities exercise the functions and power of People's Congresses. But there are still a number of responsible officials of counties and municipalities who do not sufficiently understand that People's Representative Conferences and People's Congresses represent the basic system of our state and who do not convene People's Representative Conferences according to the system." (NCNA, Sian, July 15, 1952)

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"During the three years from 1949 to 1952, twice the Provin-
631 cial Conference of Representatives of All Nationalities and All
668 Groups of the People was held in Sinkiang Province. In each of

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631 the 78 counties, 1 municipality, 1 central district in Sinkiang, at
668 least three times, and up to nine times...these conferences have
been held. In Tihua Municipality and Ch'ien-tse County, the conference
S has already acted as the People's Congress. It elected
[666) the mayor or the head of the county and the Council members..."
(Burhan: "The great achievements during the three years of
people's Sinkiang" in Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 1, 1953).

S "In October, 1953, a general election was held..." (Burhan:
668 "The work report of the past six years of the Sinkiang Provincial
666 People's Government," a report at the 2nd meeting of the 1st
session of the Provincial People's Congress, in Hsin-hua yüeh-pao,
1955, No. 11, p. 30).

N This general election mentioned by the Governor of Sinkiang,
#668 Burhan, was one part of the election held all over the country. It
666 was carried out according to the Electoral Law of 1953. The
S nation-wide election was not completed until September, 1954, just
668 in time to meet for voting on the new Constitution. The meetings
666 of the leading local People's Congresses in the Northwest were held
on the following dates: (NCNA, August 24, 1954)

Unit	Beginning (1954)	End (1954)	Days of Meeting	Deputies Elected to the National People's Congress
Sian Municipality	July 14	July 17	4	8
Sinkiang Province	July 21	July 31	11	21
Chinghai Province	August 4	August 15	12	9
Shensi Province	August 4	August 12	8	19
Kansu Province	August 16	August 20	5	25

The real meaning of this kind of election was well illustrated in a deputy's confession: "I have never thought of being elected as a deputy to the National People's Congress. Some of my friends ran over the other day to congratulate me, saying, 'Do you know that? You have already received the weighty trust of the people of the whole nation. You are a deputy!'

"When I read my name in the People's Daily I did not know whether I was happy or flurried. My eyes became moist. I was grateful as well as ashamed. I felt that I could hardly catch my breath." (Ts'ao Yü, "I must do my job well as a deputy to the National People's Congress" in Hsin-kuan-ch'a, 1954, No. 18, September 16, p. 3).

VI. The Rights of the Minorities

A. Constitutional Rights

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668 In the Common Program of 1949, chapter VI defined the Com-
641 munists' Nationality Policy. In this chapter, it said:
642 Article 50: All nationalities within the boundaries of the People's
Republic of China are equal....

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668 641 642 Article 51: Regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated and various kinds of autonomy organizations of the different nationalities shall be set up according to the size of the respective populations and regions. In places where different nationalities live together and in the autonomous areas of the national minorities, the different nationalities shall each have an appropriate number of representatives in the local organs of political power.
Article 53: All national minorities shall have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to preserve or reform their traditions, customs and religious beliefs...

In the Constitution of 1954 the articles 3, 53, 54, 60, 67-72, 77, and 86 refer to the minorities. Some statements in these articles are very concrete, such as:
"Article 68: In all autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties where a number of nationalities live together, each nationality is entitled to appropriate representation on the organs of self-government.
Article 71: In performing their duties, organs of self-government of all autonomous regions, autonomous chou and autonomous counties employ the spoken and written language or languages commonly used in the locality.
Article 77: Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The People's Courts are to provide interpretation for any party unacquainted with the spoken or written language commonly used in the locality.

In an area where people of national minorities live in compact communities or where a number of nationalities live together, hearings in people's courts are conducted in the language commonly used in the locality, and judgments, notices and all other documents of the people's courts are made public in such language."
Others are more vague, such as articles 3, 67, 70 and 72. Contrary to Article 4 of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic of the early 1930's, which stated that the minority groups "may either join the Chinese Soviet state or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer," the Constitution of 1954 denies the right of secession. It says in clear and definite words: "National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China." (Article 3). Before further analysis can be made, some essential data help reveal the Communists' policy in practice toward the minorities in the Northwest.

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B. Class Barriers vs. Nationality Barriers

563 423 431 565 668 1) "Comrade Editor:

In November, 1952, when the six 'land-reform experimenting hsiang' in the 5th district of Sui-ting County were 'distributing the

563 fruit of struggle' there were more landlords and more fruits in the
423 1st hsiang than the 6th hsiang where both the landlords and fruits
431 were few. The laboring people of the 1st hsiang passed to the
565 peasants of the 6th hsiang fruits valued to 400 buckets (hu) of wheat
668 and 3,000 mou (about 500 acres) of rice paddies for distribution.
The peasants of the 6th hsiang were deeply moved and wept. The 6th hsiang originally was a Kazakh area. When the Russians, Chinese Uighurs, Mongols of the 1st hsiang...drove carts loaded with fruits to the hsiang, the Kazakh fellow-citizens were so happy that they jumped up and down and ran to the side of the carts. They hugged the Russians and kissed them. They stuck out their thumbs before the Chinese (a gesture of approval) and yelled 'A-k'ang' (i.e. elder brother). They danced with the Uighurs and the Mongols.

At the same time, when the 6th hsiang classified the people, they found that there were 2 Chinese landlords, 1 Uighur landlord and 4 Kazakh landlords. People suddenly realized that the ones
[186] who had suppressed the people were these landlords, not the landlords of one particular nationality, and certainly not any nationality as a whole..." (Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 24, 1953).

668 This is an excellent example of the way the Communists carry
565 the class struggle across nationality lines. They substitute class
186 hatred for national hatred.

2) "The second stage of land reform in Shu-le County, Sinkiang,
668 involved 20 hsiang and lasted 78 days from December 12, 1952, to
423 March 3, 1953.... In these 20 hsiang (during the land reform) we have developed 859 'positive elements,' an average of more than forty people in each hsiang. This laid the foundation for further works....

"Before the confiscation, we called in the rich farmers, the small land lessors and religious leaders for discussion meetings. In these meetings we explained the policy of preserving 'rich farmer economy' and 'freedom of religious belief.' In execution, we definitely carried out the government's policy toward the mosques. Besides leaving strictly alone the land originally owned by the mosques, through consultation between the mosques and the farmers associations, we left a reasonable amount of land to the mosques which had lost their land through confiscation. In the bazaar, we called meetings of businessmen. There we propagated one step forward the policy of protecting business. Throughout the confiscation we did not touch business owned by the landlords.

"We strengthened the work of the United Front. Through the upper level, the religious leaders and people with high prestige and influence among the local mass, we promoted the propaganda of our policy. Hence we avoided the fear psychology which had spread among the landlords to a certain extent. During the confiscation, we firmly carried out the policy of discrimination. We carried out struggled against landlords who stubbornly resisted, 668 423 but gave a certain degree of good care to the liberal-minded landlords during the procedure of confiscation. To those obedient landlords we only carried out confiscation but not the struggle. Besides land, other properties were left to them for a while before actual confiscation. Thus we isolated the stubborn landlords, reduced the resistance and increased help. Under the threat of the peasants, the majority of the landlords expressed willingness to be obedient.

"But there were still defects and mistakes...(1) We were not able to build up the poor farmers and hired hands to be the nucleus of the movement as we had planned...(On the contrary), it was the middle farmers who led the poor farmers, and the poor farmers who led the hired hands...(2) Some farmers...gave sympathy to the landlords during the confiscation and dared not accept the land in distribution...(3) During the distribution, there was illustrated a serious domination of the party cadres over the farmers...." (Yang Tseng-wen, "Victoriously concluded the work of the second stage of land reform in Shu-le County" in Sinkiang Jih-pao, 1953, April 3.)

Some basic facts in this statement can be summarized as follows:

(1) Natives were used to fight against the natives.

(2) Native workers were selected and built up through various devices.

(3) Enemy groups were divided and isolated by discriminating treatment.

(4) Only a few of the most stubborn enemies were selected as targets at one time. Thus most of the people were kept hopeful and cooperative.

(5) Religious groups and the local leaders with great influence among the minorities were handled with care.

668 563 The policy of controlling the minority groups through minority cadres is further shown in the following report: "In the whole special district...of Ili, there originally were 3243 cadres at the hsiang, ch'ü, county and special district level. During 1952...the number increased to 4736. It was a 46.3% increase over that of 1951.... During the past one year,...more than 30,000 common workers and farmers became 'positive elements' who executed the policy and orders of the Communist Party and the People's Government....

"During the past year, 90% of the cadres of the special district received education and drill through the struggles of the suppression of the counter-revolutionists movement, the American Aid-Korea movement, the reduce-rent and anti-despot movement, the land reform movement, the 3-anti and 5-anti movement...and joined the Communist Party and Youth Corps. Some of them became leading workers. According to the incomplete statistics, in the whole special district there were 274 persons promoted from 'positive elements' to become new cadres; 88 persons promoted from cadres to leading

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668 cadres; (among these 17 were at the level of county head, 2 were
563 at the level of division head in the special district, 46 were at the
level of division head in the county, 23 were at the level of ch'ü head); 22 persons promoted from servants to be cadres; with a grand total of 384 promotions. Among these, 93% belonged to the minority groups and 7% were Chinese. 84% of those being promoted from 'positive elements' were selected from the workers and farmers." (A report from Ili in Sinkiang jih-pao, January 18, 1953. Cf. Chao Hua-Sheng: "A report on Party construction in the 1st hsiang of Aya ch'ü in Hami Qumul County" in Sinkiang jih-pao, January 24, 1953.)

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With this control of the minority groups from inside, the Com-
*668 munists claim to be promoting the minority autonomy and inter-
*563 nationality harmony with unprecedented success. The following
S are some of the reports: 1) "A report on the life of the Tibetan
[668] minority in the Northwest, 'Improvement of the political, economic
[563] and cultural life of the Tibetans in China during the past year,'
given by Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o, Tibetan Vice-chairman of the Chinghai Provincial Government, appeared recently in the Sian Ch'ün-chung jih pao and was released by NCNA from Peking on November 2, 1950, stating:

'In political life, Tibetans now participate in the work of the people's government on all levels and spheres. They take part in local, and national conferences, where they study the work of the government, discuss and adopt government decisions and enjoy the right to vote and to be elected. They also visit other parts of the country to study conditions and exchange experiences. Like all other fraternal nationalities, they have become masters in name and in reality. Any dispute arising among nationalities is solved by ways of arbitration and discussion on the principle of equality, through which they have realized the importance of unity among various nationalities!'"

2) "In the past three years, the people's governments at all levels in the Northwest region have correctly and definitely implemented the nationalities policy, carried out nationalities work, and made great achievements. More than 3000 cases of internationality conflicts were mediated, of which some had not been solved in the past decades or in hundreds of years. Nationality democratic coalition governments have been established in various places. 11 autonomous areas, equivalent to first grade district and counties have been established. Besides, the Yu-shu autonomous area, equivalent to a first grade special district with a dense population of Tibetans, has been established in Chinghai province. About 30,000 cadres of the national minorities have been trained throughout the region to take part in political work, and some of them have become the backbone of the local political work." (NCNA, Sian, May 12, 1952.)

N *668 *563 The success, however, is not so complete as it is indicated in these reports. While there are minority groups which cooperate with the Communists, others do not. A good example is Hsiang Ch'ien, a Tibetan chief in Chinghai, who fought against the Communists from the beginning of the Communists' rule till he exhausted his supplies. For more than two years, the Communists wooed him to no avail. In 1952, he suffered big losses, and even his family was captured by the Communists. The Communists mobilized numerous local leaders to talk terms with him and finally brought him to surrender. This case was publicized because it had a "happy ending" for the Communists. It nevertheless indicates that not all goes as well in the Northwest as the Communists might like.

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D. Minority Languages

Besides these general practices of the Communist minority policy, a special point of interest is the promise in article 3 of the Communist constitution: "All the nationalities have freedom to use and foster the growth of their spoken and written languages." In fact, the Communists even intended to create new written languages for those nationalities who had not had a written language of their own. (A resolution at the 217th meeting of the Government Administration Council on May 20, 1954, in K'e-hsüeh t'ung-pao, 1954, July issue p. 24). After consultation with experts a compromise was reached in 1954. It was decided to try one or two new written languages first. After reviewing the whole situation, Lo Ch'ang-p'ei, head of the Institute of Linguistics of China Science Academy, drew this conclusion: "Not only may the minority groups learn written and spoken Chinese before their own written language is created, but even after they have a written language, it is still necessary for them to learn Chinese." (Lo Ch'ang-p'ei, "Following the direction of the Government Administration Council to help the various nationalities without language to create their own," in K'e-hsüeh t'ung-pao, July, 1954, pp. 24-26.)

The language policy is apparently two-fold. On the one hand, the minority groups may retain their own languages; on the other hand, they are encouraged, it not required, to learn the Chinese language. This second policy has to be seen in the light of the drive to promote the national language and to eliminate all local dialects. Judging by the trend in the Soviet Union, the minority groups at least will be required to learn and to use the Chinese language, regardless of the fate of their own.

S 668 563 19 A team to investigate the minority languages in Sinkiang was organized and sent to the field by the Institute of Linguistics of the China Science Academy. They stayed in Sinkiang for over fifty days recording and collecting material concerning the local

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668 languages. This seems to be part of the effort toward the creation
563 of the new written languages.
19 So far the only new written language on record in the Northwest
S is the language used in Kozelesu Khalkha Kirghiz Autonomous Chou
19 in Sinkiang. This Kirghiz group had had a written language before,
212 but it used now an Arabic alphabet. The Government adopted for
the group, the Soviet Kirghiz script and created a new 3--letter
alphabet. (Kuang-ming jih-pao, April 11, 1955.)

N As the situation stands in 1956, the written languages,other
S than Chinese, used in the Northwest are Uighur, Kazakh, Manchu,
19
212 Mongolian, Tibetan, and Kirghiz.

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STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

000 I. The Government of Administrative Regions

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- B. Organizational Regulations
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        - b. expiration
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        - a. composition
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3. Kansu Provincial People's Government
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10. Autonomous Administrative Units at or above the County Level

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Sinkiang AII


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II. Autonomous Hsien
1. Ho-pu-k'o-sai-erh Mongol (Hobuksair Mongol)
2. Ch'a-pu-ch'a-erh Sibo (Chapchal Sibo)
3. Mu-lei Kazakh
4. Pa-li-k'un Kazakh (Barkul Kazakh)
5. Yen-ch'i Moslem
6. T'a-shih-k'u-erh Tajik (Tash Qurghan Tajik)
7. T'ien-chun Tibetan
8. Tu-lan Mongol
9. Men-yuan Moslem
10. Hu-chu T'u
11. Hua-lung Moslem
12. Hsun-hua Salar
13. Ho-nan Mongol
14. A-k'o-sai Kazakh
15. Su-pei Mongol
16. Su-nan Yu-ku
17. O-chi-na Banner Mongol (Edsingol Banner Mongol)
18. T'ien-chu Tibetan
19. Tung-hsiang Moslem
20. Kuang-t'ung Moslem
21. Cho-ni (Choni Tibetan)
22. Chin-yuan Moslem
23. Chang-chia-ch'uan Moslem
I. Autonomous Chou
A. Ili Kazakh
B. Po-erh-t'a-la Mongol (Boratala Mongol)
C. Ch'ang-chi Moslem
D. Pa-yin-kuo-leng Moslem (Bayankhon Mongol ?)
E. K'o-tzu-le-su Kirghiz (Qizil Su Kolkos)
F. Hai-hsi Mongol, Tibetan, Kazakh
G. Hai-pei Tibetan
H. Hai-nan Tibetan
I. Huang-nan Tibetan
J. Yu-shu Tibetan (Yu-shu Tibetan)
K. Kuo-lo Tibetan
L. Mongol
M. Ho-tung Moslem
N. Hsi-hai-ku Moslem (Hsi-hai-ku Moslem)
O. Kan-nan Tibetan
CHINA
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SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION
CH'INGHAI
SHENSI
NORTHWESTERN CHINA AUTONOMOUS UNITS
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STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

I. The Government of Administrative Regions

*175 A. Basis of Regions
*668 The turning point of the Chinese Communists' military cam-
paign in northwest China was on April 22, 1948, when they retook
669 Yenan. With the deteriorating general military situation, the
Nationalists rapidly lost the Northwest. In December, 1949, the
Communist conquest of the area was basically complete. Just as
in other areas, the army was their main strength, essential in
maintaining peace and order. Thus the local political structures
which they set up were closely knit to the military forces, an in-
heritance from the civil war. Recognizing this fact, the central
*175 government of the People's Republic decided to divide the nation
*668 into several large regions, roughly corresponding to the assigned
631 areas of each field army. It appointed the commanders of the
various field armies to manage the civil administrations of the
corresponding regions. The Northwest Region included the muni-
cipality of Sian, directly under the central authority, and five
provinces: Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai, and Sinkiang.

*175 B. Organizational Regulations
*668 1. Military and administrative council
On December 16, 1949, the Government Administrative
631 Council passed the organizational regulations of the People's Gov-
701 ernment Committee on Administrative Regions. According to
these regulations, a Military and Administrative Committee was
to be appointed by the Central Government in each administrative
region to maintain peace and order during the first stage of the
Communist conquest.

a. composition

P'eng Te-huai, the commander of the First Field Army, was appointed Chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, which had two vice-chairmen and forty-one members. The chairman and vice-chairmen were Chinese, and the members included four Moslems, two Uighurs, one Tibetan, one Mongol, and thirty-three Chinese. One of the Chinese was a woman.

b. expiation

In the regulations it was also stated that the Military and Administrative Councils were to be abolished as soon as the following conditions were fulfilled:

(1) when the military action was over;
(2) when land reform was completed;
(3) when the people of each region were well organized and a gen-
[666] eral election had been called. Then the People's Congresses of
each administration region, elected by popular vote, were to elect

*175
*668 a People's Government Council of the administrative region to take
631 the place of the Military and Administrative Council.

801 2. Northwest administrative council

[666) a. composition

Apparently this anticipated election never took place in Northwest China under the Northwest Military and Administrative Council. Since November 15, 1952, when the Central People's Government ordered the reorganization of the Council into the Northwest Administrative Council, it has been known as the Northwest People's Government Council.

*175 b. functions

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631 Article 3 of the same regulations indicated that the People's Government Council of the administrative region (the Military and Administrative Council) was to be a part of the regular local government system, ranking between the Central Government and the provinces. It represented the Government Administration Council in guiding the provincial and county governments in administrative work.

This was well defined in Article 4, which gave the detailed functions of the Council. The Council was to be the organ for transferring the orders of the central government to the provincial and other lower local governments. It made suggestions to the central government concerning personnel, law, and financial arrangements for the region. It also coordinated and supervised administrative work for the central government.

These regulations indicated that the Communist Government meant to make the administrative regions and their administrative structures a part of their regular, permanent government system. This was quite a change from the former system, which emphasized the position of the provinces.

c. structure

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647 After the Communists organized the Military and Administrative Councils of the administrative regions into offices with real power, their structure became large, and even bulky. In 1952, at the peak of its power, the Northwest Military and Administrative Council included the following offices;

Administrative Office;
Committee on Political and Legal Affairs;
Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs;
Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs;
Committee on People's Control
Committee on Land Reform;
Commission of Nationalities Affairs;
Department of Personnel;
Department of Civil Administration;
Department of Public Safety;
Department of Justice;

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TABLE I

THE STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL OF NW MAC IN 1952



CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT COUNCIL

GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION COUNCIL

NORTHWEST MILITARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL
Chairman: P'eng Te-huai Vice-chairmen: Hsi Chung-hsün, Chang Chih-chung
Members: 48 (47 men and 1 woman; 1 Mongol, 4 Moslems, 2 Tibetans, 2 Uighurs, 38 Chinese, 1 unidentified)
Secretary-general: Ch'ang Li-fu Deputy secretary-general: T'an Wei-hsü

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
Director: (Not appointed at that time)
Deputy directors: Ch'en Pi-chia, Chi Teh-li

COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL AND LEGAL AFFAIRS
Director: Chang Chih-chung
Deputy directors: Wang Tzu-i, Yang Tzu-lien
Members: 29 (28 men and 1 woman)
Secretary-general: Ch'ang Li-fu
Deputy secretary-general: T'an Wei-hsü

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
Director: P'eng Te-huai
Deputy directors: Chia T'o-fu, Pai Ju-ping
Members: 37 (but only 36 appointed)
Secretary-general: Ti Chung-hsiang
Deputy secretary-general: Hao Shih-i[1]

COMMITTEE ON CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS
Director: Yang Ming-hsüan
Deputy directors: Chang Chia-fu, K'o Chung-ping
Members: 38 (37 men and 1 woman)
Secretary-general: Wu Wen-ling
Deputy secretary-generals: A Ma, Wang Chih-jen
Director of Administrative Office: Wang Chih-jen

COMMITTEE ON PEOPLE'S CONTROL
Director: Ma Wen-jui
Deputy directors: Yang Sheng-chih, Shih Tzu-chung
Members: 12 (11 men and 1 woman)
Secretary-general: T'an Sheng-pin

COMMITTEE ON LAND REFORM
Director: Hsi Chung-hsün
Deputy director: Han Chao-o
Members: 23 (22 men and 1 woman)
Secretary-general: Huang Chih
Deputy secretary-general: Hsieh Ho-ting

COMMISSION ON NATIONALITIES AFFAIRS
Chairman: Wang Feng
Vice-chairmen: Saifudin, Ma Hung-pin, Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o, Ta-li-cha-ya
Members: 44 (43 men and 1 woman)

DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL
Director: Wang Tzu-i
Deputy directors: Li Ching-ying, Meng Ting-chih

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
Director: Wang Tzu-i
Deputy directors: Jen Ch'ien, Wu Chih-yüan

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Director: Kan Sen-ch'i
Deputy Directors: Li Ch'i-ming, Su Ming-te

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Director: Yang Tzu-lien
Deputy director: Ho Lien-ch'eng

DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
Director: Pai Ju-ping
Deputy directors: Lu Yung-ju, Ma Nan-feng

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE
Director: Yü Chieh
Deputy directors: Shih Wei-jen, Tung Lan-chu

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY
Director: Wang Ta-ch'eng
Deputy directors: Ma Fu-ch'ang, Wu Sheng-hsin, Fu Tso-chen

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION
Director: Ho Wei-te
Deputy directors: Liu Liang-chang, Tseng Chen-wu

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
Director: Hsu Ching-ch'uan
Deputy directors: Pai Hai-feng, Ts'ui Tzu-wen

DEPARTMENT OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
Director: Ho Tsu-lo
Deputy directors: Chang Cheng, Sheng T'ung-sheng, Huang Cheng-ch'ing

DEPARTMENT OF WATER CONSERVANCY
Director: Li Fu-tu
Deputy director: Tung Chung-wen

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Director: Chao Po-p'ing
Deputy director: Chao Chen-t'ung

DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE
Director: Ch'eng Po-jen
Deputy directors: Wu Wen-lin, Ma Chien-ling, Ching Chi-ch'uan

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Director: Chang Ling-chi
Deputy directors: Liu Ti-cheng, Tung Ch'ing-fan

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Director: Ho Piao
Deputy directors: Tseng Yu-cheng, Chang Ch'e-li, Ch'e Ching, Shih Ho-lan

PRESS BUREAU
(Abolished in July, 1952)
Director: Ch'in Ch'uan
Deputy directors: Yu Chi-wei, Liu Ling

BUREAU OF PUBLICATIONS
Director: Wang Shih-p'ing
Deputy directors: Chang Sheng-ch'u, T'ao Hsin-yen, Ch'eng Tao-sheng

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*175 Department of Finance;
*668 Department of Trade;
631 Department of Industry;
647 Department of Communications;
Department of Agriculture and Forestry;
Department of Animal Husbandry;
Department of Water Conservancy;
Department of Labor;
Department of Cultural Affairs;
Department of Education;
Department of Public Health;
Press Bureau (abolished in July, 1952);
Bureau of Publications

d. drawbacks

With the gradual consolidation of the central government, the all-powerful Military and Administrative Council of the administrative regions became less and less desirable, and the traditional conflict between the central and the regional forces became more and more significant. This situation reached a climax on November 15, 1952, when the Central People's Government Council passed a resolution to change the structure and the function of the Military and Administrative Councils. It was stated that the change was necessary for strengthening the leadership of the Central People's Government in its new responsibilities of nation-wide economic and cultural reconstruction. The power of the provincial and municipal governments was to be strengthened, while that of the Military and Administrative Councils of the administrative regions was to be curtailed. At that time these decisions were made:

C. Reorganization

(1) to organize all the People's Government Councils (or the Military and Administrative Councils) of the administrative regions into Administrative Councils. Each council was to function as an agent representing the central People's Government to guide and check the local governments.

(2) to preserve the Administrative Office and the four committees on Political and Legal Affairs, Financial and Economic Affairs, Cultural and Educational Affairs, and People's Control under the People's Government Councils (or the Military and Administrative Councils) of the administrative regions.

(3) to reduce the original departments to bureaus and offices. Some of these new bureaus and offices were to be put under the direct control of the related ministries of the central People's Government.

This reorganization was to be accomplished before the end of 1952, but the actual reorganization of the Northwest Military and

*175 Administrative Council was not completed until January 27, 1953.
*668 P'eng Te-huai was released from his post as chairman of the
631 Northwest Military and Administrative Council with a new assign-
647 ment to command the Chinese Volunteer Corps in Korea, with the
title of vice-premier of the Government Administration Council.

After this, the final step in abolishing the whole system of the administrative regions and their administrative bodies became almost insignificant. By a resolution in the thirty-second meeting of the central People's Government Council, formal abolition was achieved on June 19, 1954.

II. The Provincial and Other Lower Level Governments

*175 A. Relationship to Regional Government

*668 The provincial governments traditionally have been important
635 links in the Chinese governmental system. During the decades prior to the Communist victory, when the regional power groups had become extremely influential, this fact was even more true. After the Communists took over, however, the power of the provincial government was temporarily weakened by the establishment of the administrative regions. When the Government Administration Council passed the Organizational Regulations of the Provincial People's Governments on January 6, 1950, the provincial governments were reduced almost to instruments of the Military and Administrative Councils of the administrative regions. The first article of these regulations mentioned that the people of a province would execute their political power through the provincial people's congress. The second article promised that the provincial government, including the governor, would be elected by the provincial people's congress. However, the second section of Article 2, had most significance. It stated:

"In the first stage of liberation, for the sake of a speedy establishment of a revolutionary order, the provincial People's Government Council should be nominated by the government Administration Council, subject to the approval and appointment of the Central People's Government Council; or by the People's Government Council of the administrative region... subject to the approval and appointment of the Central People's Government Council."

The appointed term of the provincial People's Government Council was two years. But through reappointments, the same provincial People's Government Council could be continued indefinitely.

1. authority

In the same regulations, the provincial People's Government Councils were given authority similar to that of the Military and Administrative Council of the administrative regions. For instance;

*175 they were to forward orders from above to the lower level govern-
*668 ments; to make decisions or suggestions concerning the personnel,
635 laws, and financial arrangements of the province; and to coordinate and supervise work in the area. There were, however, some new points. They were required "to execute the decisions of the provincial people's congresses."

a. limitations on authority

The significance of this requirement was lessened by the qualification: "provided that these decisions have been approved by the Government Administrative Council or the Military and Administrative Council of the administrative regions." Thus, nothing could be done on the provincial level that was not acceptable to the officials of higher levels. Second, the provincial councils were to
[632] "annul or revise the decisions and orders of the municipal and
[634] county people's government councils, or the municipal and county people's congresses under its jurisdiction, whenever these decisions and orders are contradictory to those of the higher level people's government." The higher government officials could over-ride the local interests.

b. increased authority

Under this system, the provincial governments of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai, and Sinkiang actually were branch offices of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, until the power of the latter was weakened in 1952. With the abolition of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council in June, 1954, the traditional importance and position of the provincial governments was fully restored. However, primarily they still are instruments of the central government.

B. People's Congress and People's Councils

631 The day after the First National People's Congress passed the
*668 new Chinese Communist Constitution, on September 21, 1954, the same congress passed the organic law for local governments.
[671] Taken at face value, this law gives more power to the local governments as well as to the people. From the town level up to the province, each is supposed to have a people's congress and a people's council, the congress representing the people, and the council acting as the executive body. Their position and interrelation can be seen in the following excerpts from the law:

1. Role of peoples' congress

Local people's congresses at all levels are the organs of government authority in their respective localities. (The Organic Law of People's Congresses and People's Councils at all Local levels in Chinese Peoples' Republic, p. 1, Article 3.)

a. election of deputies

[666] Deputies to the people's congresses of provinces, municipalities directly under the central authority, counties, and municipalities divided into districts are elected by the people's congresses

*668 631 666 [563] of the next lower level; deputies to the people's congresses of municipalities not divided into districts, municipal districts, hsiang, nationality hsiang, and towns are directly elected by the voters. The minority groups shall have guaranteed quotas in these congresses. Minority nationals in administrative areas shall have an appropriate number of deputies to the people's congresses of their administrative areas.

Thus, the people theoretically have political authority and the people's congresses are the organs for practicing this authority. These congresses on the lower levels are elected directly by the voters, while those on the higher levels are elected by the people's congresses of the next lowest level. For instance, the voters elect the people's congresses of the various towns. Then the People's Congresses of the towns elect deputies to the people's congresses of the counties, and so on. The provincial People's Congresses are elected for four years, while the other local congresses are elected for two years.

b. functions of congress

*668 631 671 As listed by law the functions of the people's congresses are numerous. In brief, the congresses are to defend the rights of the people and also to assure the support of the people. They approve local budgets and financial accounts; draw up plans for local economic and cultural development; elect and recall the people's councils at their own level; elect the deputies to the people's congresses at the next highest level; listen to and examine the working reports of the people's councils at their own level; and revise or annul inappropriate decisions and orders issued by these people's councils.

These functions and powers could make the local people's congresses into real "watch dogs" for the people, but for several hidden handicaps. One of these is to be found in this same Organic Law, Article 6, which states that a people's congress can "revise or annul inappropriate decisions of the people's congresses at the next lower level." In this way power is retained by the upper level.

2. Role of people's councils

*668 631 The people's councils have a dual role: they are responsible to the people's congresses at their corresponding levels, and they are responsible to the governments above their own levels. Although they are supposed to be the people's instruments of self-government, they are also agencies of the central government and must obey the State Council. Theoretically, this double responsibility could put the local governments in an embarrassing dilemma, were the local congresses to differ with the central government on policy. In practice, however, it is not possible, because of the tight party control at every level and since the representatives are hand-picked by the party.

a. composition

In addition to the council members, a local People's Council

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includes, depending on its level, the provincial governor and deputy provincial governors; the mayor and deputy mayors ; the county head and deputy county heads; the district head and deputy district heads; the hsiang head and deputy hsiang heads; or the town head and deputy town heads. The number of members in a people's council (head and deputy head included) differs according to level, as follows:

(1) Provinces and municipalities directly under the central authority, 25 to 55;

(2) Municipalities, 9 t 25; membership may increase when there is an extraordinarily large population, but in no case may exceed 45;

(3) Counties, 9 to 21; membership may increase when there is an extraordinarily large number of hsiang and towns, as well as a large population, but in no case may exceed 31;

(4) Municipal districts, 9 to 21;

(5) Hsiang, nationality hsiang, and towns, 3 to 13.

The term of office of a provincial People's council is four years. It is two years for those councils or municipalities, municipal districts, hsiang, nationality hsiang, and towns.

b. functions of councils

The functions of the people's councils at all levels are numerous. Many of them are traditional, such as collecting taxes, managing conscription, and running the administrative routine. But some are new or have been given new content, such as:

(1) Carrying out economic plans and budgets;

(2) Regulating and controlling the market and the local state enterprises, and directing the socialization of the private enterprises.

(3) Directing the production of agriculture, handicrafts, and mutual-aid cooperatives;

(4) Managing transportation, communications, and public enterprises;

(5) Managing local activities in the fields of culture, education, public health, pensions, relief, and social welfare.

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The nationalization of business and industry has burdened the local governments with much that formerly was done by private parties. Economic plans existed previously, but were limited to a few public works. Now the plans and budgets of the government cover almost every economic activity in the area. Previously, only when an occasional crisis arose did the local governments regulate or control the market. Now it is one of their regular functions. In the past, there were few, if any, local state enterprises. Now, with the program of socialization of private enterprises in full swing, the task of operating local state enterprises is tremendous. The local governments are responsible for the people from before birth until after death, and for controlling and managing almost every phase of their lives.

000 almost every phase of their lives.

*668 631 182 The functions of the people's councils, reveal the contradictory character of the Communist system of local government. The Councils are responsible for carrying out decisions of the people's congresses at their corresponding levels, but they also have to carry out all decisions and orders from higher level government organs. The people's councils are the servants of the people, but they also are entrusted with stopping the execution of inappropriate decisions of people's congresses at the next lowest level. This power is especially significant since the higher people's councils must decide what decisions are inappropriate.

c. bureaus, offices and commissions

*668 647 635 631 The Organic Law for local governments states that the provincial people's councils may establish the following bureaus, offices, or commissions according to local needs:

(1) Civil Affairs;
(2) Public Security;
(3) Justice;
(4) Supervision;
(5) Planning;
(6) Finance;
(7) Food;
(8) Industry;
(9) Commerce;
(10) Transportation and Communications;
(11) Agriculture and Forestry;
(12) Water Conservancy;
(13) Labor;
(14) Culture;
(15) Education;
(16) Public Health;
(17) Physical Culture;
(18) Administrative Office.

[563] In areas where there are minority groups, the councils may also add a Commission on Nationalities Affairs.

So far, no material is available concerning the actual structure of the northwestern provinces under the new law. However, it is known that the Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs and the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs have been abolished.

*668 647 632 631 Under the new law, the municipal people's council may establish the following bureaus, offices, or commissions:

(1) Civil Affairs;
(2) Public Safety;
(3) Justice;
(4) Supervision;
(5) Planning;

*668 (6) Finance;
647 (7) Food;
632 (8) Taxation;
631 (9) Industry;
(10) Commerce;
(11) Labor;
(12) Culture;
(13) Education;
(14) Public Health;
(15) Physical Culture;
(16) Municipal Construction;
(17) Public Utilities;
(18) Administrative Office.

In areas where there are minority groups they may also establish a Commission on Nationalities Affairs.

*668 647 634 631 The county people's councils may establish, according to need, the following divisions or bureaus:

(1) Civil Affairs;
(2) Public Security;
(3) Finance;
(4) Food;
(5) Taxation;
(6) Industry and Commerce;
(7) Agriculture and Forestry;
(8) Transportation and Communications;
(9) Culture and Education;
(10) Public Health;
(11) Administrative Office.

The people's councils of the hsiang, nationality hsiang, and towns may establish, according to need, the following working committees:

(1) Civil Affairs
(2) Public Security;
(3) Armed Forces;
(4) Production and Cooperation;
(5) Finance and Taxation;
(6) Culture and Education;
(7) Mediation.

Members of the local people's congresses and other suitable individuals are encouraged to serve on these working committees.

*668 635

D. Comparison with Nationalist Organization

If this system is compared with the system of local governments under the Nationalists, the following differences can be noted:

(1) The Nationalists adopted the council system only at the provincial level.

(2) Under the Nationalists, the heads of the provincial bureaus and

N *668 635 offices were usually members of the Provincial Council. The people in the Council also ran the administrative organs; under the Communists, however, most of the members of the People's Councils have no part in the bureaus and offices where real power lies.

(3) Under the Nationalists, the chairman of the Provincial Council had effective control. Under the Communists the chairman of the provincial People's Government in the past, or the governor of the provincial People's Council at present, may or may not have control. For instance, the chairman of Kansu in 1950, Tent Pao-san, was merely a figurehead, and the newly-elected governor of Shensi, Chao Shou-shan, looks like another. But Ma Ming-fan, chairman of Shensi in 1950, definitely held power. In brief, the influence and power of a local official under the Communists does not depend on his official position in the government, but on his relations with the party. Ma Ming-fang was important because he was also the Deputy Secretary-General of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party.

(4) Under the Nationalists, when a minority leader such as Ma Hung-k'uei was appointed provincial chairman in the Northwest, he had authority in fact as well as in name. The Communists publicize the northwest local government members who belong to minority groups, but in practice what matters is the assignment given to the member by the Party. If a trusted party member - be he Chinese or Muslim - is assigned to run the office he is the actual head, even if he has a low rank. However, he is only a wheel in the party machinery, and has very little freedom to act on his own.

N [631] (5) Under the Communists, the local governments at every level are much larger and more powerful than under the Nationalists. See Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 for the structure and personnel of the provincial governments in Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, and Sinkiang in 1950, and Table 6 for the relationships between local governments in the present stage.

N *668 635 S 668 635 The specific structure of each provincial government in Northwest China and of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, as of 1955, is not yet available. Except for the abolition of the Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs and the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, one may assume that the present structure of these provinces and of the Sinkiang Uughur Autonomous Region are approximately the same as in 1950.

N *668 633 Sian was a municipality directly under the central government authority from late in 1949 until 1954. The people's government of the city had thirteen different bureaus and offices, and the area was divided into twelve districts. In 1950, the mayor was Chia T'o-fu and the deputy mayors were Fang Chung-ju and Chang Feng-po. In 1952 the mayor was Fang, with Chang Feng-po and

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TABLE II

SHENSI PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
Chairman: Ma Ming-fang
Vice-chairman: Chang Pang-ying
Chang Feng-hui
Han Chao-o
Members: 35 (1 Moslem, 34 Chinese)
Secretary-general: Shih I-chih
Deputy secretary-generals: Li Tsu-chien
Ch'i Kuo

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
Director: Ma Ming-fang
Deputy director: Yang Yü-t'ing
Members: 13

COMMITTEE ON PEOPLE'S CONTROL
Director: Han Chao-o
Deputy director: Li Ho-pang
Ts'ui T'ien-fu
Liu Ming-tsai
Members: 12

BUREAU OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
Commissioner: Yang Po-lun
Vice-commissioner: Lü Hsiang-ch'en

BUREAU OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Commissioner: Chang Pang-ying
Vice-commissioners: Liu Tsu-i
Chia Huai-kuang

BUREAU OF FINANCE
Commissioner: Yang Yü-t'ing
Vice-commissioners: Feng Shao-hsü
Kuo Ai-cheng

BUREAU OF INDUSTRY
Commissioner: Chang I-ch'eng
Vice-commissioner: Wang Fu-ch'u

BUREAU OF COMMERCE
Commissioner: Li Wei-hsin
Vice-commissioner: Ch'en K'ai

BUREAU OF COMMUNICATION
Commissioner: Huang Tsu-ch'iang

BUREAU OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTY
Commissioner: Hsieh Huai-te
Vice-commissioner: Su Tsü-sheng

BUREAU OF LABOR
Commissioner: Chang Yü-ming

BUREAU OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION
Commissioner: Ching Yen-cheng
Vice-commissioners: Lu Ch'ieng-liang
Feng I-hang

BUREAU OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Commissioner: Ch'en Ch'un-ping
Vice-commissioners: Wang Chi-t'ao
Wei Ming-chung

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TABLE III



KANSU PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
Chairman: Teng Pao-shan
Vice-chairmen: Wang Shih-t'ai
Chang Te-sheng
Ma Hung-ping (Moslem)
Members: 25 (5 Moslems, 2 Tibetans, 18 Chinese)
Secretary-general: Ch'en Ch'eng-i
Vice-secretary-generals: Hsieh Ch'eng
Sheng Ch'iu-wo

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
Director: Wang Shih-t'ai
Members: 9

COMMITTEE ON PEOPLE'S CONTROL
Director: 'Sun Cho-ping
Members: 13 (12 men and 1 woman)

BUREAU ON CIVIL AFFAIRS
Commissioner: Li P'ei-fu
Vice-commissioners: Wei Tsŭ-yu
Hsien Wei-ch'ün

BUREAU ON PUBLIC SAFETY
Commissioner: Li P'u-shan
Vice-commissioner: Liu Lan-t'ing

COMMISSION ON NATIONALITIES AFFAIRS
Chairman: Ma Hung-ping
Vice-chairmen: Fan Ming,
Ma Ch'ing-nien
Members: 18

BUREAU OF FINANCE
Commissioner: Huang Ching-po
Vice-commissioner: Ma Nan-feng

BUREAU OF INDUSTRY
Commissioner: Yang I-mu
Vice-commissioner: T'ien P'ei-ming

BUREAU OF COMMERCE
Commissioner: Yü Chien-hsin
Vice-commissioner: Shih Ting-hsin

BUREAU OF COMMUNICATION
Commissioner: Yang Tsŭ-heng
Vice-commissioner: Li Cheng-h'ua

BUREAU OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
Commissioner: Hsieh Lan-ping
Vice-commissioners: Huang Cheng-ch'ing
Lu Wei-kung
Ma P'ei-lieh

BUREAU OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE
Commissioner: Hsin An-t'ing
Vice-commissioner: Ma Chi-ch'uan
Liu Hai-sheng

BUREAU OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Commissioner: Liu Yün-chung

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TABLE IV



CHINGHAI PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
Chairman: Chao Shou-shan
Vice-chairmen: Chang Chung-liang
Liao Han-sheng
Hei-jao-chia-ts'o (Tibetan)
Ma P'u (Moslem)
Members: 17 (3 Tibetans, 1 Mongol, 2 Moslems, 11 Chinese)
Secretary-general: Chang Kuo-sheng
Vice-secretary-general: Ma Lo-t'ien Tsa-hsi

COMMITTEE ON CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS
Director: Hei-jao-chia-ts'o
Deputy director: Sun Chün-i

COMMITTEE ON PEOPLE'S CONTROL
Director: Liao Han-sheng
Deputy director: Wang En-hui

BUREAU OF CIVIL AFFAIRS
Commissioner: Ch'en Ssŭ-hung

BUREAU OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Commissioner: Hsieh K'e-ming
Vice-commissioner: Li Kuang

COMMISSION ON NATIONALITIES AFFAIRS
Chairman: Ma P'u
Vice-chairmen: Tsa-hsi Chou Jen-shan

BUREAU OF FINANCE
Commissioner: Chao Ch'üan-pi
Vice-commissioner: Hsia Lung-yao

BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE
Commissioner: Fu Tsu-ho
Vice-commissioner: Hsieh Hung-hu

BUREAU OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
Commissioner: Chao Ching-feng

BUREAU OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION
Commissioner: Wang Chih-yün
Vice-commissioner: Wei Fu-tzu

OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Director: Huang Chia-lung
Deputy-directors: Liang Ch'ang-han
Ch'u T'ien-jen

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
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TABLE V



SINKIANG PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
Chairman: Burhan (Uighur)
Vice-Chairmen: Kao Chin-ch'un
Saifudin (Uighur)
Members: 30 (only 28 appointed: 12 Chinese, 7 Uighurs, 2 Kazakhs, 1 Uzbek, 1 Tatar, 1 Moslem, 1 Kirghiz, 3 unidentified
Secretary-general: Liu Meng-ch'un
Vice-secretary-general: A-pu-tu-la-tan-k'e-erh
Ni Tien-te

BUREAU OF CIVIL AFFAIRS
Commissioner: A-pu-tu-je-ho-man-mu-lan-t'i
Vice-commissioner: Kao Wen-t'ien

BUREAU OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Commissioner: A-pu-lieh-tzu
Vice-commissioners: Liu Hu-p'ing
Shu Chih-t'ung

COMMISSION ON NATIONALITIES AFFAIRS
Chairman: Saifudin
Members: 19 (18 men and 1 woman)

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
Director: Wang Cheng
Deputy director: Hsin Lan-t'ing
Members: 13

OFFICE OF PLANNING
Director: P'u-la-t'e

BUREAU OF FINANCE
Commissioner: Hsin Lan-t'ing
Vice-commissioner: Hu Sai-ying

BUREAU OF COMMERCE
Commissioner: Kao Chin-ch'un
Vice-commissioner: Liu Tzu-mou

BUREAU OF COMMUNICATION
Commissioner: Mai-pa-su-a-t'i-lung
2nd commissioner: Mai-mai-ti-ai-sha
Vice-commissioner: Ma-chi-t'i

BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND MINING
Commissioner: K'a-yu-mu-po-k'e-ho-chia
Vice-commissioner: K'o-ma-li-ting

BUREAU OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY
Commissioner: T'u Chih
Vice-commissioner: Sou-wu-yi-le

BUREAU OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
Commissioner: Ta-hsia-p'u
Vice-commissioner: Ai-ni-wa-erh

BANK
President: Chang Ting-fan

TRADING COMPANY
Manager: Liu Tzu-mo
Vice-managers: Che K'o
Wang P'u
Ko-ma-li-ting

COMMITTEE ON CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS
Director: Teng Li-ch'un
Deputy directors: I-pu-la-yin
Ai-ni-wa-erh-pa-pa
Yü Wen

BUREAU OF EDUCATION
Commissioner: Ai-ni-wa-erh-pa-pa
Vice-commissioner: Ma Wen

BUREAU OF WATER CONSERVANCY
Commissioner: A-ji-mu-chiang
Vice-commissioner: Wang Ho-t'ing

OFFICE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Head: Ya-ho-p'u-po-k'e
Deputy head: P ... Shih-cheng

SINKIANG PROVINCE PEOPLE'S COURT
President: Burhan
Vice-president: T'e-fa

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TABLE VI

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM UNDER THE COMMUNISTS AFTER SEPTEMBER 21, 1954.


LEVELS:
THE STATE COUNCIL
The National People's Congress
The Nation
THE PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S COUNCIL
Governor
Deputy governors
Members
The Provincial People's Congress
Provinces, including:
Municipalities directly controlled by the central government
Autonomous areas
Administrative districts, including:
Autonomous chou
THE COUNTY OR MUNICIPAL PEOPLE'S COUNCIL
County head
Deputy County heads
Members
The County or Municipal People's Congress
Counties, including:
Municipalities
Autonomous hsien
Municipal People's Congress
THE HSIANG PEOPLE'S COUNCIL
Hsiang head
Hsiang deputy heads
Members
The Hsiang People's Congress
Hsiang, including:
Towns
Nationality hsiang
Districts under municipalities
Voters
The people
The Line of Election
The Line of Control

N
*668 Ch'en Shih-yü deputy mayors. All were appointed by the central
[633] People's Government. After the abolition of the administrative
region in 1954, the Communist Government made these major
N changes in Northwest China:
[633] (1) Sian was changed from a municipality under central authority
N to a municipality under the authority of Shensi province.
[635] (2) Ninghsia was made part of Kansu on September 27, 1954.
S (3) Sinkiang province was made the Sinkiang Uighur autonomous
[668] region on October 1, 1955.
[635] Thus, in 1955 the administrative units of Northwest China were
N
*668 quite different from those of 1950. The units under Shensi, Kansu,
631 and Chinghai are summarized in Table 7. The units under Sinkiang
S in early 1955 are shown in Table 8, while those after October 1,
668
631 1955, are shown in Table 9.
N After the promulgation of the Chinese Communist constitution
*668 in 1954, elections were held and People's Congresses and People's
631 Councils were organized. There were some personnel changes,
666 but the general structure and control of the government remained
about the same.

III. Government of the Autonomous Districts

N
*175 A. Earlier Systems
631 In the past, although the Chinese government gave little pub-
*563 licity to them, autonomous governments existed among the minori-
ties in Northwest China. As late as the 1880's, when the proposal
S
175 to transform Sinkiang into a regular province was presented to the
631 Court, it met with strong opposition on the grounds that the minor-
563 ities who differed from the Chinese in tradition, language, religion,
and customs would be difficult to govern. Before then, the minorities had been governed by their own leaders. Even after the area became a province, the life of the minorities was not greatly disturbed.

N
B. The Communist System
*668 The Communists have a definite program for changing the
*563 social and economic order. Knowing that cooperation is neces-
631 sary to attain their aims, the Communists intend to lessen the
S friction between racial groups under their regime. On the surface,
668 they grant autonomous governments to the minorities; in fact, they
563 control them from within through hand-picked Party members.
631 So far there is no evidence to show that the structure of these autonomous local governments is essentially different from that of the regular local governments. The government of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, as well as of the local governments under it, superficially is the same as under the former Sinkiang province. A complete list of all autonomous districts in Northwest China,

N
*668 with the local governmental divisions down to the county level, is
*563 shown in Table 10.
631
S
668
563
631

TABLE 7

Administration Units in Shensi, Kansu, and Chinghai

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*668

NAME	CAPITAL	ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
Shensi province	Sian	4 municipalities 4 counties under direct supervision of the provincial government 8 special districts having a total of 91 counties and 2 districts
Kansu province	Lanchow	6 municipalities 1 county under direct supervision of the provincial government 1 mining district under direct supervision of the provincial government 9 special districts 4 autonomous chou (special districts); under these and the special districts there are altogether 80 counties, 9 autonomous hsien (counties), and 1 banner
Chinghai province	Sining	1 municipality 5 counties under direct supervision of the provincial government 4 autonomous hsien (counties) 6 autonomous chou (special districts) having a total of 21 counties and 3 autonomous districts at the county level.

TABLE 8

Administrative Units in Sinkiang Province early in 1955:

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668

NAME	CAPITAL	ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
Sinkiang province	Urumchi	4 municipalities 1 branch office 10 special districts 4 autonomous chou (special districts); under these and the regular special districts, there are altogether 75 counties and 4 autonomous areas at the county level

TABLE 9

Administrative Units in Sinkiang Province since October 1, 1955:

NAME	CAPITAL	ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
Sinkiang Uighur autonomous region	Urumchi	4 municipalities 7 special districts 5 autonomous chou (special districts) with a total, under these and the regular special districts, of 74 counties and 6 autonomous hsien[1]

---

[1] The three special districts of Ili, T'a-ch'eng (Chuguchak), and Altai were combined to make the Kazakh autonomous chou of Ili. On February 5, 1955, all the self-governing special districts were renamed "autonomous chou" and the self-governing counties were renamed "autonomous hsien."

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TABLE 10
Autonomous Administrative Units at or above the County Level:

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(635)

NAME	DESCRIPTION
SINKIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION	Same as the former Sinkiang province
Kazakh autonomous chou of Ili	The three former special districts of Ili, T'a-ch'eng, and Altai (Chuguchak)
Mongol autonomous chou of Pa-yin-ko-leng (Bayankara)	Including the two counties of Ho-shuo and Ho-ching, and the Moslem autonomous hsien of Yen-ch'i
Kirghiz (Kolkoz) autonomous chou of K'e-tzu-le-su (Koslesu)	Including the three counties of A-ho-ch'i, U-ch'a, and A-t'u-shih, and the Tajik autonomous hsien of T'a-shih-k'u-erh
Moslem autonomous chou of Ch'ang-chi (Changki)	Including the three counties of Urumchi, Mi-ch'üan, and Ch'ang-chi
Mongol autonomous chou of Po-erh-t'a-la (Borotala)	Including the three counties of Wen-ch'üan, Chingho, and Po-l
Sibe (Sibo) autonomous hsien of Ch'a-pu-cha-erh (Chapchal)	In the Ili area
Mongol autonomous hsien of Ho-pu-k'e-sai-erh (Hobukozel)	In the T'a-ch'eng (Chuguchak) area
Kazakh autonomous hsien of Pa-li-k'un (Balikun)	The former county of Ch'eng-hsi
Moslem autonomous hsien of Yen-ch'i (Yenki)	The former county of Yen-ch'i
Kazakh autonomous hsien of Mu-lui	The former county of Mu-lui-ho
Tajik autonomous hsien of T'a-chih-k'u-erh (Tash Qurghan)	An area comprising the former counties of P'u-li, Wu-shih, Ying-chi-sha, and Su-fu

TABLE 10 (continued)

*668
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NAME	DESCRIPTION
CHINGHAI PROVINCE	
Tibetan Autonomous chou of Hai-pei	Including the three counties of Ch'i-lien, Hai-yen, and Kang-ch'a, and the Moslem autonomous hsien of Wei-yüan
Tibetan autonomous chou of Hai-nan	Including the five counties of Kung-ho, Hsing-hai, Kuei-te, Kuei-nan, and T'ung-te
Mongol, Tibetan, and Kajakh autonomous chou of Hai-hsi	Including the Mongol autonomous hsien of Tu-lan
Tibetan autonomous chou of Huang-nan	Including the three counties of T'ung-jen, Tse-k'u, and Chien-cha
Tibetan autonomous chou of Yü-shu	Including the 6 counties of Yü-shu, Lang-ch'ien, Ch'eng-to, Chih-to, Tsa-to, and Ch'ü-ma-lai
Tibetan autonomous chou of Kuo-lo (Kolo)	The southeastern part of Chinghai bordering Sikang and Szechuan; situated east of the Tibetan autonomous chou of Yü-shou and south of the Tibetan autonomous hsien of T'ung-te. It covers 240,000 sq. kilometers, and has a population of more than 110,000 Tibetans. It is to be divided into 4 counties, the names of which have not yet been determined
T'u autonomous hsien of	Formerly Hu-chu county
Moslem autonomous hsien of Hua-lung	Formerly Hua-lung county
Salar autonomous hsien of Hsün-hua	Formerly Hsün-hua county
Mongol autonomous hsien of Ho-nan	Formerly Ho-nan district

TABLE 10 (continued)

NAME	DESCRIPTION
*668 **CHINGHAI (continued)**	
631 634 Moslem autonomous hsien of Wei-yüan	Formerly Wei-yüan district
*563 Mongol autonomous hsien of Tu-lan	Formerly Tu-lan district
Tibetan autonomous hsien of T'ien-chü	An area west of Kokonor
KANSU PROVINCE	
Mongol autonomous chou	Including the county of Tun-k'ou and the Alashan Banner
Tibetan autonomous chou of Kan-nan	Including the two counties of Hsia-ho and Lin-t'an and the Cho-ni autonomous hsien, plus an area cut from Hsi-ku, Min, Wu-tu, and Ho-ch'uan
Moslem autonomous chou of Hsi-Hai-Ku	Including the three counties of Ku-yüan, Hsi-chi, and Hai-yüan
Moslem autonomous chou of Ho-tung	Including the four counties of Lin-wu, Chin-chi, T'ung-hsin, and Yen-ch'ih
Moslem autonomous hsien of Chin-yüan	Formerly Hua-p'ing county
Moslem autonomous hsien of Chang-chia-ch'uan	Chang-chia-ch'uan
Tung-hsiang autonomous hsien	Su-nan-pa, the eastern district of Ho-chou
Moslem autonomous hsien of Kuang-t'ung	Probably the former Ling-ting county
Tibetan autonomous hsien of T'ien-chu	Wu-shao-ling

TABLE 10 (Continued)

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NAME	DESCRIPTION
KANSU PROVINCE (continued)	
Mongol autonomous hsien of Su-pei	Formerly Su-pei administrative chü
Kazakh autonomous hsien of A-k'e-sai	Southwest of Tun-huang
Mongol autonomous hsien of O-chi-na (Edsin) Banner	Formerly Edsin Banner
Cho-ni autonomous hsien	Formerly Cho-ni administrative chü

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

000 I. Historical Background

II. United Front Work, 1: Political Leaders and Factions
  A. Top Echelon Officials
  B. Parties

III. United Front Work, 2: The Masses
  A. Mobilization of the Masses
  B. Elevation of Political Consciousness
  C. Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries

IV. United Front Work, 3: The Cadres
  A. Recruitment of Cadres
  B. Demoralization and Conflicts of the Cadres
  C. Cadres Reforms and Purges

V. Political Structure and Political Process
  A. The Northwest Military and Administrative Council and People's Governments
  B. Regional Autonomous Areas
  C. The General Election of 1953-54

VI. Further Consolidation of Communist Control
  A. Collectivization
  B. Transfer of Cadres
  C. Expansion of the Communist Party

VII. Formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
  A. Extent and Limitations of Regional Autonomy
  B. Autonomy for Sinkiang

VIII. Prospects

Tables:
  1. Concurrent Posts held by Officials in the Northwest in 1952
  2. National Minority Cadres Trained in the Northwest
  3. Chinese and Non-Chinese in Regional, Provincial, and Local Governments
  4. Organization of the Peasants in the Northwest up to December, 1953
  5. Comparison of Election Procedures
  6. Cadres Assigned to and Trained for Cooperative Work
  7. Workers and Cadres Transferred to the Northwest

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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

N
I. Historical Background

631 Political life in China's Northwest, a region which in area com-
prises one-third of China but with a population that comes to less
than six per cent of China's population, is complicated by the dis-
similitudes of the geographical components and diversity of its pop-
ulation. Joined by the narrow neck of Kansu province, it is virtually
N two widely divergent regions. Historically, the problem and basic
*[175] cause of conflict have been the attempts of the eastern or Chinese
*[563] end of the vast region to dominate the western or non-Chinese end,
[578] and the resistance and struggle for autonomy of the non-Chinese
peoples in the west against the domination of the Chinese in the east.

N
635 East of the narrow passage of Kansu is Shensi and southern
[162] Kansu, a region densely populated by Chinese, forming an integral
part of China and subject to all the political vicissitudes of China.
This region was the base of strong dynasties in the past not only for
N the conquest of China but also for the extension of power to the west.
635 The Chinese Communists, who had a nucleus in this region since
*175 1931, considerably expanded their control since 1935 when they
*668 established their Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region with head-
quarters at Yenan. From 1935 to 1947 this region was the center
of the Communist revolution, and the laboratory of Communist ex-
periments in government and in the mobilization of the people.
After 1949, when the Communists moved their capital to Peiping,
the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region became one of their
many "old liberation areas," and their base for their domination
of the Northwest. The headquarters of the Northwest Military and
Administrative Council (later the Northwest Administrative Council)
as well as the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the
CCP were located at Sian.

Westward, beyond the Kansu Corridor is Sinkiang, a huge
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635 dominion which, in accessibility and in economic ties is more
648 closely oriented to Soviet Central Asia than to China. During the
past century, the province had been the amphitheater for a three-
way tug-o'war among China, Russia and Britain, and for a time
in the 1930's, this was further complicated by the machinations
of the Japanese. The conglomeration of the inhabitants of Chinese
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635 Turkestan, three-quarters of whom are Uighurs, a Moslem Turkic
563 people, are split along racial, regional, religious, cultural and
political lines and disunited by historical and traditional antipathy,
present wide differences of interests and aspiration. Even in their
opposition to Chinese domination and in their striving for self-
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* 563 rule, which they share in common, they rarely presented a united
635 front. The history of the Northwest is thus a prolix story of at-
648 tempts of the Chinese to assert their political dominance and the

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attempts of the native peoples to throw off the Chinese yoke and to set up their own government, a story of intrigue and bloodshed, set against the backdrop of international rivalry.

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In the past thirty years, superimposed on the political and international complex of Sinkiang were the new ideas that have added fuel to the discords and discontent in Sinkiang. Generally, the more important of the new ideologies injected into the political life of Sinkiang were the following:

1. Policy of assimilation, generally denounced by its enemies as the Great Hanism (Ta-Han chu-i), in which the border peoples were regarded as descendants of an ancient Great Chinese race and should be reabsorbed into the Chinese race. This concept was pushed by the Kuomintang extremists.
2. Program of cultural diversity and cultural autonomy. This idea was pushed by men such as Sheng Shih-ts'ai and Chang Chih-chung, as an alternative to the policy of compulsory assimilation.
3. Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-Islamism, promoted by the native people, especially by the Uighurs and their Kazakh allies, stressed the fact that the majority of people of Sinkiang speak Turkic language and belong to the Moslem faith. The exponents of this concept belong to many shades of political opinion, from the moderates such as Maksud Sabri, Burkhan Shahidi, and Mehmet Emin Bughra, to the more radical faction which included Akhmejan Kasimi, Saifuddin Azizi, and the members of the Kulja coalition.
4. Territorial and cultural autonomy under the principle of federalism based on ideas derived from the Soviet policy towards the minority nationalities. This policy was actively propagandized by the Chinese Communists and served to inflame the native peoples as well as to embarrass the Nationalist authorities.

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These divergent views, in substance, were the expressions of nationalism on the part of the Chinese and on the part of the native peoples of Chinese Turkestan, especially among the educated classes. As in many other parts of the Orient, the game of politics was not a popular one. The people, downtrodden and persecuted, desired only to be left alone, and they rose in revolt only when tyranny and injustice became intolerable, and they would then follow the cue of their leaders in wholesale uprisings. In the wars of the Oirats against the Ch'ing government two hundred years ago, the leaders were the tribal chieftains; and in the rebellion of the Khojas and the Dungan rebellion in the last century, the leaders were religious prelates. But in republican times, there were few of the hereditary tribal princes or religious leaders taking a part. Instead, the leaders were drawn from the ranks of the bandits, officers in the Chinese army, or young intellectuals who had studied in China or abroad. On the part of the Chinese, the men in political life in the Northwest were either local civil and military officials, or officials sent out by the central government.

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*668 Even with the advent of the Chinese Communists, there was
554 little fundamental change in the composition of the panel of men
S in the political arena of the Northwest. The men who acquiesced
668 to the Communists and were retained in office as well as those who
554 opposed the Communists were the same men who had been in the
political limelight in the past. Some of the men sent out by the
Communist Central People's Government were the same men who
had been sent out in the past by the Nationalists. The names of
local Communist officials appeared to be new, but actually many
of them had been in the Northwest for a long time, working in the
underground. The old and the new, the local and the Peking-ap-
pointed, were all worked into the Administrative Council of the
S Northwest and the provincial governments. The general election
N of 1954 resulted in a reshuffle of the political figures of the North-
[666] west, but not in a basic change in the composition.

N The situation in the northwestern provinces was in a state of
*668 flux in 1949 prior to the actual occupation by the Chinese Commun-
*175 ists who were then in the process of conquering all of mainland
669 China. In May, Sian was occupied by Chinese Communist troops,
S
668 who were posed for their westward advance to gain control of Ning-
669 hsia, Chinghai (both of which soon fell to Communist arms), and
175 Sinkiang.

S Out in the west, Sinkiang was divided into two political regimes:
669 the adherents of the provincial government and the insurrectionists
175 in Ili. At Urumchi was the headquarters of the Chinese Nationalist
631 Army, under the command of T'ao Chih-yüeh, and the provincial
635 government headed by Burkhan Shahidi, a Russianized Uighur, who
was then middle-of-the-road in politics and who represented the
554 large Uighur population. With him was Mehmet Emin Bughra, who
had played a part in the establishment of the East Turkestan Repub-
lic of 1933 (at Kashgar) as well as in the East Turkestan Republic
of 1944 (at Kulja in Ili). Politically, they cooperated with the
Nationalist Government and they sought only a modicum of liberties,
such as the establishment of a government of their own choosing
and the preservation of their languages, culture and traditions.
They were thus a less militantly revolutionary group than the Ili
faction. In September, 1949, with the defeat of the Nationalists on
the mainland, with the Chinese Communist Army preparing to
march into Sinkiang, and with the persuasion of such men as
Chang Chih-shung, the provincial government under Burkhan and
the Nationalist forces under T'ao Chih-yüeh formally submitted to
the Communists.

The revolutionary movement centered around Kulja was, since 1948, quiescent, rendered impotent by internal dissensions and the defection of some of its leaders, including Osman Batur. To recoup their fortunes, Akhmejan Kasimi and his lieutenant, Saifuddin, organized the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace

669 and Democracy and began to make overtures to the Chinese Communists.
175 In September, 1949, Akhmejan Kasimi was killed in a
631 plane crash en route to attend the Chinese People's Political Consultative
635 Conference convened by the Chinese Communists.
554 Saifuddin, who was already friendly to the Communists and who
may have been an undercover Communist agent, became the head of the Sinkiang League, bringing it formally into the Communist fold and using it to assist the Communist takeover of northern Sinkiang.

Even with the submission of civil and military dignitaries of
175 both factions, the situation in Sinkiang was delicate, due to the
631 strong growth of Soviet Russian influence in the political vacuum
635 following the withdrawal of Nationalist power. Actual authority
648 rested in the hands of the Soviet consul-general at Urumchi, the
669 Soviet consul at Kulja, and the secretary-general of the Turkestan
branch of the Communist Party. The district of Ili was reported to be wholly Russianized, and by April, 1949, according to Urumchi police records, 6,200 natives changed their nationality to become Soviet citizens. (Mehmet Emin Bughra, Doghr Turkestan, (Eastern Turkestan), pp. 83-4, and interview with Isa Yussuf Aliptakin, in NYT, March 23, 1951). The Chinese Communists were obliged to proceed with caution in their advance on and occupation of Sinkiang.

II. United Front Work, 1. Political Leaders and Factions

175 The fact that the provincial leaders of the Northwest peacefully
668 submitted to the Chinese Communists, bringing the areas under
669 their control along with them and thus sparing the Communists of
the effort and cost of a military campaign, posed for the Communist leaders acute problems of absorption and disposition of the local officials. As a reward for their defection to the Communist cause, even though it was, for some of them, at the eleventh hour, they had to be retained in office. However, it was also necessary to reward the Communist officials, who had been working in the underground, as well as the officers of the Communist army, and at the same time, it was necessary to establish control by the Communists over the local functionaries.

175 The Communists, long anticipating this problem, had a ready-
668 made solution. This was the United Front, when applied to every-
one in general, and the "democratic coalition" when applied to different factions working together for the Communist government.

"The aims of the Chinese People's Central Government vis-a-vis the Northwest," stated Wang Chen (commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub bureau of the CCP), were "first, to establish people's provincial governments made up of democratic coalition of all nationalities; second, to enlist progressive elements of all nation-

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175 alities and classes to participate in the governments; and third,
668 to establish people's democratic United Front of democratic
nationalities under the leadership of the people's provincial governments and various branches of the CCP committees." (JMJP Oct. 1, 1950).

In response, the people's council of Sinkiang passed a resolution urging the establishment of a people's democratic dictatorship based on a union of all democratic classes and all nationalities, built around the alliance of workers and farmers. This was to be achieved by the establishment and consolidation of the united front, by the annihilation of reactionary elements, by the re-education and reform of former government functionaries and by the absorption of progressive elements into the government.

The extent to which the Chinese Communists succeeded in implementing their policy of a United Front in Northwest China may be seen in (1), the alignment of the top ranking officials and the parties, (2) the mobilization of the people, and (3) the building of an army of trained men - the cadres - to serve as instruments of Communist policy.

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A. Top Echelon Officials

*175 The men in power in the northwestern provinces at the time
*668 of the Communist takeover belonged to an assortment of political
554 factions and held to a hodge-podge of views and interests. There
635 were the Communists, many of whom had held official positions
S in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, who were immedi-
175 ately summoned to take charge. There were the members of the
668 Democratic League, which had thrown in their lot with the Com-
554 munists and which maintained branch offices in Sian and Lanchou.
635 The Nationalist officials in China Proper who defected formed
themselves into the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and they were joined by the Nationalist officials in the Northwest. Among the national minorities, there were those who held responsible positions under the Nationalists and who, as prominent men among the national minorities, were carefully preserved by the Communists. Another group of native leaders who rose to power were the former participants of the Ili revolt.

The administrative structure formed from these varied political groups was a cunning piece of assembly. The non-Communist figures had to be given conspicuous display in order to give the impression of a coalition government, but their line had to be stiffened by Communist officials so that it would answer to the dictates of Peking. Each of the top-ranking officials held three or more concurrent positions in one or more places.
Political: in the Central People's Government, in the regional Military and Administrative Council (later the Administrative Council), in the provincial or the municipal governments.

N Military: In the People's Revolutionary Military Council, the
*175 Northwest Military District, or the provincial sub-districts.
*668 Party: In the Central Committee of the CCP, in the Northwest
554 Bureau of the Central Committee and the Sinkiang Sub-bureau, and
635 in the provincial committees.
S Mass organizations: In the national committee and in regional
175 committees.
668 The positions held were either vertical, from Peking down to
554 the provincial level, or horizontal, in more than one collateral
635 agencies. The system of interlocking political positions may be seen in the cases of the following men, chosen at random as illustrations. The positions they held were as of 1952:

Hsi Chung-hsün: In Peking, he was a member of the Government Administration Council, member of the People's Revolutionary Military Council, and a member of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. In the Northwest, he was vice-chairman of the Military Administrative Council, director of the Commission of Land Reform, deputy director of the Commission on Culture and Education, and political commissar of the Northwest Military District. In the Party, he was an alternate member of the Central Committee, and first secretary of the Northwest Bureau.

Ma Wen-jui is primarily concerned with party work. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, in which he is a member of the council, he was chairman of the People's Supervisory Commission and member of the Commission on Political and Legal Affairs. In the party, he was concurrently director of the Organization Department of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee and director of the Committee on Women's Work.

S Saifuddin Azizi, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Democratic
175 League, was also a member of the Northwest Military and Admin-
668 istrative Council and a member of its Political and Legal Commis-
554 sion and its Nationality Affairs Commission, which have offices in
635 Sian. In Sinkiang he was vice-chairman of the Provincial People's Government and fourth secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the CCP. In Peking, he was a member of the Central Peoples Government Council, a member of the Political and Legal Commission and vice-chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission. He was also reportedly commander of the 5th Army in Sinkiang.

S Among the non-Communists, the men who had climbed the
N highest in the Communist hierarchy were the members of the
175 Democratic League. One of these was Han Chao-e who, in Peking,
554 was a member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League,
635 a member of the Central Committee of the China Farmers' and Workers' Democratic Party, and a member of the People's Supervisory Commission in the Central People's Government. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, he was a member of the Political and Legal Commission and vice-chairman of the Land Reform Commission.

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Land Reform Commission. In the Shensi Provincial People's Government, he was vice chairman and director of the People's Supervisory Commission.

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In the case of Yang Ming-hsüan, one can see the tie-in between the Democratic League and the Chinese Communists. Before the rise to power of the Chinese Communists on the mainland, he was a vice chairman of the Communist-controlled Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Regional Government which had its headquarters at Yenan. Later, he became chairman of the Northwest branch of the China Democratic League, with headquarters at Sian and thus helped to prepare the way for the take-over by the Communists in 1949. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, in which he was a member, he was director of the Cultural and Educational Commission and a member of the Commission on Nationalities Affairs.

It would be tedious to list the concurrent posts held by other key figures in the Northwest. Table 1. shows the number of responsible positions (director, chairman, secretary, member of councils and committees, military command and head of mass organization and minority party branches) held by a few of the members of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, in Peking and in the Northwest provinces in 1952.

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B. Parties

Having integrated the leaders of non-Communist political bodies into the government, the next step was to reorganize them and to utilize them as arms of the Communist Party. The Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, headed by Saifuddin, was reorganized into the Sinkiang People's Democratic League (not to be confused with the China Democratic League). It brought over 17,000 trained cadres, veterans of the Ili revolt, to the Communist cause. The official announcement of the reorganization, in 1950, stated that the Sinkiang League was to be guided by the CCP and would base its work on the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. It was to be established in parts of Sinkiang as part of the democratic United Front.

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In December, 1953, the Northwest branch committee of the China Democratic League held a conference at Sian, to hear Yang Ming-hsüan, chairman of the branch committee, and other League leaders report on the work of organization, propaganda, and education. Yang exhorted the members of the league to unite and educate the intellectual masses to take part in building the economy, national defense, and culture of the Northwest. Responding to the resolution of its parent body in the spring of 1953, the Northwest branch committee called upon its membership to concentrate its efforts in mobilizing and organizing the students and teachers in

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TABLE I.

CONCURRENT POSTS HELD BY OFFICIALS IN THE NORTHWEST IN 1952

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(All Communists, unless specified otherwise)	GOVERNMENT					MILITARY		PARTY		MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND MINORITY PARTIES	
	CENTRAL		NORTHWEST								
	ADMINISTRATIVE	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL	MAC	LEGAL AND JUDICIAL	PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL	CENTRAL	NORTHWEST	CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF CCP	NW AND SINKIANG BUREAUS	CENTRAL	NORTHWEST
Chang Chia-fu		1	2	1							
Chang Chih-chung (KMT-RC)	1		3			2				3	1
Chang Chung-hsün		1	1			1	1	1			
Chang Pang-ying			1		2				2		
Chang Tsu-fang (woman)			4							1	
Chia T'o-fu			4		1				1		
Han Chao-o (DL)	1		3		1					2	
Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o (Tibetan-NC)			3		2						
Hsi Chung-hsün	2		3						1	1	
Ma Hsi-wu		1	2	1							
Ma Ming-fang			2		1				1	1	1
Ma Hung-pin (CM-NC)			4		2						
Ma Wen-jui			1						3		
P'eng Te-huai	4		3			2	1	1	1	1	
Saifuddin (Uighur)	3		3		1				1	1	1
Wang Feng			4						1		
Wang Shih-t'ai			4				1				
Wang Tzu-i	1		5						2		
Wu Hung-pin (CCM-DL)			1		2					3	1
Yang Ming-hsuan (DL)			3							1	1

ABBREVIATIONS CM Chinese Moslem DL Democratic League NC Non-Communist
KMT-RC Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee

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N *175 *668 the Northwest under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

In May, 1953, the Northwest Work Committee of the KMT Revolutionary Committee was organized with Chang Chih-chung as chairman. Its avowed aim was to coordinate all its branch offices and members of the KMT Revolutionary Committee in the Northwest under the leadership of the CCP and to implement so-called United Front work. It was significant that the conference of the KMT Revolutionary Committee at Sian was attended by high-ranking Communist Party and Democratic League officials, who were there apparently in a supervisory capacity, a fact which may indicate that the KMT Revolutionary Committee had not then gained the confidence of the Communists. Ma Ming-fang, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, expounded on the role of the "democratic" parties during the stage of New Democracy, which he said was "to educate their members to actively participate in political campaigns." Yang Ming-hsüan, chairman of the Northwest branch committee of the Democratic League, in a speech similar in content with those of the other speakers, declared that it was imperative "to continue the enlargement of the people's democratic united front (and) to get closely united under the CCP and Chairman Mao." (Sian Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, May 26, 1953).

III. United Front Work, 2. The Masses

A. Mobilization of the Masses

The organization of people's governments and the employment of non-Communist political leaders were part of the window-dressing for the organization and mobilization of the masses of the people. S [175] [668] As early as January, 1950, the Sinkiang People's Government Council, in a statement of its policies, declared that one of the primary tasks was "to activate and organize the workers, farmers, youth, women, and other popular bodies so that they would become strong and reliable support for the government in all fields of construction." (NCNA January 8, 1950).

The agencies for the mobilization of the people were, as in other parts of China, the mass organizations, which supplement and bolster the work of the political parties, and were either directly controlled or indirectly manipulated by Communists or trusted agents of the Communists. The following are a few of the organizations of mass control.

The United Front Department of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP: This agency has overall supervision over the other mass organizations and also serves as liaison between them. The chairman, Wang Feng, was also director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council.

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*175 Northwest Federation of Trade Unions: The chairman is Chia
*668 T'o-fu, a member of the Financial and Economic Commission in
467 the Central People's Government and vice chairman of the Finan-
554 cial and Economic Commission in the Northwest Military and
Administrative Council. An influential figure is Chao Chan-hui,
director of the Department of Labor in the Northwest Military and
Administrative Council and a member of the All-China Federation
N of Trade Unions.

*175 Federation of Democratic Women: The dominating personality
*668 in the Northwest is Chang Tsu-fang, onetime director of the feder-
554 ation in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and after 1949
a member of the Executive Committee of the All-China Federation.
In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, she was a
member of three commissions. Ma Wen-jui, chairman of the
People's Supervisory Commission of the Northwest Military and
Administrative Council and director of the Organizational Depart-
ment of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP, was also director of
the Commission of Women's Work. Thus, intimately and inescap-
ably entwined with Communist activities, the Northwest Federation
S of Democratic Women saw a tremendous expansion of its member-
[175] ship. In Sinkiang, by the summer of 1951, it had branches in 47
[668] of the 78 counties and in five of the ten administrative districts,
and 190,000 women members took part in the propaganda campaign
to resist America and aid Korea.

N Federation of Literary and Art Workers: By September, 1950,
*175 7,000 literary and art workers in the Northwest were mobilized
*668 to take part in propaganda activities, and 30,000 writers and
[467] artists joined the Reformation Congress of Literary and Artistic
Workers in the Northwest to establish the United Front.

New Democratic Youth League (renamed the Communist Youth
League in 1955): This is an auxiliary of the Communist Party the
function of which was to mobilize the youth. In the Northwest it was
guided by Lo I, a member of the Standing Committee of the Central
Committee of the New Democratic Youth League and of the China
Democratic Youth Federation, and a member of at least two com-
missions in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council.
S An example of the expansion of the New Democratic Youth League
[175] in the Northwest may be seen in Sinkiang, where, by spring of 1953,
[668] there were 1,015 branches with over 20,000 elite youth members.
Half of the labor models in the Urumchi Saw Mill in 1952 were New
Democratic Youth League members, and it was reported that the
New Democratic Youth League members "have become efficient
assistants of the (Communist) Party in carrying out patriotic move-
ments in factories and villages." (NCNA May 4, 1953).

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*175 Sino-Soviet Friendship Association: By the end of 1951, there
*668 were 1,314 branch associations and 417 sub-branch associations
648 in 157 of the 274 counties in the four Northwest provinces. Over
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N 60,000 of its total membership of 336,610 in the Northwest were
*175 from the city of Sian. Hsi Chung-hsün is president of the Sino-
*668 Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest, and Chang Chih-
648 chung, Chia T'o-fu, Chang Chia-fu, and Burkhan are the vice-
S presidents. Since 1951, the membership of the Sino-Soviet Friend-
175 ship Association throughout China has vastly multiplied, as the
668 following figures show: three million in 1950, 17 million in 1951,
648 23 million in 1952, and 58 million at the end of January, 1953.
The membership of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the
Northwest, therefore, must have increased proportionately.

One of the strongest centers of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest was the Ili Administrative District, where, by fall of 1951, there were 36,814 members in 11 county branches (out of the 12 counties), and in 16 branches of the government. According to Te-li-ha-te, head of the Department of Organization of the Ili branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the people of Ili, Altai (A-shan) and Chughuchak (Tacheng) had cherished the friendship of the Soviet Union since their revolt of 1944-45, and as their political consciousness was higher than elsewhere in the Northwest, they took the lead in the founding of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in 1949.

One of the chief responsibilities of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in the Northwest was the conduct of propaganda. Its propaganda objectives were not only to propagate the gospel of the advance technology in Soviet Russia and the "very great assistance received from the Soviet Cultural Associations for Foreign Countries," but also to combat popular opposition to Soviet Russia. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association in Sinkiang might have fared better if many of the people were not deterred from joining by a whispering campaign warning them that if they joined the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association they would forfeit their right of worship of their religion. (Sian Ch'un-chung jih-pao, November 7, 1951).

N B. Elevation of Political Consciousness

*175 Aside from propaganda, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association
*668 in the Northwest also initiated an ideological remoulding campaign
S in 1951 aimed at 2,500 teachers selected from eleven nationalities.
175 This campaign was one of the many drives, one following or over-
668 lapping another, which were correlated to the work of mobilizing
and organizing the people. The more important of the popular drives were the Land Reform, the Resist-America and Aid Korea Movement and the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries.

By the summer of 1952, the so-called land reform was completed in 97 per cent of all the agricultural hsiang (administrative villages) in the then five provinces of the Northwest. The membership in farmers' associations constituted 30-40 per cent of the

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*175 total number of peasant households. "The peasants in the mutual
*668 aid teams are politically organized," stated the Sian Ch'ün-chung
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175 jih-pao (January 6, 1954), and the enlargement of the membership
668 in the farmers' association have "strengthened the militia, thereby
consolidating the people's democratic dictatorship in the countryside
in the Northwest region." (NCNA, May 22, 1952).

S Concerning the effects of the agrarian reform on the political
175 organization of the people, Kao Chin-shun, vice-chairman of the
Sinkiang People's Government, mentioned the following points:
668 (1) Eradication of the "feudal" landlord class, (2) elevation of the
political consciousness of the peasants, (3) consolidation and enlargement of the United Front, and (4) training large number of cadres. (Urumchi, Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). He revealed too that in the process of the land reform, large numbers of the people signed pacts pledging to resist America and to aid Korea.

Late in 1950, branches of the China Peace Committee, organized for the purpose of rallying the people to support the war in Korea, was established in the Northwest. The work of these branch committees supplemented the activities of the people's political consultative committees and the people's representative conferences which were then in session preparatory to the formation of the people's governments. In Sinkiang, for example, the Provincial People's Representative Conference, in May, 1951, declared that its aim was to popularize and develop penetratingly the Resist-America and Aid-Korea campaign. Later in the year, in order to strengthen the hate-America campaign, the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee and the Sinkiang branch committee of the China Peace Committee were merged into one joint committee. (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). Henceforth, the activities of the so-called conferences of workers, herdsmen, peasant, youth, women, religious, industrial and commercial circles, which were the components of the people's political consultative conference, were channeled to the work of propaganda. Seven members of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee who toured the Korean front, returned to spend three months giving speeches to half a million people. By the end of 1951, a total of JMP $213 billion (about US $10 million) was raised, sufficient, it was claimed, for the purchase of 142 fighter planes. This came to 4.24 per cent of the amount raised in all of China.

N Particular efforts were made to utilize religious institutions.
*175 In Chinghai, Buddhist lamas were organized into propaganda teams,
792 monasteries into meeting places for discussion of current events
*668 and the signing of pledges, and temple fairs and festivals for the
S extension of propaganda on government policies to the rural areas.
175 Similarly, in Sinkiang, mosques were used to hold accusation
668 meetings and the *Akhuns* and *mullahs* were brought in line to sup-
793 port the land reform as well as the Hate-America campaign. A
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175 mass meeting of 3,500 mullahs in 46 mosques in Urumchi was
668 held on May 20, 1951, and again on May 25, 1953, to reaffirm
[793] their pledge to support Mao Tse-tung, the CCP, the Central
[346] People's Government and the Resist-America and Aid-Korea
[995] campaign. Burkhan, chairman of the Sinkiang People's Government, was concurrently head of the China Islamic Association, which had the responsibility of rallying the Moslems of China under the banner of the Chinese Communists.

"Through the above-mentioned activities," declared Yü Chan-lin, vice-chairman of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Conference, "the policies of the (Communist) party and the people's government ... have been conveyed to the masses of various nationalities and various circles (i.e., political groups), so that the misgivings and the hesitant attitude on the part of certain people were corrected and the masses mobilized... thus enlarging the anti-feudal United Front." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 19, 1953). As for the future, Yü urged further propaganda on "patriotism and internationalism" by means of mass movements, intensification of the mobilization of all the nationalities and all the political groups, and further supervision over the masses.

The Sinkiang jih-pao, in an editorial (June 30, 1953), also expressed gratification with the progress of the mobilization of the masses. "During the past four years, the people of all nationalities and all circles have been educated by repeated patriotic campaigns and experiences in various political activities, thereby increasing their organizational ability and their political consciousness. The general election will further consolidate and unite the people of all nationalities and the ties between the People's Government and the masses, thus enabling the state system of our people's democratic dictatorship to become more perfect."

C. Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries

668 The efforts of the Communists to herd and regiment the people
669 were not accomplished without considerable resistance. Large
578 segments of the people refused to enter into the Communist fold
175 and their resistance, strong and stubborn, made it necessary for the Communist authorities to launch campaigns for the suppression of the opposition, whom the Communists designate as "counter-revolutionaries."

The "counter-revolutionaries" or "bandits" were, according to Wang Chen, commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang and concurrently secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, composed of the following groups: (1) Former Nationalist forces; (2) local forces under Osman Batur, Mehmet Emin Bughra, Jamin Khan and Yolbars Khan; (3) White Russians; (4) members of secret societies; (5) bandits; and, he added, "all sorts of subversive espionage organizations (which)

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668 make use of reactionary elements of Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-
669 Islamism to establish anti-Communist and anti-Soviet bases of
578 operation." (JMJP October 1, 1950).

175 The extent of opposition to Communist rule may be seen in
N the news dispatches issued by the Communist authorities on the
#175 results of their relentless crack-down of the counter-revolution-
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669 aries:
578 Item: September, 1950, liquidation of 58,000 bandit troops who
S refused to disarm and continued to resist.
175 Item: November, 1950, arrest of 6,249 Kuomintang agents and
668 seizure of 208 special service cells and 275 radio stations.
669 Item: February, 1951, capture of Osman Batur and Jamin Khan
578 and escape of Yolbars Khan to Formosa. April, 1951, Execution
of Osman Batur.
Item: 1951. Revolt of workers in the Yen-ch'ang Oilfield, Shensi.
Item: December, 1950, Suppression of the Taoist secret society, the I-kuan-tao, which claimed to have 100,000 members in Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia. Members of the organization were charged to have infiltrated into farmers' associations and sabotaged the land reform and peasant organization work.

Despite the savagery of the suppression, the Communists were unable to snuff out the opposition. Kan Ssu-ch'i, director of the Department of Public Security of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, pointed out that in the province of Kansu alone, the counter-revolutionaries killed and wounded 2,117 native cadres resulting in a profound demoralization of the people. "The people blame us," he said, "for having only government and no law. We must...by means of accusation meetings, exhibitions, public trials and forums, mobilize the broad masses to partake in the work of suppressing the counter revolutionaries." (NCNA, April 7, 1951).

The alibis for the failure to wipe out the opposition in the Northwest was attributed to many causes. T'ao Chih-yüeh, deputy commander of the Sinkiang Military District, charged that "hidden enemies are utilizing old relations, old friendships and all opportunities for winning over and buying over a few backward elements." Ma Hung-pin, vice-chairman of the Kansu provincial people's government, warned the people to renounce their old friendships. "All counter-revolutionaries," he said, "be they your relatives, your friends and your neighbors, or even your family members, must be denounced." (NCNA, April 7, 1951). Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, charged that "the imperialists" were fanning the fires of "narrow nationalism" by spreading rumors and fostering animosity among the minority peoples and they have seized upon pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism as their weapons." (JMJP, October 2, 1951).

The admonition and the threats by the officials had no effect

N in curbing the hostility of segments of the population towards the
*175 Communist regime. Sabotage as well as open rebellion continued
*668 unabated, as the following items, culled from Communist papers,
669 show:

578 Item: November, 1951, arsonists set fire to the Urumchi Fur Factory causing a loss of two billion yuan (US $100,000).

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175 Item: April to July, 1952. Revolt of Chinese Moslems in Kansu,
668 who killed over 3,000 Communist cadres and many government
669 officials and seized control of three districts.

578 Item: March to June, 1953. 1,380 "bandits" reported annihilated in southern Kansu.

Item: December, 1953, Suppression of "bandit" forces under Ma Liang in the Kansu-Chinghai-Szechwan border region.

Item: First half of 1954, 3,420 counter-revolutionary cases unearthed.

IV. United Front Work, 3. The Cadres

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A. Recruitment of Cadres

The placement of non-Communist and non-Chinese leaders in the government and the organization of the people, while important, were but subsidiary tasks. The principal task was the reform of the old cadres and the recruitment of new cadres to serve as the work forces of the party and the state. The job, which was a part
N of the building of the "democratic United Front" since it concerned
[647] the integration of Communist with non-Communist employees, was handled by two agencies of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP: the Department of Organization, headed by Ma Wen-jui, which was responsible for party expansion, and the Department of United Front Work, headed by Wang Feng, which was responsible for recruiting and integrating non-Communists and non-Chinese functionaries in government and party work.

The shortage of trained cadres and the need for more were felt by the Communist authorities from the beginning of their rule over the Northwest. In November, 1949, barely a month after the Communists took over the vast territories of the Northwest and two and a half months before the formation of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, Ma Wen-jui, who had already set up his Department of Organization, declared that the main problem facing the Chinese Communist Party was the training and employment of new cadres (JMJP, January 4, 1950). The need was particularly urgent in view of the depletion of trained men due to the transfer of many of the veteran cadres of the old Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region to other parts of the country and the reluctance of the local youth to become cadres. Hsi Chung-hsün, secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, pointed out that the number of men who had

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*175 served as underground workers in the Northwest came to about
*668 50,000, and with the population of the five northwest provinces about twenty-three million (the 1954 census gave the figure of 35 1/2 million), the number of cadres came to only 0.22 per cent of the population. Even with the addition of the 200,000 party men in the People's Liberation Army, the number of cadres was less than one per cent.

As part of the United Front Work, the Communist authorities, as soon as they took over control of the northwestern provinces, absorbed almost all the former Nationalist government functionaries and students into the rank of the cadres. By providing them with jobs, the authorities expected to remove a potential source of discontent at a time when it was necessary to win over the people. In his speech of November, 1949, Ma Wen-jui revealed that 70 per cent of the new cadres were young intellectuals and former government personnel (JMJP, January 4, 1950).

But both old cadres and those newly converted were unsatisfactory for reasons which will be discussed later, and, not only for the purpose of remedying the shortage but also in the hope of catering to the aspiration of the non-Chinese peoples who make up the bulk of the population in the outlying regions, it was necessary to train large numbers of cadres recruited from the national minorities. The training of cadres was achieved in two ways: one through the schools and special training classes and the other by placing them in low-ranking administrative positions and "coaching them as apprentices."

In June, 1951, the Government Administration Council in Peking approved a resolution entitled "Tentative Measures for the Fostering of Cadres of Minority Nationalities," which in its preamble called for the "universal and large-scale cultivation of cadres of various minority nationalities." Priority was given to the training of military and technical cadres. To implement this policy, a Central Nationalities Institute was established in Peking, to which cadres with ranks above those of section chiefs in the autonomous areas and battalion commanders in the army were sent. Regional nationality schools as well as cadre schools were estab-
S lished for the rank-and-file cadres. In addition, all the institutions
175 of education were used to turn out cadres for the state.

668 Primary Schools: In Sinkiang, it was stated that the 112,393 stu-
871 dents who graduated from the elementary schools in the years from 1950 to 1955 were assigned to the labor reserve, promoted to be cadres, or permitted to attend secondary schools.

Middle Schools: The 13,140 students who graduated from Middle schools in Sinkiang in 1950-55 were either permitted to attend colleges or were inducted into the ranks of the cadres. (Kuang-
S ming jih-pao, September 30, 1955).

[563] Nationality Schools: The seven nationality schools in Sinkiang

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175 graduated in four years a total of 11,000 students into the ranks
668 of the cadres. Deserving boys of Mongol descent were also sent
871 to study in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, which was
[563] regarded as the model for the national minorities.

Short-term Training Classes: The first thing the Chinese Communists did upon entering Sinkiang was to set up twenty-five classes to train cadres in three-to-six month courses. By summer of 1951, these training classes graduated 3,600 cadres from 13 different nationalities.

N Colleges: There were by 1955 thirteen institutions of higher
*175 education in the Northwest. The most important was the North-
*668 west Revolutionary University located at Sian. Founded in 1950,
873 it conducted courses on Marxism-Leninism and the writings of
Mao Tse-tung with the aim of "reforming the intellectuals." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, July 8, 1953). In 1953, after having graduated 12,000 cadres, its name was changed to Northwest Cadres
N School of Political and Legal Science. The Nationality College at
*[563] Lanchou was under the direction of Wang Feng, who was head of
the United Front Work Department of the Northwest Bureau of the
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175 CCP. The Sinkiang Nationality College at Urumchi, headed by
668 provincial governor Burkhan, was distinguished by a faculty of
873 350 Soviet advisors who made up 43% of the teachers. It gradu-
[563] ated 1,700 minority cadres in 1953. The Sinkiang People's Gov-
ernment and the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist
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175 Party each have a cadre school which, along with the training
668 classes, turned out 10,000 cadres by the end of 1955. By the
874 summer of 1955, these two cadre schools and the Sinkiang Nation-
873 ality College trained a total of 396 teachers and 4,355 educational
cadres.

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*175 The nationality autonomous areas were also used as nurseries
*668 for the incubation and training of nationality cadres. In Chinghai
871 over a third of the native cadres were selected from activists in
*563 the people's governments.

The purpose of study in the cadre schools was to "enable the students to shake off the bad influences and to strengthen their patriotic ideology." The cadres were drawn from the ranks of the students and from "upper religious circles" and, "on returning to national minority areas, they were able to conduct propaganda in a correct manner, do work actively and promote solidarity among various nationalities in pushing forward political, economic and cultural enterprises." (Kuang-ming jih-pao, February 24, 1954).

Allowing for the possibility of some duplications in the figures, the number of national minority cadres trained may be estimated by adding the numbers mentioned in the Communist press (see Table 2).

Table 2

NATIONAL MINORITY CADRES TRAINED IN THE NORTHWEST

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Sinkiang			
Veterans of the Ili Revolt			17,000
Graduates of 25 training classes in 1950			3,600
Graduates of the training classes in 1951			1,200
Graduates of the Sinkiang Sub-bureau cadre school in 1951, 1044, 84 per cent were natives			877
Graduates of the Sinkiang Nationality College, 1953			1,700
Educational Cadres, from Sinkiang Cadre School			4,355
Graduates of the training classes in 1954			200
Graduates of the Provincial Government Cadre School			296
Cadres promoted from activists			
In 197 hsiang	308		
In Ili, Kashgar and Yarkand	934		
In Bavenkara NAA	80		
In Qizil Su Kolkhoz NAA	1,100		2,422
Total	2,422		
Total			31,650
Ninghsia, summer 1954,			2,300
Kansu, Graduates of the Lanchou Nationality College, 1950-54			2,500
Chinghai			
Number as of summer, 1954		3,471	
Cadres promoted from activists			
Yu-shu Tibetan NAA	250		
Huang-nan Tibetan NAA	258		
Hai-pei Tibetan NAA	302		
Mongol-Tibetan-Kazakh NAA	340		
Shun-hua Salar NAA	190		
Total	1,340	1,340	
Total		4,811	4,811
Shensi, Graduates of the Northwest Nationality College at Sian, 1950-54			2,543
GRAND TOTAL FOR THE NORTHWEST			43,834

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This figure, 43,834, is not far from the figure of "over 40,000 cadres of national minorities" cited by Wang Feng, chairman of the Commission of Nationality Affairs of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and director of the Department of United Front Work of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in December, 1953 (NCNA, January 6, 1954).

As to the total number of cadres in the Northwest, it is necessary to deduce from the statistics given in the Communist press to obtain an estimate. In September, 1955, Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, claimed that there were 36,000 national minority

N cadres in the province (JMJP September 24, 1955), but this ap-
*175 peared to be an exaggeration, for an article in the Kuang-ming
*668 jih-pao, (by Chang Hung, on September 30, 1955), stated that the
*563 number of minority cadres in Sinkiang was 34,400, and that they
162 S made up 66.9 per cent of all the cadres in the then province. The
175 total, therefore, comes to 51,543. In Kansu, the total number of
668 cadres up to the end of 1953 was 12,361. In Chinghai, the 3,471
563 national minority cadres made up 40 per cent of the total number
162 of cadres, so that the total number would be about 8,500.

Early in 1950, Hsi Chung-hsün, vice-chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, stated that there were 50,000 underground cadres plus 200,000 cadres in the People's Liberation Army, or a total of 250,000. Later in the year, it was stated that over 10,000 students and former government functionaries were undergoing reform in the Northwest Cadre Training School, and that 6,000 of them were from the national minorities. A large number of these cadres were purged in 1952-53, but their ranks were filled by graduates from the training schools and colleges. The Northwest Cadre School at Sian, graduated 2,200 in the years 1949-53 and the Northwest Revolutionary University, also at Sian, graduated a total of 12,000 in the period from 1950 to 1953.

Simultaneous with the process of drawing men from schools and government offices into the special training classes, nationality colleges and cadre schools for training non-Chinese cadres were also assigned jobs in lower levels of the governments so that they could receive practical experience in the administration and also to bear the brunt of contact with local inhabitants. By fall of 1950, there were about 4,400 native cadres employed in local government agencies, half of whom held offices above the level of hsiang. By spring of 1951, according to incomplete figures, the number of national minority cadres in government increased to 22,000, distributed in the five Northwest provinces as follows, (NCNA, May 13, 1951):

Sinkiang	17,000
Chinghai	2,000
Kansu	1,976
Ninghsia	1,050
Sian Municipality	40

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*175 The 17,000 administrative personnel in Sinkiang were the same
*668 veteran cadres who took part in the 1944 Ili Revolt and who were
*663 organized into the Sinkiang People's Democratic League headed by
162 Saifuddin (JMJP, June 6, 1952; also statement of Wang Feng,
631 December 29, 1951). It was also claimed that seventy to eighty
S 175 per cent of the personnel in the magistrates' offices in the 80
668 counties of Sinkiang were native cadres. By the end of 1951, the
563 number of national minority cadres employed in government work
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N in the Northwest reached the highwater mark of 27,000 (NCNA
*175 January 8, 1952).

*668 A large number of the cadres were sent out directly from
*563 training schools to low-ranking positions in the people's govern-
162 ments. Up to the summer of 1953 the Northwest Revolutionary
631 University at Sian placed over 12,000 of its graduates in govern-
[373] ment service, the Northwest Nationality College 2,573, the Lanchou
[374] Nationality College 2,500, and the Northwest Cadre School 2,200.
S 175 The areas of concentration in Sinkiang were the Ili and Kashgar
668 Administrative Districts and three counties in Yarkand which had
563 6,907 native cadres employed as directors of departments, sec-
162 tion chiefs, and heads of counties and ch'ü (districts).
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B. Demoralization and Conflict of the Cadres

N A compelling reason for the large-scale induction of cadres,
*175 both Chinese and from the national minorities, was not only because
*668 of the small number of veteran cadres, but also because these old
578 cadres were no longer considered trustworthy and useful by the authorities. However, the authorities soon found that the new cadres were not any better and their absorption only heightened the conflict within the ranks of the cadres. The defects of the cadres were repeatedly pointed out in the series of conferences convened by the Department of United Front Work of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 1951 and in the spring of 1952. The main shortcomings of the cadres, as pointed out by the Communist leaders, were:

1. Lack of political consciousness and demoralization of the old party cadres. It was significant, and perhaps paradoxical, that the major criticisms against the cadres were directed against the veteran cadres who had been trained and who had seen service in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, which since 1935 had been the center of Communist activities and the showcase of Communist administration. As early as January, 1950, Ma Wen-jui, director of the Organization Department of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, charged in a speech (JMJP January 4, 1950), that the old cadres showed restlessness, they wanted better jobs and were anxious to return home, they suffered from the ideological defects of individualism and jealousy of the new cadres, they were inefficient and careless in their work so that they lost important documents and often divulged state secrets, they lacked initiative and a sense of responsibility, and sought only enjoyment. Cases of graft were quite frequent.

Eighteen months later, at a conference of high-ranking cadres held at Sian in August, 1951, Ma Wen-jui charged that the old party cadres, due to their long stay in the rural villages and due to the demoralizing conditions of the war, lack education. "The degrees of political awakening of some of the party members is

*175 rather low, their conception about the party is not clear, and they
*668 are not qualified, or completely qualified, as party members.
578 They take little interest in party work, consider the exemplary
behavior of other party members in leading the masses as a 'disadvantage,' take no heed of the phenomena detrimental to the interest of the people."

Ma went on to state that bad elements had infiltrated into the party: "Some of the veteran party members in the face of the nationwide victory, display laxity, are arrogant and think of themselves as heroes. They are steadily losing or have already lost the sense of responsibility and positiveness that qualified Communists should have. They pay little attention to study and improvement, take little interest in politics, lack a serious attitude towards their work, do not seek to develop the work but simply carry out routine, and some of them are not prepared to continue with the revolutionary struggle, reject any difficult tasks assigned them by the party, and even degrade themselves to corruption, moral disintegration and estrangement from the masses, and are against party discipline." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, October 8, 1951).

Two months later, at another conference of cadres, Hsi Chung-hsün also deplored the deterioration of party discipline. "Diverse non-proletarian ideas have infiltrated into the party," he said, "and some of the elements whose class standpoint is not firm and whose political consciousness is not very high cannot stand the test and become degenerated." (NCNA December 2, 1951). In May, 1952, Chang Chia-fu, director of the Department of Propaganda of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, declared: "Since they entered the cities, the Northwest Literary and Art Workers, owing to corrosion by bourgeois thought, have wavered more or less in carrying out Chairman Mao's literary and artistic policy." (NCNA May 25, 1952).

2. Poor Quality of the New Cadres: The large numbers of students and former government employees who were incorporated into the ranks of the cadres were not men of high caliber and they quickly followed the examples set by the old party cadres. At a speech at a conference of cadres at Sian in May, 1950, Hsi Chung-hsün charged that there were glaring shortcomings in the United Front Work because the new cadres, who make up 90 per cent of the total number of cadres, following the practices of the old cadres. They were arrogant, they entertained non-proletarian thoughts, and, because of their behavior, there were flagrant cases of bureaucratism (which he defined as estrangement from reality and isolation from the masses) and commandism (just going through the motions of carrying out orders). He pointed out that in the muni-
(681) cipality of Sian, for example, eleven hundred residents were
(651) arrested and punished for the mere crime of possessing bicycles,
and that in the countryside, the cadres resorted to threats, arrests, and tortures in the collection of taxes.

*175 *668 578 arrests, and tortures in the collection of taxes. (Nan-fang jih-pao, June 9, 1950). P'eng Te-huai, chairman of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, declared that bureaucratism and commandism were the greatest dangers to the Communist administration of the Northwest and that the cadres in general showed marked tendencies of ostentatiousness and averagism.

3. Friction between party cadres and non-party cadres: The old cadres, men who had lived through the dark years of privation and danger during the war with Japan and the civil war that followed, were jealous of their prerogatives as veteran party members and as victors, and they regarded the new cadres as interlopers and the people of the Northwest as a conquered people. As a result, there were widespread clashes within the ranks of the cadres. At the conference of cadres in August, 1951, Wang Feng, director of the Department of United Front Work, chastized the cadres for their haughtiness and their indifference to the alliance with non-party workers by saying: "Some of our cadres in the party, having inadequate understanding of the new situation and the nationalities and classes in the immense new areas of the Northwest, and having acquired a self-complacency and arrogance through victory, are not warm-hearted enough to the large number of non-party cadres and so there arose certain discords in our work. On the other hand, non-party cadres, working for the first time with the Chinese Communist Party members and having inadquate understanding of various policies, cherished suspicions and adopted an attitude of self-preservation entirely incompatible with the attitude that a master of a new country should adopt." This situation, he said, was caused by the fact that "In the past two years, the United Front Work within our own party has not been sound enough and we have not sufficient knowledge of United Front Work in our government organs and the education of party members within the government organs has been poor." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, October 11, 1951).

*175 *668 578 *563 4. Friction between Chinese and non-Chinese cadres: The age-old antagonism between the native population and the Chinese in the outlying regions of the Northwest persisted and was further aggravated by the arrival of the Communists. The party cadres, who were arrogant and overbearing, treated the native recruits with contempt. As early as 1950, General Wang Chen, commander of the Communist forces which entered Sinkiang, expressed concern with the animosity between the Chinese and the non-Chinese population. The Chinese party cadres, he said, were still under the influence of Great Hanism and the local national minority cadres still suffered from the influence of Pan-Turkestanism and Pan-Islamism. As a result, he said: "Certain of our cadres, failed to pay adequate attention to national differences and failed to consult with the minorities. They resorted to commandism and

*175 bureaucraticism and isolated themselves from the masses. Various
*668 national minorities adopted narrow nationalism as a means of pro-
578 tection against the ruling race (i.e., the Chinese)" (JMJP October
*563 1, 1950).

The conflict between Han Chinese cadres and national minority cadres, became so serious that in September, 1953, following the promulgation of four documents on the policy towards national minorities, the Government Administration Council and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a joint order to local party committees to investigate the implementation of the nationality policy and to cadres to carry out self-criticism and mutual criticism. The Jen-min jih-pao in its editorial (on October 10, 1953), also inveighed against the ideology of Great Hanism among the Han Chinese cadres and the "ultra-nationalism" of the minority cadres.

C. Cadres Reforms and Purges

*175 The remedy the situation, the Communist high command insti-
*668 tuted a series of reindoctrination conferences, the screening of
661 government personnel, and wholesale arrests and purges to improve
578 the quality of the cadres. Hsi Chung-hsün headed the panel of Chinese Communist Party and government speakers who harangued the cadres at mass meetings, held in May, 1950, in August-September, 1951, and in May, 1952, castigating them for bureaucraticism, commandism, incompetence, and corruption. The conferences of cadres were convened upon instructions from Peking. Following the speech of Li Wei-han, director of the Department of United Front Work of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in April, 1951, urging Communists to take the lead in rallying non-Communists and Han Chinese cadres to check their growing tendency toward "Great Nationality ideas," the Northwest Bureau of the Communist Party, at the conference of the cadres held in August-September, 1951, adopted a program for the reform of the cadres, to be in three stages. Stage one, to begin September 21, was for a two and a half month study of Chinese Communist and Soviet Communist Party documents; stage two, beginning December 6, forty days for the registration, reexamination and selection of cadres on the basis of their qualifications; and stage 3, to begin January 16, 1952, thirty days for the reform of branch organizations. (Ch'ün=chung jih-pao, October 8, 1951).

This was the occasion for the screening and dismissal of large numbers of cadres. But more drastic action was still to come. At the fourth plenary session of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, November 22=29, 1951, the program of party reform was merged into the campaign for production and austerity. Article 5 of this program was "to simplify and retrench the

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government structure and to promote work efficiency," and article 6 was "to strictly enforce austerity, to develop the struggle against corruption, waste, and bureaucratism." (NCNA December 2, 1951).

The announcement of the "simplification and retrenchment" program was the signal for the purging of additional thousands of cadres, but this was still only the beginning. A month later, in January, 1952, Hsi Chung-hsün convened a conference of the Production and Austerity Committees in government organs throughout the Northwest, attended by cadres above the rank of deputy chief in the party, the government, and the military district. At this conference, Hsi Chung-hsün made a blistering speech charging that the campaign in the Northwest was not satisfactory, not penetrating, not broad enough, not directed to the main target and did not have concrete results. The leaders were sleeping, he ranted on, and the masses lacked leadership. The middle and minor officials were guilty of corruption, waste and decay. The top officials, he concluded, should assume responsibility and proceed actively in a militant attitude. (NCNA January 10, 1952).

The result of the purges, known as the Three-Anti Movement (anti-graft, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucratism), which was launched throughout China in 1952, and which, with its companion campaign, the Five-Anti Movement directed at businessmen, became a reign of terror unprecedented in magnitude and in horror. Untold thousands of cadres, Communists as well as non-Communists, and officials in the middle and lower grades of government, were arrested, tried and convicted in "people's courts," and executed while thousands more were jailed or condemned to corrective labor camps.

However, terror and persecutions did not accomplish the desired end of bringing the cadres in line. By spring of 1954, the demoralization of the cadres and the friction among them became so serious that a series of conferences was convened by the Northwest Bureau of the Communist Party at Sian. They were convoked upon orders from Peking, following the 7th Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and in pursuance of its "Resolution to strengthen party unity." The speeches of the leaders all indicated that the demoralization of the cadres was worse and the differences and clash of interests between Communist and non-Communist cadres and between Chinese and non-Chinese cadres had increased. The cadres in general were charged with "conceit, departmentalism, dispersionism, exaggeration of seniority, boasting of achievements, concealing of defects, and suppression of criticism." (NCNA April 25, 1954), and the party cadres, in particular, were charged, at a later party conference, with "bourgeoise individualist ideas, conceit, sectarianism, parochialism, dispersionism and egotism." It was stated that "the low level of Marxist-Leninist consciousness

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*175 of the cadres had a corroding effect on the party and endangered
*668 the party cause." (NCNA July 21, 1954). But, said the leaders,
578 "the main obstacle to party unity in Sinkiang district at present
[661] is the survival of the tendency of Great Hanism and the sentiment
of local nationalism among a section of the cadres." (NCNA April 25, 1954).

The demoralization of the government personnel in the Northwest was so widespread that in March, 1954, when the residents of thirty-two villages in the Hu-chu county in Chinghai were told that they were free to voice their grievances, they made a total of 3,800 complaints in the hsiang people's representative assembly against the "bureaucratic work style of the leadership cadres." (NCNA March 20, 1954).

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V. Political Structure and Political Progress

A. The Northwest Military and Administrative Council and People's Governments

Early in 1950, the Northwest Military and Administrative Council was established at Sian, which also became the location of the Northwest Bureau of the Communist Party and of the head-
N quarters of the Northwest Military District. In the months that
[635] followed, provincial and municipal people's governments were
[632] also established in the five provinces then comprising the North-
west: Shensi, Kansu, Chinghai, Ninghsia, and Sinkiang.

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*175 While the members of the Military and Administrative Council
*668 were appointed by the Central People's Government in Peking, the
635 members of the provincial and municipal people's governments
632 were, according to Communist pronouncements, elected by conventions of representatives of all circles and all nationalities.
666 Since no machinery of election was set up and the people were not instructed, these conventions were actually meetings of Communists and fellow travellers who were invited to attend, in the manner non-Communists were invited to attend the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking in September, 1949.

Since the officials were those on the panels who were approved by the Communists, there was little for the representatives to do except to endorse the selection, and then to devote the rest of their
S
[175] time to other unrelated items of the agenda. The first conference
[668] of the people's representatives of all circles and all nationalities
[631] in Sinkiang, which met April 19 to May 10, 1951, was primarily
devoted to the purpose of propaganda, the discussion of means of popularizing the Resist-America and Aid-Korea Campaign, the campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries and the land reform. The meeting of representatives in Chinghai, held in October, 1950, discussed these items on the agenda plus the means of collecting the grain tax.

Table 3. CHINESE AND NON-CHINESE IN REGIONAL, PROVINCIAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Regional: Top level (in 1952)	total	Han Chinese	From the National Minorities	Unknown
NW MAC	43	35	8	--
Provincial: Second level (in 1950)				
Shensi People's Government Council	39	37	2	-
Kansu " " "	29	21	8	-
Chinghai " " "	22	12	7	1
Sinkiang " " "	31	13	15	3
Total	121	85	32	4
(Total in 1951)	133	78	55	-)

County Magistrates: Third level (in 1951)	
Shensi:	Chinese, head of all municipalities and counties
Kansu:	in the Linhsia Administrative District, 6 counties: 3 Chinese, 3 from the minority nationalities
Chinghai and Ninghsia:	in 35 counties: 13 Chinese, 22 from the minority nationalities
Sinkiang:	80 counties, 13 Chinese, 67 from the minority nationalities.

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*175 *668 635 The line-up of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and the provincial people's governments in 1951 shows that the responsible officials were either Communists or hold-overs from the previous governments who were approved by the Communists. In cases where the former governors were retained, as in Kansu and Sinkiang, one or two of the vice-governors were Communists.

*175 *668 *563 631 To cater to the desire of the minority peoples for a voice in government, many of the native representatives were elected to be members of the people's councils. But they were mainly permitted to serve in the lower levels of the administrations, the Chinese practically monopolized the upper levels of government. Table 3 shows the number of chairmen, vice-chairmen, and the members of the councils.

It should be noted that the term "Chinese" refers to those of the Han race and that the term "national minority" includes also the Chinese Moslems, a people once known as Dungan and now as the Hui, or Moslems. In the Linhsia Administrative District in Kansu, for example, although the number of Chinese and Hui county magistrates were the same, the Chinese still predominate. Numbering 52 per cent of the population, they had 56 per cent of the seats in the district people's council, while the Hui, who numbered 48 per cent of the population had only 55 per cent of the seats.

*175 *668 631 These local people's governments or people's councils had little authority. Their principal responsibility was the transmission of the decisions and orders of the Government Administration Council in Peking. Military and financial matters were subject to the decisions of the Central Government (cf. Organic Law of Regional Governments, December 16, 1949).

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B. Regional Autonomous Areas

The training of an army of national minority cadres had as its basic purpose, not only the staffing of the lower levels of the administration, but also the preparation of the ground for the establishment of regional autonomy for the minority peoples in the outlying regions of the Northwest. "The nucleus of work in the promotion of nationality regional autonomy and nationalities democratic coalition governments," stated the Jen-min jih-pao in an editorial (March 22, 1951), "lies in the universal and large-scale training of the nationalities' own cadres. It is only after the nationalities are provided with their own revolutionary cadres that their political, economic and cultural development can be further assured."

The nationality autonomous governments which were first set up in the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, were prepared by "the construction work of political and military cadres," (NCNA, May 17, 1953), who did the work of propaganda and organization of the people. (NCNA December 19, 1953). For example, the [illegible]-

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*175 lishment of the Hai-pei Tibetan Autonomous People's Government
*668 in Chinghai came only after the "achievement of the Chinese Com-
631 munist Party and the People's Government at upper level."

*563 "On entering the Tibetan area in Hai-pei in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party and the cadres of the People's Government exerted great efforts in propaganda, thoroughly carried out policies concerning national equality, unity and the development of production, mediated disputes... and stabilized social order." (NCNA June 18, 1954).

As one after another of the national autonomous areas proved satisfactory, from the point of view of the Communists, more were established. Following the establishment of the T'ien-chu Tibetan Autonomous district in Kansu in May, 1950, eight autonomous districts were established in 1950: five in Kansu, two in Ninghsia, and one in Chinghai. Three were established in the years 1951 and 1952, all in Chinghai. Fifteen were set up in 1953: six in Kansu, two in Ninghsia, and eight in Chinghai. Of the total of 27 autonomous districts set up by the end of 1953, 14 were Tibetan, five Chinese Moslem (Hui), four Mongol, and four others. Including the smaller autonomous areas, there were a total of over forty autonomous people's governments in the three provinces of Kansu, Chinghai, and Ninghsia, by August, 1953. Their size varied. In Chinghai, the Kung-ho Kazakh autonomous hsiang had a total population of 130 and the Huang-nan Tibetan Autonomous district a population of 220,000. These nationality autonomous areas in the three provinces embraced a total of 700,000 people, or one-ninth of the non-Chinese population in the Northwest (NCNA August 29, 1953 and September 9, 1953; but one million according to Ma Ming-fang, Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954).

5 The people of Sinkiang, who constituted the bulk of the non-Chi-
175 nese population in the Northwest, were, up to fall of 1953, four
668 years after the Communist conquest, not granted the privilege of
642 self-rule. Some of the reasons for the discrimination of Sinkiang
563 were quite obvious.

631 1. The propinquity of the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai and the predominance of the Chinese population made it easier for the Communists to exercise control. Sinkiang, on the other hand, was farther from China and the bulk of the population was non-Chinese with a long tradition of resistance to Chinese rule.

5 2. In Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, Chinese cadres far outnum-
175 bered the native cadres, but in Sinkiang, according to one source
668 (Kuang-ming jih-pao, September 30, 1955), 67 per cent of the
563 cadres were native cadres, including 17,000 of them who had taken
631 part in the Ili Revolt in 1944-45. The fact that they still entertained separatist views may be seen in the fact that Saifuddin, their leader, found it necessary to remind them: "From now on, the

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175 problem is no longer one concerned with opposition to pan-racial-
668 ism (i.e., Great Hanism), but rather how to cooperate with the...
563 Chinese in struggling for the building of a free big family and in
631 opposing petty nationalism and the saboteurs of national solidarity."
(JMJP October 2, 1951).

N 3. Up to the end of 1953, it was reported that there were a total
*175 of 2,800,000 organized peasant households in the Northwest, or
592 45 per cent of the total number of peasant households (Ch'ün-chung
162 jih-pao, January 1, 1954). The bulk of the number of organized
S peasants were in the interior provinces, while in Sinkiang only
175 33.8 per cent of the peasant households were organized. Not only
592 the percentage in Sinkiang, but also the average percentage of the
162 whole of the Northwest, compared rather unfavorably with the
77.32 per cent in Inner Mongolia.

N The figures on Table 4 are numbers of farming households in
[474] the Northwest, which were organized into farmers associations
[496] and into mutual aid teams up to December, 1953, based on statis-
tics appearing in the Communist press. (Figures in parentheses
are computed from percentages given of the total).

S 4. An important factor, too, was the special position of Soviet
[illegible] Russia in Sinkiang. Soviet authorities had succeeded in gaining a
6[illegible] foothold in Chinese Turkestan during the administration of Sheng
Shih-ts'ai and later in the political vacuum attendant upon the
withdrawal of Nationalist influence in 1948-49. Soviet troops were
stationed at strategic points and Soviet party and consular officials
actually held the reins of power. Soviet interests were confirmed
in the treaty signed between Peking and Moscow in February, 1950,
to which were attached two codicils providing for the organization
of two joint stock companies for Soviet exploitation of the oil and
mineral resources in Sinkiang (not excluding the possibility of the
mining and shipment of uranium ores to the Soviet Union). To
implement these agreements, large numbers of Soviet experts
arrived to set up machine works, power plants, and to assist the
Chinese, in the work of geological survey, veterinary and medical
research, the operation of trucking lines and state farms, cotton
production, insect eradication and sheep-raising (NCNA interview
with Burkhan, Kuang-ming Jih-pao, September 27, 1955). In the
face of Soviet domination of Sinkiang, it was difficult for Communist
China to assert its rule, except nominally, in that remote province.

It was with the death of Stalin that there was, ostensibly, a reappraisal of Soviet relations with Communist China. During the visit of Nikita Khruschev and Nikolai Bulganin to Peking in October, 1954, the pattern of Sino-Soviet partnership was readjusted to make it more palatable to the ego of the Chinese leaders. In regard to Sinkiang, one of the five agreements reached as a result of the Peking talks was for the sale of Soviet shares in the two joint stock companies to Communist China, transforming them into

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 513]

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13 Sinkiang AF1

Table 4. ORGANIZATION OF THE PEASANTS IN THE NORTHWEST UP TO DECEMBER, 1953
(Based on Communist statistics)

	Total Population (1953 census)	Organized Farming Households		Mutual Aid Teams	Permanent Mutual Aid Teams		Agricultural Producers Cooperatives	State Farms
		Number	Percentage of total farming households		Number	Percentage of Total No. of Teams		
Northwest China	35,358,000	2,800,000	45 %				305	
Shensi	15,881,000	1,424,800	47 %	280,848	34,381	12.2%	234	93
Kansu	12,929,000 (including Ninghsia)		45 %	194,400	19,400	10 %	32	50
Ninghsia (721,000)			53 %	13,615	2,535	16 %	19	-
Chinghai	1,677,000	96,000	52.3%	25,106	1,840	7.3%	10	-
Sinkiang	4,874,000	299,000	33.8%	51,600	(2,500)	5 %	10	-

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S 175 648 Chinese-owned companies. Although Soviet and Eastern European experts were retained as salaried technicians, the move was made to appear that Soviet Russia was withdrawing from Sinkiang in favor of Communist China.

S 175 668 642 631 563 In addition to these conditions, there was a whole plethora of other factors which made the Communist authorities reluctant to grant regional autonomy to the people of Sinkiang. However, as they had in repeated pronouncements promised autonomy to the non-Chinese inhabitants of this province, they found that they could not procrastinate any longer, and in the late summer of 1953 they finally agreed to the establishment of the first autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang, but on an experimental basis. The three experimental autonomous governments were: one for the Sibo on the hsiang level, one for the Chinese Moslems on the county level, and one for the Mongols on the district (ch'ü)level. In December, 1953, Saifuddin urged "that a good job must be done to guarantee that the various national autonomies in the province may be established." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 6, 1954).

The experiments proved successful and by May, 1954, the green light was given for the establishment of autonomous people's governments in Sinkiang for other concentrations of national minorities in the province. There were thirty-three autonomous areas below the level of district in Sinkiang in August (NCNA, August 7, 1954). However, in proportion to its population of non-Chinese people, Sinkiang was still behind. During the same period, the number of autonomous areas in Kansu had increased to 86 (NCNA April 9, 1955).

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C. The General Election of 1953-54

In 1953, the people of Northwest China, as elsewhere in China, were for the first time permitted to cast their votes for the election of their representatives. In February, the Central People's Government in Peking passed the Election Law which provided for suffrage for adults over 18 years of age with the exclusion of all those whom the Communist authorities had classified as landlords, counter-revolutionaries, and lunatics and those who were deprived of the right to vote or to run for election. The certified voters vote only once, at the lowest or basic levels, and by a show of hands (art. 55). The system is pyramidal. The representatives chosen by the people at the basic election elect their representatives to people's congresses of a higher level, and these in turn elect representatives for peoples of still higher level, and so on up, through the levels of county and district people's congresses to municipal and provincial congresses, and through the level of municipal and provincial congresses to the National People's Congress. Only at high levels was the balloting secret. The candidates running for election were Communist or men approved by the

*175 *668 666 Communists. On paper, the people were permitted to nominate candidates from the floor, but such practices were discouraged. "Through the method of small group discussions and appraisals now adopted... individual nomination will gradually be standardized and consequently should not be subject to any restrictions." (Wang Shui, "How to nominate candidates for election" JMJP June 11, 1953). Thus the electoral procedure followed the Soviet practice of presenting single lists of candidates. The nominees were shifted by means of a process of "consultation and agreement" and after the list of names were agreed upon, the voters go through the motion of approving it.

[191] This manner of voting bears close resemblance to the system in the USSR and is a far cry from the system adopted by the Chinese Communists in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region sixteen years before. (See Table 5).

In preparation for the election, large numbers of cadres were given training to qualify them to serve as chairmen of basic level election committees and to guide, conduct and supervise the elections. The number who were assigned was one cadre for every 2,000 persons and one technical cadre for every 500 persons. In the months before the election, the people were screened during the process of census-taking, and the qualified ones were registered. They were subjected to a barrage of propaganda and indoctrination in the form of meetings, forums, discussion groups, and through the media of books, pamphlets, films, radio broadcasts, and exhibitions. Mock elections were held where the cadres taught the voters how to conduct themselves, how to discuss the list of candidates and how to cast their ballots. Prior to the real election, experimental elections were held in a number of selected locations. These were the straw votes to give the Communist authorities an idea as to how well the cadres and propagandists have indoctrinated the people, how well the machinery operated, and what were the reactions of the people.

In Shensi, the experimental elections were held during the months from May to October, and the places where they were held included: the counties of Lin-tung, Nan-cheng, Pao-shan, Tao-shui, and, surprisingly, the wartime capital of the Communists, Yenan. As the results were satisfactory, the real elections were permitted to take place in October, and they were expected to be completed by the end of April, 1954.

In Kansu, due to the mixed population, the preparations for the elections were the reverse of those in China Proper.[d] While in North China, in preparation for the elections, 67,727 hsiang were merged into 20,000. In Kansu, the 3975 hsiang were increased to 5650.

By March, 1954, it was reported the basic elections were nine-tenths completed in Ninghsia with 90 per cent of the people

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 516]

Table 5. **COMPARISON OF ELECTION PROCEDURES**

Chinese Communists in 1937	Chinese Communists in 1953	Soviet Russia in 1936
Universal, direct, equal	Restricted to certain groups; direct at lowest level and indirect at upper levels, unequal	Restricted, indirect, unequal
Secret ballot	Show of hands at lower level, secret ballot at higher levels	Show of hands
All men and women over 18 including landlords and capitalists	All over 18 except landlords, counter-revolutionaries, lunatics, and those deprived of civil rights	Limited to workers, farmers, and petty bourgeoisie.
Voters vote as many times as there are levels, in county and regional elections	System pyramidal. Voters vote only at lowest levels for delegates who in turn elect delegates to higher levels	Pyramidal. Voters vote for delegates to local soviets, who in turn vote for upper soviets
Ballots of citizens in all walks of life counted without discrimination	Different proportions for urban, rural, Chinese, non-Chinese, army and overseas Chinese	Segregation of farmers, workers votes. Disproportionate representation.

The sections on Chinese Communists in 1937 and Soviet Russia in 1936 are based on Chu Yun, Factual Account of a Shensi Trip (Hankow, 1938), pp. 11-12, quoted in Hsu Yung-ying, A Survey of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region (IPR, 1945), I, p. 43.

The section on Chinese Communists in 1953 is based on the Electoral Law of 1953.

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*175 going to the polls, but in Chinghai where it was reported that 95
666 per cent of the people went to the polls, the election was only one-
*668 fourth completed.

In Sinkiang, the Communist authorities were more cautious.
S The experimental elections began in May, 1953, in 17 basic elec-
175 tion units (hsiang) selected from the ten administrative districts,
666 then in 36 basic election units. In these experimental elections,
668 80-95 per cent of the electorate turned out. With the successful
conclusion of the experiments, the real basic level elections began
in September in 665 basic level areas in Sinkiang, followed in
December by the second group of 860 basic level area elections.
By April, 1954, the basic level election in Sinkiang was concluded,
S having been held in 2,424 basic units in 83 counties and munici-
[369] palities. In urban areas, 89 per cent of the voters turned out,
while in southern Sinkiang, the turnout by the Uighur population
was 95 per cent. The elections during 1953 had been supervised
by 1,127 cadres who formed 144 election courts and 98 mobile
investigation teams, which uncovered 204 cases of irregularities
and nonconformity.

The fruit of the efforts of the election cadres was the election of large numbers of cadres and party members. Sixty-three per cent of the 619 new party members employed in the Sinkiang provincial and Urumchi municipal governments were elected as delegates. In 312 hsiang in Sinkiang, out of the 7,088 of the delegates elected, 5,248 were Communist Party cadres, and the bulk were Chinese. In Ninghsia, only 25 per cent of the 9,700 deputies elected in the basic level elections were Chinese Moslems (Hui).

N Moreover, the elections in the Northwest, as in the rest of
*175 China, were by no means universal. Vice-premier Teng Hsiao-
666 p'ing, one of the top officials in charge of the nationwide elections,
*668 revealed that basic level elections were not held in a quarter of
641 the regions inhabited by national minorities, and the number of
*563 national minority people who were not given a chance to vote came
to 8,708,169. The reason for defranchising these minority people,
he said, was due to the "lack of requisite conditions," which were
(1) the native cadres were unsatisfactory and (2) the people failed
to appreciate the nationality policy of the government. (NCNA
June 19, 1954).

N In contrast to the publicity given to the basic level elections
*175 in the Northwest, the elections in the higher levels were conducted
*668 quietly and, in many cases, the results were not published. How-
666 ever, from scattered information gleaned from the Communist
635 press, the following picture emerges: in Shensi, Kansu, and
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[175] Sinkiang, the incumbent governors were re-elected. Only in
[666] Chinghai, was there a change in the governor. In these four pro-
[668] vinces, three of the governors are Chinese. In the three provinces
[635] of Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai, about half of the thirteen vice-

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*175 governors were holdovers from the past, and of these thirteen,
666 nine were Chinese. The provincial people's congresses also
*668 showed a greater proportion of Chinese. In Kansu, 20 of the 25
635 elected members of the people's congress were Chinese, and in
Chinghai, 12 of the 23 were Chinese.

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*175 A word must be said about the representation of national
minorities in the National People's Congress in Peking in the fall
*563 of 1954. The number of national minorities in China, according
666 to the 1953 census, was 35,320,360, and they elected a total of
646 150 delegates. This comes to one delegate for every 235,470
persons, which compares unfavorably with the residents of municipalities and industrial centers where the ratio was one to
800,000. In the 1226-seat National People's Assembly, 177
national minority delegates (150 elected, 27 appointed) representing
six per cent of the total population, occupy 14 per cent of the seats.

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The seats allocated to the minorities of the Northwest were as
*175 follows: Kansu 8, Chinghai 6, and Sinkiang 18, or a total of 32.
*563 Geographically, the distribution of seats were: Sian municipality
646 8, Shensi 19, Kansu 25, Chinghai 9, Sinkiang 20, or a total of 82.
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It was not explained whether the 32 minority delegates were added
175 to the 82 or were part of the 82. If the total number of seats was
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646 82 for the 35,358,000 people of the Northwest, it would come to
one delegate for every 431,200 people. At any rate, the number
of seats is unimportant, except as window-dressing. The delegates were all Communist officials, fellow travellers, labor
heroes, military commanders, religious leaders, and educational
and technical workers, who, having been screened and processed
in the elections of successive levels, were not men who would
entertain nonconformist thoughts.

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Moreover, the formation of people's congresses, like the
642 establishment of regional autonomous governments, does not
631 mean that the people have been given the right to govern them-
646 selves. According to the Organic Law on the Local People's
Congresses and Local People's Councils adopted by the National
People's Congress in September, 1954, the functions and powers
of the people's congresses was "to ensure the observance and
execution of the laws, decrees, and resolutions of the people's
congresses of higher levels," (art. 6), and the functions and
powers of the people's councils (or people's governments) was
"to promote and carry out the decisions of the governments of
higher level" (art. 27).

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VI. Further Consolidation of Communist Control

*175 In the fall of 1954, as the elections were approaching their
631 final stage, there were structural changes in the administration
*668 of the Northwest which gave the impression that Peking was re-
177 laxing its grip over the Northwest. Following the decisions of the
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*175 Central People's Government, the province of Ninghsia was merged
631 into Kansu, (in June, 1956, the territory of the Alashan and Edsin-
*668 gol Mongols in Ninghsia was incorporated into the Inner Mongolia
177 Autonomous Region), the municipality of Sian was transferred from
the direct control of Peking to the Shensi Provincial People's Government, and the Northwest Administrative Council was dissolved.

However, by other more subtle means, the control of Peking over the Northwest provinces and the ascendancy of the Chinese over the national minority peoples in the border regions were bolstered, not reduced. The election of 1953-54 signalized the kick-off of the much heralded transition of China to socialism. This was the General Line of the State during the period of transition which was adopted by the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 24, 1953. In its economic aspects, it called for industrialization and collectivization, and in its political aspects, it stressed the consolidation of the unity of the peoples of China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, and Mao Tse-tung. (JMJP March 28, 1954).

These two aspects were interrelated, industrialization and collectivization aimed at bringing further the people in line with the policies of the Communist party and government and consolidation was to be accomplished by the employment of cadres and the party members to arouse and organize the masses (cf. decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in NCNA, January 8, 1954).

A. Collectivization

*175 Under a deliberate policy of the state, intensified by the Korean
*668 War, augmented by equipment and personnel transferred from the
178 coastal cities and facilitated by improvement in transportation, in-
dustrialization had made tremendous headway in the Northwest.
And with industrialization, the control of the workers by the state
also increased. By the end of 1955, 540 kilometers of the 2,800
[496] kilometer Lanchou-Sinkiang Railway had been completed, further
extending Communist control over the Northwest.

*175 However, the population of the Northwest is still predominantly
*668 agricultural, and it was in the organization of the residents of the
474 rural areas into mutual aid teams and cooperatives that the extent
of Communist control over the masses is best revealed. The
476 situation in the four Northwest provinces is as follows:
178 Shensi: During the year 1954, the program of organizing the
farmers into mutual aid teams and agricultural producers cooperatives suffered a setback due to incompetent leadership. (Report of Chao Shou-shan, NCNA August 14, 1954). As a report of the Northwest Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party revealed (JMJP August 19, 1954): "After the summer harvest, due to slack

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*175 leadership to mutual aid and cooperative organs in some places,
*668 a number of mutual aid teams ceased to exist. In Han-ch'eng
474 and Ho-yang, in Shensi, 20-30 per cent of such teams were suspended." As to agricultural cooperatives; the number increased
[476] from 1,970 or 1.32 per cent of the farming households in November 1954, to 17,000 or 16,83 per cent of the population by summer of last year. Plans are to increase the number fo 35,000 by 1957 to embrace 55 per cent of the households. However, by summer of last year (1955) too, the number of handicraft and supply and marketing cooperatives in Shensi embraced 13.64 per cent of the agricultural workers, and the 5416 credit cooperatives had a membership of 1,400,000 households, which was 45 per cent of the total farming households.

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[476] **Kansu:** in this province, where it was claimed that 57 per cent of the peasant population was organized, the number of mutual aid teams dropped from 245,300 in the spring of 1954 to 212,000 in 1955 and only a third of these was permanent. Due to "rightist ideology" of the cadres, the number of agricultural producers cooperatives also dropped from 7,419 in the fall of 1954 to 7,151 in spring of 1955. However, this was quickly rectified and by the end of the year, there were 16,849, embracing 23.43 per cent of the rural households and plans are to have 47,400 by 1957 to comprise 60 per cent of the households.

Chinghai: The 575 agricultural producers cooperatives at the beginning of 1955 embraced 80,000 households or 50 per cent of the peasant population. Sixty-seven per cent of the rural population was organized. (67.93 per cent)

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175 Sinkiang: Only five per cent of the 58,773 mutual aid teams in the
178 summer of 1954 were permanent. The number was increased to
474 75,275 embracing 63.32 per cent of the farming population, with 28.33 per cent of the teams permanent. The number of agricultural
476 producers cooperatives rose to 1,702 by fall of 1955, but they occupied only five per cent of the cultivated area and their 47,328 households came to only 5.3 per cent of the farming population. The plans for 1957 are for 11,216 cooperatives to include 41 per cent of the households.

Only in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous District was the collectivization more satisfactory. In the summer of 1955, there were 6,200 mutual aid teams and 243 cooperatives embracing 65 per cent of the farmers. The political organization of the rural population in Sinkiang was also behind the other provinces. According to Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 45.62 per cent of the farmers were organized in spring of 1955. (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

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Table 6. CADRES ASIGNED TO AND TRAINED FOR COOPERATIVE WORK

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	Total No. of Cadres	Number of Native Cadres	Cadres Assigned to Cooperatives	Cadres, to be trained for cooperative work
Shensi			20,000	200,000
Chinghai	8,500	3,400	3,100	7,300
Sinkiang	51,000	34,400	27,000	
Kansu (no figures available)				

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B. Transfer of Cadres

The vast expansion of cooperatives and the intensification of the collectivization of the people demanded an increase in the number of cadres to supervise them. The number of cadres assigned to the task of cooperative building and the number of cadres to be trained for such work up to the fall of 1955 are shown in Table 6.

The assignment of the large number of cadres to the rural areas was, according to Chang Chih-chung, "to consolidate the mutual aid teams and producers cooperative work under a policy of active leadership." (Ch'ün-chung jih-pao, January 1, 1954). However, the demoralization, the lack of discipline, the incompetence and low degree of political consciousness of the cadres when employed as officials of the people's governments during the first four years of Communist rule have not only impeded government and party work but also incurred ill-feeling among the people. The assignment of the cadres to the cooperatives in rural areas was to remove them from sensitive positions in the government.

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Consequently, by 1955, when the work of the cadres in directing the elections was over, there were few cadres left in the upper levels of government. This was particularly the case of the national minority cadres. In Chinghai, out of the 3,400 native cadres, only 93 held responsible positions in the party organization in December, 1954, and in Sinkiang, only a third of the cadres in party committees on all levels were natives, two-thirds were Chinese. In the government and in state enterprises, the number of national cadres was even less. According to Wang En-mao, secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, only 682 out of the 34,400 national minority cadres held responsible positions in the governments above the levels of county, although it was claimed in other Communist publications that 84.6 per cent of the cadres in government offices below county levels were natives. In the state commercial, animal products, tea, silk, and export enterprises, 63 per cent of the officials were Chinese. One of the reasons for the demotion of the national minority cadres was their lack of education and training. Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, seeking to rationalize this state of affairs, said that of the 36,000 national minority cadres (his figure) trained in all fields of work since 1949, only 2,500 showed enough initiative to be promoted to be leadership cadres. (JMJP September 24, 1955).

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To bolster the position of the Chinese cadres and to fill the ranks depleted by the transfer of local cadres to the work of collectivizing the peasant population, large numbers of cadres and workers were sent to the Northwest from the coastal provinces. The figures of Table 7, gathered from scattered items in the Communist press, are incomplete, but they give an idea of the horde of cadres and approved workers and students pouring into the northwestern provinces during 1955. [TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 523]

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Table 7. WORKERS AND CADRES TRANSFERRED TO THE NORTHWEST

Date	Profession	Number	Total Number	From	Destination
January to May	workers		16,000	Shanghai	Northwest
May	workers	1,600	3,620	"	"
	truck drivers	430		"	"
	govt. cadres	1,000		Peking	Sinkiang
	cadres	362		Kuangtung	"
	demobilized servicemen	238		Chekiang	"
June	workers	1,865	2,665	Tsinan	Lanchou
	students	800		Peking	Sinkiang
July	doctors				
August	workers	900	5,640	Tientsin	"
	students from Indonesia				"
	govt. cadres	1,000		Peking	"
	" "	900		Tientsin	"
	students	540		Kiangsu	"
	"	300		Kuangtung, Shanghai	"
	"	2,000		Tientsin	"
November	govt. cadres	1,400	2,000	Peking	"
	" "	600		"	Chinghai
		Total	29,925		

000 northwestern provinces during 1955.

S Thus, even from incomplete sources, the number of people
175 sent out to the Northwest came close to 30,000. Of this number,
668 the bulk were destined for Sinkiang. The influx of this horde of
166 Chinese into Sinkiang was to safeguard Chinese Communist inter-
N est and Chinese ascendancy prior to the granting of autonomy to
*[175] the native peoples of Sinkiang. As early as the summer of 1953,
*[668] Burkhan had sought to prepare the ground for the invasion of the
[166] Chinese. In a speech, he said, "It has been due to the great help rendered by the Han Chinese cadres from other provinces and the People's Liberation Army during the past three years since the liberation that achievements of the people of all nationalities in Sinkiang in their construction work was possible. Therefore, after the enforcement of regional autonomy, autonomous organs at various levels should retain a certain number of Han Chinese cadres to take part in work." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 20, 1953).

N C. Expansion of the Communist Party

*175 Along with the assignment of cadres to the countryside to
*668 carry out the work of collectivization and the transfer of workers
178 and cadres from China Proper to the Northwest, there was also an expansion of the membership of the Communist Party in the Northwest. The induction of men into the Chinese Communist Party and into its auxiliary, the New Democratic Youth League (Communist Youth League), had been active from the beginning of Communist rule. In 1950, out of the 3,600 national minority cadres trained in the short-term classes, 560 joined the Chinese Communist Party and 1,000 the New Democratic Youth League; in 1951, out of the 1044 graduates of the Sinkiang Chinese Communist Party Sub-bureau Cadre School, 88 joined the Communist Party and 726 the New Democratic Youth League.

In May, 1952, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued instructions to strengthen the work of party expansion, and ordered the directors of the Organization Departments of local party committees to convene and to work out methods for party expansion. "In rural areas where land reform has already been carried out, we must recruit more new party members and build up our party organizations so that we may vigorously promote mutual aid and cooperation of labor in production," stated a Central Committee directive (JMJP May 4, 1952). In 1954, the announcement of the General Line for the transition of the state to socialism brought a further acceleration of the work of party expansion.

Shensi: From June, 1952 to the end of 1954, a total of 3,625 basic level (hsiang) party branches were established, increasing the number from 60 per cent to 86 per cent, and 36,833 new members recruited. Up to the end of 1954, the majority of the new

* 175 party members were from the urban areas. In 1954, 4,000 workers
178 were admitted into the party, a 14-time increase over 1953,
*668 and in the city of Sian, 40 per cent of the new members were
workers. However, the bulk of the party men were in the government where they made up 23.6 per cent of the administrative personnel. In 125 factories, mines, and government enterprises there were no party branches, and in 63 industrial units there were no party members.

*175 In the rural areas of Shensi, up to March, 1955, less than 0.6 per cent of the party members were farmers. Of the 845 hsiang
178 in Shensi, 156 had no party members and in 15 per cent of the
*668 agricultural producers' cooperatives, notably those in Yenan (the
474 old Communist capital), Han-ch'eng, and An-kang, had no party
members. In the remaining 85 per cent of the cooperatives, the only party members were the members of the cooperatives and heads of the mutual aid teams. In Yenan Administrative District,
[476] for example, out of the 106 new members inducted into the Communist Party in 1954, 82 were members of the agricultural producers cooperatives and 24 were heads of mutual aid teams, and in Ch'ang-an county, 93 per cent of the 358 new party members were from the cooperatives.

*175 The focus of attention during 1955 was the recruitment of party members from the factories and from the farms. Out of the
*668 38,300 new party members to be recruited in 1955, 28,000 were
178 to be from the rural areas, 5,600 from the factories, 3,300 from
government agencies, and 1,400 from the schools. In the first batch of 6,000 new members recruited in spring of 1955 included 4,000 model farmers and 1,200 model factory workers. The total party members up to March, 1955 was 95,000.

Kansu: Party organization was stronger here than in Shensi. In 1954, 3,400 "advanced" peasants joined the party and there was a total of 3,938 rural party branches in 70.54 per cent of the hsiang. 16,200 party members held positions in the cooperatives and mutual aid teams. In 1955, 20,000 new members were recruited, and plans call for the recruitment of 120,000 Chinese Communist Party members and 480,000 New Democratic Youth League members by 1958.

Chinghai: By the end of 1954, there were 3,121 party members
* [563] in Chinghai, 732 of whom were recruited from the 3,471
national minority cadres. Out of the 190 cadres trained in the Shun-hua Salar Autonomous Area, 61 joined the Communist Party. Since it was reported that there were party branches in 70 per cent of the hsiang, party leadership is spread very thin. Of the three thousand party members in Chinghai, only 93 native party members were employed in party headquarters, and 865 assigned to rural areas. As to the New Democratic Youth League, there were at the end of 1955, 9,328 members.

Sinkiang: Party work was also slow in this province. Although
175 at the end of 1953, it was reported that 75.68 per cent of the
178 6,400 new Party members were recruited from the national
668 minorities, only 26.1 per cent of the responsible personnel in
party committees of county level and higher were natives. The Chinese members still predominated. As to the New Democratic Youth League, there were in 1955 a total of 57,228 members in Sinkiang, and this organization supplied 3,900 of its members to the Chinese Communist Party.

Compared to the rest of Sinkiang, the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou did much better in the recruitment of party members. From 1950 to March, 1955, it recruited a total of 1,100 new party members from the activists.

VII. Formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region

A. Extend and Limitations of Regional Autonomy

175 The expansion of Chinese Communist Party membership, the
668 transfer of local cadres to the work of cooperative-building in
642 the rural areas and the collectivization of the people, the relega-
563 tion of native cadres to unimportant government posts, and the
177 influx of hordes of cadres and workers from China Proper to take
over the governments and state enterprises were preliminary steps preparatory to the conferring of regional autonomy to the non-Chinese population of Sinkiang. Self-rule has been an objective for which the minority peoples of Chinese Turkestan aspired and struggled, and the promises of self-determination and self-government were the chief planks of the political platform of the Chinese Communists. However, the definition of what constitutes autonomy for the minority peoples has undergone evolution.

As early as 1930, Mao Tse-tung had declared that the non-Chinese racial minorities "have a right to determine by themselves whether they want to secede from the Chinese Soviet Republic and form their own independent state, or to join the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or to form an autonomous region of the Chinese Soviet Republic." (The Soviets in China, p. 440 quoted in Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 115). This was incorporated in Article 14 of the constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic promulgated in 1931, with the omission of the right to join the USSR.

The Chinese Communists reaffirmed their promise of autonomy to the nationality minorities when they came to power in 1949, but autonomy was to be within the federal framework of the Chinese People's Republic and no mention was made of the right of secession by the non-Chinese minorities. The Common Program adopted by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September, 1949, promised only regional self-government and preservation of the language, religion and culture of the minority peoples, 175 and equality and prohibition of discrimination.

177 The policies of the Chinese Communists were incorporated
668 into the "General Program for the enforcement of nationalities
642 regional autonomy" which was promulgated in August, 1952,
563 along with two supplementary documents, one for the enforcement of local nationalities democratic coalition governments and the other for the protection of the equality and interests of the national minorities. Article 2 of chapter one of the General Program declared explicitly that the nationality regional autonomous areas were local administrations under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and the leadership of higher level people's governments. Chapter four provides for the "rights" of autonomy, which include the acquiescence to the leadership personnel, the use of their own language and literature, and the privilege of having their "patriotic" activists promoted to be cadres. No mention was made of the right of the nationalities to initiate legislation, and matters of finances, public security forces and militia were under the control of the Central People's Government. Chapter five stipulated that the minorities should love the Chinese and love and support the Chinese People's Republic, and chapter six stated that they should follow the leadership of governments of a higher level.

These provisions were incorporated into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted in October, 1954, which, in article 2, reiterated that the autonomous regions were inalienable parts of the People's Republic of China. Autonomy for the minority peoples, thus defined, meant only the preservation of the language and literature of the minority peoples. The autonomous regions were actually in the same status as a Chinese province, with no legislative powers of their own and no freedom from supervision and control of the Central Government. The love of and adhesion to the fatherland was reaffirmed and no separatist movements permitted from "the great family of the fatherland."

B. Autonomy for Sinkiang

Since autonomy for the national minorities, as conceived by the Chinese Communist who in turn copied it from Soviet Russia, was autonomy in name only and a sham, it was not likely to satisfy the people of Chinese Turkestan, with their tradition for independence and their aspirations for self-government. To quiet them, the provincial governor Burkhan Shahidi, in an article denouncing pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism as destructive to the "fraternal and cooperative family" of China, told his people that they did not qualify for national independence. "It is conceivable," he said, "that people who speak the Turkish language may not form a nation as they lack common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychology. Similarly, people who believe in Islam do

175 not ipso facto form a nation." And, he went on, "At this juncture,
177 any national movement which seeks separation from the Chinese
668 People's Republic for independence will be reactionary since...
642 it would undermine the interests of the various races and particularly
563 the foremost majority of the race concerned (that is, the
Chinese), and thus would work to the advantage of imperialism."
(JMJP October 2, 1951).

175 Later, in June, 1953, Burkhan enumerated the prerequisite
177 conditions for Sinkiang to achieve autonomy within the framework
668 of the Chinese People's Republic. The future Sinkiang autonomous
642 area, he said, must "be an inseparable part of the People's
[563] Republic of China and the autonomous areas of minority nationalities
in Sinkiang are likewise inseparable parts of Sinkiang and the
People's Republic of China."

The formation of autonomous governments in nationality areas, declared Burkhan, was contingent not only on having a large number of representatives and nationality cadres in these areas but also on the representatives and cadres of other nationalities in the governments, and he went on to explain that by other nationalities, he meant the Han Chinese cadres, whose presence was necessary because the native peoples were politically and culturally backward. "Autonomous organs at various levels should retain a certain number of Han Chinese cadres."

A third condition for the establishment of regional autonomy was the extent of the organization of the people. "It is imperative," he said, "to conduct more penetratively and extensively publicity and education to the people of all nationalities on patriotism and Sino-Soviet friendship."

Fourthly, he told the people of Chinese Turkestan, they should not be impatient and resentful just because other nationalities in the Northwest had already been granted regional autonomy. Regional autonomy in Sinkiang had to be achieved in five stages; at the hsiang and ch'ü level, at the county level, at the district level, at the administrative district level, and finally, at the provincial level with the Uighur as the principal constituent.

Burkhan, in conclusion, pointed to the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region as "the example of the advantages of exercising autonomy in nationality areas," and "the perfect example for other minority nationalities in the implementation of autonomy in the future." (Sinkiang jih-pao, June 20, 1953).

By fall of 1954, the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the
[563] Central People's Government in Peking was satisfied with the
"notable progress made in substantiating minority self-government organs," which included the promotion of large numbers of native cadres from the activists, the staffing of the governments with cadres, the use of the languages of the minorities, and "in some localities, armed forces of indigenous peoples have been built

175 177 under the leadership of the local party and government organs."
668 (JMJP, August 28, 1954).
642 Finally, in August, 1955, when out of the total of thirty-three
[563] autonomous areas in Sinkiang below the rank of districts, four
[631] were raised to the status of chou and six to the status of districts,
it was announced that Sinkiang would be made into the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in September.

Large numbers of dignitaries journeyed from Peking to attend the second session of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Conference at Urumchi, where the change in the status of Sinkiang was proclaimed on September 20. Among them was vice-premier Tung Pi-wu, who, in his address, told the local leaders that the bases for the establishment of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region lay in elevation of the patriotism and socialist consciousness of the people, the training and employment of large numbers of cadres, and on the degree of unity among the nationalities. To preserve and consolidate the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, he said, the people of Sinkiang must (1) welcome the assistance of the Han Chinese cadres, (2) actively assist the other nationality autonomous areas in construction, (3) pay serious attention to education in patriotism and socialism and prevent the tendency of great nation and provincial nationalism, and (4) consolidate national unity and wipe out the counter-revolutionaries. (NCNA September 21, 1955).

175 Burkhan, in his speech, elaborated on the statements of Tung
177 Pi-wu by saying that the main task of the Chinese Communist
668 Party on the problem of nationalities during the transitional
642 period was to consolidate the unity of the fatherland and the
563 solidarity among the nationalities in a common effort to build the
big family of the fatherland and to follow the centralized leadership of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, the Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Communist Party and the provincial people's government. Just as the Uighurs, who are the majority people in Sinkiang, need the help and support of the Han Chinese of China Proper, so the other minority peoples, such as the Kazakhs in Ili, need the help and support of the Uighurs.

"With the establishment of the Uighur autonomous region in Sinkiang, we should all the more warmly welcome the sincere and selfless help extended by the Han Chinese and cadres of brother nationalities. This is because the Han Chinese and their cadres have gone through a long period of revolutionary training and experience.... Only under the unified guidance of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Central People's Government, and the party committee in the autonomous region as well as the warm help of the Han Chinese and cadres, and further efforts to consolidate and strengthen unity among the

175 nationalities, will it be possible for Sinkiang nationalities to exer-
177 cise fully the rights of being masters of their own domain and
668 vigorously develop the political and cultural activities, in the
642 Autonomous Region." (NCNA September 24, 1955).

563 On October 1, 1955, the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region officially came into being. The last act of the Sinkiang People's
[666] Congress was the election of the 37-man people's council of the new Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (the names of the members have not yet been published). Saifuddin, the vice-chairman of the erstwhile provincial council, was elected chairman of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, but at the end of the month he resigned and Burkhan, the former chairman was reelected chairman. The vice-chairmen included Kao Chin-shun, former vice-chairman, and two natives, a Uighur and a Kazakh.

The Sinkiang Sub-bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, formerly subordinated to the Northwest Bureau, was made independent and renamed the Sinkiang Committee, but the party officials remained unchanged. The first secretary was Wang En-mao, a native of Kiangsi who spoke none of the local languages, the second secretary was Kao Chin-shun, concurrently vice-chairman of the autonomous region, the third secretary was Chang Pang-ying. Only the fourth secretary, Saifuddin, was a native. These men had held their positions since 1949. Both the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Sinkiang party committee thus came directly under the control of Peking.

VIII. Prospects

195 The formation of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
177 brings to a close an important phase in the political domination of
668 the Northwest by the Chinese Communists. By 1955, under the intensive program of party expansion and the staffing of the governments by party men and by tried and tested cadres, the provinces of Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai were already under effective Communist control. The United Front of the period of "New Democracy" came to an end with the transition of the country to socialism. The non-Communists in the government were cowed and eliminated. Those who survived the purges of 1952 were weeded out in the
[642] elections of 1953-54. The granting of autonomy to the Uighurs and other minority peoples in Chinese Turkestan was to placate their discontent and to satisfy their yearning for self-rule, but it was rigged in such a manner as to make the domination of the Chinese Communists over Sinkiang and its ties with China Proper firmer and stronger than that accomplished by any governments in the past.

However, the efforts of the Chinese Communists to consolidate and centralize their control over the Northwest provinces are still impeded, internally, by the clash of interests within the ranks

175 of the Communist hierarchy and externally by popular resistance.
177 The temporary setback in the program of collectivization in
668 Shensi and Kansu in 1954 had been attributed to the hostility of
the peasants and the ineptitude of the cadres. As late as March,
1954, it was revealed that "the cultural standard of the cadres
was low; only one in every three cadres could read.... The work
of political propaganda and education of the peasants in some
areas has not been carried out well and penetratingly enough."
(Kansu jih-pao, March 15, 1956). One of the main reasons for
the inertia of the cadres and party members, said Chang Chung-liang,
secretary of the Kansu Chinese Communist Party committee,
was their fear of the new situation created by the transition
from New Democracy to socialism, which has been added to their
rightist ideology. (NCNA November 2, 1955).

Besides the fear of the future, another demoralizing factor
175 was the unwillingness of the cadres and party members to leave
668 their positions in the governments and to work in the cooperatives
474 in the countryside, in defiance of the orders of their superiors.
578 As Wang En-mao, first secretary of the Sinkiang Chinese Communist
Party sub-bureau, pointed out: "The largest defect during the
past year was the failure on the part of party committees of all
levels to resolutely, effectively, and properly transfer the leadership
center to rural work in mutual aid and cooperation. Certain
defects also exist in our work in the nationalities and religious
fields." (Sinkiang jih-pao, March 2, 1955).

175 The defects in nationality work were still charged to "the
vestiges of great nation chauvinism and local nationalism," caused
668 by "the practice of usurpation by Han Chinese coming from other
563 parts of China," and their disrespect to the minority cadres, and
578 by the minority cadres who were "conceited, unwilling to study,
refusing to observe discipline and doing things not according to
policy and principle." (NCNA September 17, 1954.)

The incompetence and demoralization of the cadres and party
members, who constitute the main working force of the Communists
in the domination of the Northwest, and the discord and friction
within their ranks went, pari passu, with the opposition of the
people, to undermine the rule of the Chinese Communists. As in
the past, popular opposition to the government was often carried
on under the trappings of religion. In the Chinese inhabited
areas of Shensi and Kansu, the Taoist secret society known as
[794] I-kuan-tao was still alive and active in the summer of 1955, and
[575] the farmers were required to sign pacts pledging to support the
government in banning this sect.

175 Out in Sinkiang, pan-Islamism still gripped the mind of the
668 people who are predominantly Moslem. "Individual counter-revo-
669 lutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam," said Burkhan last
578 year, "and, putting on the cloak of religion, are carrying out
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175 counter-revolutionary activities." He said that they were carrying
668 on "rumor spreading, sabotage, and the deception of the masses in
669 an attempt to undermine our revolutionary unity." (Sinkiang jih-
578 pao, February 25, 1955). Consequently, he went on, only "legal"
795 religious activities would be permitted by the people's government.

[798] By spring of 1956, as the heavy hand of Communist rule was
intensified, the counter-revolutionary activities of the people also
668 increased. Su Chen-yung, deputy director of the Bureau of Public
669 Security in the Kansu People's government, revealed the extent of
578 popular unrest in the Northwest when he said: "The counter-revolutionaries have unceasingly waged their destructive activities against the socialist transformation enterprises in both the cities and the countryside. With the purpose of impeding the work of peasants joining the cooperatives and sabotaging the agricultural production, they concentrated on certain reactionary landowners, wealthy peasants and Taoist leaders to cheat backward elements into establishing false cooperatives and even organizing uprisings. Counter-revolutionaries hidden in factories, mines, and basic construction projects resort to such base acts as sabotaging technical reforms, stealing government secrets, and purposely committing errors of work in order to proceed with their destructive activities. Counter-revolutionaries also hid themselves in religious circles. Under the cloak of religion, they proceeded upon various kinds of destructive activities." (Kansu jih-pao, March 18, 1956).

This revelation of popular opposition to Communist rule almost six years after its establishment in the Northwest shows that the age-old conflicts of culture and ideology, which in the past have divided the region, and the stubborn recalcitrance of the people, which makes government difficult, still remain despite the efforts of the Chinese Communists in centralization and domination, in indoctrination and repression, which were unprecedented in their severity and ruthlessness. The divisive nature of the region and the discontent of the people are intrinsic conditions and cardinal factors in the political life of China's Northwest. Even the Communists themselves, in their public statements, have candidly acknowledged the difficulties and foresee greater resistance from the people as the program for socialism gets under way.

PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

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Additional Readings

1: Washington S-4 (no. date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
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PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

I. Introduction

A. Historical Administration of Area

N 1. Ch'ing Dynasty

*175 During the Ch'ing dynasty, Shensi and Kansu were two of the
635 eighteen provinces which formed China proper. The police
625 system and the problems of public order and safety were simi-
184 lar to those of the other provinces. (See Section on Public Order
and Safety in General Handbook.) However, in the Chinghai area,
the maintenance of order was mainly entrusted to the native local
S chiefs. In Sinkiang, a network of military garrisons under the rule
175 of Manchu military officers was established. Its main purpose was
701 to suppress possible rebellions by the minority groups. The daily
669 administration and maintenance of order among the minorities at
the lower local level, however, here also rested with the minority
chiefs and local leaders. The efficiency of this system is illus-
trated by the record of the riots. Periodically, at intervals of
roughly thirty to fifty years, a major rebellion broke out. Numer-
N ous small riots occurred between the big conflicts. As a whole,
*175 however, the Ch'ing dynasty's maintenance of public order in the
625 northwest was considered to be successful.

2. Post 1911

When the revolution came in 1911, the situations varied in the different provinces. The weakness of the central government in Peking helped further the development of local forces. In Shensi, Kansu (and Ninghsia) and Ch'inghai, there were various warlords who occupied and dominated a certain portion of the land at various times. The purpose of the police forces under the warlords was to maintain their dominant position. Their police forces were efficient or less so, depending on the personalities of the leaders. Often they were backward and cruel, but usually they followed the traditional pattern of the Chinese bureaucracy. Most of the warlords adopted the "closed-door" policy. Outsiders, especially those viewed as potential trouble-makers, were not too free to travel around. This simplified police work since the local population was comparatively less educated and, except for the Moslems, more submissive than the outsiders.

S In Sinkiang, the situation was complicated by two factors.
175 First, it was exposed to foreign agitation, particularly from Russia
625 and Great Britain. Second, it had a mixed population with the
[648] Chinese in the minority. Therefore, the purpose and mission of
(563) the police forces in Sinkiang were traditionally difficult. Main-
taining the leader's power involved dealing with foreign influences
and with the various local peoples. These constant challenges made
the police forces in Sinkiang more alert and efficient than in other

S
175 places. For instance, during the first two or three years of the
625 Republic, when Sinkiang was controlled by the governor Yang
Tseng-hsin, numerous local officials lost their lives in local riots.
However, Yang built up a police force efficient enough to maintain
peace and order for almost two decades, a record much better than
that of the average warlords who controlled other provinces during
S the same period. However, Yang finally was assassinated. Later,
[177] when another ambitious man, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, controlled Sinkiang,
he developed a modern police system patterned after the Soviet
secret police. Purge after purge made Sinkiang a police state,
though people had to give credit to Sheng for his efficiency in maintaining
public order. With the removal of Sheng, this police force
declined and the province gradually fell into a chaotic situation again.

S
N B. Problems of Managing Diverse Groups

184 Managing the different ethnic groups was a common problem
577 throughout the Northwest, but it was especially serious in Sinkiang
where more than a dozen different peoples lived. The problem can
be viewed in terms of the different moral standards which were the
result of their different cultural patterns and their historical and
S geographical backgrounds. For instance, among the Chinese, to
N give shelter overnight to a stranger is a favor, not an obligation.
[671] But according to V.A. Riasanovsky: *Customary Law of the Mongol
Tribes*, p. 88, among the Mongols, refusal to give shelter for the
[674] night is a crime. Obviously over the barren, bitter cold desert and
steppe refusal to grant shelter may mean life or death to a wandering
traveller, while among the Chinese agricultural society it was
S usually only an inconvenience. Among the Moslems, Muhammad Ali
N in *The Religion of Islam*, p. 759, reports that it is believed that
681 people are equal before God, so that punishment must be inflicted
184 without respect of persons. On the contrary, the Mongols pay much
674 respect to their leaders. Riasanovsky *op. cit.*, p. 93, states: "The
punishment changes not only with respect to the object, but also
with respect to the subject of the crime: there is no equality before
S the law." Hence, *ibid.*, p. 88, "for the murder (with arson) of a
N nobleman the punishment is ruin (confiscation of all properties);
[565] of a man of the middle class -- 300 animals, 30 valuable things;
of a man of the lower class -- 15 times nine animals and one valuable
thing." Adultery and rape are serious crimes among the
N Chinese. However, the Tibetans, according to Robert B. Ekvall:
681 *Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border*, p. 11, permit
more freedom in sexual intercourse than most people. Theft is
184 punished by the Mongolian laws, Riasanovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 91,
674 reports, especially if a third theft, the punishment for which is
ruin. But to the Tibetans "a crime is determined by the position of
the one against whom it is committed. Robbery of a stranger is
laudable; robbery of another Tibetan is serious only if he is powerful

681 184 674 and has great prestige; robbery of a chief may be a life-and-death matter; and robbery of some great living Buddha would mean almost certain death," states Ekvall, op. cit., p. 70. In the past, these problems of differences were somewhat minimized by leaving the various ethnic groups to their own leaders. For instance, as late as in the 1930's, among the Tibetans on the Kansu-Tibetan border, Ekvall reports that the village was the basic unit of administration:

621 184 "The village organization is generally an informal one. Among the farmers there is a tendency to have a properly chosen head-man; but among the nomads, although there is usually one person in the encampment who is known as the head-man by right of his influence, it is seldom that he has been chosen formally. The real power and final court of appeal is found in the group of substantial middle-aged and elderly men known as the elders (rgan-po), and their word is final in village affairs. Villages - whether villages in the restricted sense, like those of the sedentary districts, or in the larger sense which includes the encampments of the nomads - are associated in groups that have common territorial interests"(op. cit., p. 68).

II: Communist Administration

*668 625 A. The System in General

In order to suppress widespread resistance, the Communists have organized the largest and most complicated police system in Chinese history. This system includes regular police as well as secret police. To make sure that the police force will not rebel, there are numerous branches in the system to check on each other. The final control, however, is in the hands of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. To understand this complicated system, it is necessary to draw a skeleton diagram of the whole system instead of just the part in northwest China.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

REGULAR POLICE SYSTEM IN NORTHWEST CHINA

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
PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SAFETY BUREAU
SPECIAL DISTRICT PUBLIC SAFETY BUREAU
PROVINCIAL POLICE CORPS
COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY BUREAU
SPECIAL DISTRICT POLICE CORPS
MUNICIPAL PUBLIC SAFETY BUREAU
SUB-BUREAU (STATION)
MUNICIPAL POLICE CORPS
SUB-STATION
COUNTY POLICE CORPS
PUBLIC SECURITY DEFENSE COMMITTEE
PUBLIC SECURITY GROUP
PUBLIC SECURITY CELL

*668 1. The secret service

625 The command of the police system on mainland China rests with the national headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party. Nominally it is the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, but the real power is in the hands of the small group which forms the Political Bureau. In turn this bureau is influenced greatly by the Secretariat and the secretary-general. When the secretary-general is strong he may even dominate the bureau. It usually makes the decisions on policy. *668 The secret police service's executive body is centered around the Social Department of the Central 625 Committee of the Party. This Department has a direct system of 647 organization within the Party. In large areas (such as the former northwest region) or in special areas (such as Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region), there is a Social Department subordinate to the Party's "Central Committee Sub-bureau." From this level down, like the Party local organization, there is a social department or social secretary at each level to take charge of the secret service in the corresponding area.

*668 2. Other police systems

625 Built around this Party secret service system, are numerous other separate, but not entirely independent, systems of police forces. The most important is the regular police. Organizationally, this is a branch of the People's government. [645] Its central headquarters is the Ministry of Public Security under the Govern- [647] ment Administration Council. From this level down there is a branch office of the department at every level of the People's government. This branch commands the regular police forces.

The United Front Department system which extends to the provincial and municipal levels, is designed for two purposes. Negatively, it infiltrates into the organizations of the people and watches their functions. Positively, it dominates and utilizes the people's organizations to promote the Party program.

The system of People's control is similar. Here, people are used as spies for the Party. The People's Procurator system is slightly different. It is a prosecuting government organ. Since prosecution needs the investigation of facts, inevitably this sytem is involved in the police system.

[645] The spy system under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has a dual purpose. Positively, this system infiltrates into for- [648] eign territories to conspire for future conquests. Negatively, it is used to detect and prevent possible agitations which may disturb public order in mainland China.

*668 The police and spy system among the military forces can be 625 divided into two parts. The system of political defense is used to weed out potential political enemies inside the army, while the 708 scout and spy system is mainly used to detect military enemies. 726 Both of these systems have branches in the field army and the army areas.

000 areas.

*668 Although there are so many different branches in the whole
625 police system, final control still rests in the hands of the "Party Central."

*668 Before the abolition of the Northwest Region there was a
Northwest Regional Public Security Department in charge of the
625 regular police in the area. From June 19, 1954, when the Depart-
647 ment, together with the Northwest Administrative Committee was
abolished, the provincial Public Security Bureaus, in Shensi,
Kansu, Chinghai and Sinkiang gained increased prominence. Start-
[631] ing with the provincial level, there is an office of Public Security
at every level. The Sub-Bureau (or Station) is the Public Security
Office at the ch'ü (district) level; the sub-station is at the hsiang
level, while the public security group is the lowest open office.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

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CHART II.

THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAUS


PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU
POLICE CORPS (Regiment strength)
LABOR CAMPS
POLICE SCHOOL
BORDER DEFENSE PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU
SPECIAL DISTRICT PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU
POLICE CORPS
SECRETARIAT
PUBLIC ORDER DEFENSE SECTION
MILITARY DEFENSE SECTION
PUBLIC ORDER ADMINISTRATION SECTION
POLICE ADMINISTRATION SECTION
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SECTION
LABOR REFORM SECTION
COUNTY (MUNICIPAL) PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU
SECRETARIAT
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SECTION
PERSONNEL SECTION
THE 1st SECTION (POLITICAL DEFENSE)
THE 2nd SECTION (PUBLIC ORDER ADMINISTRATION)
THE 3rd SECTION (DETECTIVE)
CRIMINAL COURT POLICE CORPS
THE 4th SECTION (JURISDICTION)
FIRE DEPARTMENT
PRISON FOR PEOPLE AWAITING TRIAL
POLICE CORPS (Company strength)
PUBLIC SECURITY SUB-BUREAU (Station)
SECRETARIAT
SUPPLY SECTION
ADMINISTRATION SECTION
CENSUS SECTION
JUDICIAL SECTION
POLITICAL SECTION (SOCIAL SECTION)
DETECTIVE GROUP
SUB-STATION
STAFF OFFICER
CENSUS OFFICER
PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICER
POLICE CORPS (Platoon strength)
PUBLIC SECURITY CELLS
CH'U PUBLIC SECURITY ASSISTANT
HSIANG (village), PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICER
THE 1st OFFICE (Secretariat)
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
SECRETARIAT
PERSONNEL SECTION
COMMUNICATION SECTION
THE 2nd OFFICE (Political Defense)
POLITICAL DEFENSE SECTION
ECONOMIC DEFENSE SECTION
BORDER DEFENSE SECTION
MILITARY DEFENSE SECTION
INFORMATION OFFICE
THE 3rd OFFICE (Public Security Administration)
PUBLIC SECURITY SECTION
CENSUS SECTION
TRANSPORTATION SECTION
FIRE-CONTROL SECTION
ALIEN CONTROL SECTION
THE 4th OFFICE (Police Administration)
RESEARCH SECTION
DETECTIVE SECTION
INVESTIGATION SECTIO
POLITICAL SECTION
JUDICIAL SECTION
THE 5th OFFICE (Logistics)
MANAGEMENT SECTION
SUPPLY SECTION
CASHIER SECTION
AUDIT SECTION
ACCOUNTING SECTION
THE 6th OFFICE (Labor Reformation)

following page 537

625 The above chart (chart II) is self-explanatory. However,
*668 in the past, the major work of the police station was the fight
178 against crime. At present, the emphasis has been shifted to
political defense. Thus, the political section becomes a major
section in the internal organization of the police offices. To
673 view the problem from another angle, even common crimes
*668 can be political in nature. A case of arson may be considered
sabotage of state property. A case of theft may involve the stealing of state property. Murder may be viewed as a disruption of production. Therefore it is difficult to separate common crimes from political resistance. One of the major arguments of the Communists to defend their own criminal past (e.g. Chou En-lai has a record as murderer in Shanghai Police Department) is the political purpose of the crime.

3. Committee of residents

625 In addition to the regular police, the Communists have also
*668 organized and used the common people to maintain public order
and safety. In cities, there are Committees of Residents. These Committees are organized by districts, each one controlling from 100 to 600 families. Under the committee are "cells of residents." Each cell includes from 15 to 40 families. Each committee shall not control more than 17 such cells. The main function of these cells and committees is to maintain public order. ("The Regulations of the Urban Committee of Residents," adopted by the 4th meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on December 31, 1954, articles 2 and 3 in Peking Kuang-ming Jih-pao, January 1, 1955.)

The rural areas have Security Committees, the administrative village being the unit with 3 to 11 members participating. Under these committees, security teams of 3 to 5 activitsts are established. These people police the countryside for the Communist government. The functions and power of these security committees are:

> 1)...Arresting and rugning over to the government and public security organs of counter-revolutionaries caught flagrant, derelicts and criminals wanted by law, but... have no power to try to imprison or dispose of such criminals.
>
> 2)...Investigating, supervising, prosecuting and denouncing counter-revolutionaries other than those caught in the act, but...have no power to arrest, detain, search or restrict them.
>
> 3)...Educating the masses to preserve the revolutionary order and supervising the persons subject to control in labor and production, forbidding them to speak and act indiscriminately and reporting in time to the public security organs on their behavior, but...have no power to

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*668 detain, punish or evict them... ("The Provisional Regulations Governing Organization of Security Committees" proclaimed on August 10, 1952 by the Ministry of Public Safety of the CPG, NCNA, Peking, August 10, 1952.)

Besides these auxiliary police forces, there are People's Supervision Correspondents and People's Denunciation Reception Rooms. People's Supervision Correspondents are recruited from every branch of government organs, enterprises and people's popular bodies in towns and villages. The members are selected from among the activists. "The tasks of the People's Supervision Correspondents are to investigate all cases of violation of laws and discipline and damage to the state and people's interest such as graft, waste, bureaucracy and dereliction of duty by government organs, enterprises and their personnel, as well as to canvass the opinions of the masses on the implementation of government policies and laws, report them to supervisory organs of a superior level and to leading officials of their own departments and to assist them in the disposal of cases. The methods for studying and discovering problems are: (1) to observe and discover problems through their own activities; (2) to regularly go deep into the masses to discover problems and listen to the views of the masses; (3) to collect accusations and appeals from the masses through people's opinion boxes; (4) to maintain close contacts with the People's Denunciation Reception Rooms, and to cooperate with the latter in work." (NCNA, Peking, August 25, 1952.)

The same source adds "The principal task of the People's Denunciation Reception Rooms is to receive and dispose of accusations and appeals from the masses."

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*668 These police forces are supported by the regular People's Liberation Army and the militias. The militias are local self-defense corps who, according to Peking, Jen-min jih-pao, August 10, 1952, p. 18, cannot be separated from production. They are those who must engage in productive work, such as farming or handicraft, to make a living. They provide a powerful auxiliary force for the army and regular police.

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[873] Augmenting all these organizations is the persistent program of indoctrination. The Communists realize that every crime committed now is politically harmful to their regime, so they have instituted numerous programs in education and propaganda to fight against crime. Reading the "new" moral standards set up for high school students by the Communist Ministry of Education (The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China: Jen-min chiao-yu, or People's Education, monthly, July issue of 1955, p. 46. "The moral standard of the middle school students" promulgated by the Ministry of Education on May 13, 1955.) is like reading something from the past. Absolute loyalty to the government, strict obedience to authorities, extreme care not to

*668 violate rules and regulations are stressed as they were in the
monarchal days.

[626] Social pressure is also great. With the whole population
organized under the Communists' tight control, the entire society can be mobilized to work against crime and political conspiracies. This has been well demonstrated by the various "anti" movements and the study groups.

174 B. Current Problems of Administration

Because of the tight governmental control of news and the
*668 distance which separates northwest China from the outside world,
[656] very little information has been obtained about resistance activities
in the area. However, judging by the meager information offered by the Communists themselves, their rule over the northwest has not been very smooth. The Communists seldom, if ever, reveal their troubles while they are current, but they do uncover some facts when the resistance has been suppressed. By careful screening, one may piece together the picture of subversive activities in the area. Sometimes they were on an alarming scale. To help clarify this general background, some excerpts from the Chinese Communists' own reports and a few indirect quotations are presented as examples.

1. "During the past year, (i.e. 1950)...we have destroyed
*175 more than 69,600 bandits in the northwest. Right now there are
579 still more than 5,400 active bandits. The largest group is the one
*668 under the leadership of Osman and Husein who are hiding in the
669 deep mountains along the border line between the provinces of Kansu,
Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sinkiang. There are about two to three thousand men in this group. The rest of the bandits are in small groups linked with various underground spies and the rural counter-revolutionary forces. The condition is still very complicated..." (Jen-min ch'u-pan-she: Cheng-fu kung-tso pao-jao, 1950, p. 418, Report on the book of the Government.)

2. "...the misunderstanding...between the various nationalities
*175 has not yet been thoroughly dissolved. Consciously or unconsciously,...
563 the Pan-Chinese idea still exists in our Chinese
*668 cadres' mind. Besides, we still have some serious shortcomings
669 and mistakes in our nationality work. When the remnants of the
bandits and spies fanned up the feelings of the people, it led to the disputes that occurred among the nationality groups in certain areas after the liberation. In the area of Lin-hsia (in Kansu), the military conflict between the Moslems and the Chinese caused more than one thousand deaths and the dislocation of more than 30,000 people who were forced to leave their homes. The loss in production was even more serious.

"In Ta-t'ung county of Chinghai, the T'ung-hsin-ch'eng of Ninghsia, in the area of P'ing-liang of Kansu, there have been

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*175 military riots on a large or small scale.... The Chinese at Tien-
*563 tzu-wa of Ku-yuan county (in Kansu) were unwilling to be annexed
*668 to Chang-hua-tien where the Moslems were the majority. They
669 repeatedly petitioned to the county government, but the county magistrate insisted on upholding his own opinion.... This ended in the tragedy of the magistrate being beaten and numerous people murdered." (Ibid., p. 444).

3. "(NCNA Sian, December 10, 1950)"

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"Bandit remnants remaining in Sinkiang, native bandits,
175 and special agents working for the US-Chiang elements, led by
579 Ulachibai, Stiga and Pulungchiafu who had been determinedly pur-
668 sued by the People's Liberation Army, were forced on December 1
669 to surrender their force of 127, bringing with them 70 rifles, 4,000 rounds of ammunition, and a number of horses.

"Ulachibai, a Kazak, was formerly the puppet (i.e. Nationalist) deputy magistrate of Chinghua hsien. Stiga, also a Kazak, was Commander of the Kou-mintang Self-Defense Corps at Nanshan. Pulungchiafu, a Mongol, was formerly puppet deputy magistrate of Ashan hsiem and a company commander of the forces of the bandit Osman.

"During the months of June and July, 1950, the aforementioned three bandits, in collusion with the US-Chiang agent, Osman, undertook to shelter special agents and army deserters, and proceeded with an orgy of rebellion, massacre, and robbery, in the Ching-hua, Nanshan, and Yenki areas.

"For the protection of the interest of the people, the People's Liberation Army, after the successful suppression of the bandit gangs led by Osman, Yollbars (Yolbar), and Janimkan (Janim Khan), since July has conducted operations against the bandit remnants of the three bandit chiefs.

"After overcoming many difficulties, the People's Liberation Army finally dealt annihilating blows to the remaining bandits."

An editorial in the Peking Jen-min jih-pao, (December 28, 1950) reported:

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4. "Liu Yung-nien, chief of the technical division of the
*175 Kuomingtang's 'Second Bureau' in Lanchow... is an arch criminal,
669 who, after liberation of Lanchow, planted 1,200 mines and destroyed the Hsiang-t'ang bridge."

5. "In the spring of 1952, the anti-Communists guerrillas in the P'ing-liang area of eastern Kansu started two open rebellions on April 2nd and May 8th under the leadership of Ma Hsiao-tung and Ma Kuo-yuan. They attacked the counties of Hsi-chi, Hai-yuan and spread all over eastern Kansu and continued their activities," commented Lo Chun in "The Construction and Management of the Highway in Northwest China," in Chung-kung wen-t'i, No. 3, p. 120.

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6. "(NCNA Sian, September 7, 1952)
*175 The Ang-la tribe is located 300 li southeast of Sining in the
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*175 Chien-cha district in Chinghai province. It is a place in the wooded
*668 mountains on the west bank of the upper stretch of the Yellow River,
669 where over 8,000 Tibetans dwell together. After the liberation of
579 Chinghai province, large numbers of the KMT remnant bandits
under Ma Pu-fang fled to the Chien-cha district, and instigated Hsiang Ch'ien, chieftain of the tribe, to oppose the People's Government, obstructed the communication lines in the adjoining districts, successively assaulted with force the Tibetans and people of other nationalities in the border regions of Kweiteh, Hwalung, Shunhwa, and Tungjen, and several times attacked the PLA.

"With a view to peacefully solving the problem of the Ang-la tribe, as early as October, 1950, the Chinghai Provincial People's Government appointed Hsiang Ch'ien as a member of the Consultative Conference. From September, 1951, to April, '952, the provincial people's government dispatched personnel 17 times to persuade and convince Hsiang Ch'ien. Chairman of the Chinghai Provincial People's Government Hsi-jao-chia-tso, Vice Chairman of the Consultative Committee Drashi, Deputy Secretary General Ku-chia-sai; Ta-erh-ssu-fa-t'ai-hsia-jung-to-pu, member; Yueh-sai-to-chieh, member of the Committee of Financial and Economic Affairs; Sang-je-shia-tso, deputy director of the Department of Culture and Education; Keng-teng, deputy magistrate of Kweiteh hsien; Ch'ueh-chi, deputy magistrate of Hwalung hsien; T'ung-ch'u-hu, magistrate of Haiyen hsien; Pa-meng, Vice Manager of the Chinghai Trading Company, and other prominent figures of the Tibetan nationality went in person to persuade him...

"In February and March 1952, Hsiang Ch'ien thrice instigated more than 1,000 persons to invade the border region of Kweiteh and other hsien, and attacked the PLA forces at the locality. Furthermore, he dispatched personnel to infiltrate into Tungteh, Hsinghai, Tulan, and other hsien with the intent of instigating and expanding the rebellion...

"In early May, under the assistance and cooperation of the Tibetans and the people of various nationalities, the PLA of the Chinghai Military District carried out an annihilation campaign in the Chiencha district. Most of the reactionary armed forces surrendered at the locality, while Hsiang Ch'ien himself fled and hid in the mountains, bringing along a small number of persons and horses....Hsiang Ch'ien's family was protected by the PLA...

"Chou Jen-shan, director of the United Front Work Department of the CCP Chinghai Provincial Committee, Sang-je-chia-tso, deputy director of the Department of Culture and Education of the Chinghai Provincial People's Government, Yueh-sai-to-chieh, member of the Committee of Nationalities Affairs, Yu-chia-sai, Secretary General of the Chinghai Provincial Consultative Committee, and Ch'ueh Chi, deputy magistrate of Hwalung hsien also went to comfort them...

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*175 "Under a call of the correct nationalities policy, Hsiang Ch'ien
*668 yielded to the people in Chiencha in the afternoon of July 11, and
669 arrived at Sining on July 31....
579 "The Chinghai Provincial People's Government has appointed
Hsiang Ch'ien to continue to hold the post of chieftain."
S 7. In an article entitled "The great achievements of People's
175 Sinkiang during the past three years", in Sinkiang jih-pao, January
668 1, 1953, Burhan, the governor of Sinkiang, gave the following report:
669 "During the past three years, (1949-1952)...we have wiped out
579 more than 20,000 of the remnant of the KMT bandits, basically
cleared out the hidden spies...."
8. In the same paper, in April of 1953 there appeared the
following:
N "(NCNA Lanchow April 6, 1953)...Northwest Regional Admin-
*175 istration Council called a meeting of the Kazakh chiefs along the
*563 border of Kansu, Chinghai, Sinkiang at Lanchow from March 23,
*668 to April 3, 1953....The Kazakh chief A-t'ung-pai-k'e said: 'In
669 the past, being deceived by the bad people and believing in the
S rumors, we did not cooperate with the People's government. In-
175 stead of punishing us for our past faults, you are now helping us...'"
563 The above cases all clearly indicated political disturbances.
668 Judging by what has been revealed here, the Communists did try
669 to modify their laws and standards to woo the minority groups.
They also did use the minority people as their own agents to police
as well as to pacify the resisting minorities.
N 9. (NCNA Sian, February 28, 1955)
*175 "According to statistics of the people's procuratorates in 48
administrative districts, hsien, and municipalities, 3,500 cases
*668 were taken on in 1954."
625 10. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
694 "The Provincial Public Security Department has also dispatched
631 five work teams to various places and adopted a combined policy of
S carrying out penetrating detection, investigation and research to-
175 gether with the resettling of vagrants and the pronouncing of sen-
668 tences with great fanfare. According to incomplete data from
625 various localities during the past 11 months, 71.7% of the crimi-
694 nal cases have been brought to light. The data from the two spe-
631 cial districts of Tacheng (Chuguchak) and Altai, from the two mu-
nicipalities of Ining and Kuche as well as from Shache hsien reveal
that a total of 25 major criminal cases have been unearthed."
11. (Urumchi Sinkiang jih-pao, January 20, 1955)
S "Judging from the events that have taken place in our province
175 during the past year, there are still some habitual robbers, habit-
668 ual thieves and other criminal culprits who have not been disposed
674 of. Some elements who have gone through reform through labor or
who have been released on termination of sentences still refuse to
repent and continue to jeopardize social order. Some landlords

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who are recalcitrant in maintaining their reactionary standing and military and government officials of the former Chiang government still cling to the shameful and parasitical way of life without engaging themselves in proper employment but commit various practices of thieft and swindling. Some ruffians indulge in drinking and assaulting women. Some illegal prostitutes and professional gamblers convert their brothels and gambling houses into dens for robbers, thieves, and ruffians, and into hotbeds for nourishing crimes. Some unscrupulous second-hand goods dealers and hotel keepers collude with burglarious elements to dispose of spoils and even act as chief planner of crimes. More serious still, a batch of habitual thieves who sneakily move around various places even collaborate with one another to commit theft and robbery in an organized manner, using arms to threaten people and to carry out violence. Some culprits refuse to repent during reform through labor and even escape from jails to continue their crimes. Some burglarious elements who sneaked into our province from other provinces and who also belonged to the category of counter-revolutionaries carry out their counter-revolutionary sabotage activities in the form of criminal offense or impose themselves as military and government personnel to commit extortion and blackmailing. Some ruffians even intensified their activities to rob and rape women."

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12. "An address delived by Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o, a deputy from Chinghai, at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the National Congress:

"'Recently, in some nomadic areas (in Chinghai) we discovered rumors spread by the enemies, saying, "To start cooperatives in nomadic areas is just another form of confiscation of cattle and sheep." It definitely hurt the productive morale of the people....

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"' Furthermore, there are numerous counter-revolutionary elements carrying on sabotage under the cover of religion. This is often discovered in the area of minority groups. For instance in some nomadic areas in Chinghai, people rumored that a Heavenly mandate had descended, saying that the world would be destroyed soon. The people would suffer in great calamities, etc. It was a disguise of the devil to disturb the common people... But a lot of those who had faith but were short of wisdom believed it.... They interrupted their productive activities and devoted their time wholly on chanting Buddhist scriptures every day, hoping that by doing so they may escape from the disasters....

"'The counter-revolutionists are so active that we cannot afford to neglect them. We must get rid of the idea that everything is in order.... We must suppress them.'" (Hsin-hua yueh-pao, 1955, No. 8, p. 69.)

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13. In the Hsin-hua yueh-pao, 1955, No. 8, p. 197, there appeared

"An address delivered by Sun Tso-ping, a deputy from Chinghai,

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at the 2nd meeting of the 1st session of the National People's Congress on July 27, 1955:

"'Chinghai is an area where many nationalities live.... There are hidden counter-revolutionists and reactionary landlords, rich farmers who are still trying in every way to sabotage the unity of the nationalities. The methods used by these enemies for sabotage are dangerous and shrewd, mainly along two lines, namely, under the cover of religion or by upsetting international relations. The counter-revolutionists also sabotage our productive activities through arson, robbery, spreading of rumor, etc. They even organize open military rebellions. The reactionary landlords and rich farmers also stir up trouble between the middle farmers and the poor farmers. They infiltrate into the mutual cooperative groups and cooperatives to sabotage the mutual cooperative movement.'"

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14. The Sinkiang jih-pao, September 30, 1954, reported that

"In the first half of 1954 alone, we have discovered 3429 cases of counter-revolutionary plots in Sinkiang. According to incomplete statistics, we have made arrests in at least 15,000 cases of various criminal offenses during the past 5 years." (A Report on the Achievements of the Political Works in Sinkiang Province during the Past Five Years," by Vice-chairman Kao Chin-ch'un of Sinkiang Province.)

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The above reports clearly indicate that there have been disturbances, resistance, sabotage and open rebellion besides ordinary crimes in every province of the Northwest from the very beginning of the Communist conquest until the present.

4. Conclusion

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The regular police system under the Communists is huge, yet it is only a very small part of the whole police system, much like the part of an iceberg floating above the sea level. Strictly speaking, every branch of the Communist government, no matter whether it is legislative, administrative, judicial or economic, is a part of the police system and under the control of the Party. Moreover, every person in the country is organized and enlisted in the secret service. He is watching and being watched. Violators are subject to very heavy penalty. (See "The Regulations for Punishing the Counter-Revolutionaries" adopted by 11th meeting of the Central People's Government Council on February 20, 1951, in 1952 Jen-min shou-ts'e.)

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FOREIGN RELATIONS

000
I. Strategic Importance of Sinkiang

II. Russian Advance in Sinkiang

III. Policy of Tso Tsung-t'ang

IV. Policy of Yang Tseng-hsin

V. Foreign Relations under Chin Shu-jen

VI. Policy of Sheng Shih-ts'ai

VII. Chinese Nationalist Attempt to Reassert its Influence

VIII. Soviet Efforts to Regain Power in Sinkiang

IX Sinkiang under the Chinese Communists

FOREIGN RELATIONS

I. Strategic Importance of Sinkiang

175 648 439 [487] Sinkiang has been one of the most strategic areas of China in imperial and modern times. Ever since the area first came under Chinese control during the Han period (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.), it has been for China a key position for the control of central Asia. The two caravan routes to the north and south of the Tien-shan range linked China with the steppes of western Turkestan and with Europe and the Near East. The control of the oasis cities along these caravan routes gave China not only a dominant position in the trade, but also a check over the states of central Asia that profited from this trade. In the times of the empire the Chinese control over tribal groups in central Asia was strongest when the corridor of trade was safely in Chinese hands.

175 648 Full Chinese control over Eastern Turkestan was maintained, however, only over limited periods in imperial history. In the period of division and chaos that followed the Han period, Turkestan was lost to China and became a contested area between rival tribal states. Chinese control was reasserted in T'ang times by a Chinese dynasty which itself was partly of Central Asian origin. The area was included in the Mongol empire when the Mongols established their rule over China. Lost again under the Ming dynasty, Chinese Turkestan was finally reconquered by the Manchus in the eighteenth century and has been recognized as a part of China since the time when the modern West came in contact with the Chinese world.

The strategic role of Chinese Turkestan has become somewhat modified in modern times. When Czarist Russia expanded her frontiers across the Asiatic continent towards the Chinese border, the Inner Asiatic frontiers of China were threatened by a new type of attack by a modern Western state. The Russian expansion across Asia found its counterpart in the British conquest of India. From that time on the British regarded the high plateaus of Asia as potential basis for an attack on India through the mountain passes of the northwest. Chinese Turkestan became an area of conflicting British-Russian policies, and at the same time an anchor of the whole Chinese defense of Central Asia against Russian and British invasion.

Of the two powers, Russia was by far the more dangerous to Chinese control. Through her move into Asia, Russia became China's neighbor along a frontier of 3,000 miles. Her pressure was exerted in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as in Turkestan. The British-Indian border with China was shorter and the high mountain passes of the Himalayas and the Karakorum provided a

175 648 much greater physical barrier than existed on the Turkestan-Manchurian-Mongolian border with Russia.

II. Russian Advance in Sinkiang

In the middle of the last century when the Western powers, including Russia, opened treaty ports along the coast and in China proper, Russia had combined this coastal penetration with an inland advance. In the Treaty of Kulja of 1851, which was made public in 1861, the Russians secured the right to trade in Northern Turkestan by the establishment of trading centers in the Ili valley at Kulja. In the Treaty of Peking in 1860 Russia also secured the right to establish a consulate at Kashgar in southern Turkestan.

175 648 669 The Russian-British pressure on Turkestan came to a head in the 1870's when Chinese control was temporarily thrown off by the rebellion of Yakub Beg. This was the period when major rebellions were taking place within China, and the revolts against the ruling dynasty spread to the northwestern border. The Moslem rebellion began in the Northwest region of China and extended to Chinese Turkestan where one of the former ruling Moslem families which had been driven out by the Chinese administration into western Turkestan attempted to re-establish its power. Its leading military figure was Yakub Beg who soon took over the rebellious movement and attempted to set up an independent government over the southern and nortnern parts of Chinese Turkestan. During his stay in power, he negotiated treaties with both Britain and Russia. The British recognized Yakub Beg and permitted him to secure arms through India. A British envoy signed a treaty with his government at Kashgar in 1874, a treaty which was formally ratified by the government of India in 1876. In this treaty Sinkiang was opened to trade with India, and a British trading company was formed with the assistance of India. Through India, Yakub Beg established contact with the Sultan of Turkey in a Moslem religious alliance. At that time, the British believed that Yakub Beg would be able to maintain himself and hoped that Chinese Turkestan would become an independent or at least autonomous area, a buffer between India and Russia.

The Russian reaction to Yakub Beg's rebellion was a direct attack on the territory of Chinese Turkestan. When Yakub Beg had occupied Urumchi and moved towards the northwestern border area, the Russians moved troops across the border and occupied Kulja and the territory of the Ili valley in 1871. In 1872 they forced Yakub Beg to conclude a commercial agreement which opened Eastern Turkestan to Russian trade. In 1874-75, Russia concentrated troops on the border of southern Sinkiang. But unrest in Russian Turkestan prevented them from further military action. In 1876, they forced Yakub Beg to surrender the strategic moun-

175 648 669 tain passes west of Kashgar to Russian control. The Russian government had thus used the unrest in Turkestan for military expansion into Chinese territory, although it declared at the time that the occupation was only a temporary move for the protection of Russian commercial interests and that the area would eventually be given back to China.

This Russian attack gave the Turkestan rebellion an even more dangerous character in Chinese eyes. What was at stake now for China was not only the subjection of a rebellious leader but the defense of the whole Chinese Inner Asian position. China's realization of this danger became very clear in the discussions that preceded the Chinese military compaigns to reconquer Turkestan. Two views were expressed at that time on the importance of that area to China. One was represented by Li Hung-chang, who had come to power as the leader of the Anhwei army, one of the regional forces that had been established to suppress the Taiping Rebellion. In this campaign Li had had his main base at Shanghai and had come to control the financial resources of the central coastal region. Later his army had been used in the suppression of the Nien Rebellion in Anhwei and Shantung and after this successful campaign he had become governor-general of the capital province of Chihli and was the leading military figure in the north. Li Hung-chang was willing to abandon China's position in Central Asia in favor of strengthening coastal defenses. According to him the expenses of a Sinkiang campaign would seriously endanger the coastal defense, so important for holding the capital.

III. Policy of Tso Tsung-t'ang

175 648 In contrast to Li's regional view on the importance of China's coastal area, Tso Tsung-t'ang, then in charge of the suppression of the Moslem Rebellion in the northwestern provinces of Shensi and Kansu, saw the control of Sinkiang as a vital part of the defense of the whole Chinese Inner Asiatic frontier. According to Tso Tsung-t'ang, "The reason why great weight should be given to Sinkiang is the protection of Mongolia. In protecting Mongolia, one ensures the defense of the capital. When the fingers and forearms of the West and North work in unison and the topographical position is continuous then there is no break in the country's defenses. But if Sinkiang is not strong, then Mongolia will not be safe. Not only the border provinces of Shensi, Kansu, and Shansi would be constantly open to invasion and it would be difficult to defend them, but also Northern Chihli and Shanhaikuan would not have a day of rest or sleep." (Tso Tsung-t'ang, Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi, ch'üan 50, pp. 76a, b.) Tso argued that the defense of Sinkiang would be less expensive in the

175 long run than would be an inland defense of the northwest, if the
648 Sinkiang passes were lost. The defense of Peking depended on the Chinese military garrisons at Kalgan, Uliasutai, and Kobdo in Mongolia; the defense of Mongolia depended on the control of Sinkiang; the defense of Sinkiang depended on the passes at Kulja and Chuguchak. He did not believe that there was a real military threat to the Chinese coasts because in his opinion the Western powers were interested in commercial privileges rather than in military conquest. When at that time the British minister to Peking intervened in support of Yakub Beg and suggested that the imperial government should allow the rebel leader to maintain his rule over Turkestan as an autonomous area under Chinese suzerainty, Tso Tsung-t'ang sent a memorial to the throne stating that the status of Yakub Beg was purely a domestic question, and that "if Britain wished to create a buffer state in central Asia she was herself well able to furnish the territory." (Arthur W. Hummel Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, Washington, 1944, vol. II, p. 766.)

Tso Tsung-t'ang's main concern, however, was the Russian military invasion. It was his avowed strategy to use such overwhelming force in the defeat of Yakub Beg and to make the reconquest of Turkestan so convincing that Russia would have to live up to the promise which she had given at the time of the occupation in 1871 and return the Ili area to Chinese control. But the diplomatic negotiations between China and Russia which followed did not bring the results for which Tso Tsung-t'ang had hoped. In the draft treaty concluded in St. Petersburg in 1879, Russia returned only the city of Kulja and the eastern part of the Ili valley but retained the western part of the Ili area including the valley of a tributary, the Tekes, and most important of all, the strategic mountain passes of the Altai and related ranges. This treaty aroused a storm of indignation at the court in Peking. The government refused to ratify it and imposed a death sentence on the returning envoy who had negotiated it. The sentence was not carried out, but a new envoy signed another treaty at St. Petersburg in 1881 with somewhat more favorable conditions. While Russia retained some of the territory she had occupied, she returned the Tekes valley and the strategic passes to China.

After it had reasserted its authority over almost all of the Turkestan area, the Chinese government carried through an administrative reorganization in order to strengthen the ties with its outlying region. In November, 1884, an imperial edict made Turkestan into a Chinese province under the name of Sinkiang ("The New Territory"). Urumchi (the Chinese Ti-hua) became the provincial capital and the province was divided into more than twenty districts. Thus, while Chinese political control

175 648 was re-established, economic penetration from Russia and to a lesser degree from British India continued. In the treaty of 1881, Russia had established consulates at Kulja, Chuguchak, Kashgar, and Turfan. The treaty also stipulated that consulates should be established at Urumchi, Hami (Qomul), and Ch'i-t'ai, if the development of Russian trade warranted it. England arranged in 1884 for the stationing of a British trade agent at Kashgar.

In the following period the Chinese political position in Sinkiang was not threatened again by either Russia or England. Chinese control created, in effect, something of a buffer area for the conflicting expansionist interests of these two powers. Towards the turn of the century, attempts were made to delimit Russian and British areas of expansion in order to diminish chances of conflict. In 1895 the two powers agreed to delimit their respective areas of expansion in the Pamirs. In a decision of the Pamir Boundary Commission the two powers agreed to set aside a narrow corridor of Afghan territory which would extend from Afghanistan to the Chinese province of Sinkiang. This corridor would prevent a direct Russo-British-India frontier. The Anglo-Russian tensions came to a new height during the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05. When the war was over, Russian and England came to settle all their conflicting interests in the Triple Entente of 1907. By that time the neutralization of the central Asiatic area of possible conflict had already been recognized for so long that Turkestan was no longer mentioned in the agreement.

IV Policy of Yang Tseng-hsin

175 648 635 The Chinese position in inkiang entered into a new phase with the Chinese Revolution of 1911. The Revolution changed the relationship between the province and the new types of central governments that succeeded each other in China. In imperial times the Chinese governors were a part of the imperial bureaucracy, and the court had been able to appoint and recall governors more or less at will. It had also given the provincial administration a yearly subsidy of over two and a half million taels (a tael equals about 1.28 U.S. dollars). With the revolution, the central control over the province was greatly weakened. No more subsidy was forthcoming from China and the governors had to base their power and position almost entirely on local support. Yang Tseng-hsin, the Chinese governor of Sinkiang from 1912 to 1928 gained such support by giving the non-Chinese population groups greater economic autonomy. At the same time he maintained good relations with Russia by permitting Russian economic activities which had considerably increased since 1905. The Russo-Asiatic Bank had its branches at Urumchi, Kulja, Chuguchak, and Kashgar with the right to issue paper currency. These branches played a large role in the local trade.

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648 The isolation of Sinkiang from the Chinese government became even more pronounced as a result of the events in Outer Mongolia. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 gave the Mongols the opportunity to declare their independence from Chinese control. This move was in part inspired and supported by Czarist Russia which established itw osn control over Outer Mongolia. Though Outer Mongolia remained nominally a part of Chinese territory, Chinese control ended and Outer Mongolia became in fact a Russian protectorate. The loss of Outer Mongolia changed the position of China in central Asia and greatly affected her hold over Chinese Turkestan. Tso Tsung-t'ang had described Turkestan as the key position for the defense of Mongolia, which in turn was important for the security of north China and of the capital. Now Turkestan itself was outflanked by the Russian position in Mongolia. From Mongolia, Russian forces could at any time cut the corridor that led from the Chinese province of Kansu to Urumchi and Kashgar. Sinkiang, formerly the central basis of the Chinese military position in Inner Asia, now became an exposed advance position which could only be held in the long run if a new and safe connection with China Proper could be found.

Of still greater importance for the power sturggle in central Asia was the change brought about in Russia by the October Revolution. The new Soviet Russia soon resumed the Czarist policy of expansion in central Asia. But to the economic and strategic interests which had been the morivating force behind Czarist advance there was now added the Communist aim of infiltrating the neighboring area with its ideological and political organization. This Soviet advance began slowly and accelerated with the growing strength of the Soviet government. During the early years of the civil war in Siberia, Soviet Russia was in no position to resume an aggressive policy in central Asia. The Russian position in Outer Mongolia was also temporarily lost and regained only in 1922, when after the defeat of the White Russian leader, Ungern Sternberg, Outer Mongolia became a Soviet satellite.

[167] The outcome of the red victory in the civil war in Siberia had the immediate result of bringing a stream of White Russian refugees to the central Asiatic areas. In addition to smaller groups, two White Russian armies retreated into Sinkiang in 1920 and 1921. The number of these troops has been reported as 30,000 to 40,000 men, a much stronger force than the Chinese army of governor Yang Tseng-hsin. In Outer Mongolia, White Russian forces retreating at that time had been able to take over the government, but the Chinese administration of Sinkiang managed to bring the Russian influx into its territory fully under control. Most of the Russian troops let themselves be disarmed and were interned at Kuchengste. Other troops which had retreated to the Altai border region of Russia and Outer Mongolia retained their arms.

175/ 648 The Altai region has been an area of conflict all the more critical because of the potential value of its mineral resources. In imperial time some control had been exerted over part of the area by the Imperial Amban in Kobdo in Outer Mongolia. The border between Chinese and Russian territory was also not clearly delineated, and the Chinese claim that the highest mountain ridge formed the border being at times contested by Soviet Russia. The area was mainly inhabited by Kazakh tribesmen who were closely related to similar groups at the other side of the border in Russian Turkestan. During World War I a number of Kazakhs from the Russian side had moved over into Chinese territory to escape the draft for labor conscription, and no control had been [563] exerted over these groups. Of all the Turkic people of the province of Sinkiang, the Kazakhs were the most nationalistic and unruly. The attitude of the Kazakh people played, therefore, an important role in the relations between Russia and Chinese Turkestan.

At the critical time, in 1920, when the White Russian influx became a problem, the Chinese governor negotiated with the Soviet authorities an agreement which established friendly relations across the border but at the same time enabled the governor to deal successfully with the problem of White Russian immigrants. He gained a Soviet promise of amnesty for all those White Russians who wanted to return to Russian territory and encouraged as many as he could to go back to Russia, while others continued their journey to China proper. At the same time, he asked for Soviet support in removing the armed White Russians from the Altai region and strengthened the Chinese position in that area by dividing it into regular Chinese districts and sub-district administrations. Connected with this political agreement was a trade agreement in which the Ili valley area was opened to Soviet economic activities. Two soviet consulated were established in this area, in contrast to the seven consulates which the Czarist government had maintained in its last years in Sinkiang. In exchange for the Soviet consulated the Chinese administration was permitted to maintain two consulated in Soviet territory. These consulates were to be established at Semipalatinsk and at Verkhenevelinsk on the border of Outer Mongolia. The agreement also abolished extraterritoriality, and in opening economic relations with the Soviets, Governor Yang gained Soviet release of the property of Chinese merchants in Russian territory which had at first been confisfacted by the new Soviet regime. Through this agreement of 1920 Chinese-Soviet relations were established in Sinkiang long before the beginning of official relations between the government at Peking and the Soviet government and even before the arrangement of Soviet support to Sun Yat-sen at Canton. The agreement of 1920 was broadened by the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1924, signed at Peking, which provided for the opening of additional Soviet

175 consulates. Soviet consulates were opened at Chuguchak, at
648 Sharasume in the Altai region, and at Urumchi and at Kashgar in exchange for the opening of Chinese consulates at Tashkent, Andijan, Zaisan, and Alma Ata.

The Chinese administration under Governor Yang thus maintained a very cautious policy of friendly economic relations with the Soviet Union. This policy was continued even after the leaders of the Kuomintang had broken with the Chinese Communists and had sent the Russian advisers home. The economic relations between Turkestan and Soviet territory remained close; the Chinese consul at Semipalatinsk was quoted by Izvesta as stating that Sinkiang had nothing in common with central China and that the commercial as well as the political relations between western China and the friendly republic of the USSR remained unchanged. Even after Governor Yang accepted the nominal authority of the National Government at Nanking, this policy did not change.

From the side of the National Government, however, the first attempts were now made to strengthen the physical link with Sinkiang. These attempts were later to be renewed during and after the years of World War II and led to the building of new communication links, a policy to be continued later by the Chinese Communists.

In 1928 the Sven Hedin expedition was sent by the National Government to explore a new road connection from Inner Mongolia to Chinese Turkestan as well as to investigate the possiblity of using older caravan routes to the south of Qomul. The expedition was treated politely by the Chinese administration but was closely supervised and restricted in its movements. Even so the routes which the Sven Hedin expedition investigated would not have provided a road between Nanking and Sinkiang which would not have been in easy reach of Russian forces based on Outer Mongolia.

V. Foreign Relations under Chin Shu-jen

While Sven Hedin's expedition was still in Sinkiang, the Russian influence was greatly increased when the Chinese administration of the province was changed. Governor Yang was assassinated, and the former chief of the Political Department, Chin Shu-jen, assumed power. The assassination was carried out by Fan Yao-nan, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, at a feast at which the Soviet consular officials and several other Russian guests were present. The Commissioner of Foreign Affairs was in turn seized and executed by troops under the control of Chin Shu-jen, who himself then became governor. Under Chin's governorship there was soon an opportunity for great expansion of the Russian influence. In 1929 the Russians reputedly began building up Communist Party cells in

175 648 Sinkiang. In 1930 the completion of the Turksib Railroad in Russian Turkestan along the Chinese border enabled Soviet Russia to intensify the exploitation of the Sinkiang economy. Ever since the Russian development of central Asia, the weight of Russian influence had increased and the Chinese National Government lagged behind in its attempt to answer this threat by a new development of the communications between Sinkiang and China.

175 648 669 The greatest increase in Russian influence came as the result of the revolt of the Chinese Moslems, the Tungans, in 1931, who called in as their leader Ma Chung-ying, a Moslem from Kansu who came close to capturing the provincial government. Governor Chin's administration was saved by Soviet Russia, which gave him arms and military support under the pretext that some Japanese had been on Ma's staff, implying that Japanese schemes were endangering Soviet interests in the province, although no proof has ever been brought forward for such Japanese activities. In order to get Russian support, Chin concluded in November, 1931, an agreement with Soviet Russia which was kept secret from the National Government. By this agreement, eight Soviet trade agencies were set up at Urumchi, Chuguchak, Kulja, Kashgar, Aksu, Kucha, Yarkand, and Khotan; the tariff for Soviet products was reduced, and telegraph and radio communications were established with Soviet territory. Chin Shu-jen did not succeed, however, in suppressing the rebellion, and according to one account by a Mr. Tshumabay, then chairman of the GPU mission in Sinkiang, the Soviets, in order to weaken the Chinese military forces, did not at first provide the military support they had promised. When a Moslem force reached the outskirts of the capital of Urumchi, Chin turned over the defense to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, an officer of Manchurian origin. Sheng was placed in command of Chinese troops from Manchuria who had in their fight with the Japanese retreated on to Soviet territory and had been transported by Soviet Russia to Turkestan. Thus from the outset Sheng derived his military power from Russian support. He was substantially supported by another military force recruited from the White Russians living in Urumchi and neighboring cities. Within the ranks of this force could reportedly also be found Red Russian soldiers. When asked about this comradeship-in-arms the White Russians stated to members of the Sven Hedin expedition that there was no difficulty in working together for a common purpose. The equipment of both these forces was provided by the Soviet Union.

With these troops Sheng succeeded in driving off the Moslem attackers. In April, 1935, a coup d'etat by these Russian troops forced the retirement of Governor Chin, who fled to Russian territory and from there returned to China. Sheng Shih-ts'ai became governor and, with the help of Russian war materiel, including

175 military planes, succeeded in destroying the Moslem forces of
648 Ma Chung-ying who was eventually driven to Kashgar from where in
669 June, 1934, he fled to Soviet territory. All the three leading figures in the struggle for power, Chin Shu--jen, Ma Chung-ying, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai were thus in different ways under Soviet control. Chin had been supported and at the same time handicapped by the Russians who finally permitted him to return to China through their territory. Governor Sheng, his successor, depended from the very beginning on Russian support for his power. And Ma Chung-ying, the defeated aspirant for power, who might have established a closer link with the National Government, entrusted his fate to the Soviet regime. He was reportedly seen in Moscow at the beginning of 1936, but from that time on his fate has remained unknown.

VI. Policy of Sheng Shih-ts'ai

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648 From the outset Sheng Shih-ts'ai was strongly under Russian dominance. Soviet Russia did not only have influence over the locally recruited Russian forces and over the Manchurian troops of Sheng, both equipped with Russian weapons; it also sent a special tank regiment of 3,000 men, the so-called "Altai Volunteers," to be stationed near Komul on the main caravan route from the Chinese province of Kansu to Urumchi and Kashgar. This force was stationed in a strategic position ostensibly to guard against any Japanese advance from Inner Mongolia. In practice it also could interfere with any attempt of the Chinese National Government to reestablish its authority over Urumchi. Soviet military advisors supervised the training of the Chinese as well as the Russian troops, and through their influence communists were reputedly introduced also into the officer and private ranks of the Chinese forces. They also trained political commissars for the indoctrination of the Chinese forces. In addition to this control of the forces the Soviet government had a hold over the administration of the province. Two Russians, a Mr. Yuravlev and a Dr. Lapin, held high positions in the civil administration of the province and Russian advisers under the direction of the Russian consul-general had decisive influence in all important departments of government. Many of the Turks employed in the administration were recruited from West Turkestan or Turkic groups living in the Soviet Union. According to Chinese reports (see article by Yolbars Khan "Sinkiang Under the Control of Chinese and Russian Communists," Chung Hua Nien Pao, vol. 4, 1954, pp. 52-55), Governor Sheng was told by the Soviet consul at Urumchi that he had to follow Party orders. This was the time when, after the Sian kidnaping of Chiang Kai-shek, a united front had been established in China proper for the war of resistance against Japan. During the time

175 648 when this united front continued in operation, in 1937 and 1938, a number of Chinese Communists were brought in who seemed to have worked in close cooperation with the Soviet advisers.

When he came to power, Governor Sheng was given a Soviet loan of five million rubles for reconstruction. For the plans of reconstruction he was provided with Soviet technical advisers. In 1937 Sheng introduced a three-year plan of reconstruction for which he received a further fifteen million rubles in Soviet loans; a second plan was introduced in 1940. These funds were used to build motor roads, among other things, and to introduce a large fleet of Soviet trucks. It was reported that 1,350 miles of telephone lines were installed by 1941. By 1939 twenty factories had been set up in the province and over four hundred tons of Soviet machinery had been imported for the exploitation of oil resources and the establishment of an oil refinery northwest of Urumchi. In november, 1940, Governor Sheng concluded a secret agreement with the Soviet Union which included permission for Soviet Russia to prospect for and exploit tin and other mineral resources in Sinkiang, and which gave Soviet Russia control over the mineral resources of the province. (The text of this agreement was published in 1950 in Formosa and appeared in 1954 in the American Journal of Foreign Affairs, and in November, 1954, in the German newspaper, Ost-Probleme.")

175 648 669 While extending their military and economic influence over the government of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, the Soviet government attempted to deal separately with a group of Kazakhs in the Ili and Altai regions who had begun in 1940 to work for an autonomy of their region. When some of their leaders were invited to Urumchi and arrested there at the beginning of 1940, the Kazakhs rose in revolt in February of that year. A truce was concluded on May 15, 1940, in which the insurgents agreed to cease fighting provided that no more Russian troops would be brought into their area. But fighting soon broke out again and the Kazakh leader, Osman Batur, succeeded by the end of 1940 in establishing a provisional government in the Ili and Altai region which was called the National Republic of East Turkestan. A Soviet attempt to deal with the government of Osman Batur failed. Osman Batur turned down the Russian offer of arms which was coupled with a request to withdraw his forces from the Altai region and move them to the Ili area. In September 1941, the insurgent leadership split. Abdulaziz Kasim, a leader who was a Soviet citizen, concluded an agreement with the Soviets, while Osman Batur and his followers continued their fight against Soviet troops as well as the forces of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai. At the beginning of 1942, the Soviets brought 23,000 troops into the Altai area but the critical situation in the war with Germany forced the Soviets to discontinue their campaign and to concentrate on the protection of a few bases in Sinkiang.

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In the meantime Governor Sheng attempted to end his dependence on Soviet Russia and to turn instead to the National Government. When the pressure of the German advance forced the Soviet government to withdraw most of its forces from Sinkiang, it attempted to maintain its position by disorganizing the Turkestan administration. Aside from the negotiations with the Kazakh rebels, the Soviets made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Governor Sheng when they feared he would seek cooperation with the Chinese National Government. This Russian move precipitated a switch of Sheng's administration to the Chinese side. Sheng drove out his Russian advisers and arrested large numbers of his staff who had been cooperating with the Russians as well as with Chinese Communists who had been brought in through Russian support.

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The cooperation between the Soviet representatives in Sinkiang and the Chinese Communists during this time seems to have been close. While the Russian representatives conveyed the policy line as determined in Moscow and provided the military and political power behind it, the Chinese Communists infiltrated Sheng's staff and helped to work out many of Sheng's administrative measures. For instance a currency reform instituted in 1938 was claimed to have been the work of the brother of Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-min who had come to Turkestan with the Chinese Communist group under Russian protection. The Communists also established the Fan-ti-hui, or Anti-Imperialist Association which was used for propaganda and intelligence. When Governor Sheng broke with the Soviets and turned to the National Government, he attempted to eradicate this Chinese Communist group. Mao Tse-min and a number of others, including Governor Sheng's secretary, were executed, and many were imprisoned.

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VII. Chinese Nationalist Attempt to Reassert Nationalist Influence

The new active interest which the National Government took in Sinkiang was related to the military situation of the time. The Russian withdrawal was the result of the military defeats brought on Soviet Russia by the Nazi armies which threatened Moscow and forced a concentration of all available Russian troops at the European front. The Chinese National Government could not count on any further Soviet support in its war against Japan, and the further developments in Soviet Russia were uncertain. Even if Soviet Russia could hold out, this seemed an opportune time to eliminate the dangerous Soviet control which was no longer compensated by any military advantage.

The Chinese situation had become still more desperate after Pearl Harbor and the Japanese conquest of the mainland of southeast Asia. Cut off from the supply routes which could bring in

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175 support from its new military allies, the Chinese National Govern-
648 ment searched for new links with the outside world. In February 1942
N on his visit to India, Chian Kai-shek explored the possibility of the
*175 supply route via Tibet through Chinghai Province. While this long
*648 and arduous route never became of major importance, it saved as
491 a communication link over which large commercial caravans
S passed for many years, even after the war. This development
175 brought new importance to Chinghai Province where the Moslem
648 general, Ma Pu-ch'ing, was appointed Pacification Comissioner
by the National Government. This appointment was of still greater importance for the Sinkiang Government. As a Moslem, Ma Pu-ch'ing could become a potential rival of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai in extending his influence over the Moslem Turks of Sinkiang Province, as Ma Chung-ying had done before him. More important still was his control over the strategically located province of Chinghai. From Chinghai was to open a route to the Tarim Basin and to the southern part of Sinkiang. Since this route passed to the south of the Nanshan Range, it was better protected from any Soviet threat from Outer Mongolia than was the caravan route of the Kansu corridor. This corridor to Sinkiang had been controlled by the Russian tank force at Qomul while the new route, if developed, would give the National Government a passage to Sinkiang not so easily threatened from Soviet-controlled territory. In fact, the build-up of Chinghai as a strategic center was the logical Chinese Nationalist answer to the Russian domination of Outer Mongolia. Sinkiang, formerly a center of the Chinese Inner-Asian position, had now become a contested frontier area which could be held only if a relatively safe and practicable connection could be opened up. From this time on, the Chinese position at Sining and the Kokonor and in the Tsaidam area became of key strategic importance.

S While the Chinese National Government was beginning to re-
175 establish its position in central Asia, it negotiated with Sheng Shih-
648 ts'ai. Chiang Kai-shek himself came to Lanchow in Kansu and the
chief of the northwest headquarters at Sian, General Chu Shao-liang, flew twice to Urumchi for negotiations with Governor Sheng. The second time he was accompanied by Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Wu Chunghsin, who was in 1944 to become successor to Governor Sheng. At this time, Wu Tse-hsiang (Chaucer H. Wu) became Governor Sheng's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. In the fall of 1943, Governor Sheng himself flew to Chungking to confer with Chiang Kai-shek, As a result of these talks, the National Government
S began to subsidize the Sinkiang administration. Several thousand
(167) Chinese refugees were moved into Sinkiang between 1942 and 1943,
and at the beginning of 1943 Nationalist troops were also sent in.

This Nationalist advance was paralleled by the withdrawal of the Soviet troops which began in spring of 1942 and was almost

175 completed by March 1943. Soviet Russia not only withdrew its
648 military forces but also retreated from its economic expoitation
of Sinkiang. The Soviets capped the main oil well north of Urumchi and shipped back to Russia all the movable machinery from the oil refineries and the gold, copper, and iron mines which they had set up in Ili, Chuguchak, and in the Altai area, and from the factories they had built in Urumchi and other cities.

This Russian retreat was, however, far from complete. The Soviets maintained their consulates in all the larger cities of Sinkiang with a staff of several hundred people. At these consulates the Russians left military guards. At Urumchi a company of Soviet infantry with a strength of at least four hundred men was left behind to guard the consulate. Other consulates were guarded by units of ten to fifty men each. Other units were left behind to guard the gold, copper, and iron mines in the Ili and Chuguchak regions as well as the oil wells at Wusu and at Urumchi where the valuable machinery that could not be removed was protected by these troops. Soviet troops also continued to guard the airfields at Kulja, Urumchi, Kashgar, and Turfan. In each Soviet
175 consulate the biggest department was the propaganda section.
648 These departments distributed among Turks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz,
208 and Mongols pamphlets printed in Soviet Russia. Agents of the
consulates traveled throughout the province giving out these pamphlets and explaining the contents to the illiterate. The pamphlets gave favorable accounts of the Turkic people within the Soviet Union and contained material on methods of agriculture, irrigation, and animal husbandry. Altogether, the Soviet consulates concentrated more than before on the support and protection of the nationality group who had started to fight the Chinese administration. Although the Soviets did not establish Communist Party cells among these nationality groups, they attempts to infiltrate their leadership. And since Chinese policy aimed at the suppression of this nationality movement, the nationality groups depended on the intervention of the Soviet consulates with the Chinese administration for the protection of the lives of their leaders. In several cases the Soviet representatives prevented execution and in other cases secured the release of imprisoned nationality leaders. As a result the Turks, the Kirghiz, and the Kazakhs, and Mongols, had to accept the orders of Soviet agents in their dealings with the administration of Governor Sheng.

175 648 VIII. Soviet Efforts to Regain Power in Sinkiang.

By 1944 the defeat of Nazi Germany enabled Soviet Russia to
return to an active policy in Sinkiang. The Soviets supported a
[669] Kazakh uprising which broke out in the Ili valley on November

175 7, 1944. This Kazakh uprising occurred in the three border
648 districts of Ili, Chuguchak (Tacheng), and Ashan (Altai) and
669 resulted in the establishment of an "East Turkestan Republic."
These districts on the Soviet border were preponderantly Kazakh
in population and comprised almost one-sixth of the population of
the province. They are rich in oil, coal, iron, tungsten, gold,
lead, and reportedly also in uranium; they also have rich agricultural soil. The revolt was in the hands of experienced Kazakh
leaders who had been in practical control of much of the area since
their earlier uprising in 1940. When they had attempted in 1943 to
declare their independence, they had been forced to abandon this
plan by the threat of military action from the Soviet troops that
were guarding the closed mines in the area. But by 1944 the
Soviets were willing to support them. Their uprising resulted in
fighting in the Ili valley for over a month until the Chinese provincial troops gave up the city of Kulja which remained under the control of Kazakh insurgents. From Kulja the rebel forces moved
north to extend their control over the Chuguchak region and then
captured the town of Manass close to Urumchi. The rebellion also
spread to some cities of southern Turkestan. When attempts to
suppress the rebellion by military forces failed, the Chinese
National Government, which by this time was reasserting its
authority over Sinkiang, sent General Chang Chih=chung to
Sinkiang in September 1945 to negotiate with the rebels. These
negotiations were handled through the mediation of the Soviet
Consul-General in Urumchi. After many meetings between October 1945 and June 1946, the negotiations resulted in three agreements signed by General Chang and three Kulja delegates. The
agreements resulted in the abolition of the "East Turkestan Republic" and of its local flag but they practically secured autonomy
[635] for the rebellious districts and troops. They also resulted in the
reorganization of the provincial government. The new governor,
Chang Chih-chung had two vice-governors as his assistants, one
[563] an Uighur, the other a Tatar. The appointment of representatives
of the nationalities to such positions was an attempt to pacify the
revolt of the nationalities against Chinese rule. Governor Chang
did not, however, regain any control over the autonomous group
which continued to rule the vital border districts of Sinkiang under
the leadership of Akmedjan, Burkhan, Isakh Beg, and Saifuddin.
The national government troops under Governor Chang did not
control the area west of Urumchi and the products of this region,
including the oil, coal, and mineral products, went to the Soviet
175 side. From 1943 on the Soviet resumed the working of the tungsten mines and since 1945 the Soviets have reportedly obtained
648 diamonds, gold, bismuth, and uranium from this area. An attempt
[135] by the Chinese government to end this secret exploitation of

175 648 Turkestan resources by proposing an open trade agreement in November 1946 remained unanswered by the Soviets.

The Chinese attempt to regain control by Chang Chih-chung's policy of negotiation was based on military measures aimed at strengthening the strategic position. Along the whole route from Lanchow to Urumchi, blockhouses were maintained at distances of about twenty miles. And at the same time a new effort was made to open up the route from Ching-hai. The new Moslem governor of [491] the province, Ma Pu-fang, received Nationalist support in his efforts to build a road from Sining along Lake Kokonor towards the Tarim Basin. This road had been driven well past the Kokonor [701] before the Communist victory in 1949. The National Government had also strengthened the military force in Sinkiang. In addition to the six divisions which Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai had left behin, four divisions of Nationalist troops had been sent to the province and two divisions of Ma Pu-fang's cavalry from Chinghai had also been brought in, bringing the total of Chinese forces up to twelve divisions, or about 100,000 men, which have remained there since the Communists took over.

In spite of this military force, Governor Chang Chih-chung did not succeed in transforming the agreements concluded with the Kulja group in 1946 into a working arrangement. He demanded that the reorganization of the forces of the Kulja area should be preceded by acceptance of Chinese control. He also wanted the approval of the Sinkiang Nationalist leaders for the railroad to be built from China into Sinkiang and the acceptance by Sinkiang of the Chinese Nationalist currency. The Sinkiang Nationalist leaders refused these conditions, and in May 1947, Chang Chih-chung resigned as governor and was succeeded by an Uighur, Masud Sabri, who was a compromise candidate acceptable to the Chinese National Government. In July 1947 the Kulja nationalists broke with Masud [669] Sabri and maintained their own autonomous administration under Akmedjan. The situation remained in a deadlock and the Kulja group was reportedly receiving aid for its troops from Soviet Russia. The Kazakh leader, Osman Batur, who had formerly joined the Kulja group, had broken with it on account of the Soviet support and had withdrawn with his own forces to the Altai border region.

To overcome the deadlock with the Turkic Nationalists, the National government agreed in December 1949 to the appointment of one of the Nationalist leaders as governor of the province. This was Burkhan who was by origin a Russian Tatar and a man with whom the Kazakh nationalists were willing to cooperate. In January 1949 Chang Chih-chung flew once more to Sinkiang to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet economic treaty. But all these moves by the National Government to appease Soviet Russia by economic concessions and to appease theRussian-supported Kulja Nationalists

175 a change of the provincial administration came to nothing because
648 of the rapid disintegration and collapse of the National Government
[635] in 1949. The Sinkiang Provincial Government had a formal decla-
ration of adherence to the new Communist regime in Peking in
[668] September 1949.

IX. Sinkiang Under the Chinese Communists

175
648 After the victory of the Chinese Communists, both Soviet and
669 Chinese policy changed in its attitude toward the Sinkiang Nationalists.
668 While they had been supported and equipped with Soviet arms against
the Chinese provincial administration under the National Govern-
ment, they were now suppressed by the Chinese Communists with
Russian help. Soviet troops which were greatly increased and have
been estimated as consisting of about 50,000 men during this
time were instrumental in defeating the independent forces of Os-
man Batur who was captured and executed in April 1951 at Urumchi,
together with over 13,000 of hi's followers. The key Nationalist
leaders of the Ili area who had been formerly supported by Soviet
Russia were eliminated in another way. While on their way to
Peking to participate in the opening of the Communist People's
Political Consultative Conference, Akmedjan, Isakh Beg, and
several other leading figures were killed in an airplane crash on
August 29, 1949. The leaders who remained behind, Burkhan and
175 Saifuddin, were willing to work with the Chinese Communists
668 and Soviet Russia along a new line of policy which condemned the
[648] former nationalism and re-interpreted the previous fight in an
anti-Kuomintang line. The new leaders were willing to admit
former "mistakes: in their nationality policy which had not made
a clear distinction between opposition to "rapacious Kuomintang
officials, plundering Kuomintang troops, and the oppressive
Kuomintang police," and hostility to the "entire Han race."
This previous"narrow nationalism" was described as harmful
and the aim was now to establish full unity between the formerly
rebellious districts and the rest of the province. The Ili armed
forces were dissolved and integrated into the Chinese Communist
Army and a new policy was introduced of ridding the province of
its "feudal oppression."

175 This new policy propagandized by both Burkahn and Saifuddin
668 aroused strong nationalist opposition. In 1951, a Kazakh revolt which
669 continued in the Ili area spread towards the east. The move-
ment was attacked by Burhan as representing the "reactionary
bourgeois class, such as pan-Turkestanists and pan-Islamists"
who were trying to undermine the "solidarity among various races
in the People's Republic of China." He stated that "what has been
[661] regarded as progressive at one time may become reactionary at
another time," and ordered the liquidation of all "reactionaries,

175 counter-revolutionaries, and pan-Turkestanists" and demanded
668 that the "people of various races" be taught" the spirit of patrio-
669 tism and internationalism." Simultaneously, a large-scale
661 purge was undertaken to liquidate most of the original revolutionary leaders in the three western districts who had not perished in the airplane crash of 1949. These leaders were replaced by Chinese Communist cadres. The new policy was carried through with great bloodshed. According to a statement by Burkhan in January 1952, over 120,000 "people's enemies" had been liquidated. About 60,000 people attempted to flee from Turkestan, of whom only about 35,000 survived and reached safety in other countries. Large number of people were arrested and used as forced labor among the construction works introduced by the Chinese Communists under Russian guidance. Bollowing this purge, a re-education campaign was carried on by "friendship delegation from Peking, and in the words of the New China News Agency: "It was only after all this that the entire Kazakh people returned to the fold of the fatherland." (See Allen S. Whiting, "Nationality Tensions in Sinkiang," Far Eastern Survey, January 1956, vol. 25, no. 1.)

175 This policy was carried through with the backing of Russian
648 troops as well as the Chinese Communist troops of the First
668 Army Corps which had moved in after 1949. At the time of the
669 Korean war, some of the Chinese troops were withdrawn
661 for Korea, and the Russian forces were reportedly increased from 50,000 to 70,000 men. They were garrisoned along the northern route at each important point.

These Russian troops have thus helped substantially in the suppression of the Turkic nationalism which Soviet Russia had formerly built up and equipped against the Chinese Nationalists. Once before, in 1942, when Soviet Russia partly withdrew from Sinkiang, these nationalists had been left at the merch of the Chinese administration. Many had been arrested and executed, although the Soviet consular officials had continued to intervene on the behalf of some of these nationalist leaders. In 1949, however, the movement was crushed and its very motivation was attacked. Only those leaders survived who were willing to cooperate fully with the new Communist line.

175 Although the Russians gave full support to the Chinese Communists
648 in their reconquest of Sinkiang, the potential remained for Sino-
668 Soviet rivalry over control in Sinkiang. For the economic development of the province, the Chinese Communists remained dependent on Russian equipment and on Russian technicians. In the Sino-Soviet treaty of February, 1950, the two governments agreed on the establishment in Sinkiang of joint Sino-Soviet stock companies for exploitation of oil and non-ferrous metals in the province. The Soviet control of these companies indicated the political importance of

175 the Soviet economic stake in Sinkiang.

648 Over the next years, the strength of the Chinese Communist
668 government increased within the Soviet-Chinese relationship. The treaty of 1950, concluded by Mao Tse-tung in Moscow after lengthy haggling, was replaced in December 1954 by a new treaty concluded at the occasion of a visit of Krushchev and Mikoyan in Peking. Among other concessions, this new treaty provided for the liquidation of the Soviet shares in the former joint stock companies. Nevertheless some element of Soviet control remained since the Soviet shares were to be repaid through deliveries of raw materials and other commodities from Turkestan. The whole industrial and communications development of the province which was to be rapidly expanded under the Chinese Communist Five Year Plans depended also on Soviet economic and technical assistance. Most important, Soviet Russia has reportedly kept possession of the atomic energy center at Mirgrad in the Takla Makan Desert and has through the maintenance of military forces full control over the exploitation of uranium deposts in the Altai region where a large number ofRussians, estimated by one observer to be as large as 80,000, has been reported.

648 On the other hand, a recent British correspondent (New York
Times, August 13, 1956, p. 9) has reported that throughout the
668 region "up to the Soviet borders, the direct control of the Central Government on development plans and on political life is everywhere apparent. There are Soviet advisers and experts and plenty of Soviet machinery, but no more than in other parts of China, and the over-riding impression is that China is in complete charge.

"Peking's orders stretch into the remotest villages, where the ever-present cadres and Party members are kept in constant touch with the capital through provincial committees. Nowhere is there any external evidence ofSoviet influence outside the technical sphere."

This observation of a Chinese Communist administration directed from Peking does not necessarily exclude consideration of Russian military and economic decisions for Sinkiang by the Chinese policy-makers in Peking. Nor does it exclude the possibility of conflict in the districtuion of the Turkestan resources between the Soviet and Chinese Communist economies, especially in the case of the uranium exploitation at present obviously in Soviet hands. The railroad from Lanchow to Aktogai in Russian
[496] Turkestan, which in 1956 has been pushed beyond the Yumen oil fields in Kansu, is the most important physical link between the two economies but is also a highway for a vast and growing stream of young Chinese immigrants who are brought in to work on the oil fields, the railroads, and the construction of new towns and factories. This movement, which is aimed at filling up the

648 thinly populated area with a Chinese population, is the most
668 important factor in the reassertion of Chinese control. The
Chinese link with Turkestan is also not limited to the railroad
under construction which will run along the old caravan route
via Qomul, Urumchi, to the Soviet border. In addition the
[491] Chinese Communists follow the policy of the National Government
[496] in the construction of road and railroad connections through
the Tsaidam Basin. This area is reportedly also to be developed by Communist China into a new key industrial center in central Asia. Oil and mineral resources are claimed to exist in abundance. The Tsaidam region is farther away from the Soviet or Outer Mongolian border than is the main railroad line and it provides a position in depth in the Chinese Communist connection with Sinkiang. In its advance into central Asia, the Chinese Communist regime seems to follow the main strategic considerations which had been observed by previous Chinese governments

With the shrinking distances and the means of modern industrial development, the importance of Sinkiang with its rich natural resources has vastly increased. There is at the moment no indication of any hitch in the Soviek-Chinese cooperation in the province. But should any conflict evolve between these Communist organizations, Sinkiang must, by the very reason of its geographic location and economic importance, become one of the decisive areas of conflict.

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SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

I. Introduction

*175 The history of China's Northwest has been a great number of 669 insurrections and revolts against the established order. Spontaneous outbreaks, however, occurred only as a result of desperation. The forces that ruled the people remained unchallenged until the misery and poverty which surrounded them became unbearable. Even then, the people would not strike out blindly against their oppressors, but would look to their own tribal chieftains and priests for leadership (see section Political Dynamics). In more recent times, intellectuals, army men and even bandits have taken the place of the old leaders, but it would be incorrect to say that the people themselves have the political consciousness which changes governments or overthrows regimes. On the other hand, the per- *175 sistent nationalism combined with the strong religious tradition *668 that exists among the Moslems of the Northwest, and the tribal 648 and nomadic past of the peoples of Turkestan and Central Asia, could always be aroused by ambitious and popular leaders in opposition to alien penetration. Throughout the centuries, hostility has existed both against any foreign rulers and among the tribes and minority groups themselves. Three major sources of conflict will be mentioned here: 1) The traditional friction among the tribes of Northwest China due to religious and economic differences; 2) wide-spread resentment on the part of the native peoples toward Chinese rule; 3) dissatisfaction with the Communist regime.

*563 II. Friction among Northwestern Peoples

In the first place, because of its geographical position, North- 578 west China stands at the crossroads of conflicting political ideologies and religious beliefs, originating from the Middle East, India, China and Russia. In an area like Sinkiang, there have lived in uneasy proximity Buddhists, Mohammedans, Greek Orthodox Russians, unorthodox Chinese and atheistic Russians, as well as believers in the most primitive religious practices. Economically also there has existed great contrast: the nomadic tradition of the Kazakhs and Mongols, the oasis economy of the peoples of Inner Asia, the methods of Chinese agriculture, the alpine economy of the Kirghiz of the Tienshan, the economy of the Arikolis who live on the high plateaus of the Pamirs, alongside of which a very young industrial and commercial economy is developing. Friction has always existed between the settled farmers of the oases and the nomadic herdsmen, while within the farming communities, conflicts over water rights, the use of forests and roads, were permanent features in rural life.

N III. Resentment of Chinese Rule

*563 These internal differences have made it impossible for the
578 people of the Northwest to cast off their Chinese rulers by united
action and to establish a Turkic, Uighur, or federated govern-
S ment of their own. In Sinkiang, 90 per cent of the population is
[162] non-Chinese, yet the forces of nationalism and of religion, which
at times made for a temporary unity, were not strong enough to
transform the sporadic revolts into a lasting revolutionary move-
ment and complete independence.

There always has been a great deal of friction between the Chinese and the non-Chinese as a result of the differences in cultural heritage. In addition, the Chinese form a ruling minority in many parts of the Northwest and appear to the native people as a foreign government of occupation. In this situation, the Chinese Moslems (the Dungans) have found themselves caught between two fires. At times they sided with their Kirghiz and Uighur co-religionists, and at other times they were compelled to support their non-Moslem Chinese compatriots. As a result, they have been distrusted by everyone and have suffered a double persecution during times of upheaval and nationalistic or religious fanaticism.

N
The Chinese method of ruling minority peoples involved the
*175 system of "divide and rule" and created friction not only with China,
657 but also among the tribes themselves. The policies of Tso Tung-
*563 t'ang in the latter part of the nineteenth century, can be taken as
578 an example. He managed to place great power in the hands of his
S own relatives and friends, and to strengthen the old social struc-
175 tures of the Mongols, Uighurs and Kazakhs through the existing
657 Begs and princes who became instruments of Chinese rule. He
563 considered the Chinese Moslems to be traitors and killed large
578 numbers of them while showing leniency toward the Uighurs, Mongols and Kazakhs. After the Revolution of 1911, during the governorship of Yang Tseng-hsin, the tradition of setting one people against another was continued. Fearing that the Mongols of Sinkiang might unite with the Mongols of Outer Mongolia during the revolution there, heavy restrictions were imposed upon them, while the Kazakhs were even allowed to carry arms. Under the previous Manchu rule, the Mongols were favored over the Kazakhs; they were considered the rightful owners of pasture lands, while the Kazakh tribes were treated as their "tenants."

S In the case of the Turkic Moslems, nationalism and religion
175 are almost inseparable. Their rebellions against the Chinese have
669 been the most persistent and the most violent, but only one short
648 period of freedom has broken two centuries of Chinese control.
668 Ever since 1759, when the Manchu general, Chao-hui, drove the
ruling Moslem Khojas into Khokand and extended Chinese rule into Turkestan, the bitter resentment aroused by foreign control has flared into periodic revolt. In the nineteenth century, while the

S 175 669 648 668 Moslems were rising in China Proper, a descendant of the Khojas was able to move from Khokand eastward into Sinkiang. By 1865 he ruled Kashgar and Yarkand. Soon, his chief of staff, Yakub Beg, replaced him and conquered the rest of Chinese Turkestan. Helped by foreign aid and diplomatic recognition, Sinkiang remained independent and under Moslem rule for over a decade. After the death of Yakub Beg in 1877 and the recapture of Sinkiang by Tso Tsung-t'ang, the dream of a great Turkic Empire, extending from the Caspian to the western frontier of China, continued to exist. Turanism (Pan Turkism or Pan Turkistanism) gradually came to acquire the ideological formulations of modern nationalism.

S 175 669 648 A Moslem uprising of proportions dangerous to the Chinese government broke out in 1931 under the leadership of Ma Ch'ung-ying, who led an army of Chinese Moslems from Kansu into Sinkiang. His defeat in 1934 by Sheng Shih-ts'ai was partly due to the aid of Russia. It regarded Ma as a collaborator and advance scout of the Japanese whose invasion of Central Asia seemed imminent.

S 175 669 668 The most recent example of an anti-Chinese uprising culminated in 1944 in the establishment at Kulja of the "Eastern Turkistan Republic." Unlike previous purely Moslem uprisings, the Kulja movement was an expression of "coalition nationalism," and it
S [646] attempted to unite all the non-Chinese of Sinkiang. The Kulja government was headed by a council made up of an Uighur, a Kazakh, and a "White" Russian. In the years that followed until the victory of the Chinese Communists, there were alternate periods of fighting, negotiations and near co-existence between the National Government and Kulja. The insurgents' chief demand was for autonomy and self-government, rather than for complete independence from China. Agreements, guaranteeing cultural freedoms and substantial independence in the administration of the local government, were made but were never really carried out. In 1947, Masud Sabri, a wealthy Uighur landlord, became Chairman of Sinkiang, the first non-Chinese to hold that position. But as he was considered by many members of the Kulja Government to be an agent of the C. C. Clique and the National Government, the movement split for and against him, and a new deadlock was created. In December, 1948, Masud Sabri was replaced by Burkhan at a time when no assembly was in session to accept or reject him. It is difficult to know to what degree the Kulja Government had been swayed by Communist or Soviet Russian influence. Only one thing was certain - the government was strongly anti-Chinese. But with the Communist victory, the entire provincial government of Sinkiang turned to the new regime and a completely new situation emerged.

N *668 Thus, there have been two major types of independence movements in the Northwest, one purely Moslem and the other seeking

*668 unity among the major national and ethnic groups. Neither have really succeeded in achieving their aims. On the other hand, it was in the Northwest that the Chinese Communists first came to power. In the 1930's, the headquarters of Chinese Communism was at Yenan, and the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region became the basis of their might. After 1949, the Northwest was regarded as one of the "old liberated areas," and the birthplace of the new regime.

*668 177

IV. Dissatisfaction with Communist Regime

With the establishment of Communist administration, new reasons for discontent have arisen, while many of the old ones have not been remedied. In the first place, it is obvious that Islam, or any of the other religions of the Northwest, is basically incompatible with Marxism, a materialistic philosophy and a way of life that excludes any belief in the supernatural. Secondly, after centuries of relative freedom, if not of independence, Communism has brought to the nomadic tribes of the Northwest a system of government that is more centralized than any previous one in modern times. With it also came such impositions as the enforcement of Five Year Plan goals, the meeting of industrial and agricultural quotas, and the insecurity which police and party supervision create. The old tribal and family organization of the peoples of Sinkiang (especially the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs) is quite remote from the Communist institutions of control whereby economic classes are ruled from party, military and bureaucratic centers. Many have rebelled against it or left their native country altogether.

A. Degree of Acceptance of Communism

Yet it would not be correct to say that discontent is universal in the Northwest. The Communists, well realizing the importance of the Islamic faith and the cultural values of the minorities, have done their best to appear as the protectors and promoters of their spiritual needs. To a large degree they have succeeded in creating that impression. To the Turks of Sinkiang the Communists appeared sincerely interested in the survival of Mohammedanism. They failed to realize that cultural control amounted to an attempt to ensure political control over the Islamic communities.

[167] The number of refugees from Central Asia testifies to the strong anti-Communist feelings that have existed among the Turkic peoples since the 1920's. However, Communist policies were such that many of those who remained have become loyal supporters of the regime. The technological improvements, especially in the field of irrigation, that the Communists have introduced,
[466] impressed them greatly. The fact that under army supervision virtual slave labor was used to accomplish this, has less signifi-

*668 172 [166] cance than the fact that the hardships and disasters previously caused by poor precipitation now seem to have been eliminated. Livestock has improved, as has the economy in general. There is a fairly good public health program to protect humans, and an even better one for the cattle. With patriotic fanfare both men and beasts now must undergo inoculation campaigns. In the cultural sphere, the Communists have increased the number of schools and have extended adult and higher education. Religious practices are not restricted. The native theater, music and dance, as well as the publication of books and magazines in the native languages, are officially encouraged, and lend color to what is generously called "cultural autonomy." Women have been given equal rights with men, a policy that has caused that segment to look favorably on the whole Communist regime. Even the enforcement of public safety and order has revealed a positive side. It has stopped the endless inter-tribal struggles over pasture lands and irrigation rights, and has insured a certain degree of internal peace - even if a rather artificial one. Mechanization in agriculture and industrialization in general has brought a great deal of pride to the tribal people. The superficial rights they have obtained have created a surprising amount of loyalty toward the regime.

[167] As a result, the number of refugees leaving for Afghanistan, Iran, Tibet and Pakistan, has become smaller, and the organs of effective opposition within Sinkiang and Northwestern China have become considerably weaker, a condition not entirely attributable to the campaign of suppression of counterrevolutionaries.

*668 669

B. "Counter-Revolutionary" Activities

While all this may be true to some degree, there are sufficient indications that the negative aspects of Communism often are greater than the technological gains and cultural freedoms that have made it acceptable to a substantial part of the population. The campaign for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries revealed that large numbers of people are antagonistic toward the Communist policies. (For incidents of this kind see section on Public Order and Safety and Political Dynamics). If these statements seem to be mutually contradictory, it must be remembered that elements of truth are present in both contentions. Any categoric evaluation of the attitudes of the people toward the Communist regime would surely be unrealistic. It must also be noted that official sources tend to exaggerate the evil and intensity of the counter-revolutionary activities in order to carry on an effective suppression campaign. This policy itself will continue to increase the dissatisfaction and insecurity of the people. Another point to be remembered is that opposition to the Communist administration is not uniform throughout the Northwest. The provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, are inhabited by large numbers of Chinese,

*668 and are closer to the Chinese capital. Thus they are more easily
669 controlled than Sinkiang with its largely non-Chinese population
and its remoteness which always have posed a greater problem
to Chinese administrators. It is probably safe to say that a certain
amount of subversion does exist in the Northwest and that a
certain amount of truth underlies the Communist accusations.

In their methodical way, the Communists have divided "counter-revolutionaries"
into five groups: former Nationalist forces, local
forces under Osman Batur, Mohammed Imin Bogllah, Jamin Khan
and Yolbars Khan, White Russians, members of secret societies,
*668 and bandits. Aside from the more basic incompatibilities between
Communism and the traditional ways of life, the present situation
578 gives rise to continual cause for complaints and disappointments.

*563 1. "Great Hanism" and "narrow nationalism"

Apparently, the old grievance against Han domination in the affairs of the Northwest has not been remedied. The Communist Party of Sinkiang, for instance, is still headed by Wang En-mao, a Chinese who has held this high position for many years. (CNA No. 113). On the next lower levels also, cadres holding responsible positions usually are Chinese. It has been estimated that only one-third of the people working in the Party Committees are native born and the rest are Chinese (Ibid.). In the field of trade and commerce, in the agencies handling the exploitation of local products, about 63% of the employees are Chinese.

The Communist leaders have continually condemned a policy
668 encouraging "Great Hanism." However, they are still more
afraid of "narrow nationalism"- a nationalism that eventually may lead to a separatist movement. In an article written by Burkhan, Chairman of the Sinkiang Provincial Government, this theme is elaborated at great length. The ideas of Pan Turkestanism and Pan Islamism are shown to be completely imperialist. Discussing the differences between progressive and reactionary national movements, Burkhan comes to the conclusion that Pan Turkestanists and Pan Islamists are reactionary "in that they were all lackeys of American and British imperialism and the traitors." However, the Kulja movement, "formed a part of the general movement of the revolution of the Chinese people, being arrayed on the side of the camp of peace, democracy, and socialism headed by the great Soviet Union." He concludes that "at this juncture, any national movement which seeks separation from the Chinese People's Republic for independence will be reactionary, since, objectively considered, it would undermine the interests of the various races and particularly the foremost majority of the race concerned, and thus would work to the advantage of imperialism.... for any movement, the prerequisites, time and locale should be coordinated, and what has been regarded as progressive at one time may become reactionary at another time." Thus it

*668 is evident that loopholes are open everywhere for sudden changes in tactics and policy. Overnight, a most loyal attitude may change into subversion.

*668 578 The Communists themselves admit that tensions exist even within the ranks of the cadres. Not only do Chinese and non-Chinese cadres confront each other with antagonism, but friction also exists between the old veteran cadres and the newly graduated younger men, as well as between party cadres and non-party cadres. Personal jealousy and ambition, mixed with the fear of sudden purges, have hardly diminished over the last few years and will probably continue to hamper the efficiency of the Communist administration. (See Political Dynamics.)

2. Effect of the campaigns

*668 661 578 Nation-wide drives and campaigns are felt as strongly in the border regions as in China Proper. The effects of the Three-Anti and the Five-Anti movements were especially violent when they hit the people of the Northwest in 1952. Countless cadres, officials, and ordinary citizens of the merchant class were charged with graft, waste, bureaucraticism, tax evasion, bribery, cheating in government contracts, theft of economic intelligence, and stealing of national property. Many were imprisoned, sent to corrective labor camps, or sentenced to death. It is difficult to gauge, however, to what degree the Communist charges were true, or, on the other hand, how much the policy of terror increased resentment against Communist rule. But it goes without saying that the result of such spiritual and physical control makes for continual intimidation and fear. While it makes concerted opposition impossible, it foments the bitterness and unrest upon which eventual open resistance is based.

*668 578 [701] Undoubtedly, the role of the army in carrying out government policies causes much tenseness. It heightens the intensity of terror involved in the implementation of such campaigns as land reform and the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. (Union Research Service, September 27, 1955.) To compensate for the lack of man-power in agriculture and industry, the Communist government has sent large numbers of "reform workers" to the Northwest. According to one source, a subversive potential has been created as "reform workers and minority peoples whose interests are identical, have banded together to oppose Communist rule," and that "cases of resistance have been more numerous than has been imagined." (Ibid.)

3. Effect of economic measures

*668 177 The Chinese Communist government hopes that the Northwest will eventually play an important part in the industrial growth of the entire country. For the moment they are still concentrating on increasing the agricultural output and developing animal husbandry. The initial pressure on Northwestern farmers to

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*668 collectivize was slight, but the speed toward socialization has
177 been increased greatly especially since the middle of 1955. The
plans call for a continuation in the breakdown of privately-owned
S farms. In Sinkiang the 1702 production cooperatives which existed
[668] in 1955 are to be increased to 3469 in 1956. By 1960, 85% of all
[177] households are scheduled to be at least semi-socialized. Further-
[474] more, a relatively large number of mechanized state farms have
been instituted in the Northwest (China News Agency No. 112.).
It is not surprising that these rapid changes, combined with methods
of terror and intimidation, should result in peasant opposition.
(Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955.)

4. Religious organizations

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*668 Religious organizations have also come under attack. Counter-
798 revolutionaries are suspected of hiding in them and of using them
669 for propaganda activities and espionage. Sinister anti-government
N activities are attributed to the traditional secret societies, espe-
*668 cially I-kuan-tao, which has many branches throughout China and
575 appears under various names. It is estimated to have 100,000
members in Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia. Secret society activities
have existed among the Chinese Moslems since Tso Tsung-t'ang's
invasion of the Northwest. Only now are they being suppressed.
It is unlikely that, after such a long existence, the Communists
will succeed in completely uprooting the organizations in the very
near future.

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C. Centers of Resistance Abroad

*668 It is clear that no effective organs of opposition can exist in
669 the Northwest under conditions of terror and in the face of a centralized system of police and military control. All that can be
expected is individual terror and sabotage - a method of opposition,
nevertheless, that continues to give the administration constant
irritation and worry. Moreover, if historical precedent can serve
as an indication for the future, a rebellious movement can attain
political significance only when military aid from abroad is available. This was the case during World War II, for instance, when
the Turks of southern Russia rebelled against the Soviet regime
and sided with the Germans. At present only two important centers of resistance exist abroad. One is the so-called National
Turkestanian Unity Committee (Turkish: Milli Turkistan Birlik
Quomitasinin), headed by its president, Veli Kayum Khan, a member of an old aristocratic Uzbek clan; the other is Formosa, the
rallying point of all anti-Communists from the mainland.

1. The Turkestanian Unity Committee

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*668 Few people in the West are aware of the existence of an East
and West Turkistan government-in-exile, which is supported by
669 the Turks of Central Asia and by Turkestanian refugees. Due to
648 their fear of political entanglements with Russia, none of the

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1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
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N countries bordering Soviet and Chinese Turkestan have given offi-
*668 cial recognition to this government-in-exile. It has its headquar-
669 ters far from Central Asia - in Düsseldorf, West Germany. How-
648 ever, the National Turkestanian Unity Committee is supported
S unofficially by many of the Moslem countries of the Middle East
668 and Central Asia, such as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
669 Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In each of these
648 countries the Committee maintains a representative office staffed by two members from each Turkish clan from Eastern and Western Turkestan. Iraq is the exception where there is only one representative. In addition to giving financial aid to the exiled government, these countries render assistance in getting Turkestanian refugees temporarily settled. They also allow the establishment of National Turkestanian Unity Committee branches within their borders.

The Committee is composed of ten departments, each of which is under the combined direction of President Veli Khayum Khan and a secretary. These departments are: 1) Organizations and Social Institutions; 2) Science; 3)Information; 4) the Press; 5) Public Health; 6) the Clergy (Turkish: Ulema); 7) Military Affairs; 8) Education, directed cooperatively by all members; 9) Women's Activities; and 10) Foreign Relations, of which Veli Khayun Khan alone is the head.

The spiritual leader of the movement for an independent Turkestan is the famous turkologist Zeki Velidi Togan, who is now a member of the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Istanbul. A native of Bashkiria, Zeki Veliki Togan studied and taught Arabic literature at the University of Kazan. In November, 1917, he became president of Bashkiria. In 1922 he led the Basmachi revolt against Soviet rule. With their suppression, he fled to Tashkent, and from there to Turkey.

During the Second World War, the National Committee gave Germany effective aid against Russia, but its aim always has been independence from any foreign power. "The Germans, as the enemy of our enemy, were temporarily our friends, but we envisaged this state of affairs only for as long as they were fighting against the Russians." (Milli Turkistan #79B, p. 5). The ultimate goal of the Turkestanian government-in-exile is to liberate all of Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, a territory of about four million square miles with a population of over twenty million. The leaders of the National Turkestanian Unity Committee claim that they are able to maintain contact with the peoples of Central Asia and that messengers frequently cross unguarded mountain passes to take contraband literature to Communist-controlled countries, and return to the West with reliable information of conditions under Communist rule. Naturally, it is difficult to estimate the degree of influence which the National Turkestanian Unity

N Committee holds over the people of Northwest China. Nor is it
*668 possible to predict to what extremes a fanatically nationalistic
669 movement may go in order to establish a Greater Turkestan Em-
648 pire, or the new sufferings which such a Turkic regime may mean
S to others.

[668] 2. Formosa

[669] Since 1949, Formosa has been the natural center for anti-Com-
[648] munist activities. The Nationalists attempt to maintain contact with the border regions, but it is impossible to estimate the effectiveness of such an espionage or sabotage system. Refugees from the Northwest and elsewhere are given subsidies. Frequently they are employed in the anti-Communist propaganda and planning undertaken by Taipeh. The Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs sponsors radio broadcasts to the Northern, Northwestern and Western border regions, and has done most of the planning for the eventual overthrow of the Communist regime. These include, 1) a draft plan for the administration of the border regions during the counter-offensive, 2) a draft plan for anti-Communist work to be handled by the anti-Communist agencies in the border regions (although no details are given about them), and 3) plans for the training of administrative personnel from the border regions. The Commission has also been publishing books and pamphlets on the problems of these areas.

An anti-Communist branch of the China Islam Association also has its headquarters on Formosa. It serves as a center for Moslem refugees from the Northwest, as well as from Inner Mongolia and China Proper.

Aside from these organizations, there are also individuals who possibly may form a nucleus for future anti-Communist leadership. They include such people as General Pai Chung-hsi, who works closely with the China Islam Association on Formosa, Yolbas Khan, one of the Kazakh leaders who fought with Osman Batur, Ma Hung-k'ui, the former governor of Ninghsia who now lives in San Francisco, and Ma Pu-fang, the former governor of Ch'inghai, who escaped to Formosa and thence to Egypt in 1949. The latter two are devout Moslems and have fought actively against the Communists in the Northwest. Ma Pu-fang is remembered for his enlightened rule and is trusted by the Moslems in all parts of the Northwest. (See section Biographies for details on these men).

Thus, the potential organization and leadership for a non-Communist government in the Northwest exists. Their practical value must remain slight as long as the regime in power continues to be centralized and as long as it gives the people enough material benefits to take the place of political freedoms.

PROPAGANDA

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PROPAGANDA

I. The Aims of Propaganda

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The power of the Communist party, in China as elsewhere, is built upon numerous factors, but three are outstanding, namely, its organization, (including its secret police), its military forces, and its propaganda. Propaganda is used to promote military conquest as well as organizational expansion, while both military forces and organization are used to back up propaganda. Every Communist Party member is required to do his share of propaganda. Little propaganda is not originated and directed by the Party organization.

Before the Communists assume political control, propaganda is used to infiltrate and soften the spiritual fortification of the Party's enemies. After conquest of an area, propaganda is used to promote the Party's governmental program and policies. Propaganda is part of the program to maintain voluntary discipline. Positively, it is necessary to propagate and explain the policies and opinions of the Party to the public; negatively, it is necessary to stop and hit back at the "propaganda and rumor" that are "mistaken and reactionary."

Furthermore, in the effort of building a propaganda network, the Communists expect to have accomplished something other than just propaganda. The party requires the propaganda workers to set good examples for the public. It also expects the propagandists to train more people to carry on its propaganda program. Theoretically, a good propagandist shall believe in what he says, and a good believer shall be a good man of action to carry out what he believes. By the continuous training and growth in the number of the propagandists, the Party gets more and more of its work done.

II. The Propaganda Organization

A. The Reporter

The network of propaganda is built around the Communist Party. At each level of the Party organization, from the province down to the ch'u (district below county), a responsible member, many times the Party secretary, is assigned as a reporter. He is responsible for making constant, systematic reports of current events, Party policy, work assignments and work experiences. At least once every two months, each reporter makes a political report to mass meetings and to the representative meetings of the local people. The title and the outline of contents are decided or approved beforehand by the Party secretary at the related level. The result of the report also is reported to the same secretary. Some of these reports are selected and published in local newspapers by

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the related provincial or local Party committees.

B. Propagandists

1. Selection and methods

Besides the official reporter, every branch of the Party organization selects a number of Party members, youth corps members, model laborers and other revolutionary activists to be propagandists. These propagandists should have the willingness to lead in labor productivity and other work as well as the ability to promote propaganda. They may choose one or several of the following methods to carry out their work:

1) personal conversations
2) passing around information
3) reading newspapers for others
4) receiving and spreading People's radio broadcasts
5) writing and painting propaganda pictures, articles, etc.
6) editing wall newspapers.

The appointment of the propagandists is checked by the Party branch committee and approved by the Party organization at the level higher. Party and Youth Corps secretaries, committee members who have working relations with the public (such as: labor union workers, cooperative workers, village workers, school teachers, staff members of public educational institutions, wall newspaper editors (etc...) all should be propagandists.

2. Activities

At least once a month, the propagandists of a Party branch gather together to receive guidance from above and to discuss current work. They should also reflect the conditions of the public. This kind of meeting occurs not more than once a week. Once a month, the county (or city) Party committee calls a joint meeting of the Party branch secretaries or a representative meeting of the propagandists or a rally of all the propagandists in the area. The Party secretary of the county (or city) makes a report on current events and missions. Then he leads the group in checking the propaganda work of the past month and in discussing the future propaganda work of the coming month. In case of difficulties of transportation, this kind of meeting may be called by the district Party committee which directs the branch Party propaganda work. In the rural areas, the district Party committee establishes the system of propaganda transfer stations. By this system, the district Party committee members regularly, but separately, call in the propagandists or representatives of the propagandists of several Party branches to the stations where the contents and methods of propaganda are taught. There they also distribute and explain the propaganda materials.

3. Instruction and program

The Party committees of all levels constantly furnish the propa-

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gandists with instructions and materials. Party newspapers and publications at all levels regularly publish discussions about the propagandists as well as about their work. The Party schools and training classes at all levels offer courses on propaganda. When possible, they establish short courses to train propagandists.

Since the Party formulates the whole propaganda program, it organizes and utilizes in the program all the so-called democratic parties and people's organizations as well as the workers in the People's government, People's Liberation Army and cultural, educational and artistic circles. The provincial and city Party committees, according to local conditions, plan a definite program of propaganda once every half year. Upon the approval by the related central committee sub-bureau, this program is put into practice and checked regularly.

C. Basic Organizational Units

1. Outlets

The basic organizational units of propaganda are:

1) newspaper reading groups
2) blackboard newspapers
3) radio receiving groups
4) megaphone units
5) propaganda groups
6) propaganda teams
7) current event study groups.

Above these basic units, the work of an area is supervised and coordinated by a committee; in rural areas, it is the cultural and educational committee; in the city, the propaganda committee; in the factories and mines, the labor union's cultural and educational committee; in the schools, the propaganda and educational committee of the students' association. These committees, together with the secretary of the local Party branch committee and the Party propaganda head, are used as nuclei around which is built the local propaganda net, which absorbs all the local school teachers, propaganda workers of the local government and people's organizations.

2. Committees

The missions of these committees are threefold: first, they guide the local propaganda activities according to the program decided by the Party. Secondly, they insure accuracy in the political interpretation of the propaganda. Thirdly, they help the organization and consolidation of the propaganda groups among the masses. In order to achieve these purposes, these committees need to build the necessary working system of meeting, report, investigation, appraisal and criticism. According to incomplete statistics, in December, 1951, there were 85,000 propagandists in northwest China.

III. Functions of Propaganda System

A. Sounding Board

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This propaganda network has another important function. It also checks public opinion and relays it to the Party. Every propagandist is supposed to report back not only what he has said but also what the public has said to him. Since the Communist Party has control of all newspapers, radio broadcast programs and other means of public information, there is no other way of knowing the true feelings of the people. Thus, the propaganda machine is utilized to sound out public opinion, in order to better deal with the public.

Furthermore, the propaganda machine is fluid and can be used as a weapon in every field. (For the details, see the Propaganda section of the General Handbook).

B. Work with National Minorities

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1. "Central People's Government Mission to National Minorities of Northwest"

Besides the regular propaganda organizations, special groups and teams have been sent at various times to different areas. For instance, in 1950 the Communists sent a "Central People's Government Mission to the National Minorities in the Northwest." The chief of the mission was Shen Chun-ju, the deputy chiefs were Sa K'ung-liao and Ma Yu-kwei. The mission visited Panchan Lama on November 1, at Kumbum monastery in Chinghai. There they also attended a welcome meeting of 12,000 people of all the nationalities in Chinghai. The Panchan Lama presented Shan, Sa and Ma with katag, consisting of silk woven portraits of Buddha, the most precious gift to the Tibetans (obviously these were specially made, usually there is no portrait of Buddha), and expressed his profound respects for, and gratitude to, Chairman Mao Tse-tung. "At the welcome meeting to the mission at Sining city on November 2, representatives of seven nationalities in Chinghai submitted to Chairman Mao a katag consisting of a silk banner more than 10 geet in length, inscribed with words in the Chinese, Arabic and Tibetan languages, stating: "Most Respected and Honored Chairman Mao; under your glorious banner, we have achieved equality, mutual assistance, love and unity." On the top of the banner there were attached 8 national flags of China and the portrait of Mao, at the bottom were paintings of the people of the seven nationalities in the province. (NCNA, November 4, 1950).

Of course, these activities greatly impressed the local people. This same mission in different groups visited Ninghsia and Sinkiang.

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In 1952 the Party promoted an ideological remoulding and study campaign among the literary and art circles in the Northwest. Many of those so indoctrinated were organized into groups and sent

*668 to factories, rural villages, areas along the railways and in the
658 minority districts. Among them, 45 literary and art workers in Sian formed twelve creative writing teams and proceeded to factories, rural villages, areas along the Tienshui-Lanchow railway cities.

2. Propaganda missions by minority representatives

*668 a. To minority areas

658 There was another form of propaganda team which included well-known local leaders as members, with one of them as the
*563 head of the group. They were sent to a particular area to win over its minority groups. For instance, in June, 1952, the Northwest Military Administrative Committee sent out two propaganda missions from Sian, one to the Tibetan districts in southern Kansu and the other to pastoral districts in southern Chinghai. Each of these two divided again into two sub-groups. The first sub-group of the mission to the pastoral districts in southern Chinghai, under the leadership of Hsi-jao-chia-tso (Tibetan), visited the Mongolian banners and Chien-cha districts; the second sub-group, led by Hsia-jih-tsang, the Tibetan Living Buddha of Tung-jen hsien, Chinghai, visited Tung-teh and Tung-jen. The first and second sub-groups of the mission to the Tibetan districts in Kansu arrived at Hsia-ho and Lin-tan on July 17 and 20 respectively. The first sub-group led by Chief Huang Cheng-ch'ing (Tibetan) and Deputy Chiefs, Chu Hsia-fu, Ma Pei-ching (Moslem) and Huang hsiang, offered gifts to Labrang Monastery and its Living Buddha, Chia-mu-yang VI, on July 24. The visiting mission's welcome by the
[576] Tibetans, who had awaited the mission along the Mien-hsien-Hsia-ho highway, included the most solemn welcome ceremony of salutes fired from horseback and the presentation of katags. Abbot Tachi of Labrang Monastery and the leader of the mosque, Kung Ching-lu, were also present to welcome the mission at the outskirt of Labrang. Similar organizations were formed on other occasions.

b. To Peking, etc.

*668 Besides organizing and sending propaganda teams to the minori-
658 ty groups, the local minority people were also organized and trans-
*563 ported inland, especially to the Red capital, Peking, for short visits.
484 There they were exposed to systematic propaganda. They might come to attend meetings, to give performances, to receive training and education, or simply to have a sightseeing tour. The following are some examples.

"The preparatory meeting of the Chinese Moslem Association was held in Peking on July 27-31. The meeting was initiated and convened by eight well-known Moslems among minority nationalities: Burhan, Liu Ko-ping, Saifudin, Ta Pu-sheng, Ma Chien, Pang Shih-ch'ien, Yang Ching-jen and Ma Yu-huai. The meeting was attended by 53 delegates from all parts of China. Among them were Akhuns, Mullah and responsible people of the Moslem groups

*668 658 of Muslim-Hui, Uighurs (Sarigh-Uighur), Kazaks, Usbeks, Tatars, and Tung-hsiang nationalities. (NCNA Peking, August 4, 1952).

*563 484 A 45 member delegation from 15 different nationalities of Northwest China arrived in Peking yesterday to take part in the coming October 1st National Day celebrations....

The Northwest delegation, headed by Mainor, an Uigur woman, included the following 15 nationalities: Han, Hui, Uigur, Kazakh, Mongolian, Tibetan, Tunghsiang, (Sarigh-Uighur), Uzbek, Manchu, Tartar, Solon, Khalhas (Kirgiz), Tajik, Sibo and Russian." (NCNA Peking, September 24, 1952).

3. Minority group organizations

*668 *563 794 Various nation-wide organizations such as the China Buddaist Association, the Chinese Islamic Association, the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, and the China-Soviet Friendship Association were organized with numerous minority and local leaders as members and sponsors. The local chapters also have propaganda departments. For instance, the Tibetan Buddhists in Chinghai, under the leadership of Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o contributed 728, 750, 000 for the Resist-America Aid Korea movement in the year 1951 alone. Some monasteries signed patriotic compacts and launched programs of propaganda on current events. According to Hsi-jao-chia-ts'os report,

"The next step is to expand the propaganda work, mobilize the lamas to organize propaganda teams, make use of temple fairs or festivals for propaganda activities, and carry the propaganda deep into the rural villages and nomadic regions.... In pushing the autonomous work in the minority region, Buddhism should give more active support and preach the nationality policy of the People's Government." (Sian, Ch'un-chung jih-pao, November 23, 1951.)

[788] [648] Besides the Buddhists, the Moslems are used to promote the Communist programs, not only in Northwest China, but some were organized into pilgrim groups to visit Mecca and the Moslem nations in the Near East in order to win the friendship of these nations for Red China.

*668 648 The special effort to create Sino-Soviet Friendship Associations in northwest China can be seen in the following incomplete figures. By September of 1951, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association organizations had been organized in four provinces, four municipalities, thirty-six administrative districts and 157 hsien in northwest China. There were 1, 314 branch associations and 417 sub-branch associations with a total membership of 336, 610 of all nationalities. The purpose of this association is to tell the people of the merits of the USSR.

Obviously a special attempt has been made in Northwest China to capture the minorities with propaganda.

S 4. Cultural corps

668 In the army, cultural work corps promoted propaganda by means
708 of entertainment. In local dances and songs, the Cultural Work
208 Corps of the Fifth Army (originally the Sinkiang National Army)
545 in the summer of 1951 promoted the Party's Nationality policy and
the Resist-America Aid-Korea movement in Sinkiang. They
visited various villages and regularly attracted an audience of
S from three or four thousand to ten thousand people. The members
[563] included thirteen minority groups living in Sinkiang. Some of
[484] them went to Peking in 1953 and presented a performance of 21
[648] acts before the audience in the capital.

S The visit was returned by the Central Nationality Dancing
668 Corps of Peking which sent a performing team of 140-odd members
648 to Sinkiang in April, 1955 to celebrate the establishment
545 of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. It spent more than
half a year in Sinkiang and returned to Peking on November 13 after having visited ten special districts, three autonomous chou, seven counties, two state farms, three mines in Sinkiang and two cities (Lanchow and Su-chou) in Kansu. It performed 112 times before audiences of various nationalities totalling more than 439,000 people.

N IV. The Methods of Propaganda.

*668 Besides those already mentioned, the Communists are using
208 many other methods of propaganda. Parading, signature drives, circulation of pictures and pictorial stories, large-scale welcome meetings for important personnel sent from Peking, lantern slides and movies produced by the Party and the government, theater activities such as opera, drama, dance, and concerts all have been used as means of propaganda. The public accusation meeting is another form. No matter what the main target of a particular accusation meeting may be, whether a landlord or the U.S.A., the accusation always carries out the propaganda of the day, whether it be the Resist-America Aid-Korea movement or land reform. Other kinds of meetings are equally useful. "Model
S Peasants Rallies," held in the main farming districts of Sinkiang
[668] are the place to promote propaganda for increasing production as
[208] well as for denouncing germ warfare.

N A. Festivals

*668 Festivals are always good opp;rtunities for promoting propa-
796 ganda. In Northwest China where most of the minority groups are
followers of the Moslem religion, the Islamic festivals are used
*[563] as a time to express the thoughtfulness of the Communist govern-
[771] ment. For instance, during their celebration of the three major
[651] Moslem festivals of the year, the butchery tax on beef and mutton
consumed by Mohammedan communities is exempted. Further-

*668 796 656 Furthermore, in places where restrictions are exercised over the slaughter of cattle and sheep, these restrictions may be relaxed.

B. Guided Tours

*668 484 648 *563 Representatives of national minorities from northwest China are invited to visit Peking and other urban centers of north and east China. They are guided to see the factories, schools and palaces of historical interest. After being deeply impressed they are sent back to their homes. They often become good native propagandists for the Party.

C. School Programs

*668 208 876 In local schools, the pupils are not spared from propaganda. For instance, in the Mongol schools in the province of Chinghai:

"In mathematics, the number of American and bandit Rhee's troops annihilated by the Chinese and Korean people's armies in Korea and the construction figures in Chinghai were made into questions for the students and the masses to solve. By this way, they not only learned mathematics but they also retained in their minds the victorious results of our war and the great achievements in construction following the liberation." (Sian, Ch'un-chung jih-pao, March 30, 1952.)

D. Other Methods

*668 208 The whole propaganda system generally functions as follows. When the Party central committee decides to promote certain propaganda, it orders the reporter at every level of the Party organization to report the party line to the people inside as well as outside the Party. Then the propagandists and activists all go out to do the work. This can be done in various ways, according to the situation. In factories, it may be a kind of question and answer. The workers might be asked to check each other with these questions until all got the right answers. In streets, it might be in the form of door-to-door visits and "casual chats." While these were going on, the people would be bombarded daily with the same theme in newspapers, blackboard newspapers, wall newspapers, periodicals, books, pamphlets, pictures, cartoons, radio broadcasts, concerts, lantern slides, movies, plays, operas, story-tellers, picture-story books, street meetings, signature drives, production competitions, challenges, counter-challenges.. and a lot of other devices to drive the point home.

V. The Campaigns and Contents of Propaganda.

A. Campaigns

1. Destruction of organized resistance

The contents of propaganda follow the shifts in the Party line.

*668 208 The subject changes as the Party moves from one campaign to another. For instance, in Northwest China the first stage emphasized the destruction of organized resistance and the establishment of the Communist Government. About the time that the editorial of Jen-min jih-pao, Peiping, November 14, 1950, declared that "a comprehensive and far-reaching propaganda campaign should be carried out beforehand so as to enable the masses to gain a true understanding of the significance, functions and the way of the convening the chu people's representatives' conference" in Sining, Chinghai, "the Central People's Government Mission to the Northwest...convened three forum meetings of representatives of Tibetan, Mongolian, Turk, Moslem, Salar and Kazakh nationalities, and personages of all circles in Sining, and visited the mosque at the East Gate of Sining and the Chinghai Nationalities House..."

2. Resist-America, Aid-Korea and related movements

After the Communists participated in the Korean War and when the U.N. was discussing the case against Red China, an anti-Austin (chief U.S. delegate to the U.N. at the time) Rally" was held at Sian, Shensi. It promoted the Resist-America, Aid-Korea movement as well as the three self (self-governing, self-supporting, self-propagating) movement of the Chinese Christian churches. In January, 1951, there came the first wave of attacks against the religious group I-Kuan-Tao. In 1952, there were the three anti and five anti-movements. About the same time, a movement for production-increase was launched.

3. Agricultural tax campaign

*668 651 When the new agricultural tax system came into force in June, 1952, the propaganda gave unreserved priase of the new tax and cursed the old regime. It is a good example of the Communist propaganda:

"New minimum tax rate is 7 per cent. For the majority of peasants, the rate will range from 11 to 15 per cent. Exemptions or tax reductions will be given those having economic difficulties arising from calamities, lack of manpower or disabilities and to families of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea and Chinese People's Liberation Army men. The new system is based on average annual agricultural income of every member of a family.

This new tax system is in sharp contrast to multifarious taxes under the Kuomintang regime. At that time peasants on an average paid from 30 to 60 per cent of what was left to them in taxes to the Kuomintang government after paying 50 to 80 or even 90 per cent of their harvest to landlords as rent." (NCNA, Peking, June 20, 1952. See section Agriculture of General Handbook for an evaluation of the actual tax burden.)

Judging by the above paragraph, the peasants under the Nationalists (Kuomintang) paid as high as 90 per cent of their harvest to

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the landlord as rent and 60 per cent of what was left to the government as tax. If these figures were true, then the peasants were receiving only 4 per cent of what they harvested. Furthermore, at the most, the Nationalist Government had taxed the peasants only 6 per cent of their harvest while the minimum tax of the Communists is 7 per cent of the farmers' total annual agricultural income.

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4. Achievements of Communist government

After the Communist government had existed for a while, the propaganda emphasized the achievement of the Communist regime. A good example is the article written by Liu Ke-p'ing, Deputy-Director of Commission of Nationalities Affairs of the Central People's Government, concerning "The achivements of the Nationality works during the past three years." In this article he listed the following achievements:

1) The establishment of the autonomous districts
2) The participation of the minorities in the government
3) The training and education of local cadres
4) The sending of Chinese cadres to work among the minorities
5) The establishment of state trading agencies in the minority areas
6) The gradual promotion of land reform among the minorities
7) The gradual change in the feudal relations between the owner and helpers among minority herdsmen
8) The improvements in public health among the minorities
9) The establishment of schools in Sinkiang and other areas where the minorities live
10) The help given to the minorities to create or improve their written languages
11) The printing and distribution of books and periodicals in minority languages
12) The radio broadcasts in minority languages
13) The study and improvements made on the traditional dances and music of the minority groups
14) The organization of the Chinese Islamic Association to honor the customs, habits and religious faith of the minority groups
15) Visiting groups sent to the national minorities from the Communist government and those organized among the minorities to visit Peking and inland China. (The Great Achievements in the People's Republic of China during the Past Three Years, (Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-he-kuo San-nien-lai-te Wei-ta Ch'eng-chiu, Jen min Ch'u-pan-she, ed. Peking 1952, Dec.) p. 37. The article was written on September 13, 1952.)

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Propaganda along this same line can be found in Burhan's articles on "The great achievements made in People's Sinkiang during the past three years" in Sinkiang Jih-pao, January 1, 1953

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668 and "The achievements in political and judicial work in Sinkiang in the past five years," also in Sinkiang Jih-pao, September 30, 1954, and numerous others.

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+668 5. Other campaigns

Besides the above, special propaganda campaigns as well as routine ones have been launched throughout the years. In the Northwest, at least the following campaigns took place:

1) "The march to wipe out illiteracy" in July, 1952
2) The three anti- and five anti- movements in 1952
3) The start of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953
4) The calling of People's Congresses and the establishment of the Constitution, 1953-54
5) Finishing the land reform missions in agricultural areas of Sinkiang, 1953
6) The practice of minority autonomy, 1953
7) The increase of production and the austerity movement, 1953
8) The strengthening education as a whole and training minority cadres in particular movement, 1953
9) The denunciation of the U.S.-Chiang Joint Defense Pact (over Formosa) in 1955
10) The criticism of capitalistic ideas among the peasant Party members in Shensi in 1955
11) The signature movement against the use of the atomic bomb, in 1955
12) The suppression of counter-revolutionary movements at various times
13) The killing sparrows movement in 1955 (Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao, December 24, 1955. Because of the extreme shortage of food, the Communists started to pay attention to all birds, rodents, insects and worms that might consume food. They singled out a few, including sparrows, as targets of campaigns. In this case, the movement started in Kansu and spread to the whole nation.)

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B. The Content

The flavor of the contents can be sampled in the following paragraphs:

1) A praising song used by a Sinkiang group:

You, Giant Mao Tse-tung,
Brought freedom to the people
You, Hero Mao Tse-tung,
Brought brightness to the people
You, Father Mao Tse-tung,
Saved the suffering people.
In the past we were ill-treated
And had no interest to produce;

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Now we have emerged to be honored,
And happily we produce;
From now on we will never be suppressed by the enemies again.
In the beautiful garden there appear the dawn and spring,
The sun appears in the east;
The people blessedly sing:
With only one heart and only one will,
To follow the Communist Party forever.
(Hsin-kuan-ch'a, 1953, No. 15, p. 27.)

2) Another song for the minorities:

When my heart thinks of Mao Tse-tung,
The sun turns red at midnight;
When my eyes see Mao Tse-tung,
The dark mountain paths open wide;
When my mouth talks about Mao Tse-tung,
My fatigue gone, I work day and night;
When my fellow-travellers mention Mao Tse-tung,
My thousand-pound burden suddenly becomes light. (Wen-i-pao, 1954, No. 2, p. 30: "All the Nationalities sing about Chairman Mao".)

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VI. The Effect and Influence of Propaganda

A. Factors Contributing to Success

As a whole, the propaganda program of the Communists has been successful. The success is mainly due to the fact that the Communists have completely shut off all other sources of information. They are the only ones to provide news. Moreover, the repetition, the persistency, the thoroughness and the dead seriousness of the Communists make it hard for people to disbelieve. This is especially true of the youth. The effect of the Communist propaganda is clearly illustrated in the following examples:

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1) My name is Ahbuduzheyimu Tsake. I am a Young Pioneer of Uighur nationality. I am 14 years old and attending the first grade of the No. 2 Teacher's School in Tihua. My father is a blacksmith. Before the liberation my family was so poor that we could not get enough money to buy food or clothes. . . . when Sinkiang was liberated the sunshine of the era of Mao Tse-tung began to illuminate every town, every village and every pasture north and south of Tienshan Mountain. My father became much more enthusiastic about his work and life in our family became better and better. . . . In January, 1950, several schoolmates and I were admitted to the ranks of the Young Pioneers. From then on I made up my mind to study hard, to build up my body and to be a good pupil of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. (New China

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through her children's eyes, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1953, pp. 49-50.)

2) In the 2nd district of P'i-shan County in Sinkiang, there were a large portion of the farmers thinking that since the land they received from the Communists before was taken back by the Communists for redistribution in the land reform, there is no guarantee that the land they received this time will not be taken away from them at a later date. Hence, quite a number of them were not anxious to prepare for the spring ploughing. After the propaganda work of the members of the Party and the Youth Corps, these peasants learned that the lands they had received before were only given on a temporary basis. The lands they got through land reform are really theirs now. This propaganda dissolved the peasants' mistaken thoughts and doubts.... For instance, before the doubts were dispelled, peasant T'u-ta-a-hung slept in his room all the day long instead of going out to cultivate the land. Now he is working hard on his land and even refuses to rest at noon time. (Sinkiang jih-pao, April 8, 1953.)

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B. Factors not Contributing to Success

1. Sporadic nature of campaigns

However, these successes do not indicate that the Communist propaganda program has been carried out without exceptions. As early as 1949, some writers who were responsible for manufacturing propaganda found it difficult to praise the new regime. Then when propaganda became a part of the huge Party machine in the newly-conquered mainland, it developed other problems. At first, the movements were sporadic and geared to deadlines. Whenever the Party leader decided to promote a certain program, the rank and file had to work day and night to promote the theme. Once the interest changed, the whole program would be abruptly dropped and a new program would be rushed to fit the new propaganda purpose. This was criticized by the Communists themselves:

"In September, 1953, Mr. Jen....wrote a short article ridiculing several bureaucratic persons who did not consider seriously letters sent in by the people. He mailed it to a newspaper... After one month, the newspaper editor returned his manuscript with the following comment:

'The central propaganda mission concerning the serious handling of people's letters is over now....Therefore we sent your honorable manuscript back to you...'

To the surprise of the editor, on November 4th, Jen-min jih-pao published an editorial: 'Push one step forward in the work of handling letters sent in by the people'. Then all of a sudden the editorial department of that newspaper wrote to comrade Jen, *668 requesting him to send the manuscript in immediately." (Wen-i-pao, No. 2, January 30, 1954, p. 33, Hu Chia-lin: "It should not be just a whirlwind").

Because of the necessity to fit into this sudden rush and dropping of programs, propaganda became a kind of bureaucratic routine. To quote the Communists' own words:

*668 535 545 "'Our factory is going to have "check up and evaluation" so you better present a play of "check up and evaluation"!' Some factories requested the Peking opera actors to dress up in modern costumes to show the movement of 'learning tricks'... In this, in cement factories there is 'the cement workers' dance.' In the material department of the cement factories there is 'the material worker's dance'... Down to every special branch of the factory, there is a particular dance of the branch.... These, however, were about the same. At the beginning, a group of 'laborers' would dance out to the front stage, holding a file or a hammer, or just acting as if they were holding some productive tools. Then they would start the actions of laboring, going through the whole procedure of the department's job. After several changes of positions, finally all the people would hold their hands and jump a while to express their joy after laboring.... In the case of 'the dance of the hero who found the trick (of running a machine)'...a group of people on the stage pretended to be a machine; another man jumped around it, moving a 'lever' here, pushing a 'button' there, and finally 'the machine' started to move, indicating that the hero found the trick to run the machine. Then everybody yelled congratulations and celebrated. During the period when the hero jumped around, nobody in the audience understood what he was doing.... Some laborers reflected: 'We work in the factory with machines; we discuss in the group meetings about machines; when we come to the evening entertainments we are still seeing machines!' The workers are not satisfied with this kind of dance." (Wen-i-pao, No. 13, July 15, 1953, p. 36.)

2. Over-repetition

*668 533 545 No doubt, repetition was a trump card in the process. It brought the successes of Communist propaganda, but it was not without flaws. Quoting the Communists again:

"Amid enthusiastic applause, the curtain raised. Hundreds of pairs of wide-opened round little eyes looked at the young girl who announced the programs: 'The first song, "We Happily Sing!"' When she announced this, she announced it with a frown. Right after she finished her words, among the audience there was an unanimous - not applause, but a prolonged: "Yeo...". (A Chinese exclamatory remark showing disgusted feeling). Immediately the whole theater turned noisy and the audience of little ones lost interest in the program...

What was wrong?... In a certain concert, the song "We Happily

*668 533 545 Sing!" was sung eighteen times, while another song "Let's Sing, We Chinese Youth!" was sung twenty-three times!" (Ibid., No. 16, August 30, 1955, p. 32).

Misinterpretation

*668 536 Other troubles came from misinterpretation of the doctrine. The Communist magazine stated:

"In the January issue of the Worker's Literature published in Sian, Shensi, in 1954, there was a play written for the local opera theaters, 'Sell the grain to the State'. (Author T'ien Yi-Yung). It described a peasant Wang Shou-ch'eng who did not like to sell his surplus grain to the state, until his thought transformed. Then he sold his grain to the state...

But how did Wang Shou-ch'eng transform? Because his son-in-law Li Hsiao-hsien helped him to figure out the loss and gain in the following way: the price which the state paid was 33,000 a peck, but each peck was 30 catties; though the dishonest merchant, Sun Kuang-ts'ai, promised to pay 36,000 a peck, it was counted by the local big peck of 35 catties. According to the government price, it would be 38,000 each peck. After this calculation...the thought was transformed...."(Wen-i-pao, 1954, No. 7, p. 38. The peck in Chinese measurement varies in different places. Usually it weighs 13 1/2 lbs. The pecks mentioned in this paragraph might be a kind of double peck.)

Obviously, this thought transformation was not the sort intended by the Communists. Therefore the Wen-i-pao criticized this play for capitalistic thought which should be discarded. The right kind of writing to promote the sale of grain should be something describing the peasants as willing to sell the grain to "the state" at any price, gain or loss.

*668 The Communist propaganda programs often were innocently, but embarrassingly, twisted and misunderstood by the lower cadres and audiences. Furthermore, in nearly every propaganda campaign, there was a need for the exposure of evils. Even though the formula always gave final victory to the Communists, the exposure part often lingered much longer, and loomed much larger than the Party would like to see.

VII. Conclusion

*668 178 A real test of the effectiveness of Communist propaganda is now underway. In the past, Stalin was deified by the Chinese Communist Party. He was the genius strategist. He was the Great Leader. He was the eternal sun. He was the eternal steel. Now the Party propaganda machine must tear down this idol it created. If Party propaganda were as effective as it was believed to be, faith in Stalin should live in the people's hearts forever. However, if Party propaganda is as effective as it claims, there should be nothing that cannot be obliterated. The situation resembles an

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The situation resembles an
*668 old Chinese story which was translated recently by the Chinese
178 Communists:
589 "There was a man who made shields and spears. 'Buy my shields,' he would say. 'They are very strong. Nothing in the world can penetrate them!'
He also lauded his spears, saying: 'My spears are the sharpest in the world. They are so sharp they can pierce anything!'
One day someone asked him: 'If we use one of your spears to pierce one of your shields, what then?'
The man from the land of Chu could find no answer." (China Reconstructs, December, 1955, p. 25.)

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CHART I THE PROPAGANDA SYSTEM


PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEE
SECRETARY
Reporter
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COUNTY PARTY COMMITTEE
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PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT
Joint meeting of the Party Branch Committee Secretaries or Representative meeting of Propagandists in the county or A rally of all the propagandists in the county
DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE
SECRETARY
Reporter
PROPAGANDA SECRETARY
Propagandists' Meeting or Representative Meeting
BRANCH PARTY COMMITTEE
SECRETARY
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PROPAGANDA SECRETARY
Propagandists' Meeting
CELLS
Reporter
MEMBERS
Propagandists
THE STUDENT ASSOCIATION'S PROPAGANDA AND EDUCATIONAL COMMITTEE (schools)
THE LABOR UNION'S CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL COMMITTEE (factories and mines)
THE PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE (city)
THE CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL COMMITTEE (rural)
PROPAGANDA NET OF THE AREA
CURRENT EVENTS STUDY GROUPS
PROPAGANDA TEAMS
PROPAGANDA GROUPS
MEGAPHONE UNITS
RADIO RECEIVING GROUPS
BLACKBOARD NEWSPAPERS
NEWSPAPER READING GROUPS

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BIOGRAPHIES OF KEY PERSONALITIES

Burkhan Shahidi
Chinese name: Pao-erh-han

159 Burkhan was the last governor of Sinkiang under the Nationalist Government, and the first governor of Sinkiang under the Communist regime. He is a Uighur, born in 1894 at Aqsu, Sinkiang. In 1912 he went to Berlin, Germany, and in 1916 was graduated from the University of Berlin specializing in economics and political science. Following his return from Germany, he took different positions in the local government in Sinkiang. Under the administration of Governor Chin Shu-jen (1927-1933) he was in charge of foreign-affairs. Later he was sent to Germany again to investigate political and economic conditions. Under the administration of Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai, for some time, he served as commissioner in the Altai (A-shan) region. In 1937 he was appointed by the Nationalist Government as the consul to Saizan, Soviet Central Asia. When he returned home the next year he was accused by Governor Sheng as a German spy and was imprisoned for seven years until the end of 1944, when Governor Sheng was relieved of his governorship.

159 669 631 In the early stages of the Sinkiang disturbances, which lasted from 1944 to 1949, Burkhan played a rather insignificant role. Under the administration of Governor Wu Chung-hsin, 1944-1945, he served as deputy commissioner for civil affairs, and later as the political commissioner of the first region. When the Sinkiang disorders developed to such an extent that the Central government had to send a special representative, General Chang Chih-chung, to Sinkiang with the hope of settling the differences between the rebellious tribes in Ining and the so-called Youth Corps of Eastern Turkestan, Chang Chih-chung succeeded Wu Chung-hsin as Governor of Sinkiang in 1946, and Burkhan was appointed as one of the lieutenant governors.

The Sinkiang situation continued to develop from bad to worse. Unable to solve the complicated problem, Chang Chih-chung in 1947 recommended Maksud Sabri (Mai-ssu-wu-te) a member of the Kuomintang and a minority leader in Sinkiang, for governor. In May 1947 the Central government appointed Maksud in the hope that he, being a native, could better handle the situation. Rebellious forces, however, aimed their attack at Maksud. At this crucial time, Burkhan suggested to Chang [648] Chih-chung, who was still political chief for the Nationalist Government in the Northwest, that the only possible way to settle the Sinkiang problem and improve relations between Sinkiang and the Soviet Union was to remove General Sung Hsi-lien,

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159 military commander of the Nationalist forces in Sinkiang. He
669 further hinted that he might be in a position to persuade Russian
648 authorities to render help for developing Sinkiang under Chang's
631 leadership. Thereupon Chang Chih-chung recommended Burkhan
as a member of the State Council of the Nationalist Government
in Nanking, and sent him to Nanking to negotiate with the
Soviet ambassador. By December 2, 1948, a secret agreement
was reached between Burkhan, as personal representative of
Chang Chih-chung, and the Soviet ambassador. The prerequisite
of the secret treaty was the removal of the Nationalist commander,
Sung Hsi-lien. The important clauses included closer
cooperation between Chang Chih-chung and the Chinese Communist
Party for the purpose of liberating Sinkiang, and in
return, the government of the Soviet Union would give assistance
toward reconstruction of Sinkiang. Chang had no choice but
to remove both General Sung Hsi-lien and Governor Maksud,
and recommend Burkhan as governor of Sinkiang. On December
S 31, 1948, the Central Government formally appointed Burkhan.

159 On January 10, 1949, Burkhan officially took over the office.
In his open letter to the peoples of Sinkiang, Burkhan stressed
648 the pro-Russia attitude of General Chang Chih-chung. When
631 Chang called a conference of the political and military chiefs in
the Northwest, rumors spread that Sinkiang would be given to
the Soviet Union or was preparing to surrender to the Communists.
When Burkhan returned from the conference he denied all
these rumors. By March 1949, the entire situation in the interior
S of China had made a drastic change. In Sinkiang, prices had
[458) become extremely high. Burkhan proclaimed his policy of economic
self-sufficiency in Sinkiang by issuing silver dollars and
silver dollar notes as the new currency and discontinuing use of
National gold yüan notes. In May of the same year, Burkhan extended
S the Sino-Russian Aviation Pact for another five years.
159 In the meantime Manchuria had been taken by the Communists,
668 and the whole of north China was also put under the control of
669 the Communists with the surrender of General Fu Tso-i, while
631 in Central China, a Soviet regime was also formed. Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek announced his retirement from his presidency,
and General Li Tsung-jen, vice-president of the Nationalist
Government, took over the power and began to negotiate
peace with the Communists.

N In July, 1949, the Communist troops had begun to move into
*[668] Kansu Province. On September 23, 1949, the Communist general,
[669] Wang Chen, received the surrender of the Nationalist
troops at Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu Province. On September 25, two
days after the surrender, Burkhan, together with the commander
of the Nationalist troops in Sinkiang, cabled to Peiping to
announce their severance of relationship from the Nationalist

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159 Government and their readiness to receive orders from the new
668 regime in Peiping. On October 1, 1949, General T'ao Ch'ih-
669 yueh, the commander of the Nationalist garrison in Sinkiang,
631 went to Chiu-ch'uan to welcome the arrival of the Communist
general, Wang, Chen, in Sinkiang. On October 2, General P'ang Te-huai flew to Urumchi (Tihua) with General Chang Chih-chung. Burkhan was thus appointed by the Communist regime as the
S new governor of the people's government of Sinkiang. In October
[643] 1955, he was elected chairman of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autono-
S mous Region.

159 Burkhan was a member of the NW MAC, but unlike most of
668 the other officials, he held few concurrent posts. Those he held
631 were president of the Sinkiang College of Nationalities, an institution for the training of native cadres, chairman of the Chinese Islamic Association, and a member of the Chinese People's Committee for the Protection of Children. His name was missing from the list of notables invited to attend the CPPCC held in Peking in September, 1949, and it was not until the third session of the CPPCC in 1951 that he became a delegate to that body. In 1955, he was deputy chairman of the Second National Committee of the CPPCC, the function of which had already been superceded by the National People's Congress. His name was also absent from the list of members of the presidium of the National People's Congress meeting, held in September 1954.

These facts as well as reports from escapees from Sinkiang indicate that Burkhan was probably only a figurehead in the political structure of Sinkiang under the Communists. In his speeches, however, he has denounced the separatist aspirations of his peoples as well as pan-Turkestanism and pan-Islamism, long unifying forces in the struggle of the Turkish peoples of Sinkiang, and has repeatedly and vigorously supported the unity of Sinkiang with the rest of China. He was also one of the vice-presidents of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. He relinquished the office as governor of Sinkiang in September 1955, but when, a month later, Saifuddin resigned, he became governor of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region.

N **Cha Hsi: Tibetan, Communist**
159 Cha Hsi, a Tibetan, served as a member of the Committee
*668 of Nationalities during the period of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia
631 Border Government from 1937-1945; at the end of 1949, he was appointed a member of the same committee in the Central People's Government, and also appointed a member of the Military and Political Council for the Northwest and concurrently a member of the Committee of Nationalities in that council. The council was re-organized in 1953 into the Northwest Administrative

159 Council, and Cha Hsi served the same position as before.

*668
631 Chang Chia-fu

Chang's birth date and background are unknown. When the Military and Political Council for the Northwest was formed in 1949, he was a member of that council and also a vice-chairman of the Commission on Culture and Education. In 1953, when that council was reorganized into the Northwest Administrative Council, he still served as one of the vice-chairmen of its Commission on Culture and Education. Since 1951 he has been vice-president of the Northwest Branch of the SSFA. In the Communist Party, he was director of the Department of Propaganda in the Northwest Bureau until 1953. He is also a vice-president of the China Academy of Sciences.

Chang, Chih-chung

See China General Handbook.

Chang Chung-liang: Communist

A native of Shensi Province, birth date unknown. From 1949, he served as one of the vice-chairmen in the People's Government in Chinghai Province, and secretary of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party in Chinghai. 1952, member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and member of its Financial and Economic Commission. Concurrently, he was vice-chairman of the People's Government of Chinghai Province. In 1955, he was elected chairman of the Kansu PPCC committee, and transferred to become secretary of the Kansu committee of the CCP.

Chang Feng-hui: Local leader

[565] A native of Shensi, a member of the gentry class. Birth date and other background unknown. Since the "liberation" of the Northwest, he served as a member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and a vice-chairman of the People's Government of Shensi. From 1953 he was a member of the reorganized Northwest Administrative Council and concurrently one of the vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Shensi Province.

His position in the local government was chiefly due to the fact that Chang is an influential local leader and willing to cooperate with the new regime. The policy of the Communist regime of utilizing local talents for local government finds a proof in the case of Chang Feng-hui.

Chang Feng-po: Member of the Democratic League

Background unknown. He is a member of long standing of the

159 Democratic League and has served as director of its branch in
*668 Sian. After the Communists took over, he was selected as one
631 of the two deputy mayors of the city of Sian. He is an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League.

Chang, Pang-ying: Communist Party official

Up to 1950, Chang was secretary of the South Shensi Regional Committee of the CCP. After 1950 he rose to be director of the Bureau of Public Security and vice-chairman of the Shensi People's Government. He was a member of the Northwest MAC and also third secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau (later the Sinkiang Committee) up to the present. In 1955 he was made a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

Chang Te-sheng: Government official

Chang is a native of Shensi Province. His birth date is unknown. Under the Nationalist Administration he served as a member of the Commission of Overseas Affairs of the Central Kuomintang. Later he supported the Communist revolution and served as Vice-Commissar of the Political Department of the North China Military Area. When the Northwest Administrative Council was formed in 1953, he was given the post as a member of that council and concurrently one of the vice-chairmanships of the People's Government of Kansu Province. In 1955 he was elected chairman of the Shensi PPCC Committee.

Chang, Tsung-sun: Communist Party official

Background unknown. 1937, commander of the 358th Brigade
[701] in the 133rd Division in the 18th Group Army and later commander of the 2nd Military District in Northern Shensi. 1945, elected as alternate member of the Central Committee of the CCP; 1948, deputy commander of the First Field Army under P'eng Te-huai; 1950, deputy commander of the Northwest Military District. Member of the Northwest MAC, and procurator-general of the Northwest Office of the Supreme Procuratorate. Since 1952, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army and since 1954, member of the National Defense Council.

Chang, Tzu-fang (Woman): Communist mass organization leader

Prior to the Communist triumph in 1949, Chang Tzu-fang was chairman of the Federation of Democratic Women in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region. In 1950 she became a member of the executive committee of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women. In the NW MAC, and subsequently the Administrative Council, she was a member of the council, the Political and Legal Commission, the People's Supervisory

159 Commission, and the Land Reform Commission.

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631 Ch'ang, Li-fu: Member of the Communist Party

A native of Shensi Province, dates unknown. When the Military and Political Council for the Northwest was established in the Northwest, he was appointed Secretary-General in 1950; in 1953, when that council was re-organized into the Northwest Administrative Council, Ch'ang was appointed a member of that council and also served as its secretary-general. In the Central People's Government, he was made deputy secretary-general and director of the secretariat in the State Council in 1955.

Chao, Chan-k'uei: Labor model and official

Native of Ting-yuan in Shensi; a servant at age twelve; at thirty-eight worked as a metal worker on a railroad; at forty-two, went to Yenan, organized workers into labor unions and labor corps, set production record in iron foundry. In 1947 when the Nationalist forces captured Yenan, Chao first defended the iron works and then hid the machinery.1949, delegate to CPPCC, Peking. 1950, was deputy head of the Department of Labor in the NW MAC.

Chao, Po-p'ing: Communist Party and government official

Personal data not available. 1950, director of the Department of Labor in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, deputy secretary in the Sian Municipal Committee of the CCP. 1952, director of the Department of Propaganda in the Northwest Bureau of the CCP. Elected as vice-governor of Shensi in 1954.

159 *668 701 631 Chao, Shou-shan: Army officer

Born in 1895 in Shensi Province in farm family; graduated from a surveying school; joined the army and became a commanding officer of a brigade in General Yang Hu-ch'eng's army in Shensi; Garrison Commander of Hanchung, Shensi; after the December 12, 1936, incident when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was detained by the Young Marshall, General Chang Hsueh-liang, and General Yang Hu-ch'eng, Chao became Garrison Commander of Sian. In 1937 he became commanding officer of the 38th Army; later, the commander of the 4th Army Group; 1947, relieved from his command and given a choice of becoming a member of the Military Advisory Council or going to U.S.A. on an investigating tour. Toured U.S.A., joined the Communists later that year. In 1949 his troops re-entered Sian. 1949, delegate to the CPPCC; 1950, became chairman of the People's Government of Chinghai; 1952, appointed chairman of Shensi People's Government; 1953, member of the Northwest

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159 Administrative Council. Reelected Governor of Shensi in 1954.
*668 Chao's career as an army officer was highlighted at three
701 different occasions: First he took part in the coup d'etat against
631 Chiang Kai-shek during the Sian incident; then he became a war
hero in the Sino-Japanese War for his campaign in the Chung
t'iao Mountains along the Shensi border, and finally when he
shifted his allegiance to the Communists in 1947, he was instrumental
in appealing to the Northwestern troops to revolt against
Chiang's regime. His appointment as Governor of Chinghai and
then Shensi by the Communist regime was a recognition of his
service to the Communist cause.

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159 Chia T'o-fu: Communist, government official
Background unknown, dates unknown. During the Sino-Japan-
*668 ese War he served as the secretary-general to the Northwest
631 Office of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party;
1948, member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the North China People's Government; later secretary to the Municipal Committee of Sian. 1950, mayor of Sian; 1950-52, member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Government Administration Council in the Central People's Government, and vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest; since 1952, vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Government Administrative Council, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and concurrently vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Committee of the Northwest Administrative Council. Chairman of the Northwest Headquarters of the Federation of Trade Unions, and vice-president of the Northwest Branch of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. Also a member of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP.

In 1955 he was promoted to director of the Fourth General Office (Light Industries, Fuel) and concurrently Minister of Light Industries in the State Council of the Central People's Government.

Chia is one of the principal officials responsible for the economic development and industrialization of the Northwest.

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159 Ch'ü, Wu: Government official
Head of the Office of Civil Affairs in the Sinkiang Provincial
668 Government under the Nationalists; 1949, mayor of Urumchi,
631 member of the Sinkiang People's Government Council; 1950,
deputy secretary general in the Government Administration Council; 1953, member of the Northwest Administrative Council; 1955, deputy secretary-general of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Member of the Executive Committee of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

Feng Chung-ju: Communist

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A man of Shensi Province. Served as commanding officer of supplies of the People's Liberation Army; 1949-53, mayor of the People's Government of Sian, and member of the People's Government Committee of Shensi Province. 1953-54, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and mayor of Sian. 1954, member of Shensi Provincial Government Council.

Han Chao-e: Third Party member, politician

Born in 1890's in Shensi Province; graduated from Peiping Normal University; a teacher for some years. 1936, served Yang Hu-cheng and was involved in the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian; magistrate of Ch'ang-an County in Shensi. 1937, personal representative of General Sun Wei-ju to Chungking; member of the Political Consultative Conference; member of the Democratic League. Fled to Hongkong in 1948. 1949, chairman in charge of party reorganization for the Farmers and Workers Democratic Party in Peking; delegate of the Farmers and Workers Democratic Party to the People's Political Consultative Council in Peking, appointed member of the People's Supervisory Commission of the Central People's Government. In the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest, in which he was a member, he served on the Political and Legal Commission and was vice-chairman of the Land Reform Commission. Since 1951, he was also vice-chairman of the People's Government of Shensi and director of the People's Supervisory Commission of the Shensi People's Government, positions he retained even after the elections of 1954.

Although not a member of the CCP, Han has served the Communists well by his efforts in furthering Communist line and policies in the mass organizations. He is a reserve member in the executive committee of the Farmers and Workers Democratic Party.

Han belongs to one of the many small third parties which took part in the Communist regime in Peking. Hence his prominence in the new regime is chiefly because he is a member of a third party. Since the Communist Government is a coalition government in theory, Han's role in such a government is emphasized. Another reason for Han's success in acquiring a high position in the People's Government was that the Communist policy planners emphasize the use of natives in the local government. Thus it is only logical for Han, native of Shensi, to become a vice-chairman of his provincial government.

Hou, Wai-lu

See China General Handbook

Hsi Chung-hsun: Communist

159 Born 1912 in Shensi Province. In 1926 he joined the Commun-
*668 ist Youth League. 1927, was in prison. 1932, staged "soldier
631 rebellion of the Liang-tang Mountain" and conducted guerilla
warfare in northern Shansi Province; 1937-45, in charge of the defense of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area. 1949-52, alternate member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, member of the People's Revolutionary Military Committee, vice-chairman of the Northwest Military Administrative Council and concurrently chairman of the Land Reform Committee for the Northwest MAC. Since 1953, in the Central People's Government, member of the Central People's Government, vice-chairman of the Commission on Culture and Education in the Government Administration Council, member of the People's Revolutionary Military Committee, member of the National Planning Committee, member of the Constitution Drafting Committee and member of the Central Election Committee; in the local government, vice-chairman of the Northwest Administrative Council; in the Communist Party, he is an alternate member of the Central Committee and first secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the CCP. In the army, he holds the post as political commissar of the Northwest Military District, and in the mass organizations, he has been, since 1951, president of the Northwest headquarters of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and member of the Board of Directors of the SSFA. In 1955 he was promoted to be vice-premier of the State Council of the Central People's Government.

Hsi has been virtually the boss of the Northwest region, especially after the transfer of P'eng Te-huai to be commander in chief of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea in 1951. It was Hsi who instituted the ideological reforms and the purges of the cadres in 1952, and it was he who instituted the "study" program for the general line of the state for the transition to socialism in the Northwest region.

Hsi has been a life-long Communist. The fact that he holds so many memberships in the Central Government indicates the important role he plays in the Communist regime. His position in the local administration is equally high for he is the second political boss in the Northwest, next to General P'eng Te-huai.

159 **Hsing Chao-t'ang: Army officer**
*668 Native of Kansu Province, dates unknown. 1923, commanding
officer of a division in the Second Army of the Kuo-min-chun
701 under the command of Hu Ching-i of Shensi. 1937, deputy com-
631 mander of the Hopei-Chahar Guerrilla Forces; 1941, deputy
speaker of the Hopei-Shansi-Shangtung-Honan Border Council; 1948, member of the North China People's Government of

159 *668 701 [631] Ninghsia Province; 1952-54, chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia. His name, however, disappeared from the lime light after the Ninghsia People's Government was abolished and Ninghsia merged into Kansu in 1954.

Hsing was a career soldier. His long years of fighting a guerilla war against the Japanese had made him a man of distinction. His association with the Communists, however, did not begin until he broke away from Sun Tien-ying, under whom he had fought as a guerrilla leader for many years. When Sun's guerrilla forces were re-organized into the Nationalist Fifth Army, Hsing began to shift his political leaning toward the Communists. Hsing's red star began to shine when he was first selected as deputy speaker of the Border Assembly for Hopei-Charhar area. He was responsible for the training of a large number of cadres in Ninghsia.

159 *668 Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o: Buddhist, government official

[792] Born in 1884 in Chinghai Province. At age of twelve entered one of the colleges in Drepung Temple in Tibet to study Buddhism; 1916, given the degree Geshe (after completing the five classics in Buddhism, namely, Sutras and Commentaries, Prajnparamita or book on philosophical matters, Madhyama or book on the Middle Doctrine, Vinaya or book on moral discipline and Vasubhandu's work); since then edited and commented on the Kanjur for twelve years. In 1937, he went to Nanking by way of India and gave lectures on Tibetan culture at the National Central University, Tsinghua University, Sun Yat-sen University, Peking University and Wu-han University. 1939, sent to Tibet by the Nationalist Government on a good-will mission. 159 *668 631 Since 1946 has been a reserve member of the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee and from 1947 to 1949, vice-chairman of the Commission on Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs in the National Government. In January 1950, appointed member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and concurrently deputy-chairman of the People's Government of Chinghai. Since January 1953, member of the Administrative Council of the Northwest, member of the Political and Legal Commission, vice-chairman of the People's Government of Chinghai, director of the Cultural and Educational Commission in the provincial government, and acting chairman of the Chinese Buddhist Association.

159 *668 792 554 The fact that he achieved his degree of Ke-hsi had made Hsi-jao-chia-ts'o a man of high esteem. He devoted twelve years to editing and commentating the Kanjur, the complete works of Tibetan Buddhism, and his bold approach in editing the textual errors in the scriptures has made him an authority on Buddhism, although he did incur the displeasure of the Dalai Lama.

159 Before the Communists took over Tibet in 1951, his effort in
*668 bringing about a peaceful "liberation" of Tibet had won him a
554 tribute from Communist authorities.

159 Huang Cheng-ch'ing: Tibetan army officer

*668 A Tibetan of Sik'ang Province, born 1903 and graduated from
701 the Kansu Political Training Institute; teacher of the Five
631 Tribes College in Lanchou; member of the Supervisory Committee of the Lanchou Branch of the Kuomintang; 1927-1928, commander of the tribal troops of the 7th Field Army of the Second Army Group of the People's Revolutionary Army; 1934, garrison commander of Labrang, Kansu; 1944, leader of the Labrang Delegation to Chungking; 1950, member of the Military and Political Council of the Northwest and concurrently vice director of the Department of Animal Husbandry in that council; 1953, one of the vice-chairmen of the Northwest Administrative Council. In 1955, he was elected one of the vice-chairmen of Kansu.

159 Huang is the oldest of three brothers. His second brother,
*668 Huang Cheng-pen, was the Grand Assistant of the Labrang Temple, one of the six famous Lamaist temples in the country, and was in charge of all the affairs of that temple and others under its jurisdiction. His third brother, Huang Cheng-ming, is the Living Buddha of Ah-mang-ts'ang, Chia-mu-yang the Fifth. The three brothers were the actual rulers of Labrang in charge of the military, political and religious affairs within that region. Thus Huang's high position in the Northwest under the Communist administration is understandable, another example of the Communist policy in that area of using local minorities leaders.

Ho Wei-te

[631] Background and dates unknown. 1953-, member of the Northwest Administrative Council, and one of the vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Kansu Province, a position he retained in the election of 1953-54.

159 Kan, Ssu-ch'i: Army officer and government official

*668 Native of Hunan, graduate of Hunan Middle School, political
701 commissar in the 18th Division of the Sixth Army under Hsiao
631 K'e; 1934, deputy political commissar in the Second Front Army under Ho Lung; chief of staff and political director in the 120th Division under Ho Lung; political commissar in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region Defense Forces; 1945, elected alternate member in the Central Committee of the CCP; 1950, member of the NW MAC, member of the Land Reform Commission and director of the Department of Public Security in the NW MAC. 1951, political commissar in the Chinese Volunteer

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159 Forces in Korea; 1955, deputy director of the General Political
668 Department of the People's Liberation Army.
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[631] **Kao Chin-shun: Communist Party member**

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Background unknown. When the Communists took over Sinkiang in late 1949, he was chosen as one of the two vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Sinkiang. He is now vice-chairman of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and second secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the CCP.

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Li Ching-lin

Background and dates unknown. 1949-53, member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia; 1953-54, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia.

Liao Han-sheng: Communist Party member

A native of Hupeh Province, dates unknown. A political commissar of the People's Liberation Army; in 1949 he was appointed a member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and concurrently one of the vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Chinghai Province until the election of 1954. When the council was reorganized in 1953 into the Northwest Administrative Council, he continued as a member.

Lo I: Communist official and mass organization leader

Background unknown; member of the commission on political and legal affairs, land reform and people's supervision in the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, and member of the standing committee of the Central Committee of the New Democratic Youth League. Member of the All-China Democratic Youth Association. In charge of youth work for the CCP in the Northwest.

Ma, Hsi-wu

Background unknown. In 1952 he was president of the Northwest court of the Supreme People's Court, and member in the Political and Legal Commission and the Land Reform Commission of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council. 1955, vice-president of the Supreme Court in Peking.

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Ma Hung-k'uei (1893-)

In the study of the modern history of Northwest China under the Nationalist administration, particularly the history of the provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, special attention must be directed to the history and background of the Ma clan, 159 and the so-called Four Ma, all of Moslem religion. Ma Hung- [614] k'ui is one of them. His father, Ma Fu-hsiang (literary name, Yun-t'ing), served in the early years of the Republic as the High Commissioner for Chinghai, commander of the Guards Division for Altai, and later in the second year of the Republic, 1913, the Commission of the Guards Division for Ninghsia.

When the Revolution of 1911 broke out, Ma Hung-k'uei was [669] studying at the military school in Lanchou, Kansu. He played a small part in the revolution by mobilizing the students of the school and trying, unsuccessfully, to take over some strategic points in the city.

159 701 He started his military career when he followed his father to Ninghsia as a batallion leader. In 1921, when his father was transferred to be the garrison commander of Suiyuan, he was promoted as commanding officer of the Fifth Mixed Brigade. During the war between Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria and Wu P'ei-fu of Chihli (Hopei) Province, he was appointed as the commander of the cavalry in Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan Provinces. After the war was over, he followed the victorious General Feng Yu-hsiang to Peking. In 1926, when the Northern Expedition started, he followed General Feng again, taking part in the expedition. At this time his troop was reorganized into the Fourth Army of the First Army Group, and he became the commander of the Fourth Army. In 1928, he fought the war in North China and his troops suffered a great loss. When the situation was settled, he regrouped his troops into the 17th Division, and was put in charge of suppressing the bandits in the western part [669] of Shantung Province. In April, 1929, when General Feng Yu-hsiang revolted against the Nationalist Government headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Ma remained loyal to the Nationalist Government. His troops were again reorganized into the 11th Army. In 1930, his army was enlarged into the 15th Army Group and was in charge of patrolling the Lung-hai and Tientsin-Pukou Railway lines. In the winter of 1932 he was ordered to go to Ninghsia, and on January 1, 1933, he was appointed governor of Ninghsia.

When Ma Hung-k'ui took over the administration in 1933, the 159 province of Ninghsia was in a deplorable situation, suffering 185 from floods and the ravages of Ma Chung-ying. To restore 656 peace and prosperity to the people, Ma Hung-k'uei first mopped [579] up the remnants of the bandits in his province. He introduced the Pao-chia system by which the people were organized to insure against the recurrence of banditry. Third, he adopted measures to put a gradual end to the planting and smoking of opium. Fourth, he stabilized the currency within Ninghsia and improved the taxation system. Simultaneously, he followed the policies of improving land administration, encouraging

159 185 [656] afforestation, construction and repair of roads, and introducing the irrigation system. During the fifteen years of his administration, 1933-1948, Ninghsia Province changed from a land of devastation to a land of peace and normalcy, achieved by ruthless regimentation.

159 648 When the war between Japan and China broke out in 1937, Ma Hung-k'uei volunteered to fight the enemy. Because of the importance of the Northwest, and because of the importance of Ninghsia as the gateway to the Northwest, he was ordered by the Central Government to stay in Ninghsia to guard that strategic area against Communist infiltration. From 1937-1945, however, Ninghsia became a part of the Eighth War Area, and Ma was appointed as the deputy commander-in-chief. When the war against Japan was brought to an end in 1945, he was appointed deputy director of the Northwest Headquarters of the president.
159 669 When all-out fighting started between the Nationalists and the Communists, he was given the post of deputy Director of Military and Political Affairs of the Northwest Area. In July 1949, when the Communist troops began to push their way to the Northwest, he joined Ma Pu-feng, another member of the famous Ma clan, then Director of Military and Political Affairs of the Northwest Area, to set up defense lines. But the victorious forces of the Communists broke through all these lines and pushed their way to the eastern and southern parts of Kansu Province. The two Ma flew to Canton, the provisional capital, to see Vice-President General Li Tsung-jen for new instructions. It was decided to concentrate the troops to defend Lanchou. On August 25, 1949, when the troops of Ma Hung-k'uei were still some eighty miles away from Lanchou, the Communist troops had already reached that city. By the middle of September, 1949, the whole Northwest, including Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, was taken over by the Communists.

[631] In 1949 when the Nationalist Government took up the defense of Kansu Province, Ma was appointed concurrently as governor of Kansu. His administrative record in Kansu was short-lived. The Communists took over the whole Northwest by September, 1949. When the Nationalist Government retreated to Taiwan, both the military and political life of Ma Hung-k'uei came to an end. He entered the United States and lived a life of retirement in San Francisco.

159 Ma Hung-pin (1883-)

Another of the Four Ma who once ruled the Northwest of modern China, Ma Hung-pin is a cousin of Ma Hung-k'uei, governor of Ninghsia Province from 1933-1948 and governor of Kansu Province from 1948-50. Together with Ma Pu-fang and Ma Pu-ch'ing of Chinghai Province, they were usually called the "Four Ma of Islam" in the Northwest.

159 701 the "Four Ma of Islam" in the Northwest. When he was twenty-one years old, Ma Hung-pin started his military career by serving as commanding officer of the cavalry corps in charge of the Sining mines in Chinghai Province, and at the same time he was a member of the reclamation commission and mining commission of that province. In 1911, he became commanding officer of the cavalry batallion in charge of the patrol of the western region of Kansu. His first military merit was achieved when he pacified the disturbances of the two Mongol banners in western Suiyuan who were stirred to revolt by the independence achieved by Outer Mongolia in the first years of the Chinese Republic. In 1914, he was the commanding officer of the Seventh Cavalry Batallion and stationed in western Suiyuan guarding the Yellow River Bend and keeping a watchful eye against the Outer Mongols. Because of his meritorious record in the pacification of bandits in his area, he was awarded several medals and was promoted to lieutenant general by President Li Yüan-hung of the [648] Peking Government. Later he also received a medal from the government of Belgium for his excellent work in protecting Belgian missionaries. In 1920 he was appointed as Defense Commissioner for Ninghsia (not a province at that time) and was charged with the duty of defending the frontier areas. In 1926 he was given the post of Pacification Commander of the Shensi-Kansu border regions. In 1927, when the Northern Expedition began, he was the commander of the 24th Division of the Second Army Group of which General Feng Yu-hsiang (the Christian General) was the commander-in-chief. In 1928 he was transferred as the commander of the Seventh Division.

159 635 When the Nationalist Government was established in Nanking, Ma Hung-pin was appointed the first governor of the newly organized province of Ninghsia. This was, so far, the first political assignment for Ma. In 1930 he was also made acting governor of Kansu Province. His political life ended in 1933 when his cousin, Ma Hung-k'uei, succeeded him as governor of Ninghsia. 159 [579] From 1934-1936, his main task was to pacify the remaining bandits in the eastern region of Kansu. Because his policy in suppressing bandits was to win them over rather than annihalate them, he had won for himself the nickname of "Ma the Kind [701] [648] Man." In 1937, as commander of the 81st Division and, concurrently, defense commissioner for the western region of Suiyuan, he led his troops in fighting the Japanese invaders in that area. In 1940 he became commander-in-chief for the defense of Etokuchi, a Mongol Banner in western Suiyuan.

159 669 ✱668 When the Communists started their campaign in the Northwest, Ma Hung-pin surrendered Ninghsia Province to the People's Liberation Army on September 16, 1949. Because of this drastic move, the whole Northwest was soon lost to the Communists.

159 *668 631 munists. In recognition of his help the Communist regime in Peking appointed him a member of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest in 1950, and in 1953, when the council was reorganized as the Northwest Administrative Council, he was one of the vice-chairmen. He was a member of the Land Reform Commission and the Political and Legal Commission and vice-chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission. Concurrently, he was vice-chairman of the People's Government of Kansu, a post he continued to hold after the election of 1954, and in the People's Government he was director of the commission on Nationality Affairs. He also became a member of the National Defense Council. Of the Four Ma of China's Northwest, Ma Hung-pin is the only one who shifted his loyalty to the Communist regime.

Ma Ming-fang (1904-): Communist, government official

A native of Shensi Province, born in 1904. Joined the Communist Party in 1925, took part in the 1925-27 Northern Expedition; 1931, director of the Department of Propaganda for northern Shensi; later, chairman of the Workers and Farmers Democratic Government of northern Shensi region; secretary of the Provincial Committee of the Party. 1941, jailed in Sinkiang by the Nationalists when he came back from Soviet Russia; 1946, returned to Yenan; 1949, delegate to the CPPCC; 1949-51, member of the National Committee of the CPPCC.

From 1950 to 1952, he was a member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, in which he was also a member of the Financial and Economic Commission. He was governor of Shensi and concurrently director of the Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs in the Shensi People's Government. In the Party, he was a reserve member of the Central Committee and second secretary of the Northwest Bureau. In Peking, too, he was a member of the Board of Directors of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, and in 1955, a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

159 *668 Ma's influence in the Northwest as well as his position in the local administration in the Northwest have been very great. He is a life-long member of the Communist Party and has played a rather important role for the Communist cause. He is one of the few from the Northwest who had ever visited the Soviet Union, which enhanced his prestige in the Communist hierarchy.

Ma Pu-fang (1903-)

159 614 635 Before the Communists took over Northwest China, this area had been ruled by the famous Ma clan. As Ma Hung-k'uei and Ma Hung-pin ruled Ninghsia and Kansu, so did Ma Pu-fang and Ma Pu-ch'ing rule Chinghai (Kokonor). The administration

159 under the Ma family in Chinghai Province started with their
614 father, Ma Lin, who devoted his efforts toward the promotion
635 of education within the province. After Ma Lin died, his brother,
Ma Ch'i, took over the administration. But when the war with
[648] Japan began in 1937, Ma Pu-fang was given the position of governor of Chinghai, and at the same time he shouldered the tasks of leading the Kuomintang and commanding the troops within that province.

159 Ma Pu-fang was a career army officer. He started as a
[701) commanding officer of a batallion, and gradually climbed up to
the post of commander of an army. When his uncle, Ma Ch'i,
[635] was governor of Chinghai before the Sino-Japanese War, he became a member of the provincial government. When he finally took over the administrative job in Chinghai in 1937, he was one of the youngest governors in China.

159 For more than thirteen years, 1937-1950, he held the posi-
635 tion of governorship. During his administration, particularly
during the war years, he aimed at the following six main tasks:
185 First, he organized the Pao-chia system not only among the
Chinese and Moslems, but also among the Mongols and Tibetans in his province. Second, he trained the local militia for the
[206) purpose of maintaining local order. Third, he was very strict in carrying out the policy of elimination of opium. Fourth, he
[871) conducted the movement of compulsory education aiming at the total elimination of illiteracy within Chinghai. As a result of his policy, in a single year more than a hundred thousand people learned to read. In addition, there were 8 middle normal schools, 131 primary schools and 805 grade schools in that province. The fifth task was to construct highways, and during
[499] his administration, more than two thousand kilometers of highways were constructed. The sixth point was afforestation. Every person was compelled to plant five to ten trees a year, and as a result, more than seven million trees had been planted during those war years.

159 Being a Moslem himself and realizing the complexity of
771 religions in Chinghai, Ma Pu-fang was cautious in his handling
641 of different religious groups. On the whole he worked toward
religious harmony, and his policy was one of equal treatment
635 toward all tribes. He chose his personnel regardless of religion or race, on the basis of capacity and personality. Thus he was generally trusted by all religious groups in his province.

159 When the Communists began their campaign in 1949, they
pushed their way to the Northwest. Ma Pu-fang was appointed
669 director of the Administrative Headquarters of the Northwest, succeeding General Chang Chih-chung. Joining forces with Ma Hung-k'uei, he directed the defense of the Northwest. Unfortunately, all his attempts failed and by October, 1949, the

159 provincial capital of Chinghai, Sining, fell to the Communists.
669 He was asked by the Communist authorities to serve on their
Military Control Board, but when the Nationalist Government
moved to Formosa, he managed to leave China. He now lives
in Cairo, Egypt.

Ma Pu-ch'ing (1898-)
159 Born in 1898 in the district of Lin-hsia in Kansu Province,
Ma Pu-ch'ing was the elder brother of Ma Pu-feng, governor of
Chinghai Province from 1937 to 1949, and the oldest son of the
late governor of Chinghai, Ma Lin. The youngest son, Ma Pu-
ying, did not enter public life, but chose to be a farmer. After
159 he was graduated from the First Middle School of Kansu, Ma
Pu-ch'ing entered military life. In 1922 he was commander of
701 the Fourth Regional Garrison. Next year he was promoted as
commanding officer of the Cavalry Regiment of the Fifth Mixed
Brigade of the Army. In 1928 he became commanding officer of
the 77th Brigade of the 28th Division of the Nationalist Revolu-
tionary Army. In 1929 he was transferred to commanding officer
of the 65th Brigade of the 22nd Division of the 4th Route of the
2nd Army Group of the Revolutionary Army. In 1930, he was
given commandership of the Loyang Garrison. By next year he
became commanding officer of the 26th Division of the 4th Route
of the 2nd Region of the Nationalist Army. In 1932 he was pro-
moted as commanding officer of the First Cavalry Division of
Kansu Province. In the same year, he was transferred as com-
manding officer of the Second Cavalry Division of the National-
ist Army. In 1936 he became commanding officer of the Fifth
159 Cavalry Division of the Army. When the Sino-Japanese War
701 broke out, he was appointed as the Commissioner of Highways
in Kansu Province. Later he was given the position as Reclama-
631 tion Commissioner of Tsaidam region in Chinghai Province, and
concurrently commanding officer of the Fifth Cavalry Division.
In 1943 he became deputy commander-in-chief of the Fortieth
Army Group.

159 His appointment as Reclamation Commissioner of Tsaidam
631 region in Chinghai Province by the Central Government came at
the time his brother, Ma Pu-fang, was governor of that prov-
635 ince. Thus the two brothers were often mentioned together as
administrative heads of Chinghai. At that time China was en-
gaged in the war against the Japanese invaders, and the whole
coastal region had been lost to the enemy. To deal with the
urgent need to continue the war, the Central Government then
adopted a policy of developing the border regions. Ma's ap-
pointment as Reclamation Commissioner of Tsaidam was there-
fore considered a very important step. Tsaidam region is situ-
ated in the northwestern part of Chinghai Province, between the

159 Ch'ilien and Chishih Mountains. In the Tsaidam River valley,
631 comprised of six districts, there were nearly a hundred thou-
635 sand Mongols, who were Buddhists by religion and nomads
economically, and twenty-five thousand Kazakhs, with some
Moslems and Chinese. When Ma Pu-ch'ing took over this re-
[185] gion he directed his reclamation program along the following
lines: to inspire patriotism among the border peoples, to pro-
mote education, to develop the uncultivated lands by settlements
of people, and to increase production by encouraging industrial
programs; to improve the transportation facilities to ship
needed goods to the interior, and finally to open mines in that
region for the needs of both the border area and the interior.

159 669 His public life, like that of his younger brother, was finally ended by the arrival of the Communists. When the Northwest was lost to the People's Liberation Army, he fled from Chinghai and followed the Nationalist Government to Formosa.

159 631 635 Ma T'eng-ai

Background and dates unknown. 1953-, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia Province until 1954.

159 *668 631 Ma Wen-jui: Communist Party member

A native of Shensi Province. He had served as secretary to the Communist Headquarters in eastern Kansu under the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government. When the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest was formed in 1950, he was appointed as a member of that council, in which he was chairman of the People's Supervisory Commission and a member in the Political and Legal Commission, positions which he retained when the council was reorganized as the Northwest Administrative Council in 1953. In the party, he has been since 1950, director of the Department of Organization and director of the Commission on Women's Work in the Northwest Bureau of the CCP. In 1955, he was transferred to Peking as Minister of Labor.

159 *668 The main responsibility of Ma Wen-jui was to push the United Front work in the Northwest in 1950. His Department of Organization was active, months before the formation of the MAC and the People's Governments, in the induction of former Nationalist Government functionaries and students into the governments of the Communists. Later, he was responsible for pushing the ideological reforms of the cadres and the purges in 1952, and the job of Communist Party expansion in the Northwest.

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Sinkiang AI1

Maksud Sabri: (1887-)
Chinese name: Mai-ssu-wu-te

159 Among all the different tribes in modern Sinkiang, and particularly among the Uighurs, Maksud is one of the most loyal supporters of the Nationalist Government. He was born at I-ning in 1887. After he had received his Moslem education at the Moslem school in Ili, he went to Turkey where he received comprehensive training including military, medical and scientific studies, at the Constantinople University. When he came back to Sinkiang, he established a number of schools and the Altai hospital. In addition, he encouraged the program for the ahungs (Moslem priests) to study their scripture, and other social welfare. By 1936 he was elected a member of the [631] Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. Since then he has held such positions as member of the Legislative Yüan, councillor of the Central Government, and representative to the People's Political Council. Later he was appointed Commissioner for the Control Yüan in Sinkiang. On May 19, 1947, he was appointed [635] governor of Sinkiang upon the recommendation of General Chang Chih-chung.

159 669 635 668 This appointment came at the most crucial time, when the province was politically chaotic. The tribes of Sinkiang, particularly the Kazakhs and Uighurs, were agitating for independence. By January 1945 the so-called Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formally set up in I-ning with the aim of taking over the whole of Sinkiang. At the same time, the Communist Party in Sinkiang was officially organized, and the army of the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formed. By 1946, a number of cities in northern and western Sinkiang had been lost to the rebels. To cope with such a crisis, the Nationalist Government at Nanking sent General Chang Chih-chung to Sinkiang to negotiate with the I-ning representatives with the hope that the local affair could be settled peacefully. After a number of talks, a peace agreement was finally signed between Chang Chih-chung and the I-ning representatives on January 2, 1946. As a result of this peace agreement, the provincial government of Sinkiang was reorganized with an equal number of members from Uighurs and Chinese in the local government. The peace treaty did not, however, prevent the rebels from further disturbances. Anti-government movements were found everywhere in the province, whereas the so-called Eastern Turkestan Youth Corps was organized throughout the entire Sinkiang. Unable to tackle the situation, Chang finally recommended Maksud as governor of Sinkiang, hoping that, being a minority leader, he might be able to solve the problems.

Maksud took over the administration in May 1947, but the I-ning group continued its revolt. At the same time the Pei-t'a-

159 At the same time the Pei-t'a-
669 shan (Bogdo Baitik) Affair broke out when Outer Mongolian
635 invaders attacked Sinkiang. Meanwhile, the Communists began
668 their revolution in southern Sinkiang. Realizing the hopeless-
[648] ness of the situation, Chang Chih-chung continued his retreat. First he removed the commander of the Nationalist forces in Sinkiang, General Sung, then dismissed Maksud as governor and in December 1948 recommended Burkhan, a pro-Russia Uighur, for governor of Sinkiang. With such a political shifting, the whole of Sinkiang was soon taken over by the Communists.

Just before the seizure of Sinkiang by the Chinese Communists, Maksud fled to Formosa where he new resides.

159 Osman Batur (Usman Batur): Native leader, anti-Communist
648 A Kazakh, background and early career unknown; 1940,
669 opposed the arrest of Kazakh leaders by Sheng Shih-ts'ai; 1941, revolted in the Altai (A-shan) region and fought off the provincial troops; 1942, defeated; withdrew to the border of Outer Mongolia, arrested and jailed for four months in Outer Mongolia; released upon agreement reached with Outer Mongolian authorities. Organized the Altai Kazakh Restoration Society, organized army with arms and supplies from Outer Mongolia and reportedly from Soviet Russia; 1944, led revolt against the provincial government, captured the cities of Chunuchak (Tach'eng) and Altai (A-shan); with establishment of the East Turkestan Republic at Kulja, Osman was made administrator of the Altai Region with headquarters at Sharasume (Ch'eng-hua) and also given command of the troops in the Altai region; 1948, broke with the leaders of the Ili group who, it was charged, were discriminating against the Kazakhs; led his force of six thousand men to join the Nationalist army; stationed at Peitashan (Bogdo Baitik). June 1948, his capture of eight Outer Mongolian soldiers who had crossed the broder precipitated Outer Mongolian forces' invasion of Peitashan. Invasion repelled by Osman Batur. 1949-51, led anti-Communist guerrillas against the Communists; March 1950, deputy commander of the East Sinkiang Region Headquarters of the Chinese People's Anti-Communist National Salvation Army; deputy commander of the First Front Army; July 1950, covered the withdrawal of the guerrilla forces into the Chinghai-Tibetan border and eventual flight to India; February 1951, ambushed and captured by Communist forces; April 1951, publicly executed at Urumchi by the Communists.

Osman Batur was the best military commander of the Ili insurrectionists and apparently a man who had the interests of his fellow Kazakhs at heart. He split with his colleagues such as Akhmejan Kasimi and Saifuddin, who were at that time making overtures toward the Chinese Communists and Soviet

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159 authorities. Moreover, Osman was not given a post in the gov-
648 ernment of the East Turkestan Republic, but only a regional
669 post, despite the fact that he had helped in the establishment of
the republic, and his Kazakhs were discriminated against. When he joined the Chinese Nationalist Army and repulsed the Outer Mongolian invasion, he was hailed throughout China as a hero. Later, he was the rallying point of the resistance of the Kazakhs and other anti-Communist forces in Sinkiang.

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Pai Hai-feng: Mongol, army officer

159 A native of Jehol Province and a member of the Kharchin Banner of the Mongol tribe in Inner Mongolia. Dates unknown. Graduated from the first class of the Central Military Academy; went to Russia and studied in the Oriental University. 1931-1932, served in the Peiping Branch of the National Military Council; later succeeded Yun Chi-hsien as commander of the Mongolian
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[901] Police of Pai-ling-miao, Suiyuan. During the war period, 1937-1945, when the police were reorganized into a brigade of the regular army, he served as commanding officer of the brigade and was eventually promoted to commander of a division. In the meantime, also served as a special representative of the Kuomintang to the Mongol Banners in Chahar and Suiyuan Provinces as well as the representative of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps for that region. 1943, resigned from his duties with the Kuomintang Party.

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159 When the Communists took over North China in 1949, he
631 served as a member of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest, and as vice-director of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry. 1953, a member of the Northwest Administrative Council, and vice-dean of the Northwest Nationalities College.

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Pai Ju-ping: Communist

159 A native of Shensi Province; dates unknown. During the per-
631 iod of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government, served as
*668 the director of financial affairs in the Administrative Commissioner's Office in western Shensi, and later as finance commissioner in the border government. 1950, when the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest was formed, he served as a member of the council and as director of the Department of Finance. In January 1953, the Northwest Administrative Council was established to replace the Military and Political Council of the Northwest. He serves as a member of that council and concurrently as vice-chairman of the Financial and Economic Commission in the council. 1955, director of the Central Handicraft Administrative Bureau in the State Council.

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159 **P'an Tzu-li: Communist Party member**
*668 Native of Shensi; dates and background unknown. A long-
631 time member of the Communist Party; served as secretary to the Provincial Committee of Ninghsia of the Communist Party. Since 1949, served as the chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia Province, and director of the Political Bureau of the People's Liberation Army. 1951, member of the Military and Political Council for the Northwest and vice-chairman of the People's Government of Shensi Province. From 1953, member of the reorganized Northwest Administrative Council and concurrently vice-chairman of the People's Government of Shensi
N Province. In October 1955 he was appointed Chinese Communist
[648] ambassador to North Korea, and in the spring of 1956 he was transferred as ambassador to India.

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159 Inasmuch as Chao Shou-shan, governor of Shensi, is not a
*668 Communist but only a political figurehead, the actual power in Shensi was in the hands of P'an Tzu-li. While vice-governor of Shensi, P'an was responsible for mobilizing the people and preparing for the elections. He pushed through the campaign for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries and also expedited the judicial process, clearing seventeen thousand cases from the dockets in a couple of months.

000 **Pao-erh-han**
See Burkhan Shahidi

P'eng, Te-huai
See General Handbook

S **Saifuddin Azizi: Communist, government official**
159 Born 1914 in Sinkiang. A Uighur. Studied in the Central Asia-
668 tic University in Soviet Russia, majoring in law and political science. Commissioner of education in the provincial government of Sinkiang under Chang Chih-chung's administration, 1946
S and 1947. Member and representative to the first People's Poli-
159 tical Consultative Council, 1949, delegate to the CPPCC. Mem-
668 ber in the Central People's Government Council, and vice-chair-
631 man of the Commission on Nationality Affairs, 1950, and member of the Political and Legal Commission of the Central People's Government and member of the Constitution-Drafting Commission. In September-November 1955 he served as vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and a member of the National Defense Council.

In the Northwest, he was a member of the Military and Administrative Council, in which he served as a member in the Political and Legal Commission and the Nationality Affairs Commission. In 1953, when the MAC became the Northwest Adminis-

159 668 631 trative Council, he became vice-chairman of the council. In the province of Sinkiang, he was from 1950 to 1955 vice-chairman of the provincial People's Government, director of the Commission on Nationality Affairs in the Provincial People's Government, and commander of the Fifth Army. In 1955 he was elected chairman of the first session of the Sinkiang People's Political Consultative Committee, which did the ground work in preparing the establishment of the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region. In October 1955, when the SUAR was formally inaugurated, he was elected the chairman, but after a month, for reasons unknown, he resigned and Burkhan Shahidi again became chairman.

Saifuddin's membership in the Chinese Communist Party was disclosed in 1950, but he may have been an undercover agent before. He served as the fourth secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP (later reorganized as the Sinkiang Committee) from 1950.

In the mass organizations, Saifuddin is chairman of the Sinkiang People's Democratic League and he was also a member of the national committee of the China Peace Committee, an organization formed to carry out the Resist-America-Aid-Korea campaign. Since December 1954 he has been one of the vice-presidents of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

159 668 [669] Saifuddin's rise to recognition started from the revolt at Ili in 1944 when the so-called People's Committee for the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was organized in opposition to the provincial government of Sinkiang and also to the Nationalist Government. Saifuddin was appointed Minister of Education at that time and was also in charge of the Youth Corps. By January 1945 the Republic of Eastern Turkestan was formally established. Saifuddin was one of the lieutenants of Akmedjan Kasimi, a leader in the Ili coalition, who in 1948 organized his supporters into the Sinkiang League for the Defense of Peace and Democracy, and became editor of its organ, The Progressive Daily. When Akhmedjan and two others were killed in a plane crash en route to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Peking in September 1949, Saifuddin assumed the leadership of the Sinkiang League which, in 1950, was renamed the Sinkiang People's Democratic League and which furnished seventeen thousand experienced minority cadres to staff the government agencies in Sinkiang. Through their efforts, the Ili region in Sinkiang forged ahead of the rest of the province in land reform, in collectivization, in the recruitment of activists into the ranks of the cadres, and in meeting the requirements for the establishment of regional autonomy.

How trustworthy and loyal are the members of the Sinkiang League to the Communist cause is, however, still a question. The fact that many of them still entertain separatist opinions

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668 may be seen in the speeches of Saifuddin and Burkhan, exhorting them to abandon their opposition to Chinese rule and forswear their pan-Turkanistic and pan-Islamic views, which were denounced as reactionary. Although Saifuddin has climbed high in the Communist heirarchy and holds concurrent positions in the central government, the regional and provincial government and also the Communist Party, his power rests upon his following, and the fact that he was unsure of them may have been a reason for his resignation as chairman of the SUAR a month after his election.

159 Sheng Shih-ts'ai

One of the most important modern figures in the political arena of Northwest China during the more recent years is Sheng Shih-ts'ai. Sheng was born in 1895 in the district of K'aiyuan in Liaoning Province in Manchuria, of a middle-class farming family. After he was graduated from an agricultural middle school in Mukden he went to Shanghai to attend the Chinese School of Public Affairs, Chung-kuo kung-hsueh, at Wusung (Woosung), majoring in economics and political sciences, and was graduated in 1915. Unwilling to take part in the civil service examinations under the administration of Yüan Shih-k'ai, he went to Japan to pursue further studies. Shortly the question of Shantung came up in the Versailles Conference, and Sheng was sent back to China as a representative of overseas students to take part in the movement against the transfer of territorial rights to Japan. After the movement was over he joined the Military Academy of Kwangtung at Kukong. His military career began when he served as a second lieutenant in the army of General Kuo Sung-ling in Manchuria. Because of his good record in the army he was chosen to be sent to Japan's Military Academy. In the year of 1925 when Kuo Sung-ling resisted Chang Tso-lin for the latter's pro-Japan attitude, Sheng came back to join Kuo's side. When Kuo was defeated by Chang, Sheng went back to Japan to continue his military training. Chang Tso-lin complained to Japanese authorities and Sheng Shih-ts'ai was ousted from the Military Academy. Thanks to the assistance of Sun Ch'uan-fang, Feng Yu-hsiang (the Christian General) and Chiang Kai-shek, Sheng was able to complete his training.

He came back to China in 1927, just in time to take part in the Northern Expedition launched by Chiang Kai-shek. When the expedition was finally successful he served for a short time in the office of the chief of staff as a section chief. Then he began to seek opportunities in the border areas.

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669 In 1930 he was invited to Sinkiang where he served first as chief of staff in the office of the commander of Frontier Defense. But his real opportunity came when the Moslem rebel,

159 669 Ma Chung-ying, attacked Qomul (Hami) and Barkol (Chensi) from Kansu Province. Sheng was appointed chief of staff to the Pacification Commander in the eastern region of Sinkiang. Sheng's military training and his experience gained in the Northern Expedition proved him superior to the rebels. When the rebels were defeated, Sheng was promoted to the chief of staff in the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of Frontier Defense. In 1932 when the revolts among the Moslems started again in the eastern region of Sinkiang, Sheng was appointed as Pacification Commander in that region. He put down the disturbances in Qomul, relieved Urumchi (Tihua), besieged by the Moslems, and recovered a number of cities such as Turfan and Fu-kang. His reputation and prestige were soon recognized by the peoples of Sinkiang. Finally in 1933, a conspiracy broke out to oppose the administration of Governor Chin Shu-jen. Taking this opportunity, Sheng joined forces with the "revolutionaries." As a result, Governor Chin fled and Sheng was appointed as the Provisional Commander-in-Chief of Frontier Defense. In September of the same year, Sheng was officially appointed as the Frontier Commander of the Central Government in Nanking.

159 669 648 The immediate tasks facing this new leader of Sinkiang were the quelling of insurrections led by General Chang P'ei-yuan of Ili and the rebel Ma Chung-ying of Qomul. To consolidate his newly acquired power, Sheng had to obtain outside help to suppress his internal troubles. So in October 1933, Sheng sent his representatives to Soviet Russia to negotiate with the Russian government for the Red Army to enter Sinkiang and help him. The Soviet Red Army entered Sinkiang in 1933, and by June 1934 the whole of northern Sinkiang was pacified. After the success- 159 648 ful conclusion of this military achievement, Sheng Shih-ts'ai allied himself further with Soviet Russia by signing the first secret agreement with the Russian government, on May 26, 1934. The main terms in this secret treaty included the loan of five million rubles to Sheng by the Soviet Union and the employment of Russian advisors and technicians by the Sinkiang government.

643 During the next ten years, 1933 to 1942, Sheng became absolute ruler of Sinkiang with the full support of the Soviet Union. 159 64 Immediately after he took over, Sheng proclaimed his eight-point policy: (1) racial equality, (2) freedom of religion, (3) agricultural relief, (4) financial reform, (5) political reform, (6) promotion of education, (7) self-government and (8) improvement of the judicial system. In 1935 he made known his famous "six policies" which would be followed as the guiding principles of his "reconstruction of a new Sinkiang." These six policies were: (1) anti-imperialism, (2) kinship with the Soviet Union, (3) racial equality, (4) peace, (5) honest administration and (6)

159 reconstruction. Following these proclamations and policies 64 Sheng made some drastic changes, such as the employment of minority groups in the government offices, appointments of Communists from Yenan (then headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party), and the use of Russian advisors and technicians. In the military maneuvers, Sheng invited the so-called Eighth [669] Regiment of the Red Army to Sinkiang to help in the suppression of another rebel, Ma Hu -shan, of Khotan (Hotien) in 1937. Thus Sheng Shih-ts'ai finally put both the southern and northern parts of Sinkiang under his rule, and the whole of Sinkiang, during these ten years, was under the influence of the Soviet Union.

The year 1941 marked another turn which ended the rule of 159 648 Sheng Shih-ts'ai in Sinkiang and restored the normal relationship between Sinkiang and the Nationalist Government. Sheng severed his tie with his Soviet ally. This decision was obviously not accidental. There were several factors which forced Sheng to his drastic action. First and most significant was the gradual encroachment of power by the Soviet agents and the rumored "conspiracy" initiated by the Russian military advisors and aimed at Sheng. The second was a series of murders carried out by Soviet agents against Sheng's associates, including his own brother, Sheng Shih-ch'i. The third factor was the international situation. Hitler's armies in Europe were deep in Soviet Russia, and Japan was reported to be preparing for another front against Russia in Siberia. Thus the position of the Soviet Union, Sheng's ally, was at its lowest ebb. The fourth factor 159 was a series of visits by representatives from the Nationalist Government, including Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and their arguments. When Sheng made his decision, he sent notice to the Eighth Regiment of the Red Army stationed at Hami to evacuate Sinkiang. In the meantime he began to get rid of the Communist officers in the local government. In the early spring of 1943, a group of government officials sent from Chungking arrived in Urumchi. By the end of 1943 the turn-over was completed, and Sheng Shih-ts'ai once again threw himself into the embrace of the central government.

In August 1944, however, when the news of the defeat of the Germans by Soviet troops reached Sinkiang, Sheng staged another incident. He charged the group of officials sent by the central government with pro-Communist activities and put them in jail, then reported to the central government in Chungking. Fortunately, this time the situation was completely under the control of the central government. A few days later, on August [645] 29, 1944, the central government appointed Sheng Shih-ts'ai as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and sent a special plane for him. On September 11, Sheng, accompanied by General Chu Shao-liang, regional commander of the Northwest, and Hsu En-

S 159 tseng, the deputy-director of the Central Bureau of Investigations and Statistics (the FBI of the Chinese government), flew to Chungking, and thus ended his dictatorship of Sinkiang.

S [645] His position as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry lasted only a year. In July 1945 his political life came to an end. When the Nationalist Government was forced to move to Taiwan, he followed, but, although he still holds some office in the Nationalist Government, his name has not appeared in the China Who's Who since 1951.

N 159 631 **Shih Tze-ching: Member of the Democratic League**

Of Shensi Province. Dates unknown. When the Northwest Military and Administrative Council was formed at the end of 1949, he was appointed a member of that council and also chairman of the People's Supervisory Commission; in 1953 the council was reorganized into the Northwest Administrative Council, and Shih was retained as a member. He also served as its vice-chairman of the People's Supervisory Commission.

N 159 *668 631 **Sun Tien-ts'ai: Communist Party member**

A native of Ninghsia Province, for a long time secretary to the Operational Committee of the Communist Party in Ninghsia. Since 1949, a member of the Military and Administrative Council for the Northwest, and one of the vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Ninghsia Province. Since 1953, holds the same position except that the council has been reorganized into the Northwest Administrative Council.

With the abolition of Ninghsia in 1954, Sun was elected one of the vice-chairmen of the People's Government of Kansu.

The fact that the Communists use their party members to control local administration is shown clearly in the case of Sun Tien-ts'ai and others in the Northwest.

N 159 631 [635] **Sun, Tso-pin**

In 1950, Sun was deputy secretary of the Kansu Committee of the CCP, and a member of the Kansu People's Government Council. In 1954 he was elected governor of Chinghai.

Ta-li-cha-ya: Mongol leader

A Mongol of Ninghsia Province. Dates and background unknown. Since 1949 he served as a member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, vice-chairman of the Political and Legal Commission, and member of the Commission on Nationalities Affairs. From 1953, member of the Northwest Administrative Council, member of its Committee on Nationalities Affairs, and concurrently a vice-chairman of the People's Government of Ninghsia Province until 1954. In 1955 he was elected one of the vice-chairmen of the Kansu PPCC.

000 one of the vice-chairmen of the Kansu PPCC.

S 159 631 701 T'ao Ch'ih-yueh: Army officer

A native of Hunan, dates unknown. Graduate of Whampao Military Academy; 1936, commanding officer of the Eighth Division, Nationalist Army; 1945-49, commander of the Sinkiang Garrison; 1949-, deputy commander of the Communist forces in the Sinkiang Military Area, and commanding officer of the 22nd Army Group; 1949-, member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council and member of the Government Council of the People's Government of Sinkiang; 1951-, member of the National Committee, People's Political Consultative Conference; 1953-, member of the Northwest Administrative Council.

S 159 701 During the Nationalist administration, T'ao was never in a very important position in the army. His rise to fame began when General Chang Chih-chung, representing the Nationalist Government, conducted peace talks with the local leaders of Sinkiang from 1946-1949. At this time T'ao, succeeding General Sung Hsi-lien, became the commander of the garrison forces in Sinkiang. S 159 669 668 When the defense of the Northwest by the Nationalist troops was broken down by the victorious Communist army, T'ao took the lead of all military and political leaders of Sinkiang to switch his allegiance and support to the Communist regime in Peking. On September 26, 1949, he made his public announcement in which he separated Sinkiang's relationship from the Nationalist regime and gave his whole support to the Peking regime. And on October 1, 1949, he went to Chiu-ch'uan, Kansu, to welcome the commanding officer of the People's Liberation Army, General Wang Chen, to Sinkiang. His troops were then reorganized into the 22nd Army Group, which he still commands, but which was later disarmed and transformed into "production corps." T'ao was elected to the CPPCC in 1951. He was a member of the NW MAC (later the Northwest Administrative Council) and in 1955, a member of the National Defense Council.

N 159 *668 701 Teng Pao-san: Army officer

A native of Kansu Province; dates unknown. 1927, deputy commander-in-chief of the Preparatory Army for National Construction under the command of General Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General. 1930, deputy commissioner in the Pacification Headquarters of Shensi Province. 1937, deputy commander of Suiyuan War Area under General Fu Tso-i, stationed in Paotou, Suiyuan; 1948, 1949, during the Communist advance in 1949 he gave up his city and fled. Later he defected from the Nationalists. Delegate to the CPPCC; appointed chairman in the People's Government of Kansu Province and re-elected to the same

159 *668 701 position in 1954. Since 1953, appointed concurrently a member of the Administrative Council of the Northwest. In 1955 he was made a member of the National Defense Council. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association.

Teng is another example among the officers of the Nationalist Army who shifted their allegiance from one party to the other. As his defection from the Nationalist Government speeded the Communist cause in North China, he won a rather high place in the Communist Government.

159 Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-1885); General, statesman

Born in 1812 in Hunan Province. His family was poor though both his grandfather and father held the degree of hsiu-ts'ai. He studied under his grandfather and later under his father, and in 1837 entered the Ch'eng-nan Shu-yuan (Southern City Academy) and studied under Ho Hsi-ling. Obtained the Chu-jen degree in 1838 but failed in three attempts to win Chin-shih degree. In 1852 when the Tai-ping troops entered Yunnan Province, he was asked by the governor of Hunan, Chang Liang-chi, to help in the defense of Ch'angsha, the capital city of Hunan. He fought against the Tai-ping troops for three months, until the invaders had to by-pass Hunan to go northward to Hupeh Province and down the Yangtze River. In 1853, when Chang Liang-chi was promoted to governor-general for Hunan-Hupeh-Kuangtung-Kwangsi, Tso went with him to Wuchang and defeated the Tai-ping rebels. When Chang was transferred, Tso resigned from his post and retired to his native home. In 1854, Lo Ping-chang was appointed governor of Hunan, and Tso was asked to serve under him, but did not accept the offer. In 1854 the Tai-ping troops invaded Hunan again. Tso was asked by the people of the province to resist the invasion, and he helped Lo for five years in the defense of Hunan. In 1860, Tso was asked by Tseng Kuo-fan to train five thousand troops in Hunan; in 1861 he was ordered to take charge of the military affairs of Chekiang Province, and in the same year he was appointed governor of Chekiang. In 1863 he was promoted to governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang Provinces, and concurrently governor of Chekiang. In 1864 the whole province of Chekiang was freed from the Tai-ping troops, and Tso was awarded an earldom of the first rank and the designation of k'o-ching. In 1866 he recovered both Fukien and Kwangtung Provinces and the Tai-ping regime came to an end.

159 669 In 1866, when the Mohammedan uprising started in the Northwest, Tso was made the governor-general of Shensi and Kansu. In 1868 he first engaged the Nien bandits in Chihli, and by the summer he annihilated the bandits in Shantung Province. He

N 159 669 arrived in Sian in November 1868. From 1867 to 1872, for six years, Tso fought with the Mohammedans, and finally in February, 1871, the headquarters of the Mohammedans, Chin-chi-pao, was taken by Tso's troops and their leader, Ma Hua-lung, was executed. In August 1872, Tso finally arrived in Lanchou, Kansu. By November 1873, the whole province of Kansu was liberated from the Mohammedans, and Tso was made the associate grand secretary. In 1874 he was promoted to full grand S [669] secretary. In 1875 the trouble in Sinkiang broke out, and Tso was ordered to take charge of the military affairs of that area. After all the preparations were made, Tso began moving his troops westward to Sinkiang, and by 1877, both the northern and N [554] southern regions of T'ien-shan were recovered. In 1878, the whole region of Sinkiang was restored and Tso was awarded by promotion to second class marquis (hou) and his lieutenant, Liu Chin-t'ang, was made a baron. In 1880, when Tseng Chi-tse N 159 [648] was sent to Russia by the Manchu government for the second negotiation of the return of Ili which the Russians occupied during the Turkestan uprising, Tso was ordered to move his troops to stand by for any eventuality. But in August 1880, Tso was suddenly summoned back to Peking. He arrived at the capital in February 1881, and was appointed to serve in the Grand Council and the Tsungli yamen. In 1881 he was appointed governor-general of Kiangnan and Kiangsi. In 1883, he quelled a minor uprising in southern Shantung. By August 1884, the conflict with France began and the coast of Fukien became seriously involved, so Tso was once again appointed high commissioner of that province, and in December 1884 he arrived in Foochow. In the spring of 1885, negotiations with the French were resumed and by June 9, 1885, a treaty was signed by Li Hung-chang with the French representative. In September 1885, Tso died in Foochow. He was granted all posthumous honors and was canonized as Wen-hsiang.

The achievements of Tso Tsung-t'ang in the Northwest can be summarized briefly in the following points; First, his military achievements had consolidated the political control of the Manchu Dynasty in the north. The pacification of the Nien revolts in Chihli and Shantung, the suppression of the Moslem uprising in Shensi and Kansu and the defeat of the Sinkiang rebels, chiefly Pai Yen-hu and Yakub Beg, all contributed heavily to the restoration of Ching power in the Northwest.

S [648] Secondly, his diplomatic triumph in dealing with both Russians and British in Sinkiang had secured that territory under the Chinese administration. During the civil war in Sinkiang, N 159 the Russians occupied Ili and the British supported Yakub Beg S 669 in the south. At one time when the northern region of T'ien-648 shan was recovered by Tso-s troops, British diplomats

N 159 S 669 648 suggested to the Manchu Government that Yakub Beg's realm be recognized as a protectorate state. But Tso Tsung-t'ang frustrated this attempt by defeating Yakub Beg and recovering the territory of southern Sinkiang. When the negotiations for the return of Ili were going on between China and Russia, Tso again moved his troops to Qomul (Hami) to prepare for any possible break of the negotiations and recover Ili by force if necessary. As a result, Ili was returned to China and the whole Sinkiang territory was preserved as a part of China.

N 159 S 635 Thirdly, he should be credited for his statesmanlike foresight for his proposal of making Sinkiang into a new province on an equal footing with the rest of the provinces. On this matter he had memorialized five times to the Ching Government, insisting that Sinkiang must be given the status of a province to defend the border of the Northwest. Although Sinkiang Province was finally established after the death of Tso, the credit must go to him.

N 159 Though his achievements in the Northwest were great, they were of a military nature. Politically and economically speaking Tso's achievements during his twelve long years in the Northwest were rather limited and insignificant. He was primarily a military man. Though he held positions as governor or governor general, his primary duty was involved in the pacification of bandits and uprisings. His importance in the history of modern Northwest China should not be minimized, however, but should be recognized and praised.

Veli Kajum-Khan: Anti-Communist political leader

S 159 Born in 1904 in Tashkent, a member of an old aristocratic Uzbek clan. 1921, went to Germany, graduated from the agricultural school of Berlin and from the school of foreign affairs of the Berlin University. 1926, sentenced to death in absentia by Soviet authorities in Samarkand; 1925-41, active in the publishing field, in politics and in the Turkistan liberation movement; until 1940, publisher of the newspaper "Der Nähe Osten," and an information bulletin on Turkistan. S 159 668 648 Since 1941, concerned with the work of looking after the welfare and expediting the liberation of Turkistanian prisoners of war in Germany; 1945, organized ex-prisoners into the nucleus of the National Turkistanian Union Committee (Turkish: Milli Turkistan Birlik Qomitasinin) located at Bonn am Rhein; head of the Committee; founder of the Turkistanian Legion; 1945-47, served as a witness at the International Trials at Nürnberg; 1947, re-elected head of the National Turkistanian Unity Committee; 1953, reelected president of the Turkistanian refugee organization.

Veli Kajum-Khan, as founder and director of the Turkistanian Legion, has directed more than 180,000 Turkistanian exiles

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in Europe, while his National Turkistanian Unity Committee, in which he is president, has, unofficially, the support of such countries as Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In each of these countries, with the exception of Iraq, the committee has a representative office staffed by two members from each Turkish tribe of East and West Turkistan. Among his many activities, Vali Kajum-Khan has also the supervision of the political and ideological education of exiled Turkistanian youths. He publishes various Turkistanian newspapers and maintains important contacts with his native country.

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Wang Chen (1908-): Army officer, Communist Party member

Born in 1908 in Hunan in a poor farmer's family. Studied in grade school for three years. Railway worker, member of railway workers' union, 1924; joined Communist Party, 1927; member of the Executive Committee of Communist Youth, 1928; secretary of Communist Party at Liu-yang, Hunan; political commissioner, First Independent Division of Hunan and Kiangsi, 1932; political commissioner, Sixth Division, 1934; chief of staff to General Li Hsien-nien, 1937; since 1952, first secretary in the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the Communist Party; in 1950-52, commander, First Field Army, Acting Commander, Sinkiang Military Area. Member of the National Defense Council, 1955.

Wang Chen's outstanding status in the Party is due partly to his long membership in the Party and partly to his excellent record and achievement both as an army officer and as a worker. He participated in the Long March, 1935-36. He won fame in the army when he led a vanguard unit which marched from the Yellow River down to Kwangtung Province, hailed as another "long March." When he was stationed at Yenan, the capital of the Communists, he was given the task of utilizing the soldiers to do production jobs, and the result was that the army became a self-supported team which not only got no help from the government, but paid taxes to help support the government. When the military campaign of the Communists began, Wang Chen played a rather significant role by taking over the whole of the Northwest territory. First he received the surrender of Kansu on September 23, 1949; then on October 21, 1949, he flew to Sinkiang and took over that province.

In Sinkiang, Wang's first job was to crush the opposition, whom he denounced as counter-revolutionaries. His troops took part in destroying the forces of Osman Batur and in pursuing the fleeing Kazakhs to the border of India. In his capacity as first secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the CCP, a post he held for only a year, he helped further the so-called united front of the workers and farmers.

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159 Wang, En-mao: Communist Party official
668 First secretary of the Sinkiang Sub-Bureau of the Central
[631] Committee of the CCP and after September 1955, first secretary of the Sinkiang Committee of the CCP. In 1950-52, member of the Northwest MAC.

Wang is the top party boss in Sinkiang and thus the actual ruler of that province. Unlike his colleagues, he holds no concurrent positions in the administration except for a couple of years as a member of the NW MAC. A man of mystery, little is known about him except that he is a native of Kiangsi and does not speak any of the native languages of Sinkiang, and that in 1933 he served in the CCP committee in the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region under Jen Pi-shih.

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159 Wang Feng: Communist Party official
Native of Shensi Province and presently director of the De-
*668 partment of United Front Work in the Northwest Bureau of the
[631] Central Committee of the CCP. In the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, of which he was a member, he was a member of the Political and Legal Commission, the Land Reform Commission, and chairman of the Nationality Affairs Commission. He is also president of the Lanchou College of Nationalities.

Wang's main job was what the Communists called united fron work, that is, the alignment of non-Communists to work with Communist cadres in the Northwest and to encourage non-Chinese to work with the Chinese. As director of the Department of United Front Work in the Party, he incorporated thousands of former Nationalist officials as well as students into the ranks of the cadres, to govern the vast territory of the Northwest that the Communists acquired in 1949. Later, he was responsible for the ideological reform and the purges of the cadres in 1952. As
N a Chinese heading the Commission of Nationality Affairs in the
159 NW MAC, his job was to rationalize the long-standing differ-
*668 ences between the Chinese and non-Chinese peoples in the North-
*563 west. Much of the progress of socialist transformation in the Northwest depends upon the degrees to which Wang Feng at the regional level and Li Wei-han, director of the Department of United Front Work of the Central Committee, on the national have succeeded in smoothing relations between Communist and non-Communist officials, and between the Chinese and non-Chinese peoples.

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159 Wang, Shih-t'ai: Military and administrative official
Background unknown. 1934, member of the Central Execu-
*668 tive Committee in the Chinese Soviet Government in Kiangsi and
631 delegate to the Second All-China Representative Conference of
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Chinese Soviets, 1950, political commissar in the People's Liberation Army, member of the NW MAC, and a member of its Financial and Economic Commission, vice-chairman of Kansu People's Government and director of its Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs, director of the Northwest Railway Trunk Line Engineering Bureau, and deputy head of the political committee of the Northwest Railway Trunk Line. 1952, vice-minister of Railways; 1955, vice-chairman of the National Construction Commission in the State Council of the Central People's Government; member of the CCP. Member of the National Defense Council, 1955.

[466] Wang's major responsibility has been the extension of the railway from Lanchou into Sinkiang, and he commanded the troops which supervised the workers building the railway, many of them slave laborers.

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Wang, Tzu-i: Government and Party official

Former director of the Office of Civil Affairs in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, 1950, member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council, member of its Land Reform Commission, vice-chairman of its Political and Legal Commission, head of the Department of Personnel, and head of the Department of Civil Affairs. 1953, vice-minister of Interior in the Central People's Government.

Wu Hung-pin (1902-): Moslem leader, government official

Born in Kansu Province in 1902, reared in a Moslem family. In 1930, graduated from the National Peking University; 1932, took part in Anti-Japan activities in Shanghai during the Shanghai incident; 1936, organized Moslem People's League in the Anti-Japan and National Salvation Association; 1945, organized and headed the Lanchou branch of the Democratic League; 1949, represented the league in the First Chinese People's Political Consultative Council in Peking and was a member of its standing committee; in the same year, appointed mayor of Lanchou; vice-chairman of the Military Control Commission in Lanchou, and member of the Northwest Military and Administrative Council. 1953-54, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and served concurrently as mayor of Lanchou.

Concurrently, in Peking, he was a member of the Commission on Nationality Affairs, a member of the central committee of the Democratic League, member of the Board of Directors of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and a member of the executive council of the China Peace Committee, an outfit organized in 1950 to rally the people to support the campaign to resist America and aid Korea.

Wu was noted as an able organizer. He organized the students

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159 of Shanghai and engaged in the anti-Japan activities during the
*668 Shanghai incident when the Japanese troops invaded Shanghai.
[648] He also organized his own Moslems after the Sian incident when the Japanese aspirations in China became very clear. When the war was over, he was responsible for the organization of the Lanchou chapter of the Democratic League. Being an educated
[354] leader in a minority group has helped him reach his high position in the Communist government.

159 Yang Ming-hsuan: Member of the Democratic League
*668 A native of Shensi Province, dates unknown. 1937-45, vice-
631 chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Government and chairman of the Northwest Branch Committee of the China Democratic League; 1949, delegate to the CPPCC: 1950, member of the People's Government of Shensi Province; 1952, member of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest, director of the Commission on Culture and Education of that council and member of the Commission on Nationality Affairs; 1953-54, appointed one of the vice-chairmen and secretary general of the Northwest Administrative Council, and chairman of the Committee on Culture and Education; since 1951, member of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference, member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League and member of its Standing Committee. In 1955, he was made a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

159 Yang Ming-hsuan belongs to that group of men who, claiming
*668 to be non-Communists and members of third parties, have served the Communists well. It may be noted that he was, even before the Communists came to power, a vice-chairman of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region People's Government. Later, after 1950, he was director of the Commission on Culture and Education, with the task of bringing the students and teachers in line. In 1951, the Democratic League announced that it would devote its efforts to rallying and mobilizing the students and teachers, and Yang Ming-hsuan, as head of the Northwest headquarters of the China Democratic League, turned the attention of the league members toward organizing the students and teachers. But Yang's services to the Communists went further. He sought also to use his influence in bringing other political factions into line with Communist policies. When the Northwest Work Committee of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee was formed with Chang Chih-chung as head, Yang was among the Communist officials who spoke, saying that the duty of the minority parties was to follow the lead of the Communist Party.

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N **Yang Shen-chih: Local leader**
159 A native of Kansu Province, dates unknown. An influential
631 local leader. From 1949, member of the Military and Administrative
Council for the Northwest, member of its Land Reform
Commission and vice-chairman of the People's Supervisory
Commission; since 1953, member of the Northwest Administrative
Council and vice-chairman of the People's Supervisory
Commission.

S **Yang Tseng-hsin (1860-1928): Former governor of Sinkiang**
159 Born in 1860 in Yunnan Province, holder of both the Chu-jen
and Chin-shih degrees of the late Ch'ing Dynasty. In 1889, magistrate
of Chung-wei district of Kansu, later promoted as the
chou commissioner of Hochow, Kansu. He also commanded
troops under Chen Sheng-ch'uan. In 1901, he joined the staff of
Wei Kuang-t'ao, governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, and
was appointed superintendent of the army school in Kansu. In
S 1908 he was given the position of circuit commissioner of Aksu
693 Circuit, Sinkiang. In 1911 he was transferred to the Chenti Circuit
and concurrently held the positions as prosecutor. In 1912
652 he was promoted to provincial treasurer of Sinkiang. When the
635 newly appointed governor, Yuan Hung-yu, was murdered on his
way to Urumchi (Tihua), Yang was appointed governor of Sinkiang.
His title was changed several times, but his actual position
remained as the political and military boss of Sinkiang
from 1912 to 1928. When Yuan Shih-k'ai enthroned himself as
S 554 the emperor of China in 1916, Yang was awarded an earldom of
the first rank. In 1928, he pledged his support to the Nationalist
635 Government in Nanking, and was appointed the provincial chairman
of Sinkiang. He was assassinated in July, 1928.

S In the history of modern Sinkiang, Yang Tseng-hsin was the
159 only person who ruled Sinkiang for seventeen years. He was
635 credited, during his administration, with restoring peace and
prosperity to the province. During those seventeen years, he
S smashed the secret society, Ko-lao-hui (Elder Brother Society),
575 defeated the invasion of Kobdo and Altai (A-shan) by the troops
648 of Outer Mongolia in 1928, quelled the disturbances of the Kazakhs
who fled into Sinkiang from Soviet rule in 1917, and pacified
the defeated White Russian troops who also escaped into
S Sinkiang during the Soviet Revolution in 1917. Internally, he
563 adopted the policy of racial equality among the different tribes
641 within the border of Sinkiang. Diplomatically, he improved the
648 trade relations with Russia and settled the border troubles. But,
because of his autocratic and dictatorial attitude toward his
subordinates, and his cruelty toward his opponents, he made
enemies who brought about his assassination.

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Yang Tzu-lien: Democratic League member, government official

A native of Shensi Province, dates unknown; member of the Northwest Headquarters of the Democratic League; 1950 - 1953, member of the Military and Administrative Council of the Northwest, chairman of the Political and Legal Committee, and director of the Board of Justice in that council. Since 1953, member of the Northwest Administrative Council and vice-chairman of the Political and Legal Committee; since 1951, member of the Central Committee of the Democratic League.

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Yolbash (Yolbars) Khan: Anti-Communist army officer and government official
Chinese name: Ching-fu

A Uighur, born in 1888 (or 1883) in Yingihissar in Kashgar. Orphaned as a child and reared by his elder sister. 1904, entered the service of the King of Qomul (Hami) as an inspector of the fifth rank; 1911, delegate to the Qomul City Assembly; 1922, promoted to a beg of the third rank; 1927, commissioner of communications in Qomul; 1930, general of the second rank (erh-p'in Ta Tu-t'ung); 1932, member of the Provincial Assembly; 1933, brigadier commander of mounted troops; 1935, magistrate of Qomul and garrison commander of Qomul; 1937, compelled to leave Sinkiang because of his anti-Soviet views; made lieutenant general and a member of the Military Council of the Nationalist Government; 1938, went to Chungking, became military councillor in the Administrative headquarters (hsing-ying); member of the board of directors of the Islamic National Salvation Association; 1945, member of the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang; 1946, attended the People's Political Consultative Conference at Nanking; returned to Sinkiang as advisor to the Sinkiang Provincial Government; elected special commissioner for the Ninth District. Concurrently appointed advisor to the National Government; 1947, Administrative Supervisory Commissioner in the Qomul district; commander of peace preservation forces in the Qomul district; 1948, advisor on National policies in the office of the President in the National Government; 1949, deputy commander of the Peace Preservation Forces; 1950, commander in chief of the guerrilla forces in Sinkiang resisting the Communists; April 1950, Nationalist Government-appointed governor of Sinkiang; 1951, fled from Sinkiang to Formosa. Now advisor on national policies in the office of the President, National Government on Formosa.

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Additional Readings

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AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK

I. The Pre-Communist Period

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A. Introduction

Since the Chinese Communist Party came to power, its interest in the Northwest, as an area for economic development, has increased. The Communists feel that this vast region of 1,232,074 square miles, which is roughly one-third of the total area of China (3,657,765 square miles), offers unlimited opportunities for economic development. They claim that vast mineral deposits exist, that agriculture can be greatly expanded, and that the Northwest might serve as an outlet for some of the heavily populated sections

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of China Proper. Of China's total population of 582,605,000 million people, only 35,360,000 reside in the Northwest (Shensi: 15,881,000; Kansu and Ninghsia: 12,928,000; Chinghai: 1,677,000; and Sinkiang: 6,874,000). These figures are from the 1953 census report.

Since 1949, the Communists have begun to develop this area as rapidly as their limited capital and technological resources permit. Though the development of agriculture is only one aspect of their program, it is the foundation on which Communist planning in the Northwest rests.

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B. Sinkiang

1. The geographical setting

Sinkiang is enclosed on the north, south, and west by mighty mountain masses and on the eastern side by wide stretches of barren plateau and is bisected by the lofty Tienshan, or Heavenly Mountains, which rise to heights of 23,000 feet and extend across the province from west to east, dividing the region into two unequal parts; The southern area, two-thirds of the whole, is the Tarim

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Basin, the land of oases and deserts. The northern part is Dzungaria, traditionally the land of the nomads. The total area of the province is about 600,000 square miles, or twice the size of Texas.

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In the Tarim Basin, named from the east flowing river of the same name, is one of the world's driest deserts, the Takla Makan, which at its lowest point is actually below sea level. Vegetation is almost non-existent, so that nomadism is impossible except on a few alluvial fans where water lies near enough to the surface to support grass. The average rainfall is less than four inches a year. Water comes from the mountains which fringe the desert on the north, west and south. From the melting upland snows and glaciers, rivers cut their way down to the central oval desert.

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Where each river leaves the foothills, men dig canals to spread the water out in a fan, forming an oasis, so that the edige of the desert along the foot of the mountains is dotted by a series of oases.

000 oases. A trade road, looping around the desert, links the oases
133 like beads on a string, forming a U with the open end toward the
491 east.

131 Dsungaria is in northern Sinkiang, between the Tienshan and
the Altai mountains which mark the frontier between Sinkiang and
132 Western Mongolia. Precipitation here is slightly higher, and
137 steppe vegetation makes pastoralism possible. Northern Dsungaria
233 was the avenue of migration followed by the Mongols in their west-
[487] ward conquests.

2. Pastoral nomadism

233 In 1943, there were 11,720,000 sheep and goats in Sinkiang, 1,550,000 cattle, 870,000 horses, and 90,000 camels, totalling 14,230,000. In 1947 the province reported 12,266,000 sheep and goats, 1,659,000 cattle, 1,027,000 horses, and 85,000 camels, a total of 15,037,000. The total has remained somewhat constant over a period of time, probably due to the fact that pasture land is poor and care of the herds inadequate. Most of the livestock are in Dsungaria, pastured in the steppe land by nomad Kazakhs or Mongols. There are many variations to the techniques of herding animals since cattle, horses, and camels each prosper best on different kinds of pasture. The problem is to devise the best combinations of animals to be maintained and to select the appropriate pasture, decide how long to remain on a pasture, when to move, and how.

3. Oasis agriculture

241 There are two kinds of oases in Sinkiang: those in the south,
312 which are sharply isolated from each other by desert stretches
and the oases of the north, which have fringes of land in which rainfall farming prevails. When irrigation was introduced, it seems to have been practiced first on the lower courses of the rivers, where the soil was soft and the engineering problems required only the digging of simple ditches from the banks of the streams. In the course of time, as knowledge of engineering developed, the tendency was for the oasis to move upstream toward the boulder slopes at the edge of the foothills, but not back into the gorges where the problems were far too great.

Oasis engineering is extremely simple. The basic pattern is a main canal from the river, branching into smaller canals which branch in turn into ditches which deliver water to the fields, all arranged so that water flows by gravity from level to level, without the pumping or bailing devices which are widely used in China and in Soviet Turkestan to lift water from lower to higher levels.

In volume of discharge, the rivers of the Tarim system are
[133] far behind the two great rivers of Soviet Inner Asia, the Syr Darya
and the Amu Darya. The total discharge of all streams in Sinkiang is about 3400 cubic meters per second, of which about seventy per cent is in the Tarim Basin. In irrigation engineering

241 312 it is calculated that a discharge of one cubic meter per second should irrigate over 6,000 acres, whereas in Sinkiang the figure is estimated at 2,530 acres. There is a lack of drainage to provide for washing out the salt deposited by irrigation and of storage lakes and reservoirs and even small scale tanks. As a result, it is estimated that from a third to a half of the potential supply runs to waste.

One of the most important irrigation practices is the käriz or qanats, a gently sloping tunnel which leads along the axis of an alluvial fan, bringing ground water for irrigation from the upper slope to the surface lower down. The slope of the käriz is somewhat more gentle than that of the fan, and the käriz may be miles in length. A line of wells is dug at intervals and connected at the bottom by a continuous tunnel, three or four feet in diameter. Near the mountains, the käriz may be fifty feet below the surface. As the foot of the slope is reached, the shafts are more shallow, until at last the water emerges into the open air. In this way, ground water at the base of the mountains is tapped and brought to the surface of the plain. When the tunnel caves in or fills with sediment, a distant oasis may need to be abandoned.

241 312 471 454 The construction of käriz involves a heavy capital expense. Some forty years ago, Aurel Stein estimated the cost of a single long käriz in Turfan at over 300 pounds. The risk of failing to find water deters peasants from joining together to dig a käriz, and construction is usually undertaken by wealthy landlords who hire labor. Their reward, when successful, is a monopoly of the water, which they sell to the peasants in return for a share of the harvest. This form of enterprise is so profitable that some landlords sell all their land and invest entirely in käriz.

312 241 Springs and subterranean flows are supplementary sources of water in some oases. Small pits are used for storage of drinking water in some oasis towns. If these reservoirs are silted and new ones not constructed, the oasis will sooner or later have to be abandoned.

311 312 241 The farms surround the oasis, and the utilization of land is determined by the proximity of irrigated land to the middle of the oasis. Land nearest the market places for farm produce receive most of the fertilizer, in the form of night soil, and intensive garden cultivation of vegetables and fruits is practical on this land. Within this zone some cash crops such as apricots and other fruit are usually grown for the market. Beyond this inner area, the amount of fertilizer applied decreases rapidly. Two other zones follow where practically no fertilizer is used and hardier crops such as millet, kaoliang, and potatoes are planted. This land must be fallowed. Beyond this zone there is usually no water and the desert begins abruptly. The fringe area may sometimes be used for grazing, particularly of sheep.

161 About two-thirds of the total area of Sinkiang is uninhabited.
311 In 1946 the number of farm households was 344,000 and the average
number of acres per farm was around 7.1. (Cressey, Land of the
[114] 500 Million, p. 105. This figure, according to other sources,
is rather high.. These sources give a figure of from 0.5 to three
acres per farm.) The total amount of cultivated land was 2,455,000
acres or roughly one per cent of the total acreage of the region.
The greatest concentration of population is south of the Tienshan,
or more precisely, in the southwestern corner of the province near
the Soviet border. These are the districts of Khotan, Aksu, and
Yarkand which contain over two-thirds of the population of the
whole province. North of the Tienshan, the greatest concentration is in the Ili valley.

243 According to the figures supplied by Owen Lattimore, the
433 annual wheat crop of Sinkiang before the Communist conquest was
about 253,000 tons, about forty-four per cent of the total crop of
grain, beans, and seeds. Corn reached 331,000 tons or twenty-
eight per cent. Rice was about 71,000 tons or six per cent, and
sesame, rapeseed, and linseed accounted for 71,000 tons or six
[244] per cent. Barley, kaoliang, sorghum millet, beets, and peas
amounted to 119,000 tons or ten per cent. Millet, soybean, and
green beans totalled 71,000 tons or six per cent. Total agricultural
output was 916,000 tons. (Pivot of Asia, p. 167.)

243 Winter wheat is grown north of the Tienshan where, in spite
of the cold, the seeds are protected by the cover of snow; only
spring wheat can be grown south of the Tienshan, where lack of
snow cover exposes the seed to being frozen in the ground. Wheat
is tending to be displaced by rice in oasis fields because the fields
are highly alkaline. But the yield of rice is lower than that of
corn, because the Uighur farmers do not transplant the young rice
shoots as Chinese farmers do. Although the amount of labor
[461] expended on a unit of land is about the same in Sinkiang as in
[433] China Proper, the yield is somewhat less.

Cotton is the most important commercial crop in Sinkiang.
248 It was grown in Turfan as early as the T'ang Dynasty (618 -
907). Two varieties are raised: the native and the American.
In 1943, 100,000 acres of cotton were planted, seventy-three
per cent with native cotton and twenty-three per cent with seed
288 of the American varieties. Silk is also an ancient crop of com-
433 mercial importance. Its production reached 350,000 kg. in 1942
but fell drastically to 100,000 kg. in 1943.

592 The family group, living together under one roof, is the basic
241 producing unit in oasis agriculture. It often includes married
children, which makes it slightly larger than the average farm
family in China. While farms in the Tarim Basin average from
[423] 4.5 to six acres in size, larger than the 3.5 acres given for China
Proper, because the family in Sinkiang is larger, there is only

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592 0.58 acres per capita as against 0.68 in China Proper. It is
241 difficult to obtain a picture of the land tenure system because of
423 the lack of data. But according to a field survey referred to by Owen Lattimore covering sixty-five households in two villages in the Khotan oasis, the smallest farm was 1.08 acres and the
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largest farm was eight acres. A further breakdown revealed that
[184] rich peasants in this group had average holdings of eleven acres, middle peasant 5.7, and the poor peasants 2.8 acres. In the area where this survey was conducted, it seems that the farms of the poor were too small for the efficient use of draft animals and there was the problem of efficiently employing, on a tiny farm, the labor potential of the large Uighur family. (Pivot of Asia, p. 169.)

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4. Forestry

311 There is forest land in the rich Ili valley but it is questionable
313 whether much timber can be exploited without serious damage to the soil. Since much of Sinkiang is desert and wasteland there are few forest reserves; out of the total Sinkiang area only about five per cent is forest land.

C. Kansu, Shensi, Ninghsia, and Chinghai

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1. The setting

133 J. L. Buck refers to this part of the Northwest as the spring
134 wheat and winter wheat-millet area. In the spring wheat area
[243] (northern Kansu, Ninghsia, and Shensi) high hills, small mountains, and narrow irrigated valleys characterize the best agricultural land. But along the great wall in Shensi, Ninghsia and Kansu are many undulating sand dunes extending from ten to seventy miles both northward and southward. When the Mongols occupied this region, these dunes were covered with grass and shrubs, but where the Chinese settled here, they cultivated the slightly more fertile land in the depressions between the dunes; once the grass was destroyed the winds blew the sand so as to make farming impossible and other nearby good soil was covered with the blowing sand. Grass in such land can seldom be resodded, and it is thus that land once useful, at least for pasture, is now entirely destroyed.

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The winter wheat-millet area (southern Kansu, Ninghsia, and
133 Shensi) extends over a great part of a loess-covered plateau, a
134 high, dissected peneplain, carved largely from red or purple sholes
243 and conglomerates, covered with deposits, largely lacustrine, and blanketed by wind-blown dust, known as loess, which varies in thickness from about twenty to more than 150 meters. The fields in this region are very irregular and small, and most of the surface is so eroded that cultivation is difficult and much terracing is necessary.

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The climate is cold, dry, and windy in winter. The typical
132 precipitation is low, about fourteen inches, and exceedingly

132 variable, thus making agriculture hazardous. The growing season
[241] is short, with about five frost free months; even the few crops
that can be grown are often injured by autumn frosts. Dark colored
134 chestnut earth is common only on the higher parts of the loess
plateau of Shensi and Kansu provinces. It also occurs in the high
plateau region of Chinghai Province. In the loess region most of
the well-developed dark chestnut earth has been buried under
recent loess and alluvial deposits. (T. H. Shen. Agriculture
Resources of China, p. 20.)

2. Agriculture

241 Important irrigation systems, made possible by the Yellow
312 River and its tributaries, have been developed in Kansu, Ninghsia,
and Shensi. All these irrigated areas except Shensi produce
one crop a year, such as wheat, millet, peas, or flax because
the growing season is short. The large irrigated plains in Shensi
along the Wei River, a tributary of the Yellow River, produce
good American upland cotton in addition to wheat, corn, and millet.
The largest irrigated area is in the Ninghsia plain where
there are twenty-five canals from the Yellow River maintained
by the provincial industrial bureau. Irrigation is only possible
in the valleys, but they are narrow and comprise but a small percentage
of the total cultivated area. When Buck made his survey
of this area in 1929-1933, he estimated that thirteen per cent of
the total cultivated land was irrigated. He felt that the extent of
irrigation sometimes depended upon the prices of agricultural
[651] products fell. Because taxes were still imposed on irrigated land
and some of these taxes had even increased, further construction
of irrigation works was abandoned until prices commenced to rise
again.

137 The vegetation of this region is distinguished by the xerophytic plants, bunch grasses on the high elevation, and the tall and short grass sod. In Chinghai province, the Tsaidam Basin is characterized by desert and weeds, while in the same province, in the vicinity of Kokonor, there is grass. In Kansu, along the foothills and in the mountains, grass and weeds exist while in the desert area of Ninghsia, only weeds grow. Grass grows in Shensi along the Chin-ling and Huang-lung mountain ranges.

241 There is an inadequate amount of green manure crops used in
this region, which has resulted in a shortage of organic matter and
a deficiency in plant nutrients, especially nitrogen. In most of the
[372] area, straw of rice, wheat, rape, and legumes are not ploughed
under but are used for fuel, decreasing an important source of
organic matter to the soil and removing minerals necessary for
plant growth and crop production. Application of chemical fertilizer
in addition to local manures and the plowing under of plant
residue is very necessary to soil fertility.

241 The following chart indicates the area of the four separate pro-
311 vinces, the amount of cultivated land, the number of farm house-
131 holds, and the average number of acres per farm. (Cressey,
423 p. 105).

Province	Area in Acres	Cultivated Land	Farm Households	Acres per Farm
Kansu	96,741,133	4,310,000 acres	793,000	5.4
Ninghsia	57,653,372	304,000 acres	54,000	5.6
Shensi	46,432,319	7,514,000 acres	1,385,000	5.4
Chinghai	164,874,016	1,284,000 acres	237,000	5.4
Total	365,700,840	13,412,000	2,469,000	

Of the total area of these four provinces, roughly thirteen per cent is under cultivation (1946 figures). A survey of the National Agricultural Research Bureau findings of 1943 indicates that additional land that could be brought under cultivation is, except for Ninghsia, extremely limited. (China Handbook 1937-1943, p. 547.)

241 The extent of cultivation on the hills of this area depends upon
311 the elevation, steepness, and the dryness of the climate. High
133 elevations have a greater precipitation, more favorable for farming.
132 The drier, steeper hills have sparse, wild vegetation growth only, used for sheep grazing. Although one is impressed with the degree to which such hilly land in this dry climate is cultivated, it is probable that it has extended beyond the most profitable use of the land. In fact, according to one agricultural economist, it might be more economical if more of this land were devoted to grazing; if better varieties of grasses and improved breeds of sheep were introduced, the income derived from pastoral utilization might be greater. (T.H. Shen, Agriculture Resources of China. p. 153.)

Terracing is prevalent and is practiced on eighteen per cent
241 of all cultivated land. Much of the hill land is also cultivated in
133 a modified form of contour farming. The slopes of the fields are
134 so steep and the fields so wide that although there is some attempt at contour farming, it is not well carried out and the erosion is very severe; in fact, erosion is so serious that production is meager and some of the land has been abandoned.

241 The principal crops grown are wheat, cotton, rice in the irrigated areas of Wu-wei and Ninghsia, millet, and Irish potatoes. Cotton production is particularly extensive in Kansu and Shensi. The following figures are from the China Handbook (1937-1943) and they show the acreage and production for 1937-1942.

I: Washington 5-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION

PROVINCE	CROP (Maize, barley, oats, etc. excluded)	ACREAGE IN 1,000 MOU (1 ACRE = 6.6 MOU)					PRODUCTION IN 1,000 PICULS (1 PICUL = 2 BUSHELS OR 133 1/3 lb)				
		1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942
KANSU	WHEAT	8,055	8,359	8,434	8,330	8,247	10,331	9,424	8,953	8,411	9,077
	COTTON (lint)	123	141	167	202		37	41	51	57	
	RICE (not glutinous)	50	66	72	69		127	152	141	157	
	MILLET (excluding proso millet)	2,326	2,126	1,967	1,947		3,667	2,949	,510	2,817	
	SWEET POTATOES	116	182	184	184		1,399	1,273	1,236	1,214	
NINGHSIA	WHEAT	337	360	379	396	409	394	558	514	522	594
	COTTON		7	8	8			1	1		
	RICE	79	83	91	95		104	108	77	102	
	MILLET	220	198	227	226		341	329	341	359	

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following page 642

AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION

PROVINCE	CROP	ACREAGE IN 1,000 MOU (1 ACRE = 6.6 MOU)					PRODUCTION IN 1,000 PICULS (1 PICUL = 2 BUSHELS OR 133 1/3 LB)				
		1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942
CHINGHAI											
	WHEAT	2,444	2,356	2,319	2,427	2,409	3,501	4,096	3,030	3,641	3,797
	MILLET	260	273	215	231		254	447	205	285	
SHENSI	WHEAT	14,853	15,827	16,642	17,034	18,060	28,134	23,908	22,057	16,876	23,373
	COTTON	3,895	3,187	3,671	3,590		997	882	670	945	
	RICE	1,090	1,026	887	789		3,236	3,212	1,965	1,960	
	MILLET	3,363	2,975	2,698	2,678		3,879	4,163	3,226	3,658	
	POTATOES	353	342	336	337		3,759	3,132	2,818	2,530	

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following page 642 (a)

241 433 Oil seed bearing crops are also raised but in small quantities compared with the output from other parts of China. One reason for this is the lack of markets with a resultant slight incentive to expand and promote the planting of oil seed bearing crops. The following figures are in 1,000 metric tons and 1,000 hectares and are an average for the years 1931-1939. (T. H. Shen. pp. 248-249.)

Province	Soybean	Peanuts	Sesame	Cottonseed	Rapeseed
Ninghsia	2	-	negligible	-	1
Chinghai	-	-	-	-	21
Kansu	38	negligible	negligible	5	25
Shensi	46	12	17	86	51

Acreage in 1,000 hectares (1 hectare = 2.471 acres)

Province	Soybean	Peanuts	Sesame	Cottonseed	Rapeseed
Ninghsia	2	-	negligible	-	31
Chinghai	2	-	-	-	34
Kansu	38	negligible	1	13	54
Shensi	56	9	38	267	141

Besides the geographical and climatic limitations to farming, insects, diseases, and rodents seriously limit crop production. The black smut of wheat, barley, millet, proso-millet, and kaoliang is reported to cause losses of from twenty to eighty per cent of the crops. Yellow rust of wheat causes a loss of twenty per cent. Leaf cur of tobacco at Lanchow in Kansu decreases the yield and affects the quality of the crop. A kind of marmot, locally [136] called the "yellow rat" was a great menace during the drought [731] years 1928-1931.

241 731 The region is frequently subject to earthquakes, droughts, and famines which make farming extremely precarious. Calamities destroyed twenty per cent or more of the crop on the average annually during the period 1904-1929 and in 1930 a great famine swept through the region. Yet according to the population statistics and the total land area, there is no problem of population pressure, at least relatively. In addition, there is the possibility of increasing returns from the land under cultivation if existent farming techniques were improved and innovations introduced, i.e., use of fertilizer, better irrigation facilities, better seeds, etc.

241 489 But the biggest factors preventing increased returns in the Northwest have been the absence of transport facilities and financial assistance; e.g., the inability of the Nationalist Government to provide extensive loans at low interest rates. J.L. Buck points out that the absence of transport and communications to link the Northwest with other parts of China has accounted for the very small quantities of livestock and agricultural produce which have been exported and has hindered the development of local markets. With the growth of transportation, communications, better market facilities, etc., the possibility of increasing returns to agri-

241 489 culture on land already under cultivation might be realized.

The Nationalist Government gave no financial assistance of 241 654 175 any magnitude until the Second World War. Finally, when it was forced to retreat into the remote areas of Southwest China, the government had to depend largely on the Northwest for food and revenue (agricultural taxes). The Nationalist Government became more interested in the agricultural development of the Northwest and some experimental stations were set up in Kansu. Government assistance, however, was directed primarily to farmers engaged in producing crops for the war effort; e.g., cotton.

241 175 [435] [433] After 1938, the price index for farm products rose rapidly in all four provinces and the purchasing power of the farmers began to grow. After 1940, food prices rose speedily and the farmers had more money than in prewar days. By examination of the data of the war years as to whether farmers undertook to increase their scale of production and thereby extend cultivation, we can say that there was little increase in extensive farming (except in the case of Ninghsia) and that the output increases during this period can be attributed (wheat especially) largely to intensive farming.

241 423 [175] [429] Turning to the land tenure system, the percentage of farmers who are owners, partowners and tenants, as determined by a land survey undertaken by J. L. Buck, reveals that on the average most of the farmers own their own plots of land. The following chart, compiled from data collected by Buck in 1933 on a sample basis gives us the landholding breakdown. In Farm Survey (a), farmers who own their farmsteads but who rent all their crop land are classified as tenants rather than as partowners. When compared to the agricultural survey (b), (in this survey, 236 localities, 146 hsien, and twenty provinces in China were examined), the results in both cases are similar except in the case of Chinghai where the few samples taken disallows an accurate breakdown. (Land Utilization in China p. 57.)

Percentage of farmers who are owners, partowners and tenants

241 423 427 171 162

Province & local	Farm Survey	(a)		Agricultural Survey	(b)	
Kansu	owner	part-owner	tenant	owner	part-owner	tenant
Kao-lan	86.0	11.0	3.0	60.0	15.0	25.0
Lin-hsia	-	-	-	60.0	10.0	30.0
Wu-wei	96.0	4.0	0	60.0	25.0	15.0
Yung-teng	-	-	-	35.0	5.0	60.0
Ping-liang	82.0	17.0	1.0	85.0	10.0	5.0
Tien-shu	62.0	21.0	17.0	50.0	30.0	20.0
Average	78.6	14.2	7.2	58.4	15.8	25.8
Ninghsia	98.0	2.0	0	96.0	1.0	3.0
Chinghai						
Hwang-yau	67.3	22.7	10.0	-	-	-

241 Kuei-teh	-	-	-	30.0	10.0	60.0
423 Hsi-ning	77.8	19.4	2.8	-	-	-
427 Wei-yüan	-	-	-	10.0	5.0	85.0
171 Average	72.6	20.5	6.4	20.0	7.5	72.5
162 Shensi						
Ting-pien	72.0	20.0	8.0	-	-	-
Yu-lin	66.0	26.0	8.0	-	-	-
Average for 20 locals	69.8	16.0	14.0	70.0	14.1	15.9
Average	69.4	20.6	10.0	70.0	14.1	15.9

241 423 427 175 [114] The following charts are the results of agricultural surveys taken during the war years by the Nationalist Government. They are on a percentage basis and bear out the validity of Buck's findings; namely, that tenantry in the Northwest is not a serious problem. It is dangerous to try and depict any trend from these statistics; although this period reflects a higher standard of living for the peasantry because of high wartime prices, it usually takes a long time to bring about any change, in landed relations, since peasant attitudes are fixed and not susceptible to immediate change. (China Handbook 1937-1945, pp. 458-59, revised and enlarged with 1946 Supplement.)

241 427 175 162 Percentage of tenant farmers in China

Province	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Ninghsia	18	21	16	10	15	14	15	13
Chinghai	19	18	18	21	24	28	18	21
Kansu	19	16	22	18	18	21	22	18
Shensi	18	22	25	22	23	25	21	24

241 423 175 162 Percentage of owner farmers in China

Province	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Ninghsia	68	66	65	74	74	74	78	68
Chinghai	51	61	58	61	51	51	78	58
Kansu	61	66	59	62	61	60	55	63
Shensi	61	57	55	58	57	56	59	58

Percentage of part-owner farmers in China

Province	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Ninghsia	14	13	19	16	11	12	7	19
Chinghai	30	21	24	18	25	21	27	21
Kansu	20	18	19	20	21	19	19	19
Shensi	21	21	20	20	20	19	20	18

427 [175] There are three systems for paying land rent; namely, cash rent, crop rent, and share rent. When a tenant rents his land by paying a fixed amount of money per mou to his landlord, it is cash rent. If he pays a fixed amount of cereals produced on the land, it is crop rent. If he divides the crops raised on his rented land with his landlord at a fixed ratio, it is share rent. No investigations were made during World War II regarding the systems of paying rent. The latest study was made in 1934 by the National

NUMBER OF LIVESTOCK (UNIT 1,000 HEAD)(CHINA HAND BOOK-1937-1945, TABLE 22. p.442)

	PROVINCES	OXEN	HORSES	MULES	DONKEYS	GOATS	SHEEP	HOGS	CHICKENS	DUCKS	GEESE	WATER BUFFALO	TOTAL
1942	NINGHSIA	14	8	4	31	106	186	34	175	6	2	...	566
	CHINGHAI	35	32	24	44	224	367	79	250	3	3	1	1,062
	KANSU	583	96	94	536	1,378	2,459	760	2,431	165	43	11	8,556
	SHENSI	839	84	113	256	...	277	751	2,558	158	16	2	5,054
	TOTAL												15,238
1943	NINGHSIA	14	4	3	34	93	159	30	187	8	2	...	534
	CHINGHAI	36	26	28	50	155	274	55	192	5	1	...	822
	KANSU	626	115	112	565	1,495	2,594	663	2,545	145	34	5	8,899
	SHENSI	887	89	112	239	340	245	740	2,688	150	15	7	5,512
	TOTAL												15,767
1944	NINGHSIA	28	8	5	57	140	234	41	176	9	3	...	701
	CHINGHAI	43	36	26	42	170	211	51	139	9	2	2	731
	KANSU	623	138	105	594	1,522	2,768	614	2,470	116	28	2	8,980
	SHENSI	808	83	114	254	313	203	669	...	120	13	6	2,583
	TOTAL												12,995

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427 Agricultural Research Bureau. It is doubtful whether the results
175 have changed greatly since then. The following are the 1934 findings:

Province	No. of Hsien Reported	Cash Rent	Crop Rent	Share Rent
Ninghsia	5	46.1	18.5	35.4
Chinghai	7	10.6	53.8	35.6
Kansu	21	14.3	51.0	34.5
Shensi	51	15.1	59.0	25.9

(China Handbook 1937-1943 p. 607.)

3. Livestock

175 The chief livestock are sheep, oxen, donkeys, mules, and
231 horses. The following chart gives the number of livestock in the
four areas as of March, 1937, in thousand head. (T. H. Shen
p. 289. Notable omissions in this table are yak and camel.
There is a fairly large number of yak in Chinghai and camel in
Ninghsia and Chinghai.) The next series of charts gives the livestock number for the war years.

Province	Horses	Donkeys	Mules	Cattle	Water Buffalo	Sheep	Goats
Ninghsia	17	44	8	39	-	739	225
Chinghai	50	79	26	89	-	359	150
Kansu	151	581	160	802	1	2,625	1,646
Shensi	128	359	131	914	7	375	657

	Pigs	Chickens	Geese	Ducks	Total
Ninghsia	52	186	2	6	1,318
Chinghai	74	312	2	3	1,194
Kansu	984	3,212	53	229	10,544
Shensi	967	2,747	7	99	6,491
Total Number of Livestock (in thousand head)					19,547

The total number of livestock in China for 1937, excluding Sinkiang, Tibet, Outer Mongolia, Sikang, and Manchuria, was 445,078 animals. This meant that the Northwest possessed about four per cent of all livestock in China for the year 1937.

231 As shown by the chart, one of the most important animals is
236 sheep; wool is exported from the region. In the Northwest the
43 cost of wool production is high in relation to selling prices. Sheep
farmers operate at a deficit due chiefly to the low production of
wool per head of sheep and to the high annual death loss from starvation, disease, and other causes, whereas in other sheep and wool
producing countries the income from wool is at least forty per cent
of total income, in the Northwest, the low production of wool per
head of sheep allows only an income of twenty per cent. The esti-
236 mated annual loss of sheep is around ten per cent. Of the total
amount of wool produced in China from 1941-1945, the five pro-
433 vinces of the Northwest, including Suiyuan, produced 69.7 per cent.

236 (T.H. Shen, p. 326.) The following is in 1,000 metric tons:

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Province	Sheep Wool	Camel Hair	Cashmere
Kansu	3,611	180	30
Ninghsia	1,846	299	92
Chinghai	4,840	60	-
Sinkiang	12,853	22	10
Total	23,150	561	132

241 In Chinghai and elsewhere in the region fertilizer is scarce and the thick sod on the uncultivated hilltops is burnt in piles to help meet the fertilizer requirements of the fields below. The 311 following is a description of the principle livestock raising area 233 in Kansu and Chinghai. "The pasture land in Kansu and in the agricultural part of Chinghai is mostly the hill land far away from the cultivated fields and villages. It is not owned by farmers in- [423 dividually or collectively. It is public land. The right to graze these pastures is determined by the natural location of the villages in relation to these hills rather than by law. The nearest villages have more chance to use it. Sometimes one finds several villages grazing their sheep on the same hills without trouble. But if too many villages use the same pasture a definite agreement is made between the villages to limit certain villages to particular pastures. Such occasions rarely occur because the increase in sheep is naturally in accordance with the amount of pasture available. It is only in time of severe drought that the pastures are overstocked.

311 "The pasture of nomadic Chinghai (formerly a part of Tibet) is 423 also public land but different tribes and clans have the exclusive 233 right to use only such land as has been allotted to them by the government or by tradition. Within the boundaries of a certain tribe the pasture is open to all its member families, but no family owns any particular lot. There is no fencing or walls.

311 "The condition of these pastures is determined by annual rain- 233 fall. More rain and snow assure better grass. No human effort, such as seeding, manuring, irrigation or drainage is ever applied." (Buck, Land Utilization p. 176.)

4. Forestry

313 The following chart indicates the percentage of forest land for the region.

Province	Percentage of land in Forest
Kansu	6.0
Ninghsia	4.0
Shensi	16.0
Chinghai	2.0

If we leave out Shensi as a section of the Northwest, as George B. Cressy does, the Northwest is reported to have only one twentieth as much standing timber as the Northeast region (Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning), or 197,429,814 cubic meters, which is located

313 mostly in Kansu. In 1945, large-scale afforestation projects were
[185] undertaken by the provincial government, especially in Ninghsia.
The exceptional fact about these projects was that the young seedlings were properly cared for and did not die as so frequently occurred in other afforestation schemes. The Ninghsia projects were, of course, taken over by the Chinese Communists.

In the loess plateau region, between the great wall and the
311 mountains, and between the Tibetan Highlands on the West and
137 the Yellow plain to the East, there is almost no forest cover.
313 Forests are found only in the more inaccessible areas or in temple groves. Their disappearance is related partly to needs for lumber but also to the introduction of new crops, such as corn and Irish potatoes, which will grow on the upper slopes. Many hills
[241] were burned over in order to clear the land for a cultivation
[134] which could last for only a few years until erosion swept away the
last trace of soil.

5. The border region

*175 In 1937, the Chinese Communists occupied the northern portion
*668 of Shensi as well as the fringe areas of Chinghai, Kansu, and
433 Ninghsia. This region was regarded as the Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai border region and was developed by the Communists
[437] into a relatively self-sufficient area. When they were able, they
exchanged surpluses such as oil, salt, herbs, skin and wool for
articles which they could not as yet produce in sufficient quantity.

*175 The Communists carried out land reform as soon as they were
fully entrenched in power.. Large land holdings were cut up and
*668 parcelled out to peasants with little or no land. Rents and interest
[423] rates were reduced, efforts were made to extend cultivation, increase the number of draft animals, and develop labor cooperation beyond family circles.

*175 In a study by Yung-ying Hsü, issued by the Institute of Pacific
Relations, there is a summary of the economy and military status
*668 of this region. There are numerous statistics to indicate increases
433 in production of certain crops. These are the only available statistics we have for the region during this period, and the figures seem to indicate that despite the excessive expenditures for the maintenance of an army and guerilla forces as well as a governing body and administration, progress was made in raising the level of agriculture. However, by 1943, trade figures for the region indicate an imbalance of payments and a drain of currency from the region indicating that increasing military commitments were absorbing the created wealth of the region.

13 D. Conclusion

We may sum up the obstacles to agricultural development as
241 follows: geographic and climatic problems are the most serious.
311 The amount of cultivable land that can be reclaimed and used for

13 farming purposes is not great. Deserts, high mountains, and
241 loess covered plateaux limit the expansion of further cultivation.
311 The margin of cultivation can be extended but not without the great cost involved in reclaiming land and constructing irrigation networks. The dearth of rainfall in many sections of the Northwest and the shortness of the growing season also handicap farming. The destruction of wooded areas and gradual ruination of the top soil in the past has resulted in severe erosion and the elimination of important organic substances necessary for soil fertility.

241 The absence of transport and communications has encouraged
433 greater subsistence farming and less production for markets.
489 The inability of the farmer to sell his surplus and obtain a profitable return so that he could increase production or practice more
(438) diversified farming, has stunted the growth of internal markets in the Northwest region. The inability of the Nationalist Government to link the internal markets of the Northwest to China Proper by a series of transport and communication systems, and provide for a free flow of capital, as well as short term low interest rate loans, has seriously retarded the development of agriculture.

241 We have seen from our data that while the above problems are
311 quite serious, there exists no real problem of tenantry or population pressure on the land. Furthermore, given high prices for
(435) their goods, as occurred during the second world war, the farmers
(433) of the Northwest, in some instances, could by more intensive farming methods raise the level of output significantly.

241 Both T. H. Shen and J.L. Buck (agronomists) feel that if
311 there were some restoration of fertility to the land in terms of resodding and planting root crops, and if a large portion of the
433 hilly sections could be turned over to the raising of livestock, certain sections of the Northwest would come to have a distinct comparative advantage economically so far as the production of livestock is concerned, and greater incomes would be forthcoming to the rural inhabitants (this assumes such products could be cheaply exported and necessitates a proper balance between farming and livestock raising).

241 One of the most vital factors not yet mentioned, is the necessity for constructing irrigation works and to further extend those
433 already in existence. This entails also the building of large reservoirs; the small magnitude of irrigation works is one of the greatest stumbling blocks to the development of areas like Sinkiang and Kansu, since most of the land there is desert.

However, to carry out the above projects which would overcome some of the obstacles to the expansion of agricultural production, it would be necessary that large capital outlays be available. Serious consideration of greatly expanding the area under cultivation might, however, lead to higher costs than any administration could bear, and in turn result in diminishing returns.

241 Such costs could be avoided if intensive farming measures were
433 emphasized, internal markets developed, and these in turn linked
to China through a network of transport.

II. The Communist Period

241 *668 A. General Outline of Communist Policy for Agriculture in the Northwest

The pattern of Chinese Communist agricultural policy for this region is similar to what has emerged in China. The only differences have been in the timing and pace of reform policies which stem from the varying political, economic, and geographic conditions of the Northwest.

When the People's Liberation Army had occupied the Northwest,
[423] land reform on a regional scale commenced. By 1951 land reform
was completed in areas with an agricultural population of seven
million; rents were reduced in areas with an agricultural population of ten million. (Current Background, No. 141, November
27, 1951. General Chang Chih-chung on Development in the
241 Northwest. p. 14.) Immediately upon completion of the land
*668 reform, concerted efforts were launched to increase the agricul-
474 tural and livestock production of the Northwest through coopera-
476 tivization; by establishing mutual aid teams and then combining these into agricultural producer cooperatives where land, farm
433 implements, and livestock are pooled. The ultimate objective of
the Chinese Communists is to cooperativize all agriculture in the Northwest, and through a network of such cooperatives, concentrate on raising productivity by expanding cultivation, sowing with better types of seeds, and using more advanced tools and farming methods. Cooperativization is taking place in villages and oases, and steps have been taken to establish state farms in regions where there are large tracts of reclaimed land.

241 Survey teams were sent out to determine what land might be
reclaimed and cultivated. Upon the estimates of these teams,
311 units of the army went out to reclaim the land. Because most of
185 the land surveyed was desert, the construction and extension of
*668 irrigation works, the building of reservoirs, the setting up of
irrigation pumps to pump the water through newly-dug canals
over the desert had to begin at almost the same time.

311 Some progress has been made in extending cultivation and
185 planting cotton by reclaiming waste land. Communist planning is
ambitious and in future five year plans, they intend to make the
*668 province of Shensi a textile processing area to which Sinkiang
288 and other areas in the Northwest will ship their cotton. In this
439 way, it is hoped to ultimately make the entire region self-suffici-
[248] ent in textile production. Textile factories are being erected in
Sinkiang too for the purpose of processing cotton produced there,
and it is already reported that some cotton cloth is being shipped
to the U.S.S.R.

000 and it is already reported that some cotton cloth is being shipped
to the U.S.S.R.

452 In the field of credit financing, purchasing and marketing, extensive
474 efforts have been underway to place these activities under
*668 the control of cooperatives specifically erected and designed to
extend State control over the rural areas. These co-ops are
designed to assist in agricultural planning and to assure the realization
of annual output quotas. Credit cooperatives are closely
coordinated with the development of agricultural producer cooperatives
in order to provide them with funds to develop and simultaneously
to absorb any liquid savings that have accrued among
these co-ops. For the purpose of State purchasing and marketing,
cooperatives have been set up which survey individual households
to determine household consumption and output. Frequently,
advance purchases of expected agricultural surpluses are made
by these co-ops. All surpluses which can be purchased by State
marketing and supply co-ops are channeled through State apparatus
to where they can be used most efficiently.

654 The State has taken measures to increase livestock production
232 by first attempting to set up mutual aid teams among the pastoral
*668 people and sending specially trained teams into the pastoral areas
[476] to immunize animals, teach the herders better care of their stock
to prevent loss of animals, and conduct breeding experiments to
improve the quality of livestock. Superior types of animals from
[177] the Soviet Union have been imported on some occasions to be bred
with native stock.

242 Pests, locusts, and animal diseases have always been a
*668 scourge in this region. The State has undertaken to acquire technicians
[177] and airplanes from the U.S.S.R. to spray regions where
the threat of locusts has become serious. Insecticide has been
distributed throughout the lower level agricultural co-ops and
campaigns have been conducted among the peasants to eliminate
plant and animal diseases.

313 Teams have been sent out to survey forested portions of the
*668 region and to determine what measures might be taken to expand
existent forest reserves, plant saplings, establish nurseries and
carry out large-scale afforestation to prevent erosion.

241 These have been the general measures taken by the Chinese
*668 Communists so far to develop agriculture in this portion of the
[433] country. Some successes have been scored; e.g., in increasing
[242] the number of livestock and higher crop yields per acre by the
[474] introduction of better procedures of livestock care and farming.
However, the program of organizing the peasantry into co-ops to
achieve similar results, has not been successful in every instance.

[578] Bandits and dissatisfied portions of the minorities who did not
welcome the Communists have been quite active in disrupting their
programs. As the years in the first five year plan pass, the plan-

N 241 668 ning in agriculture has become more complex and difficulties are
encountered in realizing annual targets. The absence of trained
technicians to introduce new farming techniques, the lack of ac-
countants and organizers in the cooperatives, and the so-called
ideological backwardness of many of the Communist cadres them-
N 121 241 668 selves have prevented rapid cooperativization. We will now exa-
mine very briefly the progress achieved in the different regions
of the Northwest and the problems which have arisen to prevent
agricultural development. In this way, the pattern of Chinese Com-
munist agricultural planning can be observed more clearly.
Henceforth, all statistics concerning the number of co-ops, agri-
cultural output, etc., are Communist claims and, of course, must
be carefully considered.

B. Application of Communist Agricultural Policy to the Northwest.

1. Sinkiang

S 175 474 241 668 [476] By June, 1955, nearly six years after the area was occupied by the Communist Army, there were 75,215 mutual aid teams (it is not known how many of these were on a permanent basis) and the agricultural producer cooperative numbered 1,702 with roughly 66.4 per cent of the peasant population participating in some form of co-op. By the end of 1956, in response to Mao's directive to hasten the creation of agricultural producer cooperatives, it is planned to increase their number to 5,100 and by 1957 to 10,240. (Far Eastern Economic Review, December 1, 1955, pp. 686-87.)

S 241 433 668 175 [474] Emphasis has been on raising the production of wheat, oil seed bearing plants, and cotton, by extending cultivation. The Communists attribute all increases in production to a result of further consolidation and development of the cooperative movement. Although there is a paucity of data on output, acreage, and output per acre, the following table has been pieced together from the information available, in an attempt to give some comparisons of increases attained during the Communist period with that of 1949. The figures for the Communist period have been obtained from 1954 and 1955 reports. See Table 1.

S 242 668 433 175 The government has established agricultural stations, in order to show the peasants of various nationalities how to improve their farming methods. In 1955 it was reported that Sinkiang had seventy such stations. Two tractor stations have also been opened in Urumchi and Sui-ting. These stations have sought to improve production by planting Ukrainian winter wheat and S-3173 cotton, and promote better procedures of farming such as summer ploughing, autumn ploughing, winter irrigation, sowing in rows, close-planting, and cotton-pruning. They have made efforts to wipe out insect pests. The Soviet Union sent

175 242 668 433 [177] [475] [701]

The Soviet Union sent thirty-three airplanes and large numbers of locust experts to spray insecticides over an area of some 2,669,000 mow (or 405,688 acres) during 1952-1955. On the state farms, the Army has done the lion's share of the work of reclaiming land, building irrigation works, erecting experimental farms and stations and operating them. (Union Research Service, Oct. 14, 1955. p. 7, No. 9.)

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The Communists reported that they have given financial and technical assistance to the various nationalities who till the soil or engage in pastoral activities. By the end of 1954, agricultural loans totalling some 26,140,000 yuan (U.S. $1,061) and some 46,000 farming implements had been supplied to the peasants, enabling every peasant household to have one trowel of its own and every 1.3 households to own a plow. These small figures indicate that assistance has been meagre; but even this might enable the peasants to increase output as compared to output obtained by previous farming implements.

241 312 668 175 [475] [474]

Whether agriculture will prosper in Sinkiang depends entirely on the steps taken in water conservancy and the proper utilization of water. Already fi[illegible] million additional mow of land (160,000 acres) have been irrigated in the past six years and the irrigated acreage in 1954 has been increased by 30.2 per cent since 1949. Reservoirs have been constructed like the well-known "Red Wild Goose Reservoir" and the "Peace Reservoir" which both now irrigate more than 237,000 mow (36,024 acres of land). Three state farms, collective farms, and a dozen or so agricultural co-ops have been formed in the area.

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By the end of 1954, the total number of livestock in the whole province numbered 17,105,000 head, an increase of 7.47 per cent over 1953. (In 1947 the total number of livestock was 15,037,000. The figure reported for 1954 indicates a 13 per cent increase.) The plan for 1955 is to raise the number fo 18,987,567 head, a net increase of 11 per cent. This will include 537,280 head of large and small animals of improved breed (including 515,792 sheep, 7,930 large domestic animals, 13,538 pigs); 2,839,140 head of livestock will be innoculated against or cured of various diseases. The Chinese Communists complain, however, of many defects in animal husbandry. During the past winters, insufficient feed was gathered and many animals died. It was estimated that some 200,000 died in the spring of 1954, an approximate loss of one per cent per annum.

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The forestry policy has been to protect existent forests from fire and damage, to survey forest areas suitable for afforestation, to plant saplings there, and to afforestate areas near rural villages for the development of co-ops and state farms. Each year, the quota mou to be afforestated is set and state departments undertake to meet these quotas. Nurseries have been built and seedlings planted in these tracts.

000 planted in these tracts.

668 185 241 We have cited some of the achievements that have taken place and the general direction of agricultural development. We must be careful about accepting all figures and recognize that many targets are not met but often revised midway through the year until they can be met. When one looks at the entire scheme of development taking place it is important to remember that each group in this scheme has certain commitments to meet as set by the plan for that year. Survey teams are supposed to provide definite information about the amount of land to be reclaimed each year. If their information is not accurate, (and there have been complaints to this effect) then those units which reclaim the land are put off schedule, the proper cultivation and sowing cannot be done, and the intended output is not realized. Such intricate planning can lead to grievous bottlenecks in the attainment of planned goals.

[452] [453] Further defects that have been reported are as follows: there has been inadequate hydrographic and meteorological data for farming and animal husbandry. There has not been the correct coordinated activity between State and commercial enterprises to supply the necessary producer and consumer goods for the agricultural and pastoral co-ops. The People's Bank has been unable to give the needed credit and credit cooperatives and credit groups still have to absorb idle capital and halt usurious practices among the peasants, which still seem to prevail six years after "liberation." The Communists report that rich peasants, and so-called counter-revolutionary elements are still causing trouble by "sabotage" and the spreading of rumors which obstruct Communist policy.

According to observations made by some agricultural stations in Sha-ya County the peasants in many districts placed emphasis only on the summer harvest, and neglected the cotton, mazie and rice crops that are reaped in autumn. This meant that the peasants were devoting more of their attention to harvesting a wheat crop, a food item, and neglecting other farm crops that the state was so urgently emphasizing. In Kuerhlei County there were complaints that the peasants were not picking the cotton at the appropriate time and their delay in doing so had allowed much of the ripe cotton to fall to the ground and rot. This occurred in many of the villages throughout the county. Again the Communists complained of the peasants' lack of care for their farming tools and that damage frequently resulted from mechanical troubles and carelessness.

668 241 The principal difficulty to date has been the acute shortage of technical cadres in the province and among the local minority nationalities. To solve this problem, several agricultural institutes have been erected to train indigenous groups. But this

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668 training takes time before these technicians, accountants, etc.,
241 can go out and organize co-ops, operate them efficiently, and
train other native cadres. The 1955 plan calls for the training of 600 technical cadres for the "Centers for Promoting Agricultural Techniques," for the training of 500 in-office cadres by rotation, and for the training of 4,190 accountants and 5,337 technicians for agricultural producer cooperatives.

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668 An additional problem (which will be mentioned at this point
rather than repeated when each province of the Northwest is dis-
657 cussed) concerns the soldiers' dependents in the region and the
736 plight of discharged army personnel. The State has been particu-
474 larly upset by the lack of participation of these groups in coopera-
729 tivization and special attention is now being devoted to utilize
[464] this source of manpower. Since dependents of servicement are
given certain State stipends, in food, many of them feel that by joining a cooperative they will be deprived of this compensation. Because 1955 was a critical year in the Five Year Plan, the pace of erecting new co-ops and consolidating the older ones has been increased. Now many of the dependents and demobilized soldiers who were organized in these co-ops have backed out of them and many of these co-ops have, therefore, never been consolidated. Another problem in the co-ops is that the members do not want partly disabled or female workers, and, on the other hand, many dependents feel that the State should provide for them. (No. 1004, March 10, 1955, Supplements. "Actively Organizing Servicemen's Dependents for Mutual Aid and Co-op Work." U.S. Consulate General. Survey of China Mainland Press.) The proper allocation of labor in the Northwest remains a critical problem.

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2. Chinghai

*175 By December, 1954, 575 agricultural producer co-ops had
*668 been formed, and this constituted 9.12 per cent of all households.
474 The number of mutual aid co-ops was not given but it was reported
452 that 69.7 per cent of all households had been cooperativized to
[476] some extent. There were also 159 supply and marketing coopera-
tives, 148 credit cooperatives, and 12 handicraft producer co-ops. Long term low interest loans have been extended to poor peasants to encourage them to join farming co-ops. The first allocation totalled over 138 million yuan (U.S. $5,598). The interest rate is 0.4 per cent monthly and the repayment period is spread over five years. Besides these individual loans to poor peasants, there have been additional ones to enable the peasants to build small water conservancy works and buy new types of farm tools. All totalled, state loans amounted to more than 750 million yuan (U.S. $30,426) for 1955. (Far Eastern Economic Review, Dec. 1, 1955. pp. 686-87.)

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*668 In a provincial report by Chan Kuo-sheng, Secretary General
241 of the Chinghai Provincial People's Government, on work
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*175 conditions in 1954 and tasks for 1955, it was stated that 2,000
185 modern plows were now in use, and 67,245 mou (10,221 acres)
*668 of dry fields have been converted into water fields, while adequate
241 water supply has also been made available to 28,597 mou (4,347
433 acres) of original water fields. It was planned to have 746 agri-
[474] cultural producer co-ops in operation in 1955, with an area of
5,115,000 mou (777,480 acres) to be sowed with a planned output
for the province of 853,350,948 carries (42,337,207 bushels).
An area of 500,000 mou (76,000 acres) is to be sown for oil
bearing crops with a planned output of 10 million catties (24,137
*175 metric tons). There is so little data for the pre-Communist and
Communist period that it is impossible to construct a table.
241 The only comparison that can be made is in oil seed bearing
433 crops (and livestock which follows). The pre-Communist figures
give an average of 21,000 metric tons for the years 1931-1939.
Since it is planned to increase output to 24,137 metric tons, this
will mean an increase of 3,137 metric tons; not a very significant
increase.

162 In Chinghai there is a population of over one million; sixty per
cent belong to the Tibetan, Mongolian, and Hui minority nationali-
*668 ties. The Communists reported that the province's seven million
head of livestock in 1951 was increased to over twelve million in
231 1954 and it is planned that 20 million will be raised by 1957.
185 (Pre-war and war year statistics list the total livestock at little
*175 over one million. Communists claims of sevenfold and twelve-
fold increases in this case, ought to be accepted with reserva-
tions. However, because the base year (one million) is so low,
it is possible to have rapid increases of a relatively large magni-
[654] tude.) The People's Government issued loans to husbandmen
engaged in animal husbandry totalling 6,555,000,000 yuan (U.S.
$266,365) in 1954. Steps were taken in cutting and storing grass
for winter, repairing sheds and enclosures, and building winter
and spring shelters to protect livestock during the cold season.
It was also reported that in 1954, goals in planned purchases of
cattle and sheep were achieved, and this produced definite con-
tributions in support of the industrial construction of the State.
At the same time, these activities served to educate the people
in patriotism and mutual aid.

*668 Tasks for the future were to continue to raise agricultural
production based on the mutual aid and producer co-ops and to
185 develop supply and marketing co-ops, credit co-ops, and arrange
for markets in rural areas to promote interflow of supplies and
planned purchase and planned supply of food. Care was to be
taken to preserve livestock and to continue afforestation schemes.
It was reported that within the province some 38,900 mou (5,913
acres) had been afforestated in 1954 and the number of fires
greatly reduced.

*668 241 185 *175 Because Chinghai is a dry region and irrigation works are needed the Communists planned for 5,000 hectares (12,355 acres) of land to be brought under cultivation in 1955. Five teams of irrigation workers arrived at selected places to help extend the area of irrigated land. The plan for 1955 involved improving the irrigation canals, servicing 4,600 hectares (11,367 acres), and the setting up of two pumping stations. The Communists claimed that by the end of 1954, fifty per cent more land was irrigated than before the "liberation."

*668 185 Chinghai's problems are similar to those that prevail in Sinkiang. Production plans are not fulfilled, especially those plans for oil bearing crops and the improvement of sheep breeds. This is supposed to reflect a lack of responsibility on the part of the cadres toward the State's plans but the real problem undoubtedly lies with the difficulties of intricate planning and the insufficient number of trained, skilled cadres. Excessive spending and waste were attacked and these were blamed on the weakness of ideological leadership. The report by Chang Kuo-sheng goes so far as to say that workers are honest and loyal but it is the cadres who still retain "bourgeois" thoughts, and are to blame. Thus, it appears that the peasants are not being criticised for planning and organizational defects for fear of antagonizing and isolating many of them from Communist rural organizations.

*668 185 241 It seems fairly self-evident that as the work of planning in the agricultural areas becomes more complicated and detailed in nature, the number of technicians will have to be increased. In addition to being skillful accountants, agro-technicians, etc., they will have to be ideologically trained so as to faithfully carry out the State's plans. The Communists, then, have a twofold job: to train members of the various nationalities to be technicians and at the same time to turn them into good Communists. The speed at which they are attempting to turn out a large number may mean poorly trained technicians. This will complicate and hinder agricultural planning even more.

*668 578 Hsijaochiatso, the Vice-Governor of Chinghai, delivered a speech on July 22, 1955, to the National People's Congress on the progress made in Chinghai, which differed greatly in content from other speeches given by nationality leaders of the various frontier regions of China. While most of the other speeches to the National People's Congress dealt with concrete advancements made in the nationality areas, Vice-Governor Hsijaochiatso's report was devoted largely to acts of sabotage and resistance to socialization in Chinghai. A quotation will serve to point this out. "Because we are carrying out our construction plans very satisfactorily, the enemy both within and without the country has resorted to mad acts of sabotage in various forms. Very recently, in some pastoral areas, the rumor spread to the effect that the organization of cooperatives in pastoral areas is a disguised form

*668 578 of the nationalization of cattle and sheep." And again, "there are also many counter-revolutionaries who exploit religion for sabotage and such instances are often found in the minorities areas. In certain pastoral areas in Chinghai, for instance, the discovery of heavenly edicts was rumored. These documents stated that the world would soon be destroyed, and the people meet with severe calamities and suffering." (Current Background. No. 356, September 12, 1955.)

Rumors and religious sects are apparently some of the more concrete forms peasant resistance has taken toward collectivization: among the various minority groups, such resistance can greatly hinder Communist agricultural planning.

*668 232 242 No doubt there is much room for improvement in the pastoral sections of Chinghai, simply by the introduction of better types of breeding techniques and by showing the nationality groups the proper care of their herds during the winter season. In addition, more irrigation and better farming procedures ought to stimulate [474] greater productivity. But the central problem will remain: whether cooperative organizations will yield benefits or whether they will reduce peasant incentive and thereby, in the long run, weaken agricultural development of the area.

3. Shensi

*668 433 *175 The following statistics are from a report by Hsieh Huai-teh, Director of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry for the Shensi Provincial People's Government on 1954 conditions and tasks for 1955. (No. 1014, March 24, 1955. Supplement. Survey of Chinese Mainland Press.) By the end of 1954, the total output of food for the province was 10,091,790,000 catties (201,835,800 bushels); cotton was around 1,800,000 piculs (119,970 tons) as compared to 65,802 for 1938 (nearly a twofold increase); but insufficient attention was paid to the planting of oil bearing crops in various sections and the total output amounted to only around 117 million catties (70,571 metric tons) as compared to the pre-Communist period average for the years 1931-1939, 212,000 metric tons.

*668 241 474 *175 By 1954, 59.4 per cent of the peasant households in the province were organized into some form of co-op, and 13.22 per cent of them had joined permanent mutual aid teams. There were 3,048 agricultural producer cooperatives including one collective farm. All together, around 847 villages have virtually become cooperativized. *668 *175 241 312 In Shensi there are a total of seventeen State irrigation canals which have enlarged the irrigation area by 44,112 mou (6,705 acres). The number of wells, water wheels and pipe wells have been increased, and the total area irrigated enlarged by more than 192,000 mou (29,184 acres), amounting to 86.7 per cent of the plan for 1954. The total irrigated area in the province is now over 5,623,290 mou (854,740 acres).

*668 The number of large domestic animals increased to over
231 2,586,000, that of sheep (including goats) to over 3,003,500 and
that of pigs to over 1,825,000. There are four state livestock
farms. Compared to pre-war figures, domestic animals and pigs
increased twofold while sheep increased nearly twelvefold.

*668 In addition, a campaign for afforestation and forest protection
313 was launched so that in northern Shensi by the end of 1954, some
280,000 mou (42,560 acres) had been afforestated by the State.
*175 During 1954, 206,900 mou (31,449 acres) were afforested,
nurseries occupied 4,900 mou (754 acres), 856,100 mou (130,127
acres) of wooded wilderness were surveyed, and new forest
developments were carried out on 61,500 mou (9,348 acres).

*668 By 1955 it is planned to increase the grain acreage so that it
will be 70,150,000 mou (10,662,800 acres) and the total output
185 1,970,000 piculs (13,002 tons). Oil bearing crops will be in-
[433 creased and plans to develop animal husbandry are underway so
[244] that there will be 2,790,000 large domestic animals, 2,008,000
[231] pigs, and 3,515,000 goats and sheep to relieve the shortage of
meat and dairy products in the markets. In 1955, the area to be
[313] afforested will be 280,000 mou (42,424 acres) and 7,000 mou
(1,064 acres) will be used for nurseries. Tea plantations will be
strengthened and growing of vegetables in the suburbs of cities
will be promoted. All this will be accomplished by increasing
*668 the pace of cooperativization for 1955; seventy-five per cent of
185 all households will be cooperativized and agricultural producer
[474] co-ops will total 21,000. A spring campaign will be launched also
[241] to enlarge the sowing area and improve stock breeding, and
efforts will be made to strengthen leadership over production in
hilly regions; technical reforms will be continued and stepped up.
Finally, satisfactory supplies of consumer and producer goods
will be given to the peasant. The latter (producer goods) include
farm implements, fertilizers, draft animals, insecticides,
spraying equipment and good seeds.

Some of the defects that crop up in Shensi are particularly
serious since it is one of the most advanced provinces in the North-
west, from the standpoint of the large number of co-ops. The
following obstacles have arisen to obstruct the campaign to step
up cooperativization. So-called rural "capitalist forces" and
[578] rumors fabricated by counter-revolutionary elements have brought
uneasiness to the middle peasants. Consequently, peasants have
sold or slaughtered their farm animals, felled trees, rushed to
buy consumer goods, squandered their money. This state of
affairs is supposed to have resulted because the correct policy of
solidifying poor and middle peasants has not been carried out.
Commandism among the cadres is reported to prevail and this
has had the over-all result of slowing down cooperativization.

000 So-called counter-revolutionary elements were reported to

*668 669 578 So-called counter-revolutionary elements were reported to have operated in several provinces. In Hopei, the public security organs uncovered several cases of "I-kuan-tao" sabotage. The "I-kuan-tao" are supposed to be remnants of KMT officers and several sects like the "Golden Line". These elements had operated in Kansu, Shensi, and Inner Mongolia. They usually recruited former prisoners who had been in Chinese Communist prisons. These elements were supposed to have wormed their way into economic enterprises, rural mutual aid, and co-ops to engage in sabotage. They are blamed for fabricating rumors, and during the unified purchase of grain, they are supposed to have instigated the peasants to put aside grain and not send their surplus to the State.

*668 659 433 248 Another major problem is the assessment of cotton output and the fixing of cotton purchase quotas. What the state does with commercial crops, as it does with nearly all rural produce now, is to send teams out to each household and estimate what the output, consumption, and surplus will be. The amount to be purchased is determined on the basis of these findings. Once this data is collected and examined, other items can be planned such as the amount of thread to be spun, the textile output that will result, and how much cotton cloth can be made available to the rural areas. It is very important, then, that the initial surveys to determine the available surplus that may be purchased by the State be correct in order to fulfill other portions of the plan. If incorrect estimates are made; i.e., lower estimates of output allowing peasants to retain excessive quantities of cotton, this would promote the growth of rural capitalist elements who might carry on speculative activities by selling their surplus cotton at a higher price than offered by the State. The Chinese Communists blamed two factors for incorrect assessments of cotton output; the incorrect ideological approach of cadres and their poor survey methods. In the latter case, some cadres, because they were unpopular among the peasants, thought it adviseable to make slightly lower estimates of cotton output. In other villages, local cadres wished, by making lower estimates, to keep an extra supply of cotton for themselves or for their relatives and neighbors. In regard to defective working methods, the cadres did not carry out their estimation of output by first propagating Communist policy and mobilizing the masses; they made investigations without the assistance of the peasants and encountered difficulty in deriving the true output.

If inaccurate estimates of peasants' cotton production are made, it will also have a direct effect on peasants activity for mutual aid and cooperation and will hinder the unity between organized and individual peasants. It seems that the difficulties of estimating cotton output were widespread in Shensi and had given rise to peasant resistance of Communist agricultural

*668 policies. Such resistance is revealed in instances where wheat
659 fields have been enlarged at the expense of cotton cultivation.
433 Any failure to carry out the State's purchasing plans correctly
248 then, will "undermine the prestige of the party and of state policies, encourage spontaneous capitalist tendencies among the peasants, and throw State plans into confusion." (Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 971. Supplement, January 19, 1955. "Make Accurate Estimates of Cotton Output and Fix Purchase Quotas.") Since the publication of this article on estimating cotton output and fixing purchase quotas, Peking has encouraged the "three fix policy" which is a measure designed to overcome food and agricultural raw material shortages in order to meet the planned targets set by the State. This policy provides for every administrative body throughout China to fix the production, fix the purchase of output, and fix the marketing of this output for the agricultural sectors of the Chinese economy. Undoubtedly this policy has been rigorously applied to the Northwest. Information is not available, however, as to whether the "three fix policy" has solved the above problems.

4. Kansu

*668 The Communists have made strenuous efforts to restore Kansu
185 to its former prosperity (in the days of the old Silk Road to Europe Kansu was a fertile and prosperous region). The plan to build Lanchow, the capital, into an industrial base safely removed from the seacoast, the opening of the Lanchow-Sinkiang Railway, and the extensive geological surveys for minerals and oil, indicate recent attempts to do this. On March 14, 1956, Deputy K'o Shih-king reported on the province's five year plan. Only information pertaining to agricultural progress and policy will be considered.
*668 The total output of grain and cotton in 1956 will be 10,350 million
185 catties (207 million bushels) and 250,000 piculs (16,662 tons)
433 respectively, representing 124.42 per cent (or 6,882,750 tons of
[241] grain) and 281.87 per cent of the quotas set for 1957 in the first
five year plan. Afforestation will be carried out over an area of
[313] 5,300,000 mou (806,061 acres). (Union Research Service. Vol. 3, No. 3, April 10, 1956. p. 40.)

185 A comparison of Communist output figures with those of the
433 pre-Communist period is difficult. Since we cannot consider
[114] wheat only as grain (grain in this case would include corn, barley, millet, etc.) We possess no figures for oil seed bearing crops
[248] for 1956. However, for cotton, where Communist resources have been invested to expand cotton production and output, the 1956 figure of 16,662 tons as compared with the 1941 high of 3,712 tons represents around a fourfold increase.

*668 The Chinese Communists predict that the vast areas of waste-
185 land in Kansu will be transformed into cotton fields soon. Ex-
248 perts have been experimenting, it is reported, to select the most
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*668 suitable cotton strains for sowing and the best methods of irrigation
185 for the large-scale cultivation of cotton in the province. 17,000
248 hectares (42,907 acres) are now being surveyed in the Kansu corridor
311 and the vast plains along the Yellow River in Northwest
China for future establishment of mechanized state farms. Altogether,
the corridor and the plain are estimated to have over
650,000 hectares (1,616,150 acres) of wasteland. In 1954, it
was found that the greater part of 200,000 hectares (494,200 acres)
of wasteland surveyed was suitable for cotton; three new mechanized
state farms have been set up so far there.

*668 Some of the information available on agricultural policy in Kansu
deals with the area around Lanchow, where there is some suburban
241 farming, and the development of cooperatives in the Wu-chung Hui
369 Nationality Autonomous Chou of Kansu Province (from a speech by
Ma Teng-ai delivered on July 22, 1955, to the National People's
Congress). Discussion of these areas will not give us a complete
picture of the progress or difficulties in agricultural development
but they will indicate the trend of agriculture in Kansu.

[565] In Lanchow, it was reported that the landlord class and "feudal"
exploitation of the peasants in the suburban areas had been abolished.
[423] 15,112 mou (2,297 acres) of land had been confiscated and distributed
among 20,400 peasants who possessed no land or very little.
Production and livelihood materials were also distributed among
*668 these peasants. So far, seven vegetable and agricultural producer
241 co-ops and 606 mutual aid teams are in existence in the
474 suburban areas. These included roughly 32.48 per cent of the
369 peasant households; expanding agricultural production to meet the
[476] daily growing needs for vegetables in the city has been stressed.
By fall of 1956 it is planned to have eighty-three per cent of all
agricultural rural households in the suburbs, in agricultural
producer co-ops. Two socialist vegetable producer co-ops will
be established. Future emphasis will be on the expansion of
vegetable farms, orchards, and development of poultry and pig
rearing.

*668 The city of Lanchow has grown greatly in the past five years
241 with the influx of troops, technicians, laborers, and their families.
369 It is questionable whether agriculture in the surrounding areas
can have maintained this population growth. This would imply
that some food would need to have been shipped from China.
[474] There have been some difficulties in developing co-ops and mutual
[476] aid teams, as in other parts of the Northwest. Planned purchases
[443] and marketing of food, extremely critical in this neighborhood
since the urban life of Lanchow rests upon these marketing procedures,
have not been carried off successfuly and have slowed
up cooperativization. There has been evidence of bureaucratization,
lack of class responsibility toward the poor and middle
peasants, and a lack of serious study and investigation of conditions.

*668 In the Wu-chung Autonomous Chou, in Kansu, Hui and Han
563 groups live together. Today there are 277 agricultural producer
474 co-ops, eighty nine for the Hui and 124 for the Han. More than
476 3,200 mutual aid teams have been developedp 1,200 are perma-
185 nent. Future policy stresses increased agricultural production by cooperativization. In a speech delivered by Ma Teng-ai to the National People's Congress however, key emphasis was placed on the correct implementation of solidifying the poor and middle class peasants and following the principle of allowing the peasants of various nationalities to enter the co-ops voluntarily. Such a desire to enter must result from the mutual benefit they feel they would receive. When agricultural producer co-ops are to be formed, namely, consolidating the various permanent mutual aid teams and pooling land, farm implements, etc. special attention is to be given the customs, habits, and religious beliefs of the different nationalities. For instance, if the Hui and Han members of the same cooperative do not want to use the same well, different wells are to be drilled, and used separately. I hogs are raised in a cooperative, they may be attended by the Han members themselves and they are not considered an auxiliary occupation of the cooperative. The Chinese Communists, in dealing with the nationality problem in the Northwest, so far have tread very lightly whenever they wished to promote cooperativization. They have proceeded very slowly, using subtle methods of persuasion to urge the various nationalities to enlist their labor power in the mutual aid and produce co-ops.

*668 Communist administrators complain bitterly of counter-
669 revolutionary activities in Kansu. In a speech by Su Chen-yung,
578 Vice Director of Public Security Bureau, he states: "Counter-
474 revolutionaries have unceasingly wages destructive activities against the Socialist transformation enterprises in both the cities and the countryside. With a view to impeding the work of the peasants joining the cooperatives, and to sabotaging agricultural production, they concentrated on certain reactionary landowners, wealthy peasants, and Taoist leaders to cheat some backward elements into establishing false cooperatives and even organising uprisings." (Union Research Service. Vol. 3, p. 43.)

Su Chen-yung then gives as examples the disruption of progress in establishing agricultural cooperatives, the killing of Communist cadres, the burning of supply and marketing cooperatives storehouses, etc. Such admission by Communist officials of overt violence indicates that the Chinese Communists still are encountering peasant resistance, although nearly seven years have passed since their occupation of the region.

*668 C. Conclusion
241 The Chinese Communists have attempted to control closely
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*668 and coordinate all rural activities toward the fulfillment of Chinese
241 Communist agrarian policy: complete cooperativization of
474 agriculture and the assurance of a steady flow of food and raw
185 materials through fixed purchase of produce. (The problem of
agricultural taxes in the Northwest has not been mentioned so far.
[651] The Communists have not reported any reduction of agricultural
taxes, or what the average tax rates in the Northwest are.) They have a system of cooperatives at the basic production levels. Though cooperativization has taken place slowly because of the peculiar conditions of many areas in the last six years, it is expected that once some nucleus of control has been established in the rural areas in the form of permanent mutual aid cooperatives and producer cooperatives, rapid cooperativization will take place, to embrace, ultimately, all rural inhabitants.

*668 In the national minority area, the Chinese Communists have
563 proceeded slowly, so far, in their attempts to organize agricultural and pastoral activities. The problem of different national
[474] minority groups has been one of the principal stumbling blocks in the creation of lower level co-ops, and will undoubtedly pose a barrier to rapid cooperativization.

*668 Secondly, the State has been able to provide only a small
241 supply of farm implements and credit. Shortages in China and
654 the difficulties of transportation undoubtedly account for this.
It is questionable whether these shortages can be overcome in
452 the next few years, but when they are, new farm tools and sufficient credit should account for significant output increases.

*668 Thirdly, one of the principal ways the Communists have
attempted to increase output in the Northwest has been through
241 extensive farming rather than through intensive means. They
433 have done this by using vast amounts of labor, particularly military, to reclaim desert wastes, build irrigation works, and construct state farms to manage the reclaimed area. Evidence of this is most striking in Sinkiang and Kansu. Although Chinghai and Shensi with their hills and valleys limit extensive farming procedures, cultivation has been extended wherever possible. Because of the shortage of fertilizer and tools the Chinese Communists have been unable to promote intensive farming on a scale that would raise output per acre significantly. Instead, they have had to resort to expanding cultivation, that is, extensive farming, to obtain the desired increases.

*668 Finally, it is clearly evident that in all parts of the Northwest,
241 with the exception of Chinghai, there has been a general neglect
in promoting livestock production and instead an all-out effort to
231 increase the planting and extension of cultivation of wheat, cotton,
433 and oil seed bearing crops. This program differs radically from policy measures suggested by Western agronomists, i.e., J.L. Buck and T.H. Shen who advocated the restoration of fertility to

*668 241 231 433 to the soil by planting grass, resodding, etc., and encouraging the production of livestock. The reason for Chinese Communist policy could be that wheat, cotton, and oil seed bearing crops (these are the only three types of crops ever mentioned in Chinese Communist statistics) have priority over everything else as these crops are urgently needed in other parts of China as well as to sustain population increase and industrial construction in the Northwest.

*668 241 433 It is difficult to forecast prospective agricultural development in the Northwest. The Communists have demonstrated that they are intensely interested in developing the region and they have provided capital, when available, and vast amounts of labor to reclaim land, construct irrigation systems, and build water reservoirs. However, one gets the impression from reviewing past achievements and future goals that the Communists are depending largely on organizational changes in agriculture to bring them the desired output increases. When new targets are established, they are to be realized not by state financial or technical assistance, but through greater exertion on the part of the peasantry, more closely organized planning, better utilization of resources, and through cooperative endeavor and labor emulation.

At this stage of development, the State has few resources that it can divert to the Northwest to aid in the development of agriculture. It is forced therefore to rely solely on the production relationships already existent there and reorganize these relationships when able, to make for increased productivity. We have already cited the difficulties the Communists have encountered in their attempts to reorganize agriculture. And it has been strongly suggested that as planning becomes more intricate, and as more technicians and planners are required, the problems will multiply. One link in the entire chain of planning has only to break and large sections of the economy would be disrupted. When output increases are as vital and necessary as they are now, and the demand for greater food supplies increases, the burden on agriculture will become heavier.

It is questionable whether any increases in food production, i.e., wheat, rice, maize, barley, millet, will be of an amount sufficient to be exported to China Proper. Instead, output increases will be required to feed the expanding population of the Northwest; the recent efforts to expand the production of cotton and oil seed bearing crops by bringing additional land under cultivation for the planting of these commercial crops, may, over a period of time, yield quantities sufficient to supply the textile processing mills the Communists are planning to construct. There is a possibility also that livestock increases and the by-products from livestock, i.e., wool, meat, etc., will be of sufficient supply to be exported to other parts of China. However, consider-

¥668 able time will have to elapse before there can be the proper processing and handling of such by-products.

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During the next five to eight years, at least, it is questionable whether the Northwest, from an agricultural standpoint, can contribute significantly to the industrialization program being enacted on the Chinese Mainland. The big problem will be whether the Northwest can contribute agricultural surpluses toward its own future economic development, and the answer depends on the success of cooperativisation of agriculture and the maintenance of a constant outflow of food and agricultural raw materials. So far, we are only able to point out the trends in agricultural management and the stress on production of certain commercial crops and food staples. The problems the Communists have encountered and will continue to meet have also been mentioned. But it is still too early to venture an opinion as to the success of Chinese Communist policy in developing the broad base of agriculture in the Northwest.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1


Sandy Desert
Desert Steppe (unpastured)
Steppe Pastureland
Steppe with Scattered Agriculture
Steppe and Forest Parkland
Forest with Scattered Agriculture
Intensive Agriculture
Intensive Oasis Agriculture
CHINA
NORTHWESTERN CHINA
VEGETATION AND LAND UTILIZATION
100 50 0 100 200 300 400 MI.
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Compiled by: U. Pusch
Prepared by: J. Koran
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INDUSTRY

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INDUSTRY

A. The Pre-Communist Period

*175 47 The Northwest was an industrially backward area in China. Before the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), over ninety percent of China's modern industrial plants were located in the coastal provinces, and very few people paid any attention to the industrial potential of this area. During the war years when the coastal provinces were lost to Japan, the importance of the Northwest greatly increased, and efforts were made to develop its industrial production in order to cope with the shortage of goods. But under the difficult conditions during the war, progress was very slow. Up to the end of 1942, the major industries in the Northwest were still limited to the manufacture of woolen, cotton and leather goods, machine tools, and flour-refining. (Handicrafts are not included, because of the lack of information.)

1. The woolen industry

*175 288 474 [491] The woolen industry in the Northwest was distributed among the following cities: in Lanchou, Kansu, there were thirteen factories and thirteen cooperatives engaged in woolen manufacturing. The biggest one was the Kansu Woolen Weaving Factory, which was built by Tso Tsung-tang in 1876 with a capital of some L 80,000. Equipped with a 240 horsepower generator and twenty-one machine looms, it began production in 1879, turning out some twenty pieces of woolen cloth per day. But production of this factory was interrupted from time to time due to political instabilities and other reasons. It did not fully come back to life until after the Sino-Japanese War when the Ministry of War took it over and changed it into a blanket-making factory for the armed forces. The next was the [491] Lanchou Woolen Weaving Factory, which had a capital of CNC $600,000, and which produced some CNC$6,000,000 worth of goods in 1942. Another is the Experimental Factory of the Weaving Cooperatives, which turned out some CNC$5,400,000 worth of goods in the same year. The rest were on a very small scale, using only hand looms. The twenty-six woolen [433] [491] factories and cooperatives in Lanchou had a total capital of CNC $2,800,000, and they produced 95,600 army blankets, 30,400 ordinary blankets, 800 square feet fine woolen, and 1,062 pieces of other woolen cloth in 1942, the value of which was CNC$22,600,000.

In Yü-lin, Shensi, there were nineteen small factories and nine industrial cooperatives. They had 204 looms in all. But only one was power-operated, and the rest were hand looms. The output of the industry as a whole was not reported, but it is known that the raw wool which they consumed during one

N *175 year exceeded 2,000,000 catties, or some 2,600,000 pounds.

288 474 There were twenty-five factories in other cities in Shensi, of which number thirteen were in Sian, nine in Pao-chi, and one each in San-yuan, Ta-li and Pai-shui. Their output was also, not disclosed, but their annual consumption of raw wool was reported as 720,000 catties ching, much smaller than that in N [433] Yu-lin. Besides, there were ten cooperatives in Sian and Pao-chi, which could produce 600,000 to 700,000 army blankets per year.

N [471] [433] In Ninghsia, there were five small factories with a total capital of CNC$230,000. They produced some CNC$1,200,000 worth of goods in 1941. All of them were using hand looms.

S [288] In Sinkiang, there was one woolen factory in operation, but details are lacking. There is no report of woolen factories or cooperatives in Chinghai.

N 2. The cotton industry

*175 288 The development of cotton industry in the Northwest was mainly stimulated by the Sino-Japanese War. Before 1937, there was not a single modern cotton factory in this area. But during the war, many factories had moved from the Japanese-occupied areas to Shensi, and many new ones were built there. In 1942, the total number of spindles exceeded 60,000, and the annual consumption of raw cotton was 130,000 piculs, about twelve percent of the total production of Shensi.

N 3. The machine tool industry

392 S [392] There were forty-five machine shops in Shensi, six in Kansu, and three in Sinkiang. The more important ones are as follows:

1. Hsi-ching Machine Factory, Sian, which was built around 1910 and equipped with fifty-five tool-making machines such as lathe, planing, drilling and pressing machines. Its annual capacity was as follows: four lathe, three water-pumping machines, ten iron looms, five cotton extracting machines, twenty ginning machines, five printing machines, and a number of paper-making machines. Besides, it also accepted orders for the repair of machinery and weapons of war.

2. Hsi-ching Machine Repairing Factory, Sian, the main job of which was to make auto parts. Its monthly output was 90 pistons, 2,500 piston rings and 180 gears, enough for the maintenance of eighty trucks.

3. An iron works, operated by the army, which turned out some twenty looms per month, and also basic machine tools.

4. The Northwest Machine Factory, which had more than eighty basic machine tools, such as lathe, planing machine, drilling machine, etc., was perhaps the largest machine shop in the Northwest, and its main task was to make looms and parts for the textile industry.

4. The leather Industry

282 There were eleven tanning or leather goods factories in [433] Shensi and twelve in Kansu. Their total capacity was 180,000 pieces of hide per year, which amounted to only eighteen percent of the total production of hide in the Northwest.

Two factories were partly equipped with machinery. One was the Northwest Chemical Leather-making Factory in Sian, which had mechanical press, mechanical brush, sprayers, and its own generator. It used more than one thousand pieces of raw hide per month, and its output included shoes, belts, and other leather goods. The other was the Lanchow Leather-Making Factory, which had mechanized sander, sewing machines, pumps, and other equipment. Its products included leather and leather goods. The rest were small factories, using very simple tools.

5. The flour industry

256 There were eight modern flour mills in Shensi and two in [433] Kansu, with a total capacity of 6,500,000 bags per year. On the basis that one bag of flour requires fifty-four catties of wheat, it was estimated that the total quantity of wheat used by the flour industry was 3,500,000 piculs per year, about 7.5 percent of the total production of wheat in the Northwest.

[433] The larger mills, such as the Hua-feng Flour Co. and Cheng-feng Flour Co. in Sian, and the Fo-hsin Flour Factory in Pao-chi, produce 3,000 to 5,000 bags per day. The rest were under one thousand.

6. Miscellaneous

388 (a) Soap-making. There were five small soap factories in [433] Shensi and four in Kansu. The total annual output was some 35,000 cases, which satisfied only a small part of the demand for soap in the Northwest.

289 (b) Paper. Paper-manufacturing was one of the main handicrafts in the Northwest which may be found in many places, but details were not available.

339 [470] (c) Cement. The first cement factory was established in Shensi in 1938, with a capital of CNC$200,000. It had nineteen kilns which turned out six or seven barrels a day. In 1939, another factory was built in Shensi, with a capital of CNC $2,000,000. Its capacity was around 18,000 barrels a year, but the quality of its products was very poor. Still another factory was under construction in Kansu, with a capital of 4,500,000. But up to the end of 1942, it had not yet begun production.

315 (d) Oil. Oil has been produced in north Shensi and Kansu for over a thousand years. But it was not until the early twentieth century that modern methods of extraction were used. Since then, five or six wells have been drilled in north Shensi. During the Sino-Japanese War, the Chinese government was very much

315 interested in the Yümen Oil Field. In 1940, one well was completed, and a small refinery was also built in Yümen.

*668 B. The Communist Period

47 The Communist government has paid special attention to developing the industrial potential of the Northwest, in order

*175 to remedy the unbalanced industrial development in the past. Up to the end of 1955, the major accomplishments were as follows:

1. Shensi

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288 The most important industrial development in Shensi under the Communist regime is its textile industry. According to an August, 1953, report, three new textile mills, presumably the Northwest Number 2, 3, and 4 Plants, and one dye mill were under construction in Central Shensi. At the same time, three other textile mill were expanded. When these mills are completed, the Northwest will have an additional 136,800 spindles and over 5,000 automatic looms. The total number of spindles will then be three times and the number of looms 4.4 times those of 1949. According to an April, 1955, report, the three mills have all been completed, and a Number 5 Plant, with 100,000 spindles, was under construction. By the end of 1957, the total number of spindles in Shensi will be approximately 300,000.

A sheet and towel factory, known as Huang-ho Textile Factory, was built in Sian, first of its kind in the Northwest. It is expected to supply the people in the Northwest with over two hundred thousand bed sheets and bed covers of different colors and designs and one hundred and thirty dozens of pillow cases and face towels every year. Since it started production in March 1955, it has shipped many of its products to the areas inhabited by minority peoples in Chinghai and Sinkiang.

*668 In addition to the textile industry, they have built or expanded the following factories in Shensi:

*175 1. A new paint factory in Sian is supplying more than fifty

[386] different products for the country's needs. This was completed in 1953.

[256] 2. A flour mill of unidentified capacity was also built in Sian during 1953.

[395] 3. The expanded Tien Chiang Instrument Manufacturing Factory started production January 1955. Its output trebled that of 1954. The instruments they made were for geological surveys.

[339] 4. A mechanized brick factory in Sian started production in April, 1954. It will turn out nearly one hundred million bricks annually. Up to June, 1955, it has already supplied ten million bricks to the construction of buildings in Sian.

*668 5. The excavation of a new coal shaft near Sian started on
*175 August 24, 1955, and is expected to be completed in 1958. It
316 will become part of the Tungchwan coal mines.

*668 2. Kansu.
The most important industrial project in Kansu is perhaps
*175 the Yümen Oil Field. Since the Communists took over, extensive
315 reconstruction work has been carried out in this major
oil center of China with the help of experts from the Soviet
Union, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and East Germany. The Communists
[433] boasted that production has increased many fold. If
the index of production in 1950 was 100, that in 1951 was 140,
and 1954 was 430. In 1955, they planned to produce thirty percent
more crude oil than in 1954, and capital investment allocated
for the sinking of new wells was twenty-five percent more
than in 1954. Latest record of drilling is 234.3 meters in one
day, and products include petroleum, kerosene, lubricating
oil, diesel oils, tar and paraffin wax. The total output has
never been revealed, but it is known that more than five thousand
workers are employed.

*668 The Communists have also paid attention to the development
of industrial production in Kansu in general. In 1955, twenty-
*175 one state-owned or semi-state-owned factories and mines
were built or renovated, and all of them are in operation. The
[377] more important ones are as follows: (1) a power plant in Lanchou,
[258] which increased the supply of electric power by fifty percent;
(2) six oil-extracting plants in Kuting and Wuwei, which, when
[316] fully completed, will increase the production of vegetable oil in
Kansu nearly two hundred percent; and (3) five small coal mines,
which increased the coal production by 88.2 percent over 1954.

It was reported on April 4, 1953, that one of the country's
[316] largest copper deposits was found in Kansu, the Pai-yin-ch'ang
copper mine, which they planned to develop under the first
Five Year Plan as one of the major industrial projects in that
[382] area. There is also a report that a refinery has been built in
Lanchou. But details on these developments are lacking.

*668 There are comparatively few industrial activities in Chinghai.
However, with the development of the Chinghai-Tibet
*175 highway, the Communists are hopeful that rich oil and coal deposits
315 may be found in the Tsaidam Basin. Tsaidam is one of
316 the country's major areas scheduled for oil-prospecting in
1955, and drilling has already been started there. Besides,
[491] mining of anthracite coal has begun in an undisclosed location
in Chinghai, which was discovered by the builders of the
Chinghai-Tibet highway in August 1953. Truck loads of the coal
are now going regularly to Lhasa and other points along the new
highway.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China
Sinkiang A11

4. Sinkiang

473 Industrial development in Sinkiang is perhaps the fastest
175 in the entire Northwest. As early as 1950, four Sino-Soviet
177 joint-stock companies were established in Urumchi, of which
three were industrial plants. They were: (1) Sino-Soviet Non-
ferrous Metals Company, (2) Sino-Soviet Rare Metals Com-
pany, (3) Sino-Soviet Petroleum Company and (4) Sino- Soviet
Airlines. All the Soviet stocks were reportedly transferred
to China at the end of 1954, but the Soviet technicians have
remained there to help train the Chinese workers.

After the Communists took over, the Sinkiang Petroleum
668 Company has been greatly expanded. Its crude oil output in 1955 is
175 said to have been sixty-three percent higher than in 1954, and
315 deep testing wells were being sunk in five new districts in the
473 Gobi Desert to investigate their oil reserves. The five districts
are located in the Turfan and Dzungaria Basins in the Sinkiang-
Uighur Autonomous Region.

Another important industrial plant in Sinkiang is the July
175 First Cotton Mill, which began production in 1952. In early
288 1955, 16,500 spindles and 600 looms were added, which will
double the mill's cloth output. The total number of spindles was
then over 30,000 and of looms, one thousand. This is the first
modern textile mill built in Sinkiang, and it supplies the thirteen
nationalities there with a rich variety of fabrics manufactured
from the cotton grown in the province itself.

According to the province's initial plans, the investment in
471 capital construction during 1955 is to be increased by over
sixty percent as compared with 1954. A total of twelve construction
jobs are to be newly built or rebuilt. Preparations are under
471 way for these works. Among the new projects are a modern
339 cement factory, a sulphuric acid factory, a small hydraulic
381 power plant and an oil pressing mill. The cement factory was
[377] expected to have its first stage of construction completed in
[258] 1956. When completed, this factory will save the state a total
of ten million yuan each year in the cost of transporting cement
from China Proper. When the sulphuric acid factory starts
production, it will supply all the raw material needed for
printing and dyeing works by the July First Cotton Mill.

471 The eight units to be rebuilt in 1955 include the Liu-tao-wan
316 Colliery, the Sinkiang Machine Works, the Ceramic Factory,
and the First Cement Factory. When the underground tunnel of
392 the Liu-tao-wan Colliery is rebuilt, it will be possible to
339 produce more coal for the industries and local residents of
323 Urumchi. The output of modern farming tools will be increased
when the Sinkiang Machine Works is rebuilt. After a set of
automatic equipment is added to the glass workshop of the Ceramic
Factory, there will be nineteen additional kinds of new products
to supply the market.

S
392 Five tractor repair works were under construction in 1955.
493 Each plant will have sixteen or fifteen mechanized worships.
When completed, they will be able to repair as many as 475
tractors and combine harvesters each year in addition to
S making other farm tools and spare parts.

327 There are scattered reports on other industrial developments
398 in Sinkiang, such as: (1) the August First Iron and Steel Plant,
377 (2) the October Motor Car Repair and Assembly Shop, (3) the
256 Urumchi Automatic Electric Plant, (4) the modernized August
288 First Flour Mill, (5) the Khotan Silk Factory, (6) Houcheng
Airplane Manufacturing Factory, and (7) more than a dozen
399 animal products processing plants, which process skins, furs
237 and intestines for the purpose of exporting them to the Soviet
439 Union. But detailed information on these projects is not available.

N
S 5. Handicrafts.

121 The foregoing analysis concerns itself with the development
178 of modern industries in the Northwest under the Communist
463 regime. But handicrafts still play a very important role in this
N S area as they do in other parts of the country. According to a
463 1951 report, the main handicrafts in the Northwest were as
follows:

N (1) Cotton cloth. A side line of the peasant, it was produced
S practically everywhere in the area. However, the more important
[286] producing districts are: 1. Sian, Paochi, in Shensi, 2. Tien-shui, Ho-hsi and Min-chin in Kansu, and 3. Turfan, toqsun and
S Aqsu in Sinkiang. In terms of quantities, the total annual output
N in Shensi is approximately 3,779,670 pieces; in Kansu, 3,505,760
[433] pieces, in Sinkiang, 4,400,000 pieces.

N (2) Pottery. The annual output of pottery in the Northwest
S amounts to over 4,000,000 pieces. Of that amount Shensi produces
[323] more than 3,000,000 pieces, Kansu, 500,000, Ninghsia, 200,000,
[433] and Sinkiang, 50,000. The more famous pottery-producing
districts are: 1. Huang-pao-chen and Chen-lu-chen in Tung-chuan, Shensi, which have been famous since the Sung Dynasty, 2. Yao-kai in Yung-teng, Kansu, 3. Ah-kan-chen, Lanchou, Kansu, and An-kou-yao, Hua-ting, Kansu. The production consists mainly of pots, bowls, tea-pots, plates and tea-cups.

N (3) Paper. While paper is manufactured in many places in this
S area, the more important paper-producing districts are: 1. Nan-
463 cheng (Han-chung), Shensi, 2. Khotan, Sinkiang, 3. K'ang-cheng
289 and Tien-shui, Kansu, and 4. Ying-chuan, Ninghsia. The main
varieties are as follows:

(a) The "rough-edge" paper. Usually used as a writing paper,
N it is produced and consumed mainly in Shensi. The annual output
[433] is about 192,490 bundles.

(b) The "Flax paper." It may be made of white or black flax, N S 463 289 [439] and is used mainly for wrapping. The annual output of the white flax paper is about 966,870 bundles, and that of black flax paper is 3,982,480. Part of this is exported to Szechwan, Hankow and Anhwei.

N [433] (c) The "improved" paper. It is produced and consumed mainly in Kansu, at the rate of some 300,000 bundles per year.

S [433] (d) The "mulberry-skin" paper. It is produced and consumed mainly in Sinkiang, at the rate of some 565,977 bundles a year.

N 463 322 433 (4) Bamboo articles. A side-line of farmers, they are made in many places, especially in Hua-hsien and Han-chung, in Shensi and Min-hsien, in Kansu. The annual output is estimated as follows: (1)farming implements, 29,280 piculs, (2) sieves, 132,300, (3) large bamboo baskets, 480,000, and (4) small bamboo baskets, 27,000.

N 463 433 [294] (5) Straw hats. Also a side-line of farmers, they are made in many places, especially in Feng-hsiang, Wei-nan, Lin-tung, and Chang-an, in Shensi. The annual output in Shensi alone exceeds 1,377,900 hats.

N [412] (6) Brooms. They are made mainly in the districts near Mount Chung-nan, such as Mei-hsien and Chang-an. The annual output exceeds 800,000 brooms.

N [285] (7) Straw mats. They are produced mainly in Sui-te, Shensi, Chang-i, Kansu and Ninghsia City, Ninghsia. The annual output exceeds 3,000,000 pieces.

N [412] (8) Wooden rakes. One of the main farming implements in the Northwest, they are made mainly in Chang-an, Pu-cheng and Tung-chuan, Shensi. The annual output is about 88,000 pieces.

N [326] [415] (9) Iron utensils. They are produced mainly in Pao-chi and Feng-hsiang in Shensi, and Tienshui in Kansu. The annual output is about 76,000 counts.

S 463 286 [433] [439] (10) Carpets. Carpet-making is one of the main handicrafts in Sinkiang. The carpets come in various sizes, up to eight by sixteen feet. The annual output exceeds 10,000 square feet. Of that quantity, some six thousand square feet is exported to India, Afghanistan and Soviet Russia and the rest is sold locally or to other provinces in the Northwest.

N 6. Evaluation and Prospects.

*668 433 [288] [315] For the time being, the Communists seem to have concentrated on two things in industrializing the Northwest, one being the cotton industry in Shensi and Sinkiang, and the other being the oil industry in Kansu, Sinkiang and Chinghai. S 668 433 [288] [315] From the economic point of view, these developments are not unnatural, because Shensi and Sinkiang have been famous for their raw cotton, and the oil reserve in China is largely located in the Northwest.

While the present industrial development in the Northwest may not appear so impressive, this area will probably become

N 668 433
S 668 433 (135)
N 3 (177)

one of the most important industrial areas in China for three reasons. First, the Northwest, especially Sinkiang, has shown great promise in mineral deposits. The Communists have sent out thousands of geologic prospectors to this area, and reports of new discoveries have frequently been publicized by the Communist papers, (see the section on Mineral Resources). Second, the geographical location of this area is such that it would be the ideal location for China's new industries from the strategic point of view. Last, as this area borders on Soviet Russia, it would be more convenient from the standpoint of accepting technical aid from Russia.

S 668 433

Based perhaps on the above-mentioned reasoning, the Communists have paid special attention to the future development of this area. In Sinkiang, for instance, before the Communists took over, there was very little industrial production. But in 1952, the total industrial production in Sinkiang amounted to New JMP$39,075,400, not including the value of handicrafts, which amounted to New JMP$135,598,000. In terms of percentages of the 1952 production in Sinkiang, the industrial production accounted for 5.71 percent of the total, and the handicrafts accounted for 19.81 percent. According to plans, by the end of 1957, the value of industrial production in Sinkiang will be increased to New JMP$292,758,500, or 749 percent of that of 1952. If these plans are carried out, industrial production will account for 22.64 of the total production in Sinkiang and handicrafts will account for 15.09 percent of the total; the planned total production for 1957 would be New JMP$1,293,227,200.

TRADE

006 I. The Pre-Communist Period
  A. Shensi
  B. Kansu
  C. Ninghsia
  D. Chinghai
  E. Sinkiang
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TRADE

I. The Pre-Communist Period

Trade in the Northwest before the Communist conquest may be discussed by provinces.

A. Shensi

438 Trade between Shensi and the rest of the country was carried
491 out mainly through the historical Great Northwest Highway,
which links this province with Hankow and Tientsin on the one
hand, and Kansu and Sinkiang on the other. Since 1937, the National
[496] government has undertaken to extend the Lunghai Railway
to the Northwest, and before the Communists took over it had
reached T'ien-shui, Kansu. In addition, the northern part of
[489] this province was closely connected with Shansi through three
regional highways, and the southern part was linked with Hankow
through the Han River, and with Szechwan through the
Szechwan-Shensi bridle pass.

366 The commercial centers of this province are as follows:
(1) Sian, the provincial capital, which not only commands the
635 trade of the whole province, but also carries considerable transit
trade; (2) T'ung-kuan, which is a transportation center between
the three provinces of Shensi, Shansi and Honan; (3) An-k'ang,
also known as Hsin-an, a commercial center of the Han
River drainage area; (4) San-yuan, the commercial center of the
so-called North Shensi Plain; and (5) Han-chung, also known as
Nan-cheng, a trade center between Shensi and Szechwan.

439 According to statistics of 1934, a normal year in pre-war
435 times, the total value of imports and exports of this province,
*175 including foreign trade, amounted to 57,168,455 yüan, most of
which were carried out through Tientsin and Hankow. The details
are shown in the following table:

Table I:. The Exports and Imports of Shensi, 1934

Description	Value (yüan)	
A. Exports:		19,087,221
raw cotton	16,250,000	
hemp	200,000	
raw silk	300,000	
wool	160,000	
fur and hide	757,221	
tung oil	900,000	
raw paints and paint oil	250,000	
fungs-in-trees	270,000	

439
435
+175

B. Imports		38,081,234
textiles	22,209,861	
sundries	6,968,868	
medical herbs and drugs	2,232,542	
apparels	1,704,563	
machinery and iron goods	1,295,837	
chinaware	1,087,299	
edibles	781,044	
kerosene and oil	701,134	
cosmetics	572,751	
paper	527,235	
vehicles and transportation equipment	76,235	
Grand Total		57,168,455

Source: Shina Shōbetsū Zenshi, 1943 ed., Vol. 6, pp. 805-15.

B. Kansu

439 487 491 Aside from the historical Great Northwest Highway, trade between Kansu and the rest of the country was carried out through the following routes: (1) the Yellow River, including its tributary, the Huang River or Hsi-ning-Ho, which is navigable between Hsi-ning and Pao-t'ou, the latter being the terminal of the Peking-Pao-t'ou Railway; (2) the caravan route between Hsi-ning and Ninghsia via Lanchou; and (3) the highway between Kansu and Szechwan.

366 635 The commercial cities of this province are as follows: (1) Lanchou (also known as Kao-lan), the provincial capital of Kansu and the commercial center of not only Kansu, but also Chinghai and Ninghsia; (2) Ping-liang, the commercial center of east Kansu; (3) T'ien-shui, the commercial center of south Kansu; (4) Lin-hsia, the commercial center of the area to the west of the T'ao River; and (5) Chang-yeh, the commercial center of the Ho-hsi Corridor.

439 435 +175 According to 1933 statistics, the total value of imports and exports of Kansu amounted to 7,933,554 yüan, about one eighth of that of Shensi. The details are shown on the following table:

Table II: The Exports and Imports of Kansu, 1933

Description	Value (yüan)	
A. Exports:		1,536,832
fur and hide	714,105	
medical herbs	605,319	
tobacco	217,408	

439 B. Imports:		6,456,722
435 cotton piece goods	669,884	
*175 raw cotton	47,353	
paper	102,340	
iron and copper goods	40,362	
tea	145,786	
seafood	68,755	
chinaware	13,850	
silk	193,264	
tobacco	48,300	
sundries	5,015,022	
miscellaneous	113,793	
Grand Total		7,993,554

Source: Shina Shōbetsū Zenshi, 1943 ed., Vol. 7, pp. 634-37.

C. Ninghsia

366 The trade in Ninghsia is centered around its capital city,
487 Ninghsia, which is the midpoint of the two important trade
routes in the Northwest, one being the Yellow River, and the
other being the caravan routes. The Yellow River route is usu-
487 ally divided into the following six sections:
484

Table III: The Yellow River Route (downstream)

[804]

Places	Length (li) (1 li = 1890 ft.)	Days of Journey
Hsi-ning–Lanchou*	480	3-5
Lanchou–Chung-wei	740	3-4
Chung-wei–Ninghsia	350	3-4
Ninghsia–Shih-ts'uan-tzu	190	2
Shih-ts'uan-tzu–Teng-kuo	200	2
Teng-kuo–Pao-t'ou	1,000	7-10
Total	2,960	20-27

*Including its tributary, the Huang River or Hsi-ning-ho.
Source: Shino Shōbetsū Zenshi, 1943 ed., Vol. 7, pp. 640-41.

487 The caravan routes consist of the following:

1. from Hsi-ning to Ninghsia via Lanchou,
2. from Sinkiang to Ninghsia via Alashan,
3. from Pao-t'ou to Ninghsia via the Ordos,
4. from Ping-liang, Kansu, to Ninghsia via Hua-ma-chih.

[492] A caravan used to have thirty to fifty camels, each camel carry-
ing about 375 pounds of goods and traveling about fifty to seventy
li a day. (For modern highways see section Communications.)

439 According to 1933 statistics, the total value of exports and
435 imports of Ninghsia amounted to 6,310,000 yüan, a little less
*195

N 439 435 *175 than that of Kansu. The details are shown in the following table:

Table IV: The Exports and Imports of Ninghsia, 1933

Description	Value (yüan)	
A. Exports:		4,040,000
opium	2,400,000	
sheep's pelts	900,000	
medical herbs	450,000	
wool	240,000	
hair-like weeds	50,000	
B. Imports:		2,270,000
cotton piece goods	1,400,000	
silk, woolen cloth, cosmetics	300,000	
sundries	120,000	
cotton	150,000	
grain	300,000	
Grand Total		6,310,000

Source: Shina Shōbetsu Zenshi, 1943 ed., Vol. 7, pp. 638-39.

N D. Chinghai

366 635 N 487 N 439 Trade in Chinghai is centered around Hsi-ning, the provincial capital. Aside from the two routes which connect Hsi-ning and Lanchou, there is another route leading to Tibet and still another to Sinkiang. The main exports were fur, hide, grain, salt, lumber and medical herbs, among which fur and hide, the staples, are mostly shipped to Tientsin for re-export. The main imports are cotton piece goods and silk. Trade statistics are not available. It is also known that there was considerable trade between Chinghai and India, but details are lacking.

S E. Sinkiang

439 Trade in Sinkiang is a little more complicated, because Sinkiang trades not only with agricultural China, but also with Soviet Russia, India and Afghanistan. S 439 487 491 So far as the trade with agricultural China is concerned, there are three main trade routes. One runs from Urumchi to Tientsin via Kobdo, Urga and Pao-t'ou, generally known as the Outer Mongolia Great Grass Route. Another runs from Urumchi to Tientsin via Qomul (Hami), Darkhan League, Kuei-sui and Pao-t'ou, generally known as the Inner Mongolia Lesser Grass Route. And still another is the historical Great Northwest Highway which leads to Sian via Qomul (Hami) and Lanchou. The Outer Mongolian route had been out of use since the independence of Outer Mongolia. S 439 491 The Inner Mongolia route was originally a caravan route. But since 1933, the section between Urumchi and Kuei-sui has been open to motor traffic under the name of Sinkiang-Suiyuan highway.

439 [487] It is understood that there was also considerable trade between Sinkiang, Lanchou and Sian, which, in fact, was the main trade route, but detailed information is not available.

According to a Japanese estimate, the Chinese goods were distributed to the various cities in Sinkiang in the following proportions, which also show the relative commercial importance of the different cities or areas:

Table VI: Distribution of Chinese Goods among Cities in Sinkiang

Place	Percentages of Goods Distributed
Urumchi (Tihua)	25.0
Ili (Huei-yüan)	20.0
South Sinkiang	18.0
Ta-ch'eng (Chuguchak)	15.0
Ku-ch'eng-tzu (Chitai)	12.0
Sharasüme (Cheng-hua)	4.0
Hami (Qomul)	3.0
Khobdo (Jirgalantu)	3.0
Total	100.0

Source: Shina Shōbetsū Zenshi, Vol. 8, pp. 534-35.

439 435 175 As to the direct foreign trade, the main country is Soviet Russia. According to official Soviet reports, the value of the Soviet-Sinkiang trade is as follows:

Table VII: Value of Soviet-Sinkiang Trade (unit: 1,000 rubles)

Year	Imports	Exports	Total
1931	13,954	10,212	24,166
1932	15,698	12,305	28,003
1933	10,826	18,822	29,648
1934	4,730	5,945	10,675
1935	6,049	4,550	10,599
1936	36,145	25,671	61,816

Source: Shina Shōbetsū Zenshi, 1943 ed., Vol. 8, p. 514.

439 175 The main exports of Sinkiang to Russia were grain, fruits, wool, fur, meat, paper, cotton, silk, animal intestines and cattle; and the main imports of Sinkiang from Russia were textiles, sugar, metals and metal manufactures, glass and chinaware, oil and matches. The exports of Sinkiang constituted 1.01 per cent of the value of goods that Russia imported from East Asia in 1931, and 1.77 per cent of that in 1932. The imports of

439 motor traffic under the name of Sinkiang-Suiyuan highway. In
491 1935 there were about fifty trucks or buses running on this high-
494 way, making four trips a month. The historical Great Northwest
175 highway has also been open to motor traffic since 1930. During the Sino-Japanese War, this traditional highway was one of the most important outlets of free China. It is reported that in the first half of 1942, some seventy million rubles worth of tea, tung oil, bristles, wool and other goods were exported from China to Russia through this route. On the other hand, there were some fifteen million rubles worth of dried goods, metal, canned goods and wine imported to China during the same period, together with an unidentified amount of weapons and war material that the Soviet Union sent to China under the 1939 Sino-Soviet Military Agreement. The total number of five-ton trucks used during the period was 3,600; but those actually in operation were only about a thousand. The total capacity, including camels, of that route was not more than two thousand tons per month. (Cf. Shina Shōbetsu Zenshi, Vol. 8, pp. 636-39. It must be taken into account that this is a Japanese source.)

175 Table V: Trade Between Sinkiang and Tientsin, 1930-32 average

439 Description	Value (yüan)	
435 A. Exports:		5,298,900
sheep intestines	2,400,000	
furs and hides	2,809,000	
raisins	54,000	
medical herbs	17,200	
dried mushrooms	18,000	
B. Imports:		2,743,562
cigarettes and tobacco	808,720	
woolen cloth	104,550	
silk	223,600	
linen	285,200	
cotton goods	110,200	
medical herbs and drugs	84,730	
stationary and books	70,700	
hats and shoes	99,000	
tea	868,852	
leather goods	6,800	
cosmetics	28,350	
paints and dyes	1,200	
hardware	2,160	
seafood	4,100	
chinaware	1,560	
miscellaneous	2,240	
Grand Total		8,042,462

Source: Chung-kuo Ching-chi Nien-chien, 1935 ed., vol. 3, pp. 88-90.

439 175 Sinkiang from Russia constituted 1.58 per cent of the value of goods that Russia exported to East Asia in 1931, and 2.78 per cent of that in 1932.

Aside from Russia, Sinkiang has also entered a close trade relation with India and Afghanistan. According to 1927 statistics, the trade between Sinkiang and India amounted to 5,001,413 gold rupees. The details are as follows:

439 435 175 Table VIII: The Trade Between Sinkiang and India, 1927

Description	Value (rupee)	
A. Imports:		1,186,848
European cotton goods	276,916	
leather goods	41,448	
dye	326,254	
hide (other than sheep)	61,663	
drugs	29,426	
pearls	71.335	
velvet	115,334	
Indian silk	24,876	
spice	36,562	
Indian black tea	27,386	
other black tea	23,098	
European woolen goods	42,000	
Russian metal goods	41,298	
B. Exports:		2,814,565
horses and ponies	101,235	
cotton cloth	35,698	
cankas	96,434	
iron and copper	742,654	
raw silk	31,294	
woolen goods	358,451	
felt carpet	25,524	
iron goods	66,789	
gold	72,631	
Russian metal goods	189,242	
silver	110,377	
leather goods	16,339	
wool	17,288	
woolen thread	16,037	
donkeys and mules	7,508	
jade	8,272	
Grand Total		5,001,413

Source: Chung-kuo ching-chi nien-chien, 1935 ed., Vol. 3, pp. T.94-95.

S
439 The trade between Sinkiang and Afghanistan of the same year
435 amounted to 1,378,040 gold rupees. The details are as follows:
175

Table IX: The Trade Between Sinkiang and Afghanistan, 1927

Description	Value (rupee)	
A. Imports:		830,500
opium	675,000	
horses	10,000	
furs and hides	52,350	
Russian metal goods	8,550	
almonds	3,600	
B. Exports:		547,540
cotton cloth	176,500	
cankas	94,500	
woolen carpet	80,000	
horses	57,000	
chinaware	21,200	
felt carpet	16,800	
donkeys and mules	13,000	
Khoten silk	12,500	
Grand Total		1,378,040

Source: Chung-kuo ching-chi nien-chien, 1935 ed., Vol. 3, p. T.95.

N
II. The Communist Period
*668 Trade in the Northwest under the Communist regime may be
43 described in two parts: (1) changes in volume and kind, and (2)
government control.

N
A. Changes in Volume and Kind
[178] As far as the physical characteristics are concerned, trade
in the Northwest under the Communist regime seems to have
remained more or less the same as it was before, because
economic reconstruction in this region is still in its initial stage.
N The following changes, however, may deserve special attention:
*668 First, the Communists have taken great pains to improve trans-
496 portation in the Northwest. The most ambitious project, of
course, is the Lanchou-Alma Ata Railway, which they plan to
491 complete by 1957. Other improvements include: (1) the Lanchou-
178 Pao-t'ou Railway, which is still under construction: (2) the
Hsi-ning-Lhasa Highway, which was opened to traffic on Novem-
ber 16, 1954: and (3) the Tunhuang-Chinghai Highway, which
N links Kansu and west Chinghai, and was opened to traffic in De-
*668 cember 1954. Besides, it is also reported that the original Lan-
491 chou-Chengtu and Lanchou-Urumchi highways have been im-
178 proved upon, and the Outer Mongolia Great Grass Route between

*668 Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia have been re-opened for traffic.
491 (See section Communications.) With these improvements in
178 transportation, it is only logical to assume that trade in the
Northwest must also have increased in volume.

*668 Another important change is the increase of production of the
178 Yümen Oil Field and the establishment of four new textile factories
433 in Shensi (for details see section Industry). Although
[315] there is no information on the distribution of these products, it
is reasonable to assume that most of them are intended for the
[288] consumption in the Northwest. If this is the case, the import of
[439] textiles and kerosene, which were two of the most important
items of the imports of this region, must have been reduced.

Still another important change is the enlargement of cotton
*668 plantations in Sinkiang. It is reported that the China Cotton,
178 Yarn and Cloth Company in Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
248 plans to send five thousand tons of cotton to other parts of the
[438] country in addition to ensuring an adequate supply for local consumption.
[439] On November 3, 1955, the first cargo of cotton of
Sinkiang was dispatched to Shensi for its textile industry.

B. Government Control

*668 The Communist control of trade in the Northwest is more or
655 less the same as that in other parts of the country. The main
43 instrument of control is the state trading companies, which are
in charge of wholesale trade and, together with the various cooperatives and mobile trading units, purchase of native products from this region. According to Communist reports, the six basic commodities in Sian, i.e., food, cotton cloth, edible oil, coal, tea and salt, have been fully monopolized by the state trading companies since June 29, 1955; and all private wholesale establishments dealing with those goods have been liquidated. More than one hundred members of the "capitalist side" were sent to reform camps, and the store assistants were either employed by the state trading companies or sent back to their native places to seek other employment. In the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, the number of branches of state trading companies exceeded five hundred in 1954, about eight times as many as in 1950. They provide the people there with general merchandise, cotton cloth, oil and fats, petroleum, pharmaceuticals and stationary.

Aside from supplying goods on the wholesale level, the state trading companies have also undertaken to buy goods from this region. Among the goods bought in 1950 are: (1) wool, 23,000 catties, (2) hides, 800,000 pieces, (3) intestines, 1,270,000 pieces, (4) bristles, 280,000 catties, (5) tung oil, 4,500,000 catties, (6) medical herbs, 4,000,000 catties, (7) cotton, 800,000 piculs and (8) grain, 130,000,000 catties (cf. The Native Products of the Northwest, preface, Sian, 1951).

*668 As to control on the retail level, it is exercised through the
474 various cooperatives and the mobile trading units. As far as the
443 cooperatives are concerned, detailed information is not avail-
656 able. However, a recent report on the state of trade in the
43 rural market, Lo-men-chen, Wu-shan, Kansu, may well illus-
trate how deeply the Communist control has penetrated into the
*668 rural areas. According to this report, Lo-men-chen is one of
the large rural markets in the county of Wu-shan, which lies
443 near T'ien-shui on the T'ien-shui-Lanchou Railway. The market
656 is open on every other day, and the number of people coming to
43 trade is usually between five and six thousand. Before the Communists took over, there was no government control over such markets. But under the Communist regime, the following measures have been adopted (cf. Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, 1956, No. 2, pp. 94-96):

(655) 1. State Purchase: The Communists demand that farmers or producers sell certain commodities to the state trading companies or their agencies before they may sell elsewhere. Such commodities, in 1954, were grain and oil products.

2. Controlled Markets: The Communists have put five commodities under their direct control. They are grain, cattle, lumber, firewood and hemp. Prices are fixed by those who are in charge of economic control, and trade is conducted mainly on the wholesale level under the supervision of the Communist cadres. The volume of trade of these commodities in 1954 amounted to 276,422 yüan (approximately U.S. $110,000), constituting some 30 per cent of the total value of trade of Lo-men-chen.

3. Free Markets at Fixed Locations: Such markets are conducted in a specific place, and the Communists do not regulate the quantity nor the price. In 1954, the volume of trade in these markets amounted to 448,379 yüan, constituting some 60 per cent of the total value of Lo-men-chen trade. The main commodities belonging to this category are straw hats (seasonal), bamboo and wood articles (mostly farming implements), hemp rope, hemp shoes, vegetables, fruits and chinaware. The participants include the agencies of the state trading companies and the cooperatives.

4. Mobile Free Markets: These include peddlers who are not under government control and do not have a definite place of marketing. Trade of this nature is necessarily on a very small scale, the total volume constituting about ten per cent of the total trade of Lo-men-chen.

It is mentioned in the same report that government control
has made remarkable progress since 1953. In 1953, all retail
*[195] trade of Lo-men-chen amounted to 2,123,682 yüan (NJMP), of
[655] which amount the state trading companies handled 3.58 per cent,
[474]

*668 the cooperatives handled 2.65 per cent and 93.77 per cent was
443 handled privately. But in 1954, private trade was reduced to
656 43.02 per cent, state trade increased to 41.55 per cent and that
43 of cooperatives increased to 15.43 per cent, the total being
*175 2,372,936 yüan. In the first five months of 1955, the private
655 trade comprised only 23.42 per cent of the total of 871,234 yüan,
474 and the state and cooperatives handled 74.36 per cent. Although
all this is the situation in one single rural community, it can be
assumed that it is typical.

*668 The mobile trading units are especially designed for the con-
443 trol of trade in the so-called national minority regions where the
563 people are mostly nomads. They travel from one place to an-
43 other, to provide the herdsmen with the supplies they want and
to buy up their products. According to a semi-official statement
concerning the trade in the national minority regions (cf. Hsin-
hua yüeh-pao, 1955, No. 9, pp. 178-79), the Communists aim to
achieve two things in this connection. One is to raise the stan-
dard of living of the minority peoples by giving them better
terms of trade. For instance, the exchange ratios between wool
[175] (the main export) and tea and cloth (the main imports) in Hsi-
ning from 1950 to 1954 were as follows:

Table X: Exchange Ratios between Wool, Cloth and Tea in Hsi-ning

Year	Price of Wool per 100 catties (yüan)	Exchange Ratio with respect to: 1. cloth	2. tea
		(No. pieces per 100 catties/wool)	
1950	745,700	2.29	11.61
1951	1,042,700	3.09	19.61
1952	1,230,758	3.71	28.13
1953	1,278,825	4.18	34.44
1954	1,258,000	4.18	31.45

Source: Hsin-hua yüeh-pao, 1955, No. 3., p. 146.

The other aim is to drive foreign goods out of the national minority regions and replace them with goods made in China. If the Communists really mean what they said, this would lead to a sharp conflict between Chinese and Soviet goods, especially in Sinkiang, where Soviet goods have long been very popular. However, no detailed information on this matter is now available.

C. Evaluation and Prospects

*668 According to Communist propaganda, trade control in the
43 Northwest has been very successful. For instance, they boasted
*175 that the per capita purchase of commodities in Liu-lin-chu, Yao-
hsien, Shensi, has increased from 345,000 yüan in 1953 to

*668 467, 000 yüan in 1954, showing an increase in purchasing power
43 of 40. 8 per cent. In the second sub-district of Hsien-yang,
*175 Shensi, the per capita outlay was 410, 000 in 1953, and 620, 000 yuan in 1954, showing an increase of 51 per cent. In Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, the purchasing power of the people is said to have increased 13 per cent in 1954 as compared with 1953, and the total value of state purchases of local products went up 3. 7 times in 1954 as compared with 1950. And in the national minority regions, the total sales of state trade in 1954 increased 4. 7 times as compared with 1951, and the total purchase in 1954 increased 5.1 times as compared with the same period.

On the other hand, the Communists have admitted certain failures. For instance, on March 15, 1955, the Sian Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a directive to improve the work of unified grain marketing, in which it was pointed out that waste and extravagance have been prevalent, and it was demanded that the party and the New Democratic Youth League branches in the various places should supervise and ensure the check-up.

*668 Another failure is revealed in the report on trade control in
Lo-men-chen, Wu-shan, Kansu. From June, 1954, to January,
*175 1955, the supply and purchase cooperatives in that area under-
474 took to buy all the native products at an official price and pro-
43 hibited the farmers from entering free trade. But the farmers refused to cooperate, and they reduced production and lowered quality. As a result, the Communists had to reverse themselves and announce that it was still too early to eliminate free trade entirely in the rural areas.

*668 As to trade in the national minority regions, the shortcom-
*563 ings as admitted by the Communists are as follows: One is that
43 the state trading agencies were interested only in wholesale and
[655] refused to purchase products in small quantities. Another shortcoming is that they sometimes unduly eliminate private merchants and thus a shortage in commercial outlets results. Still another shortcoming is that the Communist cadres had failed to pay attention to the specific needs of the national minorities. For instance, some of them were so careless as to send swimming suits to mountainous areas or electric typewriters to areas in which people do not even know how to write (cf. Hsin-hua yueh-pao, 1955, No. 9, pp. 178-79).

*668 The main difficulty of the Communist control of trade in the
Northwest seems to be the lack of cadres. For instance, the so-
43 called socialization of wholesale trade in the coastal cities such
*175 as Shanghai and Tientsin was more or less completed in 1953, but they did not start it in Sian until 1955. Similarly, the control of rural trade in Kansu, as revealed in the report on Lo-men-

*668 chen, did not show any results until 1954. Even so, they could
43 control only some thirty per cent of the total trade of Lo-men-
chen as late as 1956. Besides, the number of cadres engaged in
*175 trade of the national minority regions is far from adequate. According to their own report, there were only some four thousand persons assigned to trade in minority districts, which include not only the Northwest, but also Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Yunnan. All this explains why the Communist control of trade in the Northwest is much slower than that in other parts of the country, and this tendency is probably to remain the same in the near future. It is to be anticipated, though, that the rate of development will rise sharply as soon as the major emphasis on the Northwest, expected to find expression in the second Five-Year Plan, is being brought to bear upon the situation.

COMMUNICATIONS

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IV. Conclusion

COMMUNICATIONS

I. Introduction

A. Geographical Setting

101 The Northwest Region under Communist China consists of the provinces of Shensi, Kansu (including former Ninghsia province), Chinghai and Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region. It is surrounded on the northeast and east by Outer Mongolia, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Shansi, Honan and Hupei, and on the west and northwest by Kashmir, Afghanistan and Russia. Szechwan (including Sikang) and Tibet border it on the south.

B. Historical Background of the Northwest Trade Routes

*175 487 [439] Commerce was possibly the main factor in the development of roads. In ancient times, the localization of scarce and desirable goods such as silk, led to definite long distance overland routes between China and Central Asia. The routes started either from Shensi, or Honan in China proper, and led via Kansu to Sinkiang, known as Chinese Turkestan. There were two important roads which connected China with Central Asia:

1) The Southern (or Silk) Road, from Tun-hwang in Kansu along the southern part of the Lob Nor and then along the southern brim of the Taklahakan desert via the cities of Yü-tien, Hotien (Khotan) and Kashgar to Ulugh Chat, thence a trade route leading to Central Asia through the Pamir Pass. Another road led from Turfan via Kurle Aksu and Kashgar also to Ulugh Chat.

2) The Northern Road went through the eastern part of Sinkiang along the Tienshan North Road by Hami, Turfan, Urumchi, Wusu, and Ili to Hocheng and thence to Alma Ata.

The origin of the caravan trade can be traced back even beyond the time of historical records, so we have no idea when these roads came into being. However, it was over these trade routes that the people of the East and West first met on peaceful terms, long before the seas had been navigated. To the ancient merchants this kind of route was the most natural and direct way to guide a caravan from Eastern Turkestan (or from China Proper via Turkestan) toward Bactria, or following the opposite direction from west of the Pamirs toward the Yellow River. This old trade found one of its best markets in the ancient Roman Empire, to which, among other things, the large amount of silk exported from China gave its name to one of the trade routes.

*175 648 487 The importance of China's commercial relations with Bactria and the Mediterranean provinces during the Han dynasty made it advisable for the court to send there such envoys as Chang Ch'ien in 122 B.C. and Pan Ch'ao under the Emperor Ming (A.D. 58-76) both empowered to negotiate treaties with the kingdoms of the west.

*175 It was the Mongol Empire under Chingis Khan (1162-1227) which
487 extended her power from the Yellow River through the Northern
648 Road across Asia into Poland and Hungary to the Danube. Marco
Polo went to China from Italy in 1275 by way of the Southern Road. Through the centuries, however, the life of the trade routes was subject to frequent fluctuations. There have been interruptions to commerce during the periods of warfare when the Huns came south of the mountains, and the roads were overrun. But as soon as hostilities ceased, the merchants would resume their accustomed task of rebuilding their caravans and carrying loads of goods eastward and westward.

*175 These trade routes remained significant through the years
487 until modern transportation was introduced to China. Later on,
[491] motor highways were built, based on the old trade routes in this
[496] area. The Lanchow-Urumchi-Alam Ata Railway is presently
being constructed along the old Northern Road. Even so, caravans still travel throughout the northwest.

II. Communications Development before and under the Nationalist Government

*175 A. Railways

496 In the vast area of Northwest China, there was only one railway line which was an extension of the Lunghai Railway running to Shensi province. This railway is an east-west trunk line, starting from a seaport in Kiangsu, running through Honan and Shensi, and now into Kansu. Construction was started on different sections as early as 1903, but owing to civil strife only the 810 kilometer section from Taipu Harbor near Haichou in Kiangsu in the east, westward to Ling-pao in Honan, was completed prior to 1930. Construction on the section from Ling-pao to Tung-kuan, a distance of about seventy kilometers, was initiated in 1930 and completed in August, 1932. It was extended another 130 kilometers to Sian in December, 1934. Service was inaugurated before 1937 on the last section in Shensi from Sian to Paoki, a distance of 170 kilometers.

Because of obstructions in Taipu Harbor, a new port at Lien-
[504] yün was built in 1935 to serve this railroad. In the same year,
a thirty-seven kilometer extension to join the new port with the trunk line at Hsin-pu was completed.

During the war, railway construction in the Northwest was emphasized. To solve the serious shortage of coal on the Lunghai Railway, a branch line of about 138 kilometers was created in December, 1940, from Hsien-yang northward through San-yüan and Yao-hsien to Tung-ch'uan in Tung-kuan county. Despite the extreme shortage of rail-building materials and manpower, work on the extension of the Paoki-T'ien-shui section began in 1939 and

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*175 496 it was opened for traffic in the autumn of 1945. This 165 kilometer railway ran from Paoki following a stretch of the Wei River to T'ien-shui in Kansu. This Paoki-Tien-shui area was regarded as a place of great strategic importance during the war.

Excluding the Hsien-yang-Tung-ch'uan branch of 138 kilometers, total mileage of the Lunghai Railway, before 1949, was about 1,380 kilometers of which the section from Tung-kuan to T'ien-shui running in the Northwest Region was roughly 600 kilometers in length.

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B. Highways

491 *[175] Highway construction in Northwest China had been well-developed up to the war. The main lines may be listed as follows:

1. Highways in Shensi:	kms.
Sian-Chang-wu section (of Sian-Lanchow Highway)	210
Sian-Tungkuan	145
Sian-Paoki-Ning-chiang section (of Szechwan-Shensi Highway)	500
Sian-Mei-hsien	145
Wei-nan-Ta-li-Han-cheng	180
2. Highways in Kansu:	
Lanchou-Ping-liang-Chang-wu section (of Sian-Lanchou Highway)	550
Lanchou-Yumen-Hsin-hsin-chia section (of Kansu-Sinkiang Highway)	1,400
Lanchou-Hsiang-tang section (of Kansu-Chinghai Highway)	120
Lanchou-Min-hsien section	350
/ Hua-chia-ling-T'ien-shui	210
Ping-liang-Kuyüan-Tung-hsin (in Ninghsia)	220
3. Highways in Ninghsia (now part of Kansu):	
Ninghsia (Yin-ch'uan)-Tung-hsin	210
Ninghsia-Shan-pa (in Inner Mongolia)	325
Ninghsia-Ho-chia-chi (toward Lanchou)	240
4. Highways in Chinghai:	
Hsining-Hsiang-tang section	110
Hsining-Kuei-teh	108
Hsining-Lin-hsia (in Kansu)	190
Hsining-Tu-lan (toward Tun-huang)	428
Hsining-Ta-ho-pa (toward Yu-shu)	327
S 491 5. Highways in Sinkiang:	
Urumchi-Hami-Hsin-hsin-chia	835
Urumchi-Wusu-Ili (toward Russia)	691

(Wang, Chin-fu. Hsi-pei ti ti-wen yü jen-wen Huang, Fen-sheng. 127-29; Pien-chiang tun-ken-yüan 126-28.)

N 491 487 S [491] [487] It is interesting to note that part of the highways in Kansu and all those in Sinkiang were built on the old trade routes. Highways in this region were centered at Sian, Lanchow, Ninghsia (Yin-chuan), Hsining and Urumchi.

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491 [487] Hsining and Urumchi. It should not be overlooked, however, that caravan routes (or dirt roads) were still the main auxiliaries to highway and railway transportation.

In the construction of highways in wartime, emphasis had been laid on building, renovating, and maintaining international lines in order to link the interior provinces with foreign countries. A good example in the Northwest was the 2,674 kilometer highway from Lanchow via Hsin-hsin-chia and Urumchi to Hocheng on the Sino-Soviet border. In addition, the following are among the more important highways built in this region during the war:

1. Han-chung-Pai-ho Highway: This 533-kilometer highway was an important motor-road link between southern Shensi and northern Hupei.
2. T'ien-shui-Shuang-shih-pu Highway: This line of 231 kilometers, from T'ien-shui in southeastern Kansu to Shuang-shih-pu in southwestern Shensi, formed junctions with the Sian-Lanchow and Szechwan-Shensi Highways.
3. A line of 1334 kilometers, linking Ansi in Kansu and Kurle in

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*[175] Sinkiang via Tun-huang, was planned in 1942. Between November, 1942, and 1943 the 479 kilometer section from Kurle to Nochiang was completed. Further construction plans were suspended.

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*[175] To cope with the rapidly growing transportation demands, the Nationalist Government had constructed, in 1946, seventy-nine New Life Movement Service Stations along the 2,200 kilometer highway from Kuang-yüan in Szechwan to Chiu-chuan in Kansu, in order to facilitate the movement of migrants from the interior provinces to the frontier area. This kind of station was divided into four classes: the special first class which furnished room and board, medical and postal services and caravan equipment; the special second class, without medical and postal services; general first and general second classes offered much less service. This service was designed to provide travellers with a feeling of security and hence aid the government in its policy of a movement to the Northwest.

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C. Inland Waterway Navigation:

Rivers in the Northwest were not very serviceable. The upper stretch of the Yellow River from Chung-wei to Pao-t'ou in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was navigable, especially for

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501 a distance of about 100 kilometers around Shih-tsuei-shan, where a steamer line was opened for traffic. The passages from Lanchou northward to Chung-wei and westward to Hsining were navigable only with ox-hide or sheepskin rafts. In Shensi province, both the Wei and Han Rivers were navigable with boats (not steamers) starting from Hsing-ping and Mien-hsien respectively. In

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501 Sinkiang, on the upper stretch of the Tarim River, native boats and wooden rafts were used while the Irtych River, starting at

S 487 501 [505] Cheng-hua via Burchun crossing the Soviet border to Ozero Zaisan, was navigable from April to November. It is reported that steamers under 500 tons were able to sail along its lower course.

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D. Civil Aviation

Civil airlines were initiated in 1924, the first route running from Sian via Lanchow, Hami to Urumchi. A north branch line was created from Lanchow via Yin-chuan (Ninghsia) to Pao-t'ou with a south branch line from Sian via Han-chung and Chengtu to Chungking. After 1932, a new line was inaugurated from Shanghai via Nanking and Lanchou to Urumchi. In 1935, an aviation station was established at Tah-cheng on the Sinkiang border in accord with the Sino-Soviet civil air aviation agreement to improve postal service between the two countries. However, some of the air lines were changed during the war. The Chungking-Han-chung-Paoki line of 530 kilometers was inaugurated in January, 1945, thus eliminating Sian as a regular port of call. The 1995 kilometer Chungking-Lanchow-Chiu-chuan-Hami line resumed its run in March, 1945, by extending the original Chungking-Lanchou line to Hami by way of Chiu-chuan. (The Sian-Lanchou -Urumchi line was no longer a regular line during the war.) Thus within Free China, regular air lines were focussed at Chungking. In addition, planes might be chartered, if necessary, for places like Sian, T'ien-shui, Hsining and Ninghsia which were not stops of the regular lines. Ma Hung-k'uei, the governor of Ninghsia, in order to maintain the seclusion of his province, obstructed regular calls at Ninghsia.

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III. Communication Development under the Communist Regime

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A. Railway Building and Planning

1. T'ien-shui-Lanchou Railway: This 346 kilometer section was the extension of the Lunghai Railway which had already been in existence prior to 1949 from Lien-yün via Cheng-chou, Loyang, Sian and Paoki to T'ien-shui. Construction on the T'ien-shui-Lanchou line was begun in 1950 and completed in October, 1952. It links the Lunghai with the Lanchou-Sinkiang Railway. However, according to a Nationalist report, twenty-seven per cent of the construction work on this section had been done during 1947. Another source indicated that in August, 1947, the T'ien-shui-Lanchou section was under construction. (von Lochow, H. J., China's National Railways, p. 77.)

2. Lanchou-Sinkiang Railway: The Communist laid great stress on the project of running a line westward from Lanchou via Yü-men and Hami to Urumchi in Sinkiang for a distance of about 2800 kilometers. Construction was initiated at Lanchou on

*175 *668 496 499 648 Construction was initiated at Lanchou on Communist National Day, October 1, 1952, immediately following the completion of the T'ien-shui-Lanchou section. A Sino-Soviet agreement was concluded on October 12, 1954 which provided that the originally planned route was to be extended from Urumchi to Ho-cheng on the Sino-Soviet border to link with the Russian Turk-sib Railway at Alma Ata. Construction on the section on Chinese territory was to be undertaken by Communist China, while Russia was responsible for the construction on the section from Alma Ata to Ho-cheng. It has been reported that Russia had already finished the section on its territory in 1955.

On the Chinese side, service on the Lanchow-Wu-wei section of 303 kilometers began in February, 1954. At the end of that year, tracks had been laid as far as Chiu-pa, 347 kilometers northwest of Lanchou. On September 28, 1955, the section was extended to Chang-yeh, which, in the Kansu Corridor about 538 kilometers west of Lanchou, was the original goal for 1955. An extra 108 kilometers of tracks were laid up to a point about 100 kilometers from Yü-men by the end of 1955. A new section from Chang-yeh to Ching-shui reportedly began operating on May 1, 1956. This 138 kilometer extension made the railway serviceable for a total of 676 kilometers. It has been reported that tracklayers on this railway had pledged to extend the line to Yü-men, 800 kilometers from Lanchou, by the first of July, 1956, about one month ahead of schedule.

*668 497 Construction of this railway is of utmost significance economically and politically, as well as strategically. The Northwest still lags behind in industry, agriculture, and density of population, although it is vast in area and abundant in natural resources. When this railway is completed, trucks operating on the highways along this line can be employed to support the rail transport. The people in the region will be able to buy industrial products cheaply. Large numbers of workers and technical personnel will undoubtedly move to Kansu, Chinghai and Sinkiang, so the population will grow rapidly and new cities spring up. Furthermore, travel time between Peking and Moscow via this railway would be greatly shortened, even more so than by the newly-opened route through the Chi-ning-Ulan Bator Railway.

*668 496 499 648 *175 3. Paoki-Chengtu Railway: The Chinese Communists had long looked for a route through which it could move from Northwest to Southwest China over the high mountains. At first, they intended to build a railway linking Tien-shui on the Lunghai Railway with Chengtu, the terminus of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway. It was the route originally planned by the Nationalists but construction on it was never undertaken due to the Sino-Japanese War and later, the civil strife. However, a new project, was reportedly drawn up by Russian experts and agreed to by the Chinese, to run a line from Chengtu through Lüeh-yang in Shensi to Paoki instead

*668 of T'ien-shui. Construction on this 700 kilometer railway was
496 initiated in July, 1952, and was scheduled for completion by the
499 end of the first Five Year Plan in 1957. On January 1, 1955,
648 tracks on the southern section had been laid to Kuang-yüan, 315
*175 kilometers north of Chengtu, and rail service was officially
opened on New Year's Day, 1956, from Chengtu to Lüeh-yang,
about 170 kilometers north of Kuang-yang. Construction had been in full swing on the 215 kilometer northern section from Paoki to Lüeh-yang at the same time. Although shorter, this section was said to be a more difficult project: over 100 tunnels were cut through mountains, the longest one being more than 2.3 kilometers; the Chialing River was crossed 16 times and about 400 bridges and culverts were built. Soviet technicians planned to run electric locomotives along the Feng-hsien (in Shensi)-Paoki section in order to pull the trains through the sloping terrain of the Chin-ling Mountains.

It was reported that in March, 1956, only about 100 kilometers of tracks remained to be laid on the whole Paoki-Chengtu Railway. On the northern section, rails had passed through the Chin-ling Mountains area and continued southward. It was expected that the entire line would be connected and opened for traffic by the end of 1956.

*668 This railway, when completed, will become the trunk line to
497 link the southeast with the northwest of China. It will make possible deliveries of rice and other products of the Southeast to the Northwest and Central China, and provide cheap transportation for industrial machinery and equipment with which to tap the rich natural resources of Szechwan and its neighboring provinces.

4. Lanchou-Pao-t'ou Railway: Construction on the 1000
*668 kilometer Lanchou-Pao-t'ou Railway which would link up North-
*175 west China with the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, was started
496 in February, 1955. Work was under way on the fifty kilometer
499 section from Lanchou to Hsing-hsing-wan until the end of 1955.
When completed, it would not only facilitate the development of the iron and steel base of Pao-t'ou but also shorten the route between Peking and Moscow.

5. Lanchou-Chinghai Railway: Survey work on the Lanchou-Chinghai Railway was begun on December 23, 1955. This railway was to begin at Ho-kou on the Lanchou-Sinkiang Railway, about thirty kilometers west of Lanchou, following the Lanchou Chinghai Highway, through Hsining and along the Tsaidam basin which is rich in minerals, to Ta-e h-ting for a distance of 1500 kilometers. As reported, survey of the 176 kilometer section between Ho-kou and Huang-yüan (in Chinghai) was completed at the end of 1955, and construction was scheduled to start in the beginning of 1956. (The rest of the route was not yet decided.) The construction of this railway was aimed at opening up resources in the

*668 Tsaidam basin and developing the economy and culture of the
*175 national minorities.
496 Up to the beginning of 1956, the railway mileage in the North-
499 west region was increased to roughly 1800 kilometers from some
600 kilometers prior to 1949.

Based on the above-mentioned data, new railway construction in this region may be tabulated as follows:

Railway Construction in Northwest China
1950-1955
in kilometers

Line	length planned	date started	date completed	to 1955	Total
T'ien-shui-Lanchou	346	1950	1952	346	
Lanchou-Sinkiang a	2,800	1952	- -	646	
Paoki-Chengtu b	700	1952	1956	485	
Lanchou-Paotow	1,000	1955	- -	- -	
Lanchou-Chinghai c	1,500	1956	- -	- -	
Total				1,477[c]	3660[d]

a. To the end of 1955.
b. Of the total 485 kms. only about 100 kms were in Shensi.
c. Newly projected route
d. Based on the table of "Construction of New Railways in Chiese Mainland, 1950-1955" in Communication section of General Handbook.
e. Of the 1477 kms. about 1100 kms. were built in the Northwest region.

*668 As shown in the above table, about thirty per cent of the total
471 of new railways was built in this Northwest area. As officially
499 reported, Communist China has scheduled to spend, on transport
185 and communication projects, over 140 million taels of gold (1
tael is equal to 1, 1023 ounces) of investments totalling over 700
million taels in capital construction during the First Five Year
Plan. ("A Great Plan" People's China, August 1, 1955, pp. 5-6.)
It appears clear that a very large amount has been spent on rail-
way construction in this region, though no breakdown figure can be
located. With regard to railway building materials, the same
[397] source indicated that "after reconstruction of the factories, An-
shan alone will produce enough rolled steel to meet the needs of
the nation's locomotive-building works, shipyards and motor and
tractor works throughout the first Five Year Plan and the early
part of the second. Anshan's annual output of rails will be suf-
ficient for the laying of more than 3000 kilometers." It should
be noted that at least up to the beginning of the first Five Year
[648] Plan, most of the materials for railroad building had to be supplied
[439] by the Soviet Bloc, particularly Russia.

000 by the Soviet Bloc, particularly Russia.

*668 Manpower on railway construction is another interesting point.
499 According to Dr. Ling Hung-hsün's (veteran engineer of Free
464 China) personal survey of the present Lanchou Alma Ata line in
467 1943, population along the whole line within the border of Sinkiang
466 did not exceed 600,000; the part in Kansu was also thinly populated.
*175 In view of the shortage of laborers, especially skilled workers, among the local population, it would be necessary for the Chinese Communists to use forced labor from other areas to work in this remote region. Although no exact information concerning this is available, as reported, out of a total of 23.25 million, about 250,000 persons were forced to work in transportation projects as a whole in 1955. (Wu, Yuan-li. An Economic Survey of Com-
[701] munist China. p. 323.) The armed forces were also employed for this purpose. For example, a unit of the First Field Army contracted with the Communist Government in the spring of 1950 for the construction of the entire T'ien-shui-Lanchou Railway. According to the news reporter, Robert Guillain, the manpower resources in building the Lanchou-Sinkiang Railway consisted of the Northwest Chinese troops (as well as others) who had first "volunteered" to fight in Korea, and after being demobilized in Lanchou had again "volunteered" to remain as civilian workers. ("I Saw Communist China" The Saturday Evening Post, June 2,
[648] 1956, p. 114.) Russian experts, of course, were invited to supervise the railway construction.

B. Highways

491 In addition to the railway construction which is carried out at
499 full speed in the Northwest, highway building and renovating were
*668 greatly developed. There is not much information available con-
*175 cerning new highway construction in Shensi province. The only report available said that during 1954 over 210 kilometers of highway were repaired and 115 kilometers of new highways added, in addition to the renovation of the Han-chung-Pai-ho Highway.

In Kansu, highways radiate from Lanchou towards Chinghai, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Shensi and Szechwan. The most important highways built in 1953 were the Lanchou-Hsia-ho-A-pa (in Szechwan), Hsia-ho-Min-hsien and T'ien-shui-Chang-chia-chuan lines with a total of 630 kilometers. In 1955, over 1000 kilometers of highways were either constructed or repaired in Kansu. One from Lanchou led to the Ching-tai coal field, one ran from Lanchou to the Liu-chia Gorge where the gigantic hydro-electric resources along the Yellow River are located, and another ran from Shan-tan to the Shantan coal area. The 426 kilometer section between Tun-huang of Kansu to Shuerhkuli in Sinkiang was being renovated.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang A11

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In Chinghai Province, three short lines were completed by January, 1954, namely the renovated Lao-ya-hsia sector of the Kansu-Chinghai Highway (Lanchow-Hsi-ning Highway), the sector south of La-chi-shan on the Hsi-ning Kuei-teh Highway originally planned by the Nationalist Government, and the new Hsün-hua-Tung-jen Highway, with a total of 360 kilometers. Among the publicized trunk lines, the most notable one was the 2100 kilometer Hsi-ning-Lhasa Highway. The first part of this line was constructed along the old Chinghai-Sinkiang route, and was originally built by the Mohammedan leader Ma Pu-fang during 1946-1948 (from Sining to Chin-hung-shan), from Hsining to Gormo along the southern edge of the Tsaidam basin, then the highway turning south via Ku-ku-shih-li reached Chi-ting-si-lin, the common point of Chinghai, Sikang (now part of Szechwan) and Tibet, and thence leading to Lhasa in Tibet. The complete Hsi-ning-Lhasa Highway was opened to traffic on November 16, 1954. It linked with highways radiating northwest to Sinkiang and east to Lanchou, and met Sikang-Tibet Highway at Lhasa to keep close contact with the Southwestern provinces. Of the old roads, there was the Chinghai-Sinkiang Highway (Hsi-ning-Chin-hung-shan Highway) which was damaged before 1949, the Hsi-ning-Gormo section of about 800 kilometers which was restored in 1954 as part of the Hsi-ning-Lhasa Highway, and the rest repaired in May of 1955. Along the old Hsi-ning-Sikang route construction began in early May of 1955 on the Hsi-ning-Kuolo Highway of 627 kilometers leading to the Kuolo Tibetan National Autonomous District. Consisting of sections of the Hsi-ning-Hua-shih-hsia (424 kms.) and Hua-shih-hsia-Chi-mai (203 kms.), the Hsi-ning-Kuolo line was completed in November, 1955. The completion of these highways further facilitated the interflow of supplies between the agricultural and pastoral areas and supported the economic construction of the national minorities.

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In Sinkiang, the traditional arterial highways were centered at Urumchi. To the south, one highway at Kurle was divided into two branches and met again in the west at Kashgar to form a circle link around the Taklamakan desert; to the east the highway led through Turfan, Hami toward Lanchou; to the north, a line ran along the Manas River to Sharasume (Cheng-hua); and to the west there were two highways stretching to the Sino-Soviet border, one to Ho-cheng and the other to Ta-cheng. Along the Old Silk Road, from No-chiang, one highway was extended eastward to Tun-huang in Kansu. There were three highways connecting Urumchi with Russia through Ta-cheng, Hocheng, and Kashgar, to link with the Soviet-Turksib Railway stations at Ayaguz, Ilisk, and Andizhan respectively.

C. Civil Aviation

*668 The Chinese Communist Civil Aviation Company, which until
509 the end of 1955 was a Sino-Soviet jointly-owned corporation and
[473] was still entirely adjusted to the Russian system, raised its
[648] service from two to four trips a week from Lanchou via Chiu-
*[175] chuan, Hami to Urumchi. There was another flight twice a week, continuing the route from Lanchou to Sian where two sub-lines existed, one to Peking and the other southbound to Chungking. A third flight, also twice a week, connected Urumchi with Alma Ata through Ili by the Sino-Soviet international route; and the fourth was running inside Sinkiang from Urumchi via Kucha, Aksu to Kashgar.

IV. Conclusion

*668 The influential role which the development of transportation
489 and communications can play in the creation of a favorable climate
433 for sustained national economic growth, needs no elaboration. The Northwest which contains many of China's untapped mineral resources, and where the potential of agricultural development is fairly high, is a region where the man-resource ratio is low and the long-run economic potential is promising, provided it is linked with the populous regions of China and the outside world by better transport and a modern system of communications.

Transportation and communications development in Northwest
*668 China used to lag far behind the other regions as did its agricul-
489 ture and industry. After the establishment of the Communist
499 regime, transportation construction activities in this area have
178 increased greatly in the form of railway and highway construction. Of the total railway construction in Red China from 1950 to 1955, newly-built roads in the Northwest amounted to thirty per cent. Meanwhile the Lanchou-Sinkiang Railway, Lanchou-Pao-t'ou Railway and Chengtu-Paoki Railway were still under way and the Lanchou-Chinghai Railway was projected for 1956.

Highways were constructed or renovated mostly along the old
*668 routes already in existence prior to 1949, some of which might
491 not have been motor roads. Among them the most notable ones
648 were the Hsi-ning-Tibet Highway, Sian-Lanchou-Urumchi Highway, Ansi-Tun-huang-No-chiang-Ho-tien-Kashgar Highway and the Hsi-ning-Chin-hung-shan-No-chiang-Kashgar Highway. Three international highways starting at Urumchi across the Sino-Soviet border linked up with the stations on the Soviet Turksib Railways.
*668 Air transportation was to be established to strengthen the Sino-
648 Soviet relationship from Peking to Moscow via Sian, Lanchou, and
509 Urumchi.

It is true that Chinese Communists had devoted much attention
*668 to construction in the Northwest area, especially in the phase of
489 transportation and communication. Aside from their shrewdness
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*668 in understanding the long-run economic potential of this region,
489 it is equally true that there must have been some other reasons
433 forcing them to develop this remote region more swiftly than they
might otherwise have done, investing in it sizable amounts of much
needed capital backed by considerable forced labor. Other factors,
both internal and external, should therefore be taken into consideration. In the first place, Communist China had made a tremendous
effort to shift the center of its gravity from the coastal regions
into these relatively empty lands bordering Soviet central Asia,
perhaps partly as a result of the United Nations embargo and the
Korean War. Secondly, the forced pace of development in the
Northwest might be partly a defense measure. During the War
in Korea it became clear how vulnerable Manchuria was to bombing attacks. Had the United Nations chosen to do so, most of
Manchuria's industrial complexes could have been destroyed.
N But in the Northwest, factories, railways and mines were far
safer than anywhere else in China. Moreover, this area would
[648] assure maximum secrecy for projects which Red China and Russia
were reported to have been jointly undertaking. ("I Saw Communist China" by Robert Guillain in the Saturday Evening Post, June
N 2, 1956. p. 114.)

*668 Following on the heels of the railway construction work, a
433 huge oil refinery at Lanchou was built. It is also reported that
[382] between Lanchou and the site of the refinery, a road was constructed more than twice as wide as Fifth Avenue in New York
[491] city, and a large hill thickly covered with houses was completely
N leveled to make the road straight. At Lanchou the railway yard
[498] under construction contained fifty kms. of tracks, with modern
equipment such as turntables, grain silos, refrigerating plants
and the like, all brought from Russia. Along the wide road, the
beginning of what is called New Lanchou has arisen. In Sinkiang,
S a new city was born in Urumchi, where giant factories have been
668 built, including the Sinkiang Non-ferrous Metals Co., the Sin-
433 kiang Petroleum Co., the Sinkiang "August 1st" Iron and Steel
327 Plant, the Sinkiang Machinery Plant, the October Motor Car
328 Repair and Assembly Shop, the Urumchi Automatic Electric Plant,
382 and the like. This accomplishment in industrial construction and
39 future plans of industrial development are indeed very much tied
[489] up with communications development.

N Communist China may very well focus its principal attention
*668 on the Northwest during the period of its second Five Year Plan
185 scheduled to begin in 1958, just as the first Five Year Plan con-
433 centrated on the Northeast. The Northwest might then play a
major role in the economic relations between China and Russia,
[648] and be industrialized to a level comparable with Manchuria.

It may therefore be concluded that so long as there are both internal and external pressures, and the "lean-to-one-side"

*668 policy is enforced, further economic exploitation and construction
185 may be carried out, and more rapid and deliberate development of
433 communications may be forthcoming in this remote northwest area.

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AI1



NORTHWESTERN CHINA
TRANSPORTATION
Railroad
Planned railroad
Highway
Air line
CHINA
ALMA ATA
URUMCHI
TURFAN
KASHGAR
APPROXIMATE COURSE OF THE HIGHWAY TO SINKIANG
PAOTOW
LANCHOW
TO CHENGTU
100 50 0 100 200 300 400 MI.
200 100 0 200 400 600 KM.
70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 115
75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110
45 40 35 30

[following page 704]

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[For additional information on the general cultural history of Northwest China up to 1956, see category 116, the following pages: map following p. 25, 26-29, 33-47, 73, 77-79, 113, 152-154, 158, 181, 236-237, 291, 296, 301, 306-310, 437, 465-469, 475, 484, 486, 488-524, 533, 540-545, 560, 569-570, 648, 654-658, 668-669, 671-672, 678-681, 687-690, and 692-702.]

[For additional information on the communist party in Northwest China prior to 1956, its aims, objectives, programs and the way in which these programs were implemented, see category 116, pp. 73, 158, 180, 235, 296-298, 312-320, 351-356, 358-361, 365-377, 379-381, 397-399, 408-409, 422-423, 434, 437, 441-442, 447-448, 450-452, 454-455, 459-460, 465-477, 480-482, 484,486, 488-510, 513-524, 535-545, 560, 569, 571-578, 581-596, 598-608, 611-612, 615, 618-619, 624-626, 629-632, 636, 648, 650-652, 654-665, 671-672, 675-676, 685-690, and 696-704.]

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Northwest China AF13
Sinkiang AF1

[For information on the cadres - groups of especially-trained communist party officials employed in cooperatives and collectivization programs to train others in party programs - see category 668.]

563

[For information on the various ethnic groups in Northwest China, see category 116, the following pages: map following p. 140, 152-158, 177-180, 192-195, 199-211, 223-229, 235-238, 243, 258-275, 291-296, 301-302, 304-309, 316, 319-320, 358-359, 391-396, 421-424, 429, 432-434, 459-460, 475-476, 480-482, 484-485, 499-502, 504-505, 508-510, 516-517, 521, 524, 541, 543-544, 569-570, 574, 584-588, 630 and 689.]

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Northwest China AF13
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[For information on the cadres - groups of especially-trained communist party officials employed in cooperatives and collectivization programs to train others in party programs - see category 668.]